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1 Introduction
In the Alexander Gardens in Moscow, next to the Kremlin walls, stands a
granite memorial obelisk. It was erected in 1914 to commemorate the 300th
anniversary of the Romanov dynasty, but its intended eternal endurance
proved short-lived. In 1918, as the Civil War raged across the territory of the
former Russian Empire, the obelisk received a makeover. It was refashioned
to correspond to the idols of the ﬂedgling socialist state: the Imperial double-
headed eagle at its crown was removed, and the inscribed names of the
Romanov tsars were replaced with those of socialist revolutionaries and phi-
losophers. Then, in 1966, it was relocated to the centre of the gardens to
make room for the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier – a symbolic aﬃrmation of
the then emerging myth of the Soviet victory in the Second World War. And
thus the obelisk stood, as the politically and socially revered idols of the
Soviet state ceased to be worshipped and eventually that very state ceased to
exist. By then, the names inscribed on the obelisk sounded foreign to the
average person’s ear; indeed, many belonged to Western European thinkers
and proponents of the socialist cause.1
On the occasion of the 400th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty in
2013 – a manifestly artiﬁcial anniversary that was nonetheless extensively
marked – the obelisk was restored to its original state.2 On 4 November,
the Day of National Unity, the monument was unveiled and blessed by the
patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill (Gundiaev). In his speech,
the patriarch emphasised the symbolic signiﬁcance of the restoration for
the consolidation of national unity and, by extension, the future existence
of the Russian state:
We cannot live divorced from our history, we cannot think that our state
is little more than 80 years old or, as is sometimes said, little more than
20 years. We are heirs to a thousand-year history, and if we acknowl-
edge this linkage to history, to times past, if we acknowledge our con-
nection with the heroes of the past, then we are imbued with national
consciousness and a sense of dignity, without which a nation [narod]
cannot exist.
(Samsonova 2013)
A similar sentiment was expressed by Sergei Ivanov, chief of staﬀ of the pre-
sidential administration. He commented: ‘In commemorating this date today,
and in unveiling this stele, we pay tribute to the Romanov dynasty and return
to our roots … . It is the continuity of history’ (Mel’nikov & Mal’tsev 2013).
The history of the obelisk and the signiﬁcance attributed to its restoration
in the statements quoted here is one of countless examples of how, in con-
temporary Russia, the state has sought to turn the past into a powerful sym-
bolic resource. In the period since Vladimir Putin ﬁrst became president in
2000, the Russian central government has increasingly actively engaged in
such memory politics3: employing cultural memory to claim the political
legitimacy of those in power, as well as discredit all forms of political oppo-
sition (e.g. Laruelle 2009; Miller 2012; Sherlock 2007; Sherlock 2011; Váz-
quez Liñán 2010). The rhetorical use of the past has since become a deﬁning
characteristic of Russian politics.4 The government’s strategy of memory poli-
tics has aimed to create a continuous narrative of a Great Russia (velikaia
Rossiia) that has been under constant threat from domestic and foreign ene-
mies. Drawing upon both the recent and distant past, it aimed to create a his-
torical foundation for the regime’s emphasis on a strong state and centralised
leadership. The Soviet past has become an integral part of this overarching
narrative, in which the Putin era is presented as the logical next episode.
Memory politics beyond the Kremlin walls
Yet the Russian government is not the only one who has used cultural
memory to spread its ideas about how the Russian state ‘traditionally’ should
be governed. Various societal, cultural and religious groups and organisations
have put forward their own historically framed visions on Russian statehood.
This book examines this societal dynamics of memory politics in con-
temporary Russia in the period 2000–2012. I analyse a wide range of actors,
from the central government and the Russian Orthodox Church we already
came across above, to ﬁlmmaker and cultural heavyweight Nikita Mikhalkov
and radical thinkers such as Aleksandr Dugin. In addition, in view of the
steady decline in media freedom since 2000 (Hutchings & Tolz 2015), I criti-
cally examine the role of cinema and television in shaping and spreading
these narratives. Thus, this book aims to, on the one hand, gain a better
understanding of the various means through which the Russian government
practises its memory politics (e.g. the role of state-aligned media) and, on the
other hand, suﬃciently value the existence of alternative and critical voices
that existing studies tend to overlook.
In this book I aim to answer the following set of interrelated research
questions:
1 In what way have various actors in Russian society, as well as the state,
mobilised cultural memory to legitimise, question or challenge the
political regime?
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2 Which cultural memories have been employed, by whom and to what
end?
3 How have these actors drawn upon existing interpretations and repre-
sentations of the respective cultural memories to shape their contributions
to the debate on history and political legitimacy?
The way that scholars typically approach Russian memory politics – that is,
through analysis of how the state employs references to history to support its
legitimacy and frame its political course – suggests that the state is a proactive
and dominant player in these ‘memory games’ (Mink & Neumayer 2013).
These studies allow the impression to persist that there has been no societal,
political or cultural resistance to the regime’s claims. However, in every
society, state and non-state actors at various levels contest with one another
in eﬀorts to provide that society with meaning in the present through repre-
sentations of the past, and thus, with guidance to determine its political and
ideological orientation towards the future. The same applies to twenty-ﬁrst-
century Russia. The state does not act in isolation. It is part of a complex
socio-political process of negotiating the contemporary meaning of history
and the political implications resulting from that meaning. The role played by
non-state actors at the national level, both as accomplices in and as oppo-
nents to oﬃcial memory politics, has thus far been insuﬃciently addressed.
The diﬀerentiation between state and non-state actors in today’s Russia is
notoriously murky: within the intricate maze of interactions between state
oﬃcials, state-sponsored and ‘state-aligned’ persons and organisations, draw-
ing a deﬁnite line between these two spheres is a near impossible task. In my
usage of the terms, state actor should therefore be understood in its most
concrete sense as referring to the actions and statements of the Russian gov-
ernment, state oﬃcials and so on. Non-state actor, then, refers to the grey
zone beyond the state’s oﬃcial structures and ranges from the ‘state-loyal’ to
the outspokenly oppositional. It is the complexity of this grey zone and its
manifold connections to and interactions with the state that I aim to explore.
In view of the decline since 2000 in the freedom granted to the media –
including television (Hutchings & Rulyova 2009; Hutchings & Tolz 2015) – it
is imperative to also examine how memory politics extends into the domain
of mass media and popular culture. It is here, in television and cinema, that
state eﬀorts to control public opinion are most pronounced; they have been
much less stringent, for instance, in relation to literature. To avoid over-
simplifying the means through which (authoritarian) political regimes med-
iate their views, it is essential to critically examine cultural productions about
history aimed at a mass audience. To gain strength, an interpretation of his-
tory has to be mediated at multiple levels of society. It is precisely the inter-
play between these levels, oﬃcial and unoﬃcial, that inﬂuences the potential
eﬀect of government-supported cultural memories. In this study I seek to
address these gaps. My analysis covers the years 2000 through 2012, a turning
point after which the state’s memory politics changed substantially (as I will
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elaborate on shortly), and refers to earlier and subsequent developments
wherever relevant.
To accommodate the inclusion of non-governmental actors and the sphere
of popular culture, I develop an alternative approach to memory politics.
Here, I deﬁne the latter concept as the mobilisation of cultural memory to put
forward political claims and, in particular, to propagate historically informed
visions of what constitutes ‘traditional Russian’ state governance. Memory
politics is thus conceived as not just a political but also a social process of
negotiating the meaning of the past – a process in which the state, one must
add, has a disproportionately large stake. I seek to move away from static
conceptualisations of memory politics – such as those guiding studies that
chronicle acts of memory politics and explain their meanings – towards a
dynamic model: a conceptualisation that includes other societal and cultural
actors operating at the national level and that can shed light on the dynamic
development of memory politics over time and across the political and socio-
cultural spectrum. I oﬀer an alternative approach that, looking beyond the
Russian state’s apparent hegemony on memory in the public domain, can
uncover divergent or competing voices in the national public discourse.
On the basis of four extensive thematic case studies and one smaller case
study, I demonstrate, ﬁrst, how the state has relied on memories with rich
histories of cultural representation and political instrumentalisation to por-
tray itself as traditional. Yet the accumulated meanings of these constellations
of memory greatly increase their subversive potential by providing access
points for the formulation of a historically framed political critique. Second, I
argue that non-state actors have played a highly signiﬁcant role in memory
politics during this period. Moreover, the behaviour of the government in this
respect should in some cases be characterised as reactive rather than proactive
and shows clear signs of continuous re-evaluation and adaptation.
The history of the memorial obelisk and the framing of its recent renova-
tion exemplify the three aspects of contemporary Russian memory politics
that are central to my argument in this study. The ﬁrst aspect is the emphasis
on the continuity of Russian history. In direct response to the deﬁnite break
with the past favoured by Boris Yeltsin’s regime during the 1990s, to which I
will return shortly, Putin’s memory politics in the new millennium has sought
to reintegrate the Russian Federation into an extended historical narrative.
Second, the memorial obelisk illustrates the palimpsestic layering of this
memory politics – how contemporary memory culture (implicitly and expli-
citly) engages with and builds upon previous symbolic practices and their
visual, narrative and material traces. In this particular case, the act of
restoration was actually presented as an ‘un-layering’ of memory, as a cor-
rection of the (supposedly unrighteous) Soviet appropriation of the monu-
ment. In the words of Patriarch Kirill, by restoring the names of the Russian
tsars to the obelisk, ‘the most historically unjust action [was] corrected’
(Samsonova 2013). The patriarch’s phrasing brings me to the third aspect,
namely that, in contemporary Russia, memory politics goes beyond claiming
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the existence of a state-oriented tradition to legitimise the current political
regime. It is equally preoccupied with reclaiming lost traditions of remem-
brance. By framing essentially new symbolic acts as the continuation of
commemorative practices that were forcibly abolished in Soviet and post-
Soviet times, the state pretends to undo past damages rather than impose its
own memory regime.
Two important media domains fall beyond the scope of my investigation.
With regard to television, I have chosen to exclude television journalism.
Journalistic coverage of historical topics, for instance concerning exhibits or
special events, or around commemorative dates, is controlled from the top
down to a fairly large extent. Therefore, I only note when coverage deviates in
important ways from the state-supported narrative. Moreover, the relation
between the Kremlin and national media outlets during this period is exten-
sively covered in the literature (e.g. Oates 2006; Arutunyan 2009; Beumers et
al. 2009; Hutchings & Rulyova 2009; Burrett 2011; Schimpfossl & Yablokov
2014; Hutchings & Tolz 2015). The role of non-journalistic television in
memory politics, such as the television series and documentaries analysed in
this study, has largely been neglected. Yet these programmes’ characteristics –
their longer playing time, which allows for the development of an argument,
their rich associations of genre, their extensive use of stylistic devices and an
emotionally persuasive soundtrack to support particular interpretations of
historical events, and so on – make them particularly adept at creating lasting
memory images. At the same time, these precise characteristics can introduce
ambiguities and make it diﬃcult to control the exact meaning of their mes-
sages. This merits in-depth examination. Second, my analysis of online
memory discourses is limited. I use online forums to (retrospectively) assess
audience reception of the cinema and TV productions that I am analysing.
Yet since my research is focused on the competition between the state and the
various non-state actors that operate at the national level – the political and
cultural elite, if you will – rather than with local or grassroots developments,
a comprehensive examination of these online memory discourses lies beyond
the scope of this study.
In what follows I will ﬁrst sketch the development of memory politics as
the Russian state has practised it since 1991. This brief discussion of the main
trends in governmental policy serves as a necessary introduction and back-
ground to the multi-actor analyses in the case studies. Then, I will summarise
the most important trends in historical programming for both the big and
small screens, as well as key developments in state policy regarding television
and ﬁlm production. The ﬁnal section describes this study’s methodology and
outlines the book’s structure.
Governmental memory politics in post-Soviet Russia
The dissolution of the Soviet Union made suddenly obsolete the Communist
meta-narrative that had previously guided all aspects of political, economic,
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cultural and personal life. State collapse created a rupture between the Soviet
past and the still unknown path to the future. The historic events that the
population had commemorated and the Soviet myths that had guided their
interpretation of the world and themselves were rejected, but the search for
viable substitutes proved a complicated process. For many Russians, their
newly acquired democratic freedoms were scant consolation for the loss of
state-sponsored services, overall stability and societal solidarity. Having lost
its Soviet empire, Russia found itself still at the beginning of the process of
building a nation. That the Communist meta-narrative was essentially a his-
torical narrative, based on the assumption that communism was the ﬁnal
stage of historical development, intensiﬁed the cultural impact of its being
disavowed (Yurchak 2006). The loss of Communist teleology occasioned an
acute search ‘for its substitute, for another convincing plot of Russian devel-
opment that will help make sense of the chaotic present’ (Boym 2001: 59).
During the 1990s, political and cultural elites proved unable to ﬁll this void
with new coherent narratives of national identity (Tolz 2001; Smith 2002).
The regime of Yeltsin, in fact, based its political legitimacy on historical dis-
continuity by rejecting the Soviet period in its entirety. With a lack of histor-
ical examples to draw on (the autocratic tradition represented by tsarist
Russia was thought to be as unsuitable as Soviet communism), the govern-
ment framed the extensive reforms of the 1990s within a narrative of Western
ideals of capitalism and democracy.
Only in response to the increasing popularity of the Communist Party of
the Russian Federation, which actively mobilised the Soviet past in its cam-
paigns, did the state reluctantly become involved in memory politics. The 50th
anniversary of the victory in World War II was publicly commemorated in
1995, albeit modestly in comparison to similar celebrations staged more
recently.5 Following Yeltsin’s re-election in 1996, the government took more
concrete steps. Acknowledging that social cohesion needed a ‘national idea’
to compensate for a lack of ideology, the government established a commis-
sion to formulate an ‘idea for Russia’. The initiative, which was unable to
produce a viable result, is indicative of the overall failure of the state to
coherently and eﬀectively engage history to its advantage (Smith 2002: 178).
As Kathleen Smith notes, ‘toward the end of his second term […] Yeltsin
wanted to promote stability and reconciliation, but without encouraging his-
torical amnesia’ (idem: 179). His successor, Vladimir Putin, held on to the
former of these elements, but took a far more permissive stance towards the
latter. Cherry-picking his way through recent and distant history alike, he set
as the main goal of governmental memory politics the restoration of national
pride. Tapping into, on the one hand, persistent popular sentiments of
uncertainty and national inferiority (Oushakine 2009) and, on the other,
increasing nostalgic tendencies with regard to both Soviet and imperial pasts,
the regime now showed itself to be acutely aware of the political usefulness of
historical symbolism. Within Putin’s ﬁrst year in oﬃce, he settled all the
major disputes over state symbolism, which had dragged on for most of the
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1990s. Most signiﬁcantly, the Soviet national anthem was reinstated. Its new
lyrics were written by Sergei Mikhalkov, who also composed the original lines
dating to the 1940s, as well as their de-Stalinised version from the 1970s. This
symbolic act set the tone: rather than harking back to one particular period
in history, the various and seemingly incompatible stages of the development
of Russian statehood – tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet – were reconceived as
integral parts of its history. As Marlène Laruelle rightly points out,
[w]hile the desire to regain the geopolitical power lost in 1991 is obvious,
these symbols have not been restored purely and simply for their ideolo-
gical value – communism itself has not been rehabilitated – but because
they are part of a cultural background common to the entire population
and are seen as an indication of normalcy.
(Laruelle 2009: 155)
In other words, the recognisability of the constitutive elements of state sym-
bolism is key.
Memory politics intensiﬁed especially around 2005 (Horvath 2013; Miller
2012). This was part of the state’s response to the colour revolutions that
ended in several regime changes in and beyond the post-Soviet region,
including in neighbouring Georgia and Ukraine. The Kremlin took notice as
a wave of peaceful protest swept across the former Soviet space and, fearing
that something similar would happen in Russia, responded accordingly. It
initiated a ‘preventive counter-revolution’ that repressed societal groups
that could potentially form a support base for revolution (most notably, non-
governmental organisations) and, at the same time, engaged in proactive
mobilisation – for instance, by means of patriotically oriented youth move-
ments (Horvath 2013: 5–7).6 The campaign’s ideological underpinning was
the idea that ‘Russia’s sovereignty was menaced by Western eﬀorts to foment
a revolution and impose ‘external rule’’ (idem: 6). In this narrative, opposi-
tion groups were branded as cat’s paws of foreign forces seeking to undermine
and destroy the Russian state. The intensity of this wave of oﬃcial memory
politics peaked between 2007 and 2010. Among other measures, the govern-
ment supported the 2007 textbook History of Russia: 1945–2006 written by
Aleksandr Danilov and Aleksandr Filippov, which caused an international
scandal for referring to Stalin as an ‘eﬀective manager’, and, in 2009, Med-
vedev signed a decree to set up a Presidential Commission to Counter
Attempts to Falsify History (Miller 2012; Sherlock 2016). This commission
was dissolved in early 2012. During this period, conﬂicts concerning the
interpretation of history regularly ﬂared up between Russia and neighbouring
countries in Eastern Europe.7
Nikolay Koposov correctly points out that, as relations with the West
improved, ‘aggressive memory politics [became] inappropriate’ (Koposov
2011b). President Medvedev now ‘unambiguously condemned Stalin’s crimes,
declared the memory of the repressions to be as “sacred” as that of the heroic
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exploits during the Second World War, and attempted to liberate the story of
the war from the taint of neo-Stalinism’ (ibid.). The repositioning with regard
to Stalin did not mean, however, that there was an abandonment of memory
politics. Quite the contrary. The 2010 Victory Day Parade in Moscow, mark-
ing the 65th anniversary of the end of World War II, was the largest parade
held in Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. While the format of
the parade changes somewhat from year to year,8 it has since retained its
symbolic importance as (one of) the principle patriotic events of the year
(Lutz-Auras 2012; Malinova 2017). In addition, with several convenient
memorial dates to draw from in 2012 and signs of brewing societal unrest
becoming ever more evident, the Kremlin again turned to history to underpin
its legitimacy, as I will address in chapters 3 and 5.
Although this study covers the years 2000–2012, it should be emphasised
that the intensity of memory politics has not abated since then. On the con-
trary, the state has stepped up its mobilisation of history, in particular the
memory of the Second World War, in the context of the conﬂict in Ukraine.
Putin’s return to the presidential oﬃce in 2012 also signalled a shift towards a
more ethnonationalist interpretation of Russian national identity. The Rus-
sian government started to ‘deliberately blur the boundaries between the civic
rossiiskii and the ethnic russkii identities. The civic identity has become more
explicitly Russian, with the Kremlin holding up the Russian language, culture
and traditional values as the core of this identity’ (Blakkisrud 2016: 267. Ita-
lics in original). This marked departure in the state’s identity politics and
mobilisation of memory substantiates my decision to view the start of Putin’s
third presidential term as a turning point in the development of memory
politics and to limit my analysis to the years 2000–2012.
If we look more closely at which narrative frameworks have been
employed, it becomes clear that a variety of historical references have been
used to demonstrate both the historical necessity and the traditionally Rus-
sian character of what has come to be known as ‘managed democracy’, the
‘vertical of power’, and so on. To some extent, politically useful cultural
memories have been employed interchangeably; diﬀerent historical images or
narrative frameworks were employed to deliver more or less the same political
message. Still, as will become clear from the case studies (in particular, those
of chapters 3 and 5), one can discern signiﬁcant shifts in preference for certain
cultural memories. Moreover, the state’s use of history can be categorised
according to two (at times interconnected) core ideas. The ﬁrst constellation
of narratives aimed to promote the concept that, under the new president,
political order and stability had been restored following a period of intense poli-
tical, economic, social and spiritual turmoil. The promise of (continued) eco-
nomic prosperity and the return of Russia as a great power in the international
arena complemented this narrative of Russia’s rebirth from its ashes.
A second group of narratives established a lineage of ‘great Russian refor-
mers’. This lineage includes familiar faces such as Peter the Great and Alek-
sandr II, but also newcomers such as the prerevolutionary prime minister Petr
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Stolypin (see chapter 3). Connected to the latter trend is the much wider
debate concerning ‘Russian’ models for modernisation. The paradoxical cen-
tral claim of the state’s memory politics can thus be summarised as moder-
nisation through restoration and preservation. Despite the apparent simplicity
and appeal of such an aim, it is by no means self-evident what it actually
means to reform and modernise the state in a way true to Russia’s ‘natural’
predisposition to a certain type of governance. However much the Kremlin
would prefer it to be otherwise, it has not been the only one to put forward its
views on how Russia can be modernised ‘in a Russian way’. Competing views
abound, albeit with diﬀering measures of sophistication, leverage and general
political and societal impact (see chapter 4 and, in particular, chapter 6).
The understandings of the development of Russian history underlying oﬃ-
cial memory politics on the one hand and oppositional narratives about the
(predestined) nature of governance in Russia on the other are predicated on
diﬀerent dichotomies. While the state interprets the dramatic turns in history
to be alternations of periods of chaos and order, its opponents view them as
cycles of relative freedom (e.g. the Thaw, Perestroika) and repression (e.g.
Stalinism, Stagnation and, by extension, ‘Putinism’).9 The tension resulting
from these diametrically opposed interpretations of historical development
lies at the heart of the debates I discuss in the case studies: order and repres-
sion appear to be two sides of the same coin. The fragile balance between the
two is what is at stake in virtually all discussions about current and future
Russian politics.
History on the small and big screens
As was already noted, from the beginning of Putin’s ﬁrst presidential term,
the state has steadily expanded its control over the media (Beumers et al.
2009; Hutchings & Tolz 2015). While journalism remains the primary target
of such restrictive measures, historical ﬁction and nonﬁction have also been
aﬀected as the state’s eﬀorts to promote patriotism have intensiﬁed. Indeed, as
Stephen Hutchings and Vera Tolz argue,
One of the Kremlin’s key motivations for imposing its grip on television
broadcasting was to promote its own vision of a powerful Russian state
with a unity of patriotic purpose and an enviable cultural history spanning
the imperial and the Soviet periods.
(Hutchings & Tolz 2015: 73)
The reason why television in particular was chosen to serve ‘as the propa-
ganda tool of a powerful, centralizing state’ (idem: 73) is self-evident: for an
overwhelming majority of Russians, television continues to be the main
source of information. According to polls conducted by the Levada Centre,
71 per cent of respondents listed state TV channels as their primary news
source in 2012, while an additional 7 per cent relied on private TV channels,
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including NTV, a channel loyal to the state (Levada Centre 2015: 123).10
When respondents were permitted to mention multiple sources of informa-
tion, the percentage is even higher: 94 per cent mentioned television among
their primary sources in 2009 (Levada Centre 2016: 166). This ﬁgure has since
decreased somewhat yet remains high at 86 per cent in December 2016
(Volkov & Goncharov 2017). During the period covered by this study, the
inﬂuence of the Internet was still limited. In 2011, only 6 per cent of respon-
dents listed the internet as their primary source of information, a share that
increased to 15 per cent by 2012 (Levada Centre 2015: 123). Although state
eﬀorts to inﬂuence ﬁlm production have long tended to be more covert and
indirect, a marked tendency towards establishing far-reaching control over the
industry can be observed (I will return to this point shortly).
State-aligned TV channels and the Russian ﬁlm industry have been proliﬁc
suppliers of historical narratives.11 Driven by the popularity of historically
themed productions with the Russian audience, this development was facili-
tated by increasing budgets – in part attributable to advertising revenue – and
the rapid professionalisation of the industry. Various formats and genres have
been used to delve into the Russian past: from blockbusters and art house
ﬁlms, documentaries and docudramas to TV series, documentary series and
talk shows. While a signiﬁcant portion of these productions concern the
Soviet period, other periods of Russian history have been far from neglected.
With regard to television, the genre of the historical documentary series
deserves speciﬁc mention. Some of these series ran for several years. Histor-
ical Chronicles with Nikolai Svanidze (Istoricheskie khroniki c Nikolaem Sva-
nidze, 2003–2013), for instance, was broadcast by the Rossiia channel for over
a decade. Each episode was dedicated to one year in Russian history, covering
the years 1900–1993. The historical investigation series The Searchers (Iska-
teli) has been running weekly episodes on the Kul’tura channel since 2010.
Until he was dismissed from NTV, the journalist Leonid Parfenov produced a
popular and inﬂuential documentary series called The Other Day 1961–2003:
Our Era (Namedni 1961–2003: Nasha era, 1997–2003). Finally, the historical
talk shows The Trial of Time (Sud vremeni, 2010) and its successor The His-
torical Trial (Istoricheskii protsess, 2011–2012) were as controversial as they
were popular (and, for that reason, will be discussed in chapter 6 and, as a
case in their own right, chapter 7).
Opinion polls conducted by the Levada Centre give us insights into the
popularity of the diﬀerent genres of history television and ﬁlm in the years
2000–2012, and their potential impact on popular opinion. Respondents were
asked what types of shows they watched ‘often/most often’. Comparing the
results from, respectively, 2002 and 2011, 81 (61) per cent of Russian viewers
often watched TV ﬁlms;12 68 (37) per cent regularly tuned into Russian-
produced TV series; and 24 (14) per cent of viewers frequently watched shows
about history (Levada Centre 2012: 262).13 Among the Russian TV series,
historical topics were quite popular: in 2011, 17 per cent of respondents
enjoyed watching ‘historical/historical-action/costume melodrama’, 15 per
10 Introduction
cent regularly watched melodramas set in the recent Soviet past, while
another 12 per cent turned on their televisions for historical series about
Russian history, historical events and personalities. TV series set in the past
were still surpassed in popularity, though, by police detective shows (32%),
contemporary melodramas (21%) and criminal dramas (20%) (Levada Centre
2012: 264). Regarding ﬁlm, in 2009 and 2011 respectively, 20 (21) per cent of
respondents indicated a preference for historical and costume ﬁlms, 9 (7) per
cent enjoyed ﬁlms about heroes and important individuals, while 9 (10) per
cent indicated that they watched scholarly/educational ﬁlms about history,
culture or art. By comparison, 35 (36) per cent of respondents expressed their
liking for detective movies and action ﬁlms, 32 (34) per cent for romantic
ﬁlms or melodramas, while 37 (33) per cent mentioned comedy among their
favourites (Levada Centre 2012: 252).
The ways the state has tried to promote the output of historical ﬁlm and
television productions, as well as to inﬂuence the particular interpretations of
the historical events they depict, roughly fall into two categories: measures
aimed to stimulate and measures aimed to restrict. For both strategies, con-
trolling the ﬂow of funds is the most evident and eﬃcient means to achieve
their aims. Yet changes to the institutional conditions of production (e.g.
measures that impact distribution and broadcasting) can also greatly inﬂuence
the types of projects that make it onto the big screen. Jasmijn van Gorp has
analysed the correlation between the government’s ﬁlm policy, which includes
state subsidies, and the production of ‘national’ ﬁlms – that is, ﬁlms that
contribute to nation-building – between 1991 and 2005 (Van Gorp 2011). She
demonstrates that in the period 2000–2005, the state actively tried to stimu-
late the production of such national ﬁlms through a ﬁve-year plan issued by
the Ministry of Culture. On occasion, the ministry organised competitions to
solicit ﬁlms on particular topics (a type of goszakaz). Van Gorp argues that
these measures were eﬀective primarily through how they inﬂuenced ﬁlm-
makers’ ‘common sense’. Provided with an economic incentive, they were
tempted to make ﬁlms that would satisfy the ministry’s criteria and therefore
be eligible for state support. Paradoxically, the direct calls did not always
result in the actual production of a ﬁlm. For example, as Van Gorp illustrates,
while during the years 2001–2005, 11 ﬁlms were produced about the Second
World War (of which seven received state support), an advertised commission
for a ﬁlm on the same topic in 2004 failed to produce a result. The availability
of state funding, she concludes, therefore appears to have worked as an
indirect system of state commission.
The voluntary pragmatic conformity to governmental preferences identiﬁed
by Van Gorp persisted after 2005 and indicates how state control over ﬁlm
production during these years can be diﬃcult to prove. Indeed, as Greg
Dolgopolov asserts,
[a]lthough the attraction of conspiracy theories is undeniable, it would be
wrong to consider that all these positive subjects are ‘ordered’ from the
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top as the outcomes tend to be authorially messy and ‘dirty’. […] Putin-
era cinema and television drama is best deﬁned by a heterogeneous ‘dirty’
base that supports broad genre variety, an indigenization of Western for-
mats, a decline in experimental art house cinema, and a resurgent popu-
lism based on retro-oriented blockbusters and a banal, domesticated
national consciousness in tele-serials and soap operas.
(Dolgopolov 2008)
My analyses of a wide variety of TV and cinema productions in the case
studies support Dolgopolov’s assertion.
In 2009, the system of ﬁnancial support for the ﬁlm industry was drastically
reformed. The newly established Federal Fund for Social and Economic
Support to National Cinematography, or Fond Kino, was assigned the allo-
cation of most of the available funds. The remainder is allocated by the min-
istry itself in support of the so-called leaders of national ﬁlm production
(whose criteria determining ranking is unclear) and through competitive the-
matic calls (Ziborova 2013). In both 2010 and 2011, the call mentioned, for
instance, ‘ﬁlms of historical, military and patriotic content, developing a sense
of pride in one’s country,’ as well as a similar theme regarding documentary
ﬁlm (Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation 2010; Ministry of Culture
of the Russian Federation 2011). The structural reorganisation involved a
signiﬁcant change in the composition of the councils overseeing the distribu-
tion of funds. After the restructuring only a few ﬁlm professionals were left
among their ranks, their places now occupied by bankers, vice-ministers,
chairmen of the boards of directors for major media holdings and other
people ‘wielding substantial ﬁnancial and political leverage’ (Ziborova 2013:
74). The council at the Ministry of Culture responsible for the allocation of
funds was headed by (then) Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, leaving little
doubt about the direct correspondence between political preferences and
subsidised projects. For a ﬁlm to be completely free from the implicit and
explicit restrictions that are now connected to these streams of state funding,
it has to be produced with exclusively private funds (Ziborova 2013: 75).14
In addition to direct funding and the stimulation of pragmatic self-censorship,
the state has also exerted indirect control, for instance by placing individuals
loyal to the Kremlin as heads of signiﬁcant production and distribution compa-
nies (Pomerantsev 2014: 43–45).15 Moreover, ﬁlm and television production are
increasingly mutually interdependent in Russia. Major historical ﬁlms, in parti-
cular, are often released (in extended versions) as TV miniseries, premiering on
TV not long after their cinematic releases. By producing and ﬁnancing such
productions, state TV channels have become yet another means to promote the
release of ﬁlms on certain topics. Simultaneous release on the big and small
screens dramatically increases the audience reached by such productions. Stylis-
tically, their impact has been exceedingly important. As Il’ia Kalinin correctly
argues, Channel One and the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broad-
casting Company (VGTRK, owner of, e.g., Rossiia 1 and 2 and Kul’tura) have
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‘shaped the commercial format of patriotic cinema that now dominates domestic
screens’ (Kalinin 2013).
The lack of alternative sources of funding (that is, of funds not connected
in any way to state-aligned production companies, TV channels and other
sources of direct and indirect governmental support) seriously restricts the
number of independent productions. In chapter 5 I analyse one such inde-
pendent ﬁlm, Boris Godunov (Mirzoev, 2011). For now, it suﬃces to say that
the person who sponsored this politically sensitive ﬁlm funded it on the con-
dition that his name would not be disclosed. The ﬁlm also encountered some
diﬃculties with distribution. The system of ﬁnancing has thus acted as a
restrictive tool within Russia’s increasingly state-owned media landscape in
this period.
There has, though, been some opposition to the evident loyalty to the
Kremlin shown by key individuals in the industry. The most signiﬁcant
development in this respect is the decision of a group of ﬁlmmakers to leave
the Union of Cinematographers of the Russian Federation and establish their
own independent union, Kinosoiuz, in 2010. In their founding statement ‘We
don’t like it’, which collected more than 150 signatories, the protesting ﬁlm-
makers explicitly oppose the Union of Cinematographers’ ‘imposed agreement
of opinion, oﬃcial patriotism and lackey-ness’ (‘Istoriia Kinosoiuza’ n.d.).
Their discontent was directed mainly at the Union’s long-serving chairman,
Nikita Mikhalkov, an Academy Award winner and a personal friend of Putin
(on Mikhalkov, see also chapter 3). Among Kinosoiuz’s founders are the
(internationally) acclaimed directors Aleksei German, Aleksandr Sokurov and
Boris Khlebnikov.16 While this split among ﬁlmmakers created a stir at the
time it emerged, its overall eﬀect upon the industry appears to be limited.17
Methodology
In order to be able to study memory politics as а socio-cultural process
involving governmental politics, societal actors of national importance and
the sphere of cultural production, I adopt a case-study approach. Each case is
dedicated to the remediation and political instrumentalisation of a particular
cultural memory across the three domains. As will be described in detail in
the next chapter, I depart from the theoretical conceptualisation of cultural
memory developed by Jan and Aleida Assmann to frame and analyse the
interdisciplinary subject at hand. In addition, I build upon the concept of
remediation as it has been adapted for the study of cultural memory by Astrid
Erll and Ann Rigney (see chapter 2). The selection of the cases is motivated,
ﬁrst, by the aspects of memory dynamics they allow me to explore. Taken
together, the four major case studies represent as wide a variety of political,
social and cultural actors as possible. The memory of the Time of Troubles
formed the central narrative of state memory politics and has a particularly
rich history. Putin himself advocated that the ﬁgure of Petr Stolypin be
regarded as an exemplary political ﬁgure, but did so only after television
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productions had prepared the ground. Stolypin’s case is particularly revealing
since, unlike other historical references used by the regime, there were no pre-
vious memory texts to build upon. The case of Aleksandr Nevskii provides
insights into the memory politics of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), as
well as the coinciding interests of the ROC and the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs
in favouring the medieval prince. Finally, the memory of Ivan the Terrible and
the oprichnina oﬀers a case that allows an exploration of how ultranationalist
and fundamentalist Orthodox groups use cultural memory to put forth visions
of Russian statehood that undermine current political structures.
My selection of cultural productions includes documentary and feature
ﬁlms, television series and TV shows. They were each chosen on the basis
of one or more of the following criteria: 1) the example is a major project
that involved substantial investment and/or was presented as an important
event; 2) the persons and/or organisations involved warrant particular
attention; and/or 3) the production had signiﬁcant societal impact or
sparked controversy. Consequently, my research is limited to TV channels
with national coverage.
Since this study is also an investigation of the balance between the political
arena on the one hand and television and cinema production on the other, I
have selected cases that were suﬃciently prominent in both domains. As a
result, some important names did not make the cut. Catherine the Great has
largely been absent on the cultural front, though this lack has recently been
addressed with two major television series in the wake of the annexation of
Crimea.18 From time to time, political statements made reference to Peter the
Great, but his memory was never as explicitly instrumentalised as, for
instance, Petr Stolypin’s.19 One major TV series was broadcast about Peter in
2011, but this should be seen as the exception that proves the rule, as it were,
of a further lack of symbolic investment.20 Since my main objective is to gain
insight into the various actors involved in memory politics and their interac-
tion with one another, an examination of the reasons why these and other
speciﬁc cultural memories were for the most part absent in this period is
beyond the scope of this study.
The attentive reader will have noticed that the selected case studies all
concern prerevolutionary Russian history. Obvious case studies, on Stalin or
the memory of the Second World War, are missing. This decision, as well as
being informed by my overarching aim of achieving a diverse sample of gov-
ernmental, nongovernmental and cultural actors, results from the following
considerations. First, the existing literature on Russian memory politics in the
new millennium somewhat overstates the importance of these memories in
this particular timeframe and often fails to place the regime’s attitude towards
the Soviet past in the context of other instrumentalised periods in history. The
evidence provided by my case studies challenges the argument made by, for
instance, Graeme Gill, that ‘the pre-Soviet past has not been a major source
of either symbolism or enthusiasm in post-Soviet Russian discourse (Gill
2013: 143). Contrary to Gill’s assertion that, ‘[w]hile it may be an era of
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general interest, pre-Soviet Russia has not generally been seen as a relevant
model or guide for contemporary or future development’ (Gill 2013: 143), I
have found a pronounced political interest in the pre-revolutionary period
both for framing policy decisions and for informing future policy. Second, the
various episodes of Soviet rule tend to be conﬂated in order to argue that the
Putin regime has taken an overall justiﬁcatory stance towards the Soviet past.
While, indeed, the memory of the Second World War makes up one of the
primary elements of patriotic symbolism (as Ludmila Lutz-Auras explores in
her excellent study of its politicisation),21 the state has been much more hesi-
tant in associating itself with Stalin.22 Moreover, I would argue that the pro-
minence awarded to the victory of 1945 represents a revival of memory
culture from the Brezhnev era, when the myth ﬁrst came to serve this purpose
(see Gill 2011), rather than sincere praise for Stalinism. Triumphs in war have
proved to be particularly useful in serving as the basis for patriotic celebra-
tions, and the victory in the Second World War just so happens to be the one
that Russians were used to celebrating. The memory was ‘the most ‘politically
usable’ element of the collective past due to its previous institutionalization
and its uncontested positive meaning’, as Olga Malinova has pointed out
(Malinova 2017: 65).
The regime’s failure to come to terms with the crimes committed by the
Soviet state continues to be a cause for concern (one that many excellent
scholars have addressed). While I do not directly address this issue, the ques-
tion of the permissibility of state violence against its own people occupies
centre stage in the chapters on Ivan the Terrible and Stolypin. The legacy of
the Soviet past features indirectly in yet another way. Indeed, one of my main
arguments is that the rationale behind the recirculation of pre-revolutionary
memory, e.g. by the Russian state, lies in the fact that these historical narra-
tives had been actively used during the Soviet period (see chapter 2). Thereby,
this study also sheds light on a particular aspect of the reworking of the
Soviet past that has not received enough attention: the reappropriation of
elements of Soviet history propaganda. Three of the cultural memories that I
examine in the case studies had been instrumentalised by the Soviet state, and
yet, as will become clear, contemporary memory politics engages diﬀerently
with this legacy in each case. But with regard to the memory of Stolypin, the
opposite is true. Lacking pre-existing symbolic representation, his political
actions were, in fact, almost unanimously evaluated negatively by Soviet histor-
ians and politicians (see chapter 3). The contrasts between the cases therefore
allow me to reﬂect on the importance of Soviet-era preﬁguration.
Because this book is an interdisciplinary study, I use a wide variety of pri-
mary sources that fall roughly into the following categories: oﬃcial govern-
mental documents (including presidential decrees, policy documents and
public statements); newspaper and journal publications accessed via the web-
sites of their respective media outlets and the Integrum World Wide database;
radio transcripts from Ekho Moskvy; documentary and feature ﬁlms; various
genres of television production; and online forums. My assumptions about the
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television and ﬁlm industry and, in particular, the ways the state inﬂuences
them have also been informed by a number of interviews I conducted in
Moscow in late 2014 and early 2015 (see List of interviews). The multi-
disciplinary and cross-media methodology of this study enables me to accom-
modate both conformity to and contestation of oﬃcial memory politics. This
study thereby makes a contribution to the understanding of memory politics
and, in particular, how governmental memory politics relates to societal and
cultural memory practices and, to a certain extent, is constrained by them.
The structure of the book is straightforward. Chapter 2 lays out the theo-
retical and conceptual framework of the research. The subsequent chapters
present the four main case studies, each governed by a similar structure. The
ﬁrst part of each case study provides an overview of the historical develop-
ment of the particular memory under consideration, including its representa-
tion in the arts, before turning to the analysis of the political, social and
cultural actors involved in its contemporary mobilisation. The second part is
dedicated to a discussion of key television and cinema productions, encom-
passing their production history and reception. Chapter 7 presents an addi-
tional small case study about the talk show The Trial of Time, used as a prism
to examine the politics of television programming. Building upon the the-
matic case studies that precede it, this ﬁnal chapter employs an analysis of the
societal debate generated by the show as a stepping stone for a reﬂection on
the interaction between the diﬀerent levels of memory politics: the state and
media and non-state actors, on the one hand, and the general audience whose
perceptions they aim to inﬂuence, on the other. Finally, the Conclusion sums
up my main ﬁndings and places them within the context of more recent
developments in Russian memory politics.
Notes
1 The names inscribed were the following: Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Wilhelm
Liebknecht, Ferdinand Lassalle, August Bebel, Tommaso Campanella, Jean Mes-
lier, Gerrard Winstanley, Thomas More, Henri de Saint-Simon, Édouard Vaillant,
Charles Fourier, Jean Jaurès, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, Nikolai
Chernyshevskii, Petr Lavrov, Nikolai Mikhailovskii, and Georgii Plekhanov.
2 I would like to thank Marina Frolova-Walker for drawing my attention to the
obelisk’s refurbishing.
3 Scholars have proposed various concepts to describe the political practice of
engaging with history, such as politics of history, history politics and historical
politics. Within the context this study, however, I feel it is most appropriate to
speak of memory politics (see also chapter 2).
4 Russia is not unique in this respect, however. A similar revival of memory politics
can be observed across Eastern Europe. See, e.g., Miller & Lipman (2012); Mink &
Neumayer (2013).
5 On the memory of the October Revolution, the ‘Great Patriotic War’ and Stalin-
ism in the public discourse of the 1990s, see Koposov (2011a), Langenohl (2000),
Lutz-Auras (2012).
6 On state-sponsored youth movements and the promotion of state patriotism, see
Hemment (2015); Lassila (2014); Mijnsen (2014).
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7 See, e.g., Torbakov (2011), Etkind et al. (2012), Brouwer (2016a).
8 See, e.g., Oushakine (2013).
9 For an example of the latter opinion, see Beard (2015).
10 The Levada Centre uses the following categorisation of TV channels. State TV
channels: Channel One, Rossiia, Kul’tura, and regional channels that are part of
VGTRK. Private channels: NTV, Ren-TV and other non-state-owned and com-
mercial channels, including local and regional channels.
11 Books have also been a particularly proliﬁc medium. Bookstores abound with
(non-specialist) historical works of varying academic quality as well as historical
ﬁction. A number of ﬁction writers, most notably Boris Akunin, are extremely
popular and have gained signiﬁcant social status and inﬂuence. Several of Akunin’s
works have been adapted to the screen, for instance Turkish Gambit [Turetskii
gambit] (Faiziev, 2005) and The State Counsellor [Statskii sovetnik] (Iankovskii,
2005).
12 This ﬁgure includes both domestic and foreign ﬁlm productions. On the basis of
one of the follow-up questions, the proportion of domestic ﬁlms appears to be
greater than of foreign ﬁlms. Comparing results from 2002 and 2011, 69 (59) per
cent of respondents indicated a preference for Soviet ﬁlms shown on television,
while Russian ﬁlms were similarly preferred by 66 (59) per cent. Foreign TV ﬁlms
were less popular: 37 (29) per cent of respondents indicated a preference for
American ﬁlms, 21 (10) per cent for Western European productions, 9 (6) per cent
for Arabic and Indian ﬁlms and 3 (2) per cent for Eastern European ﬁlms (Levada
Centre 2012: 263).
13 Although these percentages show a marked decrease between 2002 and 2011, this
does not appear to be related to the particular genres: with the notable exception
of the news (similar percentage) and genres that were not listed in 2002 (e.g. court
shows and ‘Dancing with the Stars’ types of programmes) all genres show a sig-
niﬁcant to dramatic drop in percentage. A possible explanation for this fact could
be the diversiﬁcation of television programming since 2002.
14 Until recently, the restructuring of the system did not necessarily preclude the
production of state critical ﬁlms, as is evidenced by the case of Andrei Zvia-
gintsev’s Leviathan (Leviafan, 2014) about the pervasiveness of corruption within
the Russian bureaucracy, legislature and Russian Orthodox Church. Minister of
Culture Vladimir Medinskii has made it very clear, however, that such ‘anti-Rus-
sian’ ﬁlms will no longer be supported by state funds, regardless of the potential
international success of a given project (promoting the international competitive-
ness of the Russia ﬁlm industry is one of the explicit aims of ﬁlm policy). See
‘Vladimir Medinskii: “Leviafan” zapredel’no kon’iunkturen’ (2015).
15 Peter Pomerantsev’s widely discussed journalistic account about the structure of
(in)direct control of media was conﬁrmed by several of my interviewees.
16 The remaining founding members are: El’dar Riazanov, Iurii Norshtein, Daniil
Dondurei, Aleksandr Gel’man, Vladimir Dostal’, Vitalii Manskii, Andrei Proshkin
and Aleksei German Jr. The current number of members exceeds 200.
17 This conclusion was supported by two of the persons I interviewed (Interviewee A;
Interviewee D). Still, signing the petition was a highly symbolic act that, in turn,
could translate into real-world consequences. Interviewee G, for example, related
the story of a ﬁlm director who was supposed to take part in the Moscow Film
Festival as a special guest. However, when his name appeared among the signa-
tories, the invitation was withdrawn; someone who is openly deﬁant of Nikita
Mikhalkov cannot appear as a special guest at the festival of which Mikhalkov is
the director. The tragedy of the situation was that the ﬁlm director claimed his
name was included erroneously: he had not signed the petition.
18 Catherine [Ekaterina] (Baranov & Sabitov, 2014); The Great [Velikaia] (Zaitsev,
2015). Catherine the Great is typically included in the manifold TV documentary
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series about the Russian tsars, yet since she is not singled out among them in any
particular way this does not warrant a case study. Moreover, while she did make it
to the ﬁnals of the TV show The Name Is Russia, her memory did not prove
popular (see chapter 4).
19 The traditional image of Peter the Great as the ruler who sought to integrate
Russia into Europe and modernise the country in emulation of the West is the
most likely obstacle in this case. The way that his legacy is commonly perceived
was too pro-Western to be of use to the Putin regime’s narrative of Russia’s ‘unique
path’ of historical development.
20 Peter the Great: The Testament [Petr Pervyi. Zaveshchanie] (Bortko, 2011). During
this period, Peter the Great appeared in a small number of ﬁlms, including The
Sovereign’s Servant [Sluga gosudarev] (Riaskov, 2011) and Russian Ark [Russkii
kovcheg] (Sokurov, 2002), but was never featured as their main subject.
21 Lutz-Auras (2012); see also Malinova (2017). On the symbolic meaning of Putin’s
personal involvement (or, ‘performance’) in the celebrations connected to the
memory of the Second World War, see Wood (2011).
22 For an analysis of ﬁlms about World War II, see, e.g., Liderman (2007).
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2 Memory politics and the remediation of
cultural memory
Cultural memory and political legitimacy
In contemporary Russia the past is omnipresent. Traces of history and nar-
ratives describing its events and main characters permeate all spheres of
society and cultural life: politics, holidays, traditions, education, popular cul-
ture, arts, architecture, the blogosphere1 and so on. The everyday presence of
the past ﬁnds expression through a wide range of media and in divergent
contexts – from the tangible remnants of periods long gone (the Muscovite
Kremlin, the architectural splendour of tsarist Saint Petersburg, the high-rise
main building of Moscow State University) to vehement television debates on
national history between politically opposed individuals (for example, The
Trial of Time that will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7) and nostalgic mar-
keting strategies (‘Alenka’ chocolate bars). These historical traces are part of
acts and processes of remembering in multiple ways. Some historical refer-
ences are closely connected to the memory of individuals, evoking memories
of lived experience or orally transferred life stories of relatives and friends.
Such, for instance, is the case with the Soviet past and the turbulent events
following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. The majority of
historical references, however, pertain to areas of common knowledge, culture
or education. One has come to know what they represent and how their
contemporary relevance should be viewed via a learning process, a transfer of
knowledge. In other words, they are evidence of collective remembrance.
To conceptualise the ways that individuals ‘remember’ collectively, Jan and
Aleida Assmann distinguish between communicative and cultural memory.
Communicative memory refers to shared memories that exist in embodied
form, literally in someone’s memory:
Communicative memory is non-institutional; it is not supported by any
institutions of learning, transmission, and interpretation; it is not culti-
vated by specialists and is not summoned or celebrated on special occa-
sions; it is not formalized and stabilized by any forms of material
symbolization; it lives in everyday interaction and communication and,
for this very reason, has only a limited time depth which normally
reaches no farther back than eighty years, the time span of three inter-
acting generations.
(J. Assmann 2008: 111)
Cultural memory, on the other hand, is the part of collective remembering
that exists in disembodied form and is mediated by carriers of memory such
as novels, monuments and pictures.
Cultural memory is a kind of institution. It is exteriorized, objectiﬁed,
and stored away in symbolic forms that, unlike the sounds of words or
the sight of gestures, are stable and situation-transcendent: They may be
transferred from one situation to another and transmitted from one gen-
eration to another.
(J. Assmann 2008: 110–111)
The line separating communicative from cultural memory is not absolute.
Shared memories of lived experience can coexist with institutionalised, sym-
bolic representations of related events, as will be discussed in greater detail
towards the end of this chapter.
Cultural memory can further be divided into two domains that, through
their interaction, shape the dynamics of the memory process (A. Assmann
2008). The ﬁrst is the active cultural memory of a society or its canon. These
are those memories that are in circulation in a society at a given moment. The
archive, on the other hand, refers, in both the literal and metaphorical senses,
to those memories no longer in active circulation that have been preserved in
an inert state. Consider, for example, memories captured in novels that are no
longer read or in statues of no-longer-revered heroes. That these memories
have been embodied in an artefact or text means that they can be redis-
covered and brought back into active cultural memory. Such re-activation is
very much a deliberate process, governed by the question of which images of
the past have been chosen to bolster or complement a present condition:
At the other end of the spectrum, there is the storehouse for cultural
relicts. These are not unmediated; they have only lost their immediate
addressees; they are de-contextualized and disconnected from their
former frames which had authorized them or determined their meaning.
As part of the archive, they are now open to new contexts and lend
themselves to new interpretations.
(A. Assmann 2008: 99)
The history of the Romanov memorial obelisk, described in the previous
chapter, illustrates well how memory artefacts can be repurposed and endowed
with new meanings.
The basic premise that memory is shaped to ﬁt the needs of the present
(Rigney 2005: 14) implies that memory practices provide us with insights into
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present-day cultural, political and social developments; indeed, they function
in this fashion to an extent far greater than the way they may shed light on a
‘factual’ past. Therefore, what is of interest in this study is the move from
archive to canon, the selection, reworking and circulation of narratives about
the past that aim to relate such narratives to the Russia of today. What
exactly happens to memory when it is moved from the archive to the canon?
How can we conceptualise the re-activation of memory and the (possible)
changes that occur in the process of re-activation? And how do we deﬁne the
relation between the ‘new’ (version of the) memory and its ‘original(s)’? The
second part of this chapter will put forward the conceptual framework that
will guide the case-study analyses in order to answer these questions. Before
proceeding, however, it is necessary to consider how cultural memory is
linked to political legitimacy, and what (groups of) actors are involved in the
process of political memory-making.
The politics of memory: conformity and contestation
For politicians and political movements, history can be an important source
of framing devices. The rhetorical use of historical references can establish a
line of tradition – an evident aim of the politics of memory of the Putin
regime, which, as mentioned in the Introduction, has focused on creating a
historical foundation for its emphasis on a strong state and centralised lea-
dership. Political actors can contextualise their connection to the political
entity they seek to represent by indicating a historical analogy between the
present and a given historical occurrence (including appeals to tradition and
collective identity); alternately, they can place themselves in opposition to a
set of characteristics embodied by a historical individual, event or movement.
Simultaneously, historical framing helps stress their singularity, the leadership
qualities or policy objectives that set them apart from competing political
groups. Scholars apply diverse concepts to describe this political practice: the
politics of history, history politics, historical politics, memory politics, and so
on. To speak of history politics or historical politics is somewhat problematic,
at least within the terms of this study, since it implies that political historical
framing is about history and consequently is aimed towards truth-ﬁnding and
the establishment of facts (or maybe the refutation of accepted historical
facts). I would argue that, on the contrary, political uses of historical refer-
ences are symbolic in aim and therefore about not history, but memory. To
paraphrase Alexander Etkind, it is not a question of validity, but of relevance
(Etkind 2017: vii). Therefore, I will speak of memory politics and the politics
of memory (phrases I use interchangeably), and will do so in instances when
political actors purport to be speaking about historical facts or the distortion
of history by others.
Since the aim of the politics of memory is to orient notions about the
shared past towards the endorsement of current policies, a regime may seek
to exert as much control as possible over public expressions of collective
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remembrance. Political statements, state symbols and holidays are the most
salient form of such endeavours, but state control over memory practices,
depending on the degree of state centrism, can extend to all spheres of
society: education, academic research, museum exhibitions and journalism,
but also, and this is the sphere under consideration in this research, television
and cinema. Russian memory politics and the inﬂuence of the state on cul-
tural production are often interpreted in an unequivocal way by journalists
and scholars alike. The state is seen as promoting a monolithic, unchanging
interpretation of Russian cultural identity, ﬁxated on sustaining its power and
eliminating domestic opposition, while non-state actors are depicted as seek-
ing to undermine and tarnish that power. However, state control over cultural
memory in the public sphere was, and continues to be, by no means compre-
hensive. Nor is it univocal. First, the politics of memory takes part in a larger
cultural dynamic of meaning-making. ‘Memory texts’ involve not only sen-
ders (who shape the message to their advantage) but also the circulation of
their messages in a medium (which leaves a trace on the message) and a
recipient (who interprets the messages and decides whether to adopt new
interpretations). Any analysis of the political elite’s pragmatic motivations to
express certain views on history in isolation would not suﬃciently reﬂect the
complexity of cultural meaning-making that occurs through memory practices.
By choosing a certain political myth to valorise, the regime reveals its belief
that the public will associate itself with it. But the regime may be mistaken and,
consequently, the myth may lose its legitimating power.
Moreover, the dynamics of memory incorporates a wide range of actors,
both within and outside the government, each having their own interests
and objectives, each exercising a diﬀerent measure of inﬂuence. Therefore, as
already indicated, this study extends its sources beyond oﬃcial speeches, texts
and policies to avoid oversimplifying the means through which political
regimes mediate their views. This is also the reason why the source material is
not limited to either cinema or television, as might be more usual scholarly
practice, and why the case studies are deﬁned thematically. As a result, the
scope is broadened to assess the dissemination of connected narratives in
diﬀerent media and place the analysed audiovisual memory products in their
societal context. To exclude non-oﬃcial texts would also be to overlook or
insuﬃciently value challenges to the dominant actor in the process of cultural
memory formation. Especially within the context of democratisation and
underdeveloped civil society structures in contemporary Russia, such signs
can provide additional insights into the development of Russian society and
politics. Conversely, this decision also helps to avoid conceptualising a strict
opposition between the state and the so-called cultural elite. While the central
government may indeed exercise a certain degree of hegemony on memory
claims, cultural memory should not restrictively be seen as the product of
manipulation and deception. In their memory practices, political and cultural
elites are to a certain extent limited and inﬂuenced by the socio-cultural
environment. Non-state actors are motivated by a multitude of diﬀerent
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considerations to act and express themselves in ways that support the state,
ranging from actual support of the state – or the belief that there is no poli-
tical alternative to the current regime – to a desire to maintain social status or
reap ﬁnancial gains.
Roughly sketched, the (groups of) actors speciﬁcally involved in shaping
historical representation in television and cinema include cultural policy-
makers (involved in the legal framework of cultural policy, state ﬁnancing and
the oﬃcial structure of production/distribution), the Union of Cinemato-
graphers, production and distribution companies (including state TV chan-
nels), scriptwriters, directors, historical advisors, societal actors and private
parties involved on the commissioning side or with funding (e.g. foundations
and religious organisations). Furthermore, the participation of a certain host
(in case of a TV show or documentary) or actor (in case of ﬁctional drama-
tisations) can lend authority to the interpretation of history presented or
increase the popularity of a production (and hence augment its societal reach
and potential impact). This study aims to provide insights into the complex-
ities of the interactions among these actors and also examine the dynamics of
contestation of and conformity to the state-supported line. TV and cinema are
thus approached simultaneously as extensions of the political sphere and a
space of (restricted) dialogue, the outcomes of which are determined by the
interplay of political, cultural and societal actors.
Finally, it has to be stressed that memory politics is not static. Historical
narratives deemed politically relevant have to be repeatedly circulated and are
continuously subject to redeﬁnition in response to challenges (for instance, the
circulation of competing memories) or societal changes. If a narrative appears
to be losing its rhetorical power and risks becoming obsolete, it can be
altered, recontextualised or abandoned. As a result, memory culture is in
continual ﬂux, and for a memory construct to gain dominance – that is,
societal acceptance as a relevant frame of interpretation – or maintain the
dominance it already enjoys, it has to be actively supported and promoted by
one or more of the actors named above. We can try to identify ‘memory
sponsors’, a variation on the concept ‘frame sponsor’2 (Van Gorp 2007: 64).
Who is working to popularise a given memory, a particular interpretation of
events, and why?
Memory politics on screen
How can we deﬁne the position and importance of TV and cinema in the
process of creating a politically ‘useful past’, described above? In his intro-
duction to the seminal work Television Histories: Shaping Collective Memory
in the Media Age (2001), Gary Edgerton outlines seven assumptions about
the role played by television in shaping (collective) notions about history.
While Edgerton formulated his views about the role of ‘television as a his-
torian’ some time ago and with the American television system in mind, the
greater part of his insights also applies to the contemporary Russian context.
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First, he emphasises the importance of recognising television as ‘the primary
way that children and adults form their understanding of the past’ and fore-
grounds the medium as ‘the principal means by which most people learn
about history today’ (Edgerton 2001: 1). Because historically oriented non-
ﬁction programming is often as popular as ﬁctional television programmes,
while being ‘relatively cost-eﬀective to produce’, historical programmes had
already then become ‘big business’ (idem: 2). This second assumption would
not entirely hold if we were to include historical ﬁction (as this study does).
While period dramas, for example, may indeed be very popular with televi-
sion audiences, they are not necessarily cheaper to produce. A similar excep-
tion can be made for screenings or television adaptations of full-length
historical feature ﬁlms. Third, Edgerton argues that such historical produc-
tions are strongly inﬂuenced by the ‘technical and stylistic features of televi-
sion as a medium’, most notably the emphasis on narrative (‘well-constructed
plot structure’) and biography (‘personalizing all […] historical matters’ and
‘viewer-involving’ in the presentation of the events) (ibid.).
The fourth assumption adheres to one of the premises of this study, namely
television’s ‘aﬃnity and ability to embody current concerns and priorities
within the stories it telecasts about the past’ (Edgerton 2001: 3). Indeed,
according to Edgerton, the producers of history on screen ‘tacitly embrace
presentism through the back door by concentrating only on those people,
events, and issues that are most relevant to themselves and their target audi-
ences’ (ibid.). They allow contemporary values to determine what image of
the past is rendered, rather than seeking to establish a (more) truthful recon-
struction of a past reality. This tendency underscores the diﬀerence between
this form of popular history and the works of academic historians. Building
upon the previous assumption, Edgerton states that this merging of past and
present happens in almost a methodological fashion and ﬂows from TV pro-
ducers and audiences being ‘similarly preoccupied with creating a “usable
past,” a long standing tenet of popular history, where stories involving his-
torical ﬁgures and events are used to clarify the present and discover the
future’ (Edgerton 2001: 4). Sixth, ‘collective memory is the site of mediation
where professional history must ultimately share space with popular history’
(idem: 5). And, ﬁnally, while popular historians may be accused of engaging
in presentism, the opposite may be said about professional historians when
they fail to acknowledge the place of popular history and ‘declare the past oﬀ
limits to nonscholars’ (Edgerton 2001: 6).
As I indicated in the Introduction, historical subjects are quite prevalent in
Russian TV programming, ranging from talk shows to documentaries and
ﬁctional TV series. Diﬀerent formats can be discerned, each with their own
stylistic characteristics (Zvereva, 2004): academic presentations, in which
experts elucidate detailed accounts of history to their uninformed or under-
informed audience; documentaries akin to sensational journalism, ﬁlled with
scandals, intrigues and secrets; investigations of history that explain the ori-
gins of current (political) events and present a political argument; or simply
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the staging of history as entertainment, where an abundance of visual trick-
eries and rapid editing ensures that the viewer remains engaged. Yet another
type is exempliﬁed by The Name Is Russia, aired in 2008 by the Rossiia TV
channel in imitation of foreign examples such as the BBC’s 100 Great Britons.
Through multiple online and telephone voting rounds, leading up to 12 TV
shows presenting the ﬁnalists, the Russian public could vote for their favourite
Russian of all time. The interactivity of the project and the way it engaged several
media platforms set it apart from the kinds of historical programmes described
above (for a detailed analysis of The Name Is Russia, see chapters 4 and 5).
While television is often disregarded for being a medium for mere popular
culture and therefore an inferior type of cultural production, or for being
simply the mouthpiece of the Russian government, its importance and socie-
tal inﬂuence remains signiﬁcant. For most of the period examined in this
study, the ‘post-Soviet television genre [was] the supreme locus for the nego-
tiation of control over cultural meaning’ (Hutchings & Rulyova 2009: 219–
220). Although internet access has proliferated rapidly in Russia and is now
widespread, achieving a penetration of 71 per cent of the adult population in
2017 (Mediascope 2017), opinion polls conducted by the Levada Centre show
that television continues, by far, to be the most important source of informa-
tion for Russians, although there is a growing generational discrepancy as
the younger generation increasingly relies on online sources (Volkov &
Goncharov 2017). This is not to say, of course, that the audience accepts or
agrees with everything it is told. Ellen Mickiewicz has shown that Russian
viewers are exceptionally adept at extracting information from television; they
are critical viewers who scrutinise television coverage in a way that goes
beyond reading between the lines. As a result of their ‘particularly eﬀortful
engagement with the news to extract the maximum amount of data in an
environment of limited information’, Russian viewers are able to, for example,
recognise TV channels by their ‘content, tone, or approach’ (Mickiewicz
2008: 33). Their characteristically sceptical attitude of viewing, Mickiewicz
suggests, is partly attributable to the ‘Soviet legacy’ that ‘has shaped the
repertoire of methods of extraction of news unintended and uncued from
broadcast’ (Mickiewicz 2008: 104). This sceptical viewing strategy enables
viewers to diﬀerentiate among the constitutive elements of a narrative, to
appreciate the inﬂuence of the narrative’s source on its representation and to
be aware of the possibility of multiple ‘truths’.
Vera Zvereva notes a particular, rather drastic shift in the representation of
history on Russian TV since the 1990s drew to a close. Historical program-
ming in the late 1980s and for most of the 1990s was preoccupied with dis-
closing previously unknown facts and hosting heated debates about topics
that had been oﬀ limits to public inquiry before Perestroika. As the turn of
the millennium approached, the public appeared to have grown tired with the
disclosure of yet more archival documents about the (Soviet) past, and its
enthusiasm for new interpretations waned. Also, since the late 1990s, ‘Russian
media are increasingly turning to the forms and rhetorics of Soviet culture’
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(Zvereva 2004). Simpler, more comprehensible and, moreover, familiar
explanations appeared to better suit the shifting preferences of the viewing
audience, who had grown tired of the negativities and uncertainties of the ﬁrst
post-Soviet decade.
Where exactly such a shift originates is diﬃcult to pinpoint, as is also evident
from Edgerton’s seven assumptions: The type of programmes that are aired and
the way their contents are presented derive from the professional and economic
considerations of those involved in their production and distribution, even as
these actors simultaneously attempt to sense viewer preferences and anticipate
and respond to any changes among them. Even with a ‘big player’ such as the
state involved, as is the case with the state-owned TV channels, it would be
mistaken to assume direct or complete control over TV’s content. Anna Novi-
kova, for example, puts forward the following explanation when she comments
on the tendency to positively re-evaluate Soviet practices noted by Zvereva:
By the end of the 1990s people were disillusioned and critical of government
policies that were aimed at shaping pro-European identity. This enabled the
new Russian government (V. Putin in particular) to change the state’s strategy
at the beginning of a new century and to return to the model of a paternalist
state. Russia’s state channels – never free from state pressure – supported new
government policies. As a result, various television shows began to rehabili-
tate the Soviet past through the use of recycled Soviet myths.
(Novikova 2014: 282)
Several studies have shown, however, that state control over the Russian
media in this period, and television in particular, is a complex matter and
should not be overestimated. Stephen Hutchings and Natalia Rulyova aptly
speak of ‘remote control’ (2009: 3). Although media freedom has declined
and ‘government control over the content and style of television programmes’
has increased since Putin took oﬃce in 2000, eﬀective control is restricted by
the drastically altered environment in which the Russia media system now
operates. Indeed, ‘precisely because of the recent changes wrought upon Rus-
sian society, a blanket return to the totalitarianism of the Soviet media has
not occurred’ (Hutchings & Rulyova 2009: 3).3 Eﬀorts to exert control over
television broadcasting, on both the production and reception sides, were
impeded in the 2000s in several ways:
1 The disjunction between oﬃcial pronouncements emanating from
central government and the confused interpretation of those pro-
nouncements by national television channels
2 The global media environment in which national television now operates
3 The ﬁckle tendencies of television audiences, aided by new media
forms less supine in their relationships with state government, to
ignore oﬃcially preferred meanings.
(Beumers et al. 2009: 7)
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It should also be noted that Novikova appears to (incorrectly) assume that
‘pro-European identity’ and ‘a paternalistic state’ act as opposite poles, which
allow little space for alternative modes of political organisation between them.
In line with Hutchings and Rulyova’s analysis, Anna Amelina argues that
the relationship between state and television during Putin’s ﬁrst two pre-
sidencies can be characterised as one of asymmetrical interdependence. She
formulates her ‘These der asymmetrischen Interdependenz’ (Amelina 2008)
as follows:
Von Interdependenz kann gesprochen werden, weil in der Tat Massen-
medien auch in Russland auf neue politische Themen, auf politische
Skandale und auf heiße Diskussionen angewiesen sind. Auch die politischen
Instanzen sind gezwungen, besondere Formen medialer Funktionsweise
zu übernehmen, um vom medialen Popularitätsbonus zu proﬁtieren.
Doch dieses Interdependenzverhältnis ist asymmetrisch, weil das poli-
tische Bedürfnis nach Anpassung an die mediale Logik von partieller
Einschränkung massenmedialer Thematisierungsleistungen begleitet
wird und sich zum Teil in Eingriﬀen in die redaktionelle Entscheidungs-
freiheit niederschlägt,
(Idem: 31–32)
Amelina emphasises the importance of self-censorship to state control over
TV journalism:
Die Entwicklung der journalistischen Selbstzensur im neuen russische
Fernsehen deutet darauf hin, dass die Aktualisierung der staatlichen
Kontrollmechanismen nicht direkt die von ‘Neophilie’ geprägte mediale
Logik auﬂöst. Stattdessen werden die Kontrollversuche der politischen
Instanzen in der medialen Kommunikation transformiert: Sie werden
zwar als Störung wahrgenommen, jedoch in der redaktionellen Entschei-
dungspraxis durch Selbstzensur verarbeitet.
(Idem: 41)
The issue of self-censorship, I would add, is of equal signiﬁcance with respect
to historical programming. Amelina indeed signals that TV ﬁction can also be
aﬀected by considerations determined by current politics: ‘Dabei muss die
Selbstzensur im Fernsehen nicht unbedingt nur die Nachrichtensparte betref-
fen. Auch Fernsehﬁlme oder -serien, die auf den Tschetschenien-Konﬂikt
verweisen, können entsprechend ‘umgestaltet’ werden’ (idem: 41). More
recent research, as well as the interviews I have conducted, support these
ﬁndings (Kalinina 2017; Schimpfossl & Yablokov 2014).
Cinema’s inﬂuence in shaping people’s knowledge and beliefs about history
has also become a subject of scholarly scrutiny, as has the use of cinema as a
means of political propaganda.4 The degree of historical accuracy adhered to
by ﬁlms set in the past varies greatly, as do opinions about whether accurate
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reconstruction – or, to use an even more objectionable term, representation5 –
is a valid criterion by which to judge the merit of this cinematic genre.6 Both
the meticulously recreated, fetishised historical ‘real’ of a period piece based
on true events – often with a recapitulation before the closing titles informing
the viewer what has become of its characters ‘after the ﬁlm ended’ – and the
romantic drama recounting the lives of ﬁctional characters loosely framed in a
historical context endeavour to make the past, or at least some elements of it,
accessible to its viewer who is located in the present (recall Roland Barthes’
amazement at the use of a signature haircut – fringes – as ‘the label of Roman-
ness’ in Mankiewicz’s Julius Caesar [Barthes 1973]). It is fair to argue that Edge-
rton’s assumption that television is ‘the primary way that children and adults
form their understanding of the past’ (Edgerton 2001: 1) to a large extent holds
true for cinema as well. The popularity of a ﬁlm may well tell us more about its
potential societal impact than a reviewer’s evaluation of its quality as a historical
document. Even in those cases where a ﬁlm’s principle aim is to keep its audience
entertained, its eﬀect can nonetheless be educational via its contribution to
the individual viewer’s memory repertoire of stock images, phrases and other
associations connected to the historical ﬁgure, event or period portrayed.
In addition to political coverage on TV, history education and the use of
historical references in political statements, Russian cinema in particular has
been recognised as an important means of popularising and consolidating
public support for the strengthening of the power vertical since the turn of the
millennium (Laruelle 2009; Vázquez Liñán 2010). Historical ﬁction has pro-
vided a suitable vehicle for quasi-nationalist narratives instilling a sense of
state patriotism in their viewers. Stephen Norris argues that there is a clear
link between the political line of the Putin regime and the messages spread
through historical feature ﬁlms, especially those of the Hollywood-style Russian
historical blockbuster that has emerged:
The birth of blockbuster history – or the way American cultural practices
could be adapted to make Russian historical epics – parallels the rise of
Putin and the resurgence of Russian political nationalism. These links
and processes […] are far from coincidental but not always connected
[…]: patriotism and the past sell.
(Norris 2012: 5)
Commenters often explain the popularity of many of the historical feature
ﬁlms released since 2000, especially those related to the Second World War,
by framing it as a response to the total rejection of history by political elites
in the 1990s and the troublesome process of redeﬁning Russian collective
identity. Re-envisionings of the past ﬁlled the void of Russians’ ‘negative
identity’ (Gudkov 2000):
Russian blockbuster history oﬀered a chance for audiences to escape into
alternative histories: the tsarist era to the Russia we lost, Great Patriotic
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War ﬁlms to the patriotism displayed by their parents’ generation, late
socialism to the values of stable socialism and a lost childhood, and fantasy
history to an invented past with clear values.
(Norris 2012: 17)
Despite the parallel rise of state-sponsored nationalism and the boom in (poli-
tically relevant) historical feature ﬁlms, this tendency to search for political
guidance in the national past should not be attributed wholly to the state, as
Norris also suggests. As already argued above, the process of cultural produc-
tion involves a multitude of actors, notwithstanding limited media freedom.
Furthermore, ﬁlmmakers explored cinematic genres other than the Hollywood-
inspired blockbuster to pursue historical themes as well. For instance, Vladimir
Mirzoev’s Boris Godunov (2011), a screen adaptation of Pushkin’s eponymous
play set in twenty-ﬁrst century Moscow, appeals more to an ‘art-house’ audi-
ence (see chapter 5). Perhaps it is more productive to approach nationalist fea-
ture ﬁlms produced after 2000 as ‘an expression of a prevailing common sense
whereby ﬁlmmakers and other stakeholders were preoccupied with a national
identity’ (Van Gorp 2011: 243) rather than as a ‘light’ version of state propa-
ganda. The equivocality or ambiguity that tends to characterise historical pro-
ductions (evident in their implicit meanings and irony) renders it even more
diﬃcult for complete control to be exerted over the end product.
To conclude, it should be emphasised that in the Russian case, much more
so than elsewhere, TV and cinema are overlapping spheres of cultural pro-
duction (as was brieﬂy mentioned in the Introduction) and are thus best
analysed together:
Because of the way television came to dominate Russian cinema in the
zero years – the largest producers of feature ﬁlms are television stations –
blockbuster history played out on both large and small screens. The
people behind this production of the past and its subsequent screening of
memory were not just ﬁlm directors – television producers, businessmen,
and even popular authors all played a role in the behind-the-scenes
development of the historical blockbuster.
(Norris 2012: 15)
Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail below, cultural memory has to
be actively and repeatedly circulated for a given interpretation of history to
gain or maintain dominance. When similar narratives are expressed in multi-
ple media simultaneously, they can reach a larger audience and compound
their signifying potential. Increased exposure can lend credibility to histori-
cally framed claims and help them gain acceptance as relevant signposts for
the present and future. Therefore, when either TV or cinema is categorically
excluded from our analyses, we may fail to appreciate the importance of these
intermedial memory dynamics. Now, let us move on the concept of remediation
and see what role it plays in the processes that were outlined above.
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Remediation
In the introduction to the volume Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics
of Cultural Memory (2009), Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney adapt the concept of
remediation, which had been introduced for the study of new media by David
Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin (1999), to the study of cultural memory.
They chose to adapt this concept out of a speciﬁc concern about the
conceptualisation and analysis of memory practices:
the dynamics of cultural memory can only be fully understood if we take
into account, not just the social factors at work, but also the ‘medial
framework’ of remembering and the speciﬁcally medial processes through
which memories come into the public arena and become collective.
(Erll & Rigney 2009: 2. Italics in original)
The concept of remediation highlights the ‘mediatedness’ of collective mem-
ories that is central to the authors’ ‘dynamic’ concept of cultural memory, in
which texts and artefacts function as media of circulation rather than as
‘static’ lieux de mémoire (cf. Pierre Nora). Furthermore, it draws attention to
relations between media and to the reshaping of memory in the process of
remediation. Central to the concept of remediation is its underlying ‘double
logic,’ based on the fact that ‘[our] culture wants to multiply its media and
erase all traces of mediation; ideally it wants to erase its media in the very act
of multiplying them’ (Bolter & Grusin 1999: 5). Remediation, then, is deter-
mined simultaneously by the opposed tensions of immediacy, which provides
a mediation that is somehow more ‘real’, and hypermediacy, which highlights
the fact of its mediation through its embedded recognition of its precursor(s):
Although each medium promises to reform its predecessors by oﬀering a
more immediate or authentic experience, the promise of reform inevitably
leads us to become aware of the new medium as a medium.
(Idem: 19)
According to Bolter and Grusin, media can exist only in relation to other media.
Consequently, remediation creates complex intertextual (or intermedial) webs as
each new medium ‘responds to, redeploys, competes with, and reforms other
media’ (Bolter & Grusin 1999: 55). The relation between subsequent mediations,
between the new mediation and the medium it ‘borrowed’ its content from,
depends on the perception and interpretation of its receiver:
With reuse comes a necessary redeﬁnition, but there may be no conscious
interplay between media. The interplay happens, if at all, only for the




Consequently, the audience’s viewing attitudes and pre-existing knowledge are
of great signiﬁcance.
Erll and Rigney argue that remediation is a central characteristic of the
creation and circulation of cultural memory:
Just as there is no cultural memory prior to mediation there is no med-
iation without remediation: all representations of the past draw on avail-
able media technologies, on existing media products, on patterns of
representation and medial aesthetics.
(Erll & Rigney 2009: 4)
The ‘double logic’ of immediacy and hypermediacy described by Bolter and
Grusin equally applies to the way that memories are mediated:
On the one hand, most memorial media strive for ever greater ‘imme-
diacy’. The goal is to provide a seemingly transparent window on the
past, to make us forget the presence of the medium and instead present us
with an ‘unmediated memory’. On the other hand, this eﬀect is usually
achieved by the recycling and multiplication of media.
(Ibid.)
The emphasis on remediation, rather than mediation as such, highlights
another aspect of the dynamic concept of cultural memory proposed in this
study, which I assume as one of its premises: cultural memory does not exist
in isolated texts or carriers of memory but, rather, is the result of repeated
mediations that disperse particular cultural memories among the members of
a society and allow them to perceive these memories as part of their shared
past and (collective) identity. The object of analysis, then, is texts not in iso-
lation but rather in their function as media of circulation, as part of a cloud
of media touching upon the same memory theme and together constituting
the constantly evolving cultural memory itself.
When we look at the emergence and ‘life’ of memory sites, it becomes
clear that these are based on repeated media representations, on a host of
remediated versions of the past which ‘converge and coalesce’ into a lieu
de mémoire, which create, stabilize and consolidate, but then also criti-
cally reﬂect upon and renew these sites.
(Erll & Rigney 2009: 5. Italics in original)
This makes it possible to reconstruct a genealogy of cultural memories that
can also encompass those periods when the memory retreats into the archive,
to be rediscovered and remediated at a later time.
As the above discussion already suggests, the social frameworks of collec-
tive remembering (which Maurice Halbwachs has called attention to) are as
important as its media forms. Indeed, ‘[it] is the public arena which turns
Memory politics 31
some remediations into relevant media versions of the past, while it ignores
and censors others’ (ibid.). A study of cultural memory ‘at the intersection of
both social and medial processes’ (ibid.), as the authors propose, aﬀords
insights into the genealogy of a given memory by mapping available reme-
diations (both synchronically and diachronically) and their respective simila-
rities and diﬀerences. In addition, by embedding these same media in their
socio-cultural and historical contexts, one can discern which ‘versions’ gained
a hegemonic meaning and which were ignored and attempt to explain the
varying societal responses to them. Through this process, one can gain a
greater understanding of the memory practices of a society within a given
timeframe.
Before proceeding, let us brieﬂy consider the diﬀerent ways that memory
can be re-activated. First, an existing memory text can be recirculated via, for
example, a rerun of a television series or the republication of a novel. While
the text is circulated integrally and appears to remain intact, the meaning
attributed to it by its readers can change substantially. A ﬁlm from the 1930s
(e.g. Sergei Eisenstein’s Aleksandr Nevskii [1938]) will most likely elicit sub-
stantially diﬀerent interpretations from its audience today than it did from its
contemporaries. Apart from such a temporal displacement, we could also
imagine the possible implications of a geographical displacement (a screening
of the same Eisenstein ﬁlm in the United States in the 1930s) and even fur-
ther social displacements (the 1930s American audience consisting either of
proponents for or opponents of communism).
Another possibility is quotation, the use of (an element from) an original
text within a new (con)text. Apart from the literary quotation of text, this
would also apply to the use of ﬁlm footage (historical and ﬁctional), images,
music and so on. The result is a new memory text that makes explicit refer-
ence to another memory text (thus creating an intertextual reference), in
which case certain qualities of the quoted original are retained. Quotations
can amount to the reproduction of a mere fragment of the original (a ﬁlm
scene or melody) or of an integral original (for images in particular). As
suggested above, such quotations establish intertextual links that (can) inﬂu-
ence the meaning of the new text. The possible intermediality of quotation
should be noted, since memory cultures encompass not just texts and visuals
but also memory artefacts, such as buildings and monuments, and perfor-
mances of memory, such as national holidays, celebrations and memorials.
Quotation, then, can become quite complex. Consider, for example, a doc-
umentary that uses a scene from a historical feature ﬁlm that shows an actual
statue of a national hero. Such intermedial ‘double quotations’, in this
instance a statue quoted in a feature ﬁlm quoted in a documentary, can pose
a serious challenge for describing and interpreting the respective meanings of
these diﬀerent layers within a memory text.
Finally, an existing memory (a historical person or event, story or myth)
can be used to create a new, original memory text. Aleksandr: The Neva
Battle (2008, see chapter 4), to create its historical epic, drew upon the same
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national mythology as Eisenstein, but this recent ﬁlm is an independent
memory text. Nevertheless, by using the same memory it becomes part of an
intertextual web consisting of other memory texts and artefacts that refer to
the same myth. It is this kind of ‘re-make’ or ‘re-cycling’ of memory that
scholars often appear to have in mind when discussing the re-activation of
cultural memory.
Most of the historical ﬁgures, periods and phenomena that have been
brought into active circulation in Russian memory culture since 2000 and that
were, in the process, adapted to suit their contemporary target audiences can
boast rich genealogies of cultural representations and political appropriations
alike. Invoking pre-revolutionary memory images in particular involves the
creation of intricate intertextual webs, and, depending on the knowledge and
interpretation of the viewer, invests the historical narrative that is presented
with additional meaning. In this study, the concept of cultural memory
remediation as described above is further developed and used in two com-
plementary ways to describe how history is employed to discuss issues per-
taining to contemporary politics. The ﬁrst way concerns the remediation of
existing stories about the past and the extent to which they are reinterpreted.
This understanding of the concept largely overlaps with the deﬁnition of
remediation as ‘the act of reworking a story […] with an eye toward cali-
brating it for its new historical moment and audience’ (Figge & Ward 2010:
10). The second way this concept is understood involves the remediation
of existing images or (feature) ﬁlm footage about particular historical ﬁgures
and events.
When we connect these two aspects of remediation to the topics of our case
studies, the analysed cultural productions and the dynamics of cultural
memory in contemporary Russia in general, two characteristics become
apparent. First, manifestations of cultural memory do not exist independently
of each other but rather behave as if they form a constellation. These memory
clusters are shaped by synchronic connections and composed of associated
memories or narratives. For example, the memory of Stolypin belongs to a
memory cluster that comprises, among other ﬁgures and events, Tsar Nicho-
las II and his family, Rasputin, the Socialist Revolutionaries, Russian terror-
ism in the early twentieth century in general and Lenin. Historical factors
(persons and events from a given time period) and topical factors (the end of
empire, revolutionary tensions, [failed] attempts at reform) – in short, the
cultural-historical timeframe that dominates the cluster and forms the tissue
connecting its constituent elements – deﬁne which narratives belong to a
memory cluster.
The existence of such clusters has implications for the dynamics of reme-
diation. It means that a reinterpretation of or even a challenge to an estab-
lished memory can occur not only via an altered version of a particular
narrative. Such revisions can also take the form of a shift in focus from one
person or event to another within the same cluster, which then has its own
connotations, associations and mediation history. In addition, the cultural or
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political prevalence of one narrative can help ‘prepare the ground’ for the
introduction of another narrative associated with it, thereby increasing the
likelihood it will gain in popularity. For example, the memory of Stolypin was
a relatively new addition to the Russian symbolic vocabulary. Yet, at the
moment of its introduction, it beneﬁted potentially from not one but two
supporting lines of narration that had recently become quite popular among
the public: narratives about early-twentieth-century terrorists and the police
detectives who pursued them (including the detectives’ present-day equivalent
of anti-terrorist special forces working for the secret police), and often nos-
talgically inclined tales about the last Romanov family and the fall of the
tsarist empire (see chapter 3).
The second characteristic involves the layered nature or even the explicit
layering of memory. These diachronic connections can manifest themselves in
a way very similar to the concept of remediation described above, namely in
the repeated mediation of the same memory (cluster) over a long period of
time – for example, when a given memory has been revisited and circulated
under several tsars, in the Soviet period and again in the post-Soviet period.
What results is ‘akin to a snowball that gathers layers over time as it rolls
across historical terrain, without losing its original core’ (Figge & Ward 2010:
10).7 The act of repetition establishes a certain connection among these peri-
ods, since it forces a positioning against previous interpretations. This form of
layered memory can be implicit or explicit, conscious or unconscious. But
what is striking about the materials that underlie this study is their wide-
spread tendency to create links binding diﬀerent periods in time, in an
attempt to actively create a chain of memory in a rather explicit way. This
layering of memory often takes the shape of cyclical historical parallels or
analogies that extend through the present and thereby embed present-day
reality in a diverse yet coherent and extensive history. Therefore, the genea-
logies of remediation and the layered meanings invested in these cultural
memories are not just hypothetical. Their interconnectedness is frequently
made explicit; memories can actually be presented as being layered. For
instance, the historical linkage of the years 1612–1812–2012 has become
common enough to have even made it onto a banner carried during the pro-
test march on Manezhnaia Square on 18 December 2011 (‘Luchshie lozungi
narodnogo protesta na Manezhke’ 2011; Brouwer 2016b).
The prevalence of memory chains appears to be connected to the complex
reworking of the Soviet past in post-Soviet Russia. Memory chains do not
seek to work around and exclude the Soviet period from the history of Russia
being constructed, as was prevalent during most of the 1990s. Rather, by
combining the pre-revolutionary and Soviet periods into one narrative, or
enclosing it within a larger historical analogy – such as the 1612–1812–2012
chain mentioned above – the memory of the Soviet past is neutralised to a
certain extent and presented as a ‘natural’ occurrence in the cyclical devel-
opment of Russian history. The creation of a memory chain makes it possible
to reintegrate the memory of the Soviet past, in its positive and negative
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elements, into narratives of national belonging (see also Brouwer 2016b). It
remedies anxieties ﬂowing from the perception of the Soviet era as a disrup-
tion of historical development and, consequently, of historical time. As such,
pre-revolutionary memories, and the layered way they are represented, in fact
forms an integral part of how contemporary Russia seeks to come to terms
with its more recent past.
While repetition is essential for memory to be consolidated and therefore to
be able to fulﬁl its potential as a political frame of reference, the product of
remediation is necessarily complex and to a certain extent ambiguous. The
implicit meanings of historical representations, resulting from their repeated
mediations and reworkings, are hard to control. With regard to Nazi
Germany, Linda Hutcheon explains:
Like parody, adaptation is politically versatile – or, perhaps more accu-
rately, politically ambivalent. It can be used to subvert or to contain the
power of its adapted work; it can exploit that power to new or nostalgic
ends. The National Socialists were adept at using adaptations to tame or
even remedy/rehabilitate what they saw as dangerous or threatening in
Weimar culture; what they couldn’t control, they discovered, was the
continuing power of the evoked work, persisting through any of their
deliberate modiﬁcations. The past is never fully erased even in an adap-
tation that consciously aims to construct a new and dominant normalcy;
it lingers on, for better or worse.
(Hutcheon 2010: vii–viii)
What is relevant to this study is that remediation appears to be just as
important for challenging the dominant line of interpretation as it is for con-
solidating it. The product of remediation already contains in itself the poten-
tial for questioning or undermining the oﬃcial line of interpretation.
Referring to Rachel Epp Buller’s study of Weimar-era women photomontage
artists included in the edited volume Reworking the German Past, Hutcheon
states that their ‘counter-narratives of resistance, like those of the various
experimental documentary and ﬁctional ﬁlmmakers […], were made possible
speciﬁcally by the act of adapting a prior narrative loaded with historical
meaning’ (Hutcheon 2010: viii). The photomontages by artists Marianne
Brandt and Alice Lex analysed by Buller employ the meanings invested in
their source material – news images from printed media – to create contrasts
and tension in their montages. By drawing upon familiar visual imagery, they
were able to visually formulate a powerful societal and political critique that
was nevertheless understandable to the general public (Buller 2010).
The dual concept of remediation, as it has been outlined above, draws
attention to a key distinctive feature of Russian memory politics: the fact that
the selection of cultural memories has been motivated by the potential of such
memories to establish a connection to early periods in Russian history; they
have been chosen because of their long reach and accumulated meanings.
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Within these remediation genealogies, (political) historical narratives and
cultural productions from the Soviet era are of particular signiﬁcance for two
reasons. When drawn upon, they have the potential to directly connect to a
person’s existing knowledge about history and also to what that individual
learned at a young age (via formal education, but also through the transfer of
knowledge and traditions within the family sphere). This pre-established
knowledge, and possibly also a personal appreciation of particular stories,
ﬁlms and imagery, make the (re)introduction of latent cultural memories
easier to accept. This eﬀect is, of course, limited by the turn of generations.
In addition, the Soviet era exerts inﬂuence over contemporary representa-
tions of pre-revolutionary Russian history through the abundance of inter-
textual references to Soviet-era interpretations of these cultural memories and
the inclusion of (audio-)visual materials in contemporary productions. Irina
Shcherbakova aptly points out the inconspicuous way that Soviet-era historical
representations continue to inﬂuence, for instance, contemporary (ﬁctional)
historical television programming:
What we see in television series […] resembles an onion, where each of its
layers reminds one of something the authors have seen on [the television]
screen in their childhood or teens. You could peel oﬀ layer after layer, but
still fail to uncover anything that is actually related to the depicted his-
torical era. You have to keep in mind that the Soviet examples were cre-
ated under conditions of censorship – this concerned everything,
including the stage properties. Therefore it is highly amusing to hear
contemporary creators of historical TV ﬁlms remark that they have
carefully watched feature ﬁlms from the ’60s.
(Shcherbakova 2014)
Many who today are making TV programming received their historical edu-
cation during the Soviet era, which (literally) formed an image of their
national past. But this is only one of the ways that Soviet historiography lives
on in contemporary Russian TV and cinema. The frequent use and recontex-
tualisation of excerpts from Soviet historical productions, and the (indirect)
inﬂuence of Soviet-era historical productions on the way topics have been
conceptualised by contemporary ﬁgures, has received little scholarly attention
(except for those instances where the object of analysis is a contemporary
remake of a Soviet production). Given the exceptionally complex dealings
with the memory of the Soviet Union and the various periods and aspects of
its existence, attitudes towards Soviet interpretations and representations of
Russian history merit particular notice. I will return to this question in chapter
5, where I provide a brief consideration of the hermeneutic eﬀect of the reme-
diation of visual representations of history on the basis of a sample of television
documentaries on the Time of Troubles. Yet when assessing the impact of
remediation of Soviet audiovisual materials on the interpretation of history, one
should always be aware of the viewing strategies of the audience. As mentioned
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earlier, it is never a given that viewers accept as valid what they are shown.
While Mickiewicz’s ﬁndings concern viewer engagement with television news, I
would argue that the Russian audience applies these same sceptical viewing
strategies to other television genres and to cinema as well, albeit to a greater or
lesser extent in each case. An ability to recognise the likely origin of a given
story, and the possible interests involved in portraying a topic in this or that
way, most certainly shapes how Russian viewers engage with other types of
media as well. We must account for this critical, at times even cynical, viewing
attitude when we make assumptions about the eﬀect of television discourse on
political views held by the general public.
Notes
1 Blogosphere is an umbrella term referring to the network of online communities,
blogs and social media. On the Russian-language Internet, or Runet, blog platform
LiveJournal (Zhivoi Zhurnal) has been particularly popular and inﬂuential.
2 The concept refers to those, actively advocating a particular framework for inter-
pretation such as politicians and interest groups.
3 Hutchings and Rulyova go on to name the precise factors that determine this
development: ‘The fact that television now operated in a global ‘infosphere’; the
inherently porous boundaries between television texts and their contexts; the grow-
ing ‘conversationalisation’ of media discourse; the inﬂuence of the market impera-
tive; television’s twin, and contradictory, national-centripetal and local-centrifugal
emphases; the lack in post-Soviet Russia of an established mechanism for mediating
between public and private spheres; and the persistently low cultural status that the
medium enjoys in Russia all conspire to ensure that the control that Putin nomin-
ally exercises remains remote and less than wholly eﬀective’ (2009: 3. Italics in
original).
4 With regard to Russian and Soviet cinema, see, e.g., Youngblood (2007), Dobrenko
(2008), Taylor & Spring (1993), Roberts (1999), Norris (2012).
5 Jean Baudrillard’s description of the relation between history and its representation
in historical ﬁlm is illuminating here: ‘Today, the history that is ‘given back’ to us
[…] has no more of a relation to a ‘historical real’ than neoﬁguration in painting
does to the classical ﬁguration of the real. Neoﬁguration is an invocation of resem-
blance, but at the same time the ﬂagrant proof of the disappearance of objects in
their very representation: hyperreal. Therein objects shine in a sort of hyperresem-
blance (like history in contemporary cinema) that makes it so that fundamentally
they no longer resemble anything, except the empty ﬁgure of resemblance, the
empty form of representation’ (Baudrillard 1998. Italics in original. Quoted in
Hughes-Warrington 2009: 190).
6 In its eﬀort to immerse the viewer in a historical ‘reality,’ historical cinema in fact
adds yet another layer of ﬁctionality to the ﬁction ﬁlm: ‘In an ordinary ﬁction ﬁlm
the actor portrays a character who he or she is not, but that character never existed;
in a historical ﬁlm, the actor portrays a referential ﬁgure who he or she is not.
Therefore, although the historical ﬁlm may claim to deal with real events, it is
actually more artiﬁcial with respect to a spectator’s desire to believe in the reality of
the image’ (Rosen 2001: 180. Italics in original).
7 Serguei Oushakine has noted something similar with regard to the St. George
Ribbon that has become one of the most potent symbols of patriotism and
remembrance of the Second World War in recent years: ‘The St. George Ribbon is
[…] a mnemonic object that has little known history of its own but helps to
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manifest a certain link with history. It presents a very particular trajectory of
remembering whose structure is fundamentally rooted in various operations of
dediﬀerentiation, historical blurring, temporal amalgamation, and semantic ambi-
guity. The familiar sequential order of the linear narrative is replaced […] by the
logic of palimpsest, which allows the retention of incompatible or contradictory
meanings within one framework. The layered – “laminated” – history of the





3 Petr Stolypin: The making of a cultural
memory
Stolypin in the Russian historical and political imagination
On 27 December 2012, President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitrii
Medvedev unveiled a 4.6-metre-high bronze statue of Petr Stolypin in down-
town Moscow.1 The statue, by sculptor Salavat Shcherbakov, was placed at
the intersection of Novy Arbat and Koniushkovskaia ulitsa in sight of the
House of Government of the Russian Federation. The unveiling marked the
end of the year-long commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the pre-
revolutionary politician’s birth. Stolypin served as minister of the interior and
subsequently as prime minister from 1906 until his assassination in Kiev by
Socialist Revolutionary and secret police agent Dmitrii Bogrov in 1911. Sto-
lypin’s name is generally associated with his agrarian reforms and his eﬀorts
to repress the terrorist movement in the wake of the 1905 revolution. He is
also noted for his rhetorical skills. Stolypin’s speeches before the Duma have
become a frequently mined source of political one-liners, most popularly
among them ‘They are in need of great upheavals, but we are in need of a
Great Russia’ and ‘Give the state twenty years of internal and external peace,
and you will not recognise present-day Russia.’ Stolypin has come to symbo-
lise a political system characterised by top-down reform and the suppression
of the opposition, combined with the aims of creating stability and stimulat-
ing economic growth. The degree of authoritarianism this system implies is
portrayed as a necessary evil in achieving the higher goal of restoring and
maintaining Russia’s greatness. In addition, it is often justiﬁed by pointing out
Stolypin’s unique visionary leadership, a tendency that bears resemblance to
the personiﬁcation of state power in the ﬁgure of Putin over the ongoing
period of his rule as president and prime minister. This chapter will analyse
the making and meaning of the myth of ‘stability Stolypin-style’ (stabil’nost
po-Stolypinski) (Nadein 2012a) under Putin, and the interplay among diﬀer-
ent actors in the political, societal and cultural spheres and, more speciﬁcally,
between politics and television in the process of this cultural memory’s creation
and dissemination.
The memory of Stolypin and its institutionalisation as an exemplary image
for Russian politics has emerged relatively recently. Contrary to the cultural
memories that will be discussed in the later case studies, this particular
memory had not been actively used by a previous political regime. In fact, the
image of Stolypin in Soviet historiography was explicitly negative. In their
appraisals, historians followed Lenin, who ‘denounced the prime minister as
the “hangman-in-chief,” or simply as a hangman, tyrant, reactionary, or
“pogrom-maker”’ (Ascher 2001: 3). The statue of Stolypin in Kiev, erected in
1913, was taken down following the 1917 revolution and, quite symbolically,
replaced by one of Karl Marx. The bust of Stolypin in present-day Ulianovsk
met a similar fate. Stolypin’s name became associated especially with two
images: ‘Stolypin’s necktie’ (Stolypinskii galstuk) and the ‘Stolypin carriages’
(Stolypinskie vagony). The ﬁrst phrase refers to a quote by Cadet Duma
member Fedor Rodichev, who coined the term in 1907 to criticise the ﬁeld
courts-martial established under Stolypin to put terrorist revolutionaries on
trial (idem: 218). In Soviet historiography, and consequently history educa-
tion, the expression came to symbolise the cruel, repressive character of Sto-
lypin’s politics. As for the second term, referring to the railway carriages used
to transport peasant migrants to Siberia, it also acquired a negative con-
notation in later years. Although the colonisation of the Far East was actively
promoted and supported by the tsarist state under Stolypin, people moved
there on a voluntary basis, and the migrants were transported on newly built,
ordinary trains (idem: 323). In the Stalinist era, however, the same route was
traversed by trains equipped with bars that transported convicts to the
region’s prison camps. Today, the term ‘Stolypin carriage’ is still used to refer
to trains specially equipped to transport convicts.
The Perestroika period saw renewed interest in pre-revolutionary Russia
and a positive reappraisal of Stolypin’s politics. Abraham Ascher speaks of
‘an avalanche of publications’ about the era when Stolypin held his position
of power (Ascher 2001: 4). In 1991 the publishing house Molodaia Gvardiia,
for example, released a complete collection of Stolypin’s speeches in the
Duma and State Council, subtitled ‘We are in need of a Great Russia’ (Nam
nuzhna Velikaia Rossiia), the second half of his famous quote and a telling
indication why the volume was published in the Soviet Union’s ﬁnal days. The
preface outlines the radically opposed interpretations of the tsarist prime
minister’s importance and the ‘myths and legends’ associated with his name,
and expresses hope that this volume of collected speeches will provide pro-
fessional historians with material for them to reconsider and correct prevalent
views (Stolypin 1991: 7–8). In essence, the Soviet argument was turned inside
out: during the late 1980s and continuing into the 1990s, advocates of his
memory re-framed Stolypin, who now came to be seen as ‘a farsighted sta-
tesman whose policies were precisely the ones Russia needed to develop into a
prosperous, stable, and powerful country’ (Ascher 2001: 5). This position was
often accompanied by the belief that had Stolypin not been assassinated, the
implementation of his reforms in full would have averted the revolution.
The two seemingly irreconcilable assessments of Stolypin as a statesman – one
Soviet, the other counter-Soviet – mark the inherent complexity of the
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memory: the man was at once a despotic tyrant and a visionary leader who
would have saved Russia from the horrors of revolution and war, had it not
been for his tragic death. Vladimir Nadein aptly summarises how proponents
of Stolypin have attempted to merge both aspects into a positive image:
Cruel, but far-sighted. For the good of the country. For the sake of a
radiant future. He hanged [convicts], but also raised [the country] from its
knees. He hanged, but also gave the country [a higher] GDP. All of
Great Britain spread our Siberian butter onto their sandwiches in the
morning. The rouble became heavier than gold. The export of grain
increased several-fold.
(Nadein 2012a)
It is hard to miss how much these arguments echo those heard in con-
temporary Russia in defence of Stalin’s reign.
Historians and politicians may have ‘rediscovered’ the legacy of Stolypin
as the Soviet Union disintegrated, but indicators of public opinion in Russia
paint a rather diﬀerent picture emerging over the past twenty years. Polls
conducted by the Levada Centre over this period indicate that Stolypin was
never especially popular (Gudkov 2010: 39). When asked to give the names
of ﬁve to ten names individuals from all nations whom they believed to
be the most outstanding persons of all time, less than 1 per cent of the
respondents named Stolypin in both the 1989 and 1991 surveys. In 1994, the
ﬁgure rose to 8 per cent, then dropped back to 1 per cent in 1999 and rose to
4 per cent in 2008. Considering these ﬁgures, it is surprising that Stolypin
was selected as the second most popular Russian of all time in 2008 in the
nationally televised competition The Name Is Russia (Imia – Rossiia, to be
discussed in detail below). This chapter aims to reconstruct how the memory
of Stolypin was mediated in this recent period and, in this process, was
continually reinterpreted to such an extent that the government felt con-
ﬁdent enough to oﬃcially endorse it. I will also reﬂect on the particularities
of the Stolypin myth that contributed to its popularisation and institutio-
nalisation in this particular period, compared to earlier periods. The chapter
is structured as follows. The ﬁrst section analyses the myth’s political
appropriation and institutionalisation and considers earlier indicators of
political interest in this image. Then I discuss the appearance of Stolypin in
Russian cultural productions, on television in particular. Here I also point
out certain precursors to the Stolypin myth, closely connected historical
narratives that nevertheless do not feature him (or in which he plays a sub-
sidiary part). The mediation of such narratives from the same memory
cluster (see chapter 2) helped facilitate the emergence of our central myth;
instead of the introduction of a brand-new memory, what transpired was
rather a shift in focus and perspective. The chapter discusses three produc-
tions in detail: the TV series Stolypin … The Undrawn Lessons (Stolypin …
Nevyuchennye uroki, 2006), the above-mentioned televised competition The
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Name Is Russia (2008), and the television documentary Petr Stolypin: A
Shot at Russia (Petr Stolypin: Vystrel v Rossiiu, 2012).
Institutionalisation of Stolypin’s memory
Stolypin has been part of Putin’s political vocabulary from the very beginning
of his presidency. In his ﬁrst Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the
Russian Federation in 2000, Putin referred to Stolypin while discussing
the diﬃculty in striking a balance between state interests and the rights of the
individual. He stated:
Over the past decade, fundamental changes have taken place in the
country – rights and freedoms of the individual are guaranteed by the
Constitution, a democratic political system has formed, and a multi-party
system has become reality. […]
However, the letter of the law and real life are often quite diﬀerent
things. Only the framework of a civil society has been formed in Russia.
Collective, patient work is now required for it to become a full partner of
the state. We are not always able to combine patriotic responsibility for
the destiny of our country with what Stolypin once called ‘civil liberties’.
So it is still hard to ﬁnd a way out of a false conﬂict between the values of
personal freedom and the interests of the state.
(Putin 2000)
Other commentators have also indicated a connection between the chal-
lenges faced by Putin at the start of the new millennium and those con-
fronting Stolypin in the wake of the 1905 revolution. In discussions from the
early 2000s of Stolypin’s reforms, and more speciﬁcally in the appraisal of
why Stolypin would have been exceptionally adept at carrying them
through, we can even trace parallels to the characterisation of Putin himself.
V. Loginov, for example, notes the following four characteristics: ﬁrst, Sto-
lypin ‘came, as it were, “out of nowhere”’; second, ‘he was young – forty-
four years old’; third, ‘he gave the impression of being a tough and decisive
individual, a “strong personality” capable of imposing “order”’; and ﬁnally,
‘he was able to express his thoughts in a precise and laconic manner’
(Loginov 2004 [2001]: 22). In the concluding paragraph of his essay Loginov
embeds the discussions on Stolypin in the context of contemporary Russian
politics. He states:
In today’s discussions of the mature, overblown, but still-unresolved pro-
blems of national life, the most frequently expressed fears are of a ‘new
dictatorship’. This is not what we should fear. It is, rather, the unwilling-
ness to take into account popular sentiments and the people’s will that
marks the high road to sweeping grass-roots upheavals.
(Idem: 27)
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In other words, the establishment of a strong state should not be judged nega-
tively, as (Western) observers of the process of democratisation in Russia have
done for most of Putin’s and Medvedev’s presidencies, as long as the dominant
political line does not conﬂict with the sentiments of the general public.
If we consider societal actors beyond the ruling elite who sponsored the
emergence of the memory of Stolypin early on, we should note the Petr Sto-
lypin National Prize for the Agrarian Elite (Natsional’naia premiia imeni
Petra Stolypina ‘Agrarnaia elita Rossii’). The award was established in 2002
as a private initiative (‘Istoriia premii’ n.d.), and the ﬁrst awards given in
2003. Its purpose is to honour those who are successful in the agricultural
sector along with those who ‘with their work revive Russian traditions, help
our rural areas’ (ibid.). In 2012, the awards ceremony was included in the
oﬃcial programme of festivities connected to the Stolypin commemorative
year and thereby implicitly adopted by the state. The foundation behind the
Petr Stolypin National Prize for the Agrarian Elite had already been one of
the main initiators responsible for the celebration of a previous Stolypin year
in 2006 (ibid.); marking the 100th anniversary of the beginning of Stolypin’s
reforms, the commemoration was supported by the Russian government. On
20 October 2006, Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov signed a directive estab-
lishing an organising committee, chaired by Dmitrii Medvedev (Russian
Government 2006). While the government thus endorsed the 2006 Stolypin
year, it did not allocate funds to the activities that had been organised.
Another organisation involved was the Fund for the Study of P.A. Stolypin’s
Legacy (Fond Izucheniia Naslediia P.A. Stolypina 2006a). This fund was
established in 2001 by historian Pavel Pozhigailo, who held the position of
state secretary of culture and mass communication between 2006 and 2008
(Fond Izucheniia Naslediia P.A. Stolypina n.d.), which may well have con-
tributed to the government’s decision to support the anniversary festivities.
The program consisted of, amongst other things, a requiem in Stolypin’s
honour at the Church of Christ the Saviour in Moscow and the scholarly
conference, ‘The Stolypin model of the modernisation of Russia, 1906–2006’.
During the ﬁnal meeting of the organising committee, Medvedev high-
lighted the parallels between the Stolypin era and the present: ‘Today, Russia
is faced by similar problems. Therefore, the general interest in Stolypin as a
ﬁgure is no coincidence. Many of his ideas and plans are indeed as relevant as
before’ (Fond Izucheniia Naslediia P.A. Stolypina 2006b). It is important to
note that the basis for the link between the two eras, as expressed by Medve-
dev, lies in the question of agricultural reform. The use of Stolypin’s image is
principally connected to speciﬁc policy issues rather than personal char-
acteristics, a particular type of leadership that he represents or an autocratic
style of governance, as we will see later on. This emphasis is consistent with
the function of the historical analogy made between Stolypin and Putin that
Caroline Humphrey has described with regard to agricultural reform
and the eﬀorts to ‘deconstruct’ the remains of Soviet collectivities in the
post-Soviet period:
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What historical analogy does is to draw a parallel between Stolypin’s
attempt to get more independent-minded peasants to leave their commu-
nes and set up as private farmers and Yeltsin’s and Putin’s policies of
disbanding collective farms and promoting ‘fermery’ today. Stolypin, in a
famous phrase, said that Russia must now ‘place a wager on the strong’.
In brief, since both Stolypin and Putin attempted to impose private indi-
vidual ownership of agricultural land, what they both represent is the
destruction of the commune.
(Humphrey 2009: 234. Italics in original)
According to Humphrey, the generally accepted basis for the analogy is
that Stolypin and Putin represent ‘strong proponents of centralized state
power’; each was ‘in charge of the secret police’ and ‘pushed through,
against ﬁerce opposition, a series of reforms introducing private property
in agricultural land in Russia’ (idem: 235). While the importance of these
elements cannot be denied, and indeed continue to inform the use of
Stolypin’s image, I will argue that since the time of Humphrey’s writing
the relevance of Stolypin has undergone a shift – from indicating paral-
lels in policy to serving as a symbolic personiﬁcation of autocratic
leadership.
Humphrey, in fact, would have been surprised to see the Stolypin memory
become institutionalised in 2012: she notes that ‘the Stolypin-Putin analogy
has died away in the last few years’ (idem: 240), which she attributes to
unresolved contradictions implicit in his remembrance, such as the alleged
involvement of the secret police and the tsar in his death and the contradictory
appraisals of his repressive policies. She argues that Putin and Stolypin might
be too similar in this respect, which makes it diﬃcult for Stolypin to be shaped
into the sort of historical image that would allow his contemporary incarnation
to be seen in a positive light:
[T]he whole personalized tangle (the rigid Stolypin, the jealous Tsar, the
corrupt secret police, the double-dealing revolutionary) is reminiscent of
the environment of secret police ‘provocations’ that also surround Putin.
It is another layer of meaning hovering around the historical analogy –
one, like the assassination itself, of course, that the present Russian
executive would have to eliminate from public consciousness if the analogy
is to work in a positive way for the leader.
(Humphrey 2009: 239–240)
Already in 2008 we can see Stolypin’s memory shifting away from historical
analogy and moving towards the assumption of a more symbolic function. In
his ﬁrst Address to the Federal Assembly as president in 2008, Medvedev
referred to Stolypin in his plea for constitutional democracy and increased
respect for individual freedoms. He stated:
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The Constitution paves the way for Russia’s renewal as a free nation and a
society that holds law and the dignity of each individual as its highest values.
The cult of the state and the illusory wisdom of the administrative
apparatus have prevailed in Russia over many centuries. Individuals with
their rights and freedoms, personal interests and problems, have been seen
as at best a means and at worst an obstacle for strengthening the state’s
might. This view endured throughout many centuries. I would like to
quote Pyotr Stolypin, who said, ‘What we need to do ﬁrst is create citi-
zens, and once this has been achieved civic spirit will prevail of its own
accord in Russia. First comes the citizen and then the civic spirit, but we
have usually preached the other way round.’
(Medvedev 2008)
Here, the Stolypin era comes to represent the development of a young
democracy undergoing a process of stabilisation following a period of severe
turmoil, paralleling the process of democratisation that has taken place in
post-Soviet Russia. It points to the diﬃculties involved in establishing a
representative system of government, as well as the issues that can arise when
the government and the Duma are forced to engage in constructive coopera-
tion as they try to implement necessary reforms. The balance between the
collective and the rights of the individual, implicit in this discussion, tends to
tilt towards the individual, which corresponds to the hope that Russia would
take important steps toward democratisation under Medvedev.
In May of that year, the Russian government issued a decree that created
the Stolypin medal. Divided into ﬁrst and second degrees, the medal was ﬁrst
awarded in 2009 by Prime Minister Putin. In the decree, the purpose of the
medal is outlined as follows:
The P.A. Stolypin medal is an encouragement for the contribution to
solving strategic problems connected to the social-economic development
of the country, including the realisation of long-term projects of the gov-
ernment of the Russian Federation in the ﬁelds of industry, agriculture,
construction, transportation, science, education, healthcare, culture and
other ﬁelds of work.
(Russian Government 2008)
The medal features a relief portrait of Stolypin and the inscription ‘To the
glory of Russia, for the good of the Russians’. Recipients have included the
former minister of ﬁnance Aleksei Kudrin (1st degree, 2010), former minister
of defence Sergei Ivanov (2nd degree, 2011) and Vladimir Zhirinovskii, leader
of the ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (2nd degree, 2012).
During his period as prime minister, Putin has quoted and paraphrased
well-known statements by Stolypin. The elements of Stolypin’s legacy con-
nected to democratisation found at the beginning of Medvedev’s presidency
quickly lost ground, replaced by a symbolic charge similar to that of the
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memory of the end of the Time of Troubles, discussed in chapter 5. Stolypin
has become yet another wrapper, as it were, to enclose the promise of stability
and economic prosperity that the Putin regime has been selling the Russian
electorate for over a decade. Consider, for instance, the statement Putin made
during a session of the Duma on 20 April 2011 – evidently, as Pavel Aptekar’
points out, an echo of Stolypin’s assertion that he needed twenty years of
peace to transform Russia beyond recognition: ‘The country needs a decade
of stable, peaceful development without various kinds of rushing, [and]
thoughtless experiments, entangled in, at times unwarranted, liberalism or, on
the other hand, in social demagogy’ (Aptekar’ 2011). On the investment
forum ‘Russia calling!’ Putin quoted Stolypin to substantiate his claim that
Russia was an ‘island of stability’ and ‘safe haven’ for foreign investors.
Putin’s remark, ‘We do not need great upheavals, we need a great Russia’,
altering the ﬁrst words of the original Stolypin quote only slightly, made
headlines in the Russian media (‘Putin zagovoril iazykom Stolypina’ 2011).
The main diﬀerence between the ‘end of the Time of Troubles’ wrapper and
the Stolypin wrapper lies in how each deﬁnes the purported threat that Russia
continues to face. While the Time of Troubles narrative places its enemies
outside of Russia, as we will see later on, the Stolypin narrative shifts attention
to enemies within the country.
Putin defended the choice of Stolypin as a role model at the All-Russian
forum of the agricultural professional class in November 2011 (‘Putin otvetil
na kritiku Stolypinu i ego reform’ 2011). One of the participants challenged
the political endorsement of Stolypin’s legacy by arguing that Stolypin’s
reforms were, in fact, unsuccessful, which naturally cast doubt on whether
someone like him should be made into a guiding ﬁgure for contemporary
politics. In his reply, Putin addressed in particular the criticism of Stolypin’s
repressive measures by claiming that such actions had been necessitated by
the tumultuous situation following the 1905 revolution. Paraphrasing Stoly-
pin, he added: ‘I hope that [his] descendants can distinguish between the
blood on the hands of a doctor and the blood on the hands of a hangman’
(ibid.). Putin also contradicted the allegation that a one-sided picture of the
great reformer was being painted. He stated: ‘We do not want to idealize the
ﬁgure of Stolypin, but we want history to know all sides of this process [of
reform] and all sides of this individual’ (ibid.).
The decree establishing the Stolypin year was signed by President Medve-
dev on 10 May 2010 (President of the Russian Federation 2010). The orga-
nising committee was headed by Putin himself and consisted of several
members of the government (‘Putin vozglavil komitet po podgatovke prazd-
novaniia iubileia Stolypina’ 2011). While the year of commemoration com-
prised numerous events, the erection of the statue was its most public
manifestation. This monument was the subject of extensive commentary in
the press from its announcement in mid-2011 up through its unveiling in
December 2012. It would not, it was decided, receive state ﬁnancing; rather,
the necessary funds would be collected from Russian businesses and
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individuals. Putin, for his part, encouraged all members of the government to
follow his example and donate a share of their salaries towards its ﬁnancing
(‘Putin predlozhil chlenam kabmina vnesti den’gi na pamiatnik Stolypinu’
2011), thereby urging them to buy into the memory of Stolypin not only
symbolically, by endorsing the decision in their capacity as politicians, but
also literally, through ﬁnancial support. About the relevance of Stolypin, Putin
oﬀered the following comment during one of the organising committee’s
meetings:
As a true patriot and wise politician, [Stolypin] understood that diﬀerent
kinds of radicalism are equally dangerous for the country as standing
still, [as] refusing reorganisation [and] necessary reforms; [he understood]
that only a strong, capable state power, supported by the private, civic
initiative of millions of people, can provide for the development, [can]
guarantee the order and stability of a vast, multinational power, [can]
guarantee the inviolability of its borders.
(‘Putin predlozhil chlenam kabmina vnesti den’gi na pamiatnik
Stolypinu’ 2011)
The design for the statue was subject to a competition in which both estab-
lished and young artists took part (Krasnov 2011). The ﬁnal decision was
based on popular voting and the judgement of a professional jury.2 Pavel
Pozhigailo, the director of the Fund for the Study of P.A. Stolypin’s Legacy
mentioned above and a man who was involved in the organisation of the
Stolypin year, has commented on how they managed to raise the required
funds (‘V Moskve ustanovili pamiatnik Petru Stolypinu’ 2012). He revealed
that more than 1,500 people in total, from all over the country, made con-
tributions. This group of donors consisted of about one hundred politicians,
political representatives and businessmen, with the rest being average citizens
‘of modest means’ such as pensioners and teachers, who, Pozhigailo claims,
donated on average half their monthly income. Pozhigailo emphasised that
the fundraising was not actively propagated, so the inﬂux of donations
demonstrates that the memory of Stolypin is very much cherished by the
Russian population as a whole. This latter claim can be questioned, however,
since all the traditional media outlets had picked up on the plans to erect the
statue and on Putin’s call to follow his example and make a donation. Even
so, the idea of employing popular fundraising instead of allocating state funds
has highly symbolic import, of course, as it suggests that the statue was erec-
ted by the Russian people rather than being imposed from above by the state.
Its location next to the House of Government is no less symbolic, emphasis-
ing the close connection between the public display of honour for Stolypin
and the ruling political regime.
Erecting a statue of Stolypin in central Moscow was not in fact a com-
pletely new idea. It had been proposed in 2001 by none other than Nikita
Mikhalkov, a renowned ﬁlm director and a highly inﬂuential ﬁgure in Russian
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cultural aﬀairs. He is also a personal friend and supporter of Putin, and one of
the main sponsors of the memory of Stolypin, as will become clear from the
remainder of this chapter. Mikhalkov suggested placing Stolypin on Lubianka
Square to replace the highly controversial statue of Feliks Dzerzhinskii that had
been taken down in 1991 (‘Kto dolzhen stoiat’ na Lublianke?’ 2011). The city
of Moscow’s commission on monumental art considered the suggestion in 2002
but decided not to endorse it because they believed ‘one monument of the
reformer in St. Petersburg was suﬃcient’ (‘V Moskve ustanoviat pamiatnik
Stolypinu’ 2011). That same year the city of Saratov, where Stolypin served as
governor before being appointed minister of the interior, erected its statue of
the reformer to mark the 140th anniversary of his birth (‘V Saratove otkryt
pamiatnik P.A. Stolypinu’ 2002). The square that is home to the monument
was named in his honour as well. Several years later, in 2011, the city of
Krasnodar also unveiled a statue (‘V Krasnodare otkryli pamiatnik Stolypinu’
2011). This time, the occasion was the 100th anniversary of Stolypin’s assassi-
nation rather than his year of birth, as had been the case with the other
celebrations.
The largest number of Stolypin-related events and commemorations so far,
however, occurred in 2012. On 26 September 2012, a statue of Stolypin was
unveiled at the State Agrarian Academy near Ulianovsk, which had borne
Stolypin’s name since February of that same year (‘Zurab Tsereteli otkryvaet
v Ul’ianovske vystavku i pamiatnik Petru Stolypinu’ 2012). Its sculptor,
Zurab Tsereteli, is one of Russia’s best-known artists, a ﬁgure who, on
account of his close relationship with the former Moscow mayor Iurii Luzh-
kov, has left a (severely criticised) mark on the post-Soviet transformation of
the Russian capital (Goscilo 2011). Indicative of Tsereteli’s favourable posi-
tion vis-à-vis the Kremlin is his immortalisation of Putin via a larger-than-
life-size bronze sculpture of the Russian leader dressed in a judo outﬁt. Tser-
eteli actually submitted a design for the Moscow monument, corresponding
to that of his statue of Stolypin in Ulianovsk. Several sources have suggested
that Tsereteli, after failing to win the bid for Moscow, oﬀered the statue of a
seated Stolypin to Kiev, whose oﬃcials declined it, stating that the memorial
plaque on the building where Stolypin drew his last breath was suﬃcient
(‘Tsereteli podaril Ul’ianovsku pamiatnik Stolypinu, ot kotorogo otkazalis’ v
Kieve’ 2012; ‘Kiev ne khochet prinimat’ ot RF v dar pamiatnik Stolypinu’
2012). For that reason, the statue ended up at the academy that then made
Tsereteli honorary professor in return for his generous gift (‘V Ul’ianovskoi
oblasti otkryli pamiatnik, izgotovlennyi Zurabom Tsereteli’ 2012). In addi-
tion, there were plans to place a bust of Stolypin, again by Tsereteli, in the
city centre of Ulianovsk (Chilikova 2012; ‘Tsereteli poobeshchal produblir-
ovat’ Stolypina’ 2012), but the selected location proved administratively pro-
blematic. The bust is a remake of a monument to Stolypin that was unveiled
in 1913 and then torn down soon afterwards. However, the plan to ‘return’
Stolypin to its original location in the centre of Ulianovsk required the relo-
cation of the statue of writer Ivan Goncharov now occupying that space. As
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the bust was gathering dust in a municipal storehouse, a public vote was
ﬁnally organised in February 2017 to decide on the statue’s future location
(Ul’ianovsk Public Chamber 2017). Other events connected with the celebra-
tion of the Stolypin year included an exhibition in the State Historical
Museum entitled ‘The last knight of the empire’; renamings of the Moscow
city university of management, a street, and a vessel of the Russian navy; a
silver two-rouble coin bearing Stolypin’s image (Russian Central Bank 2012);
and a special commemorative stamp (Filaticheskii Obzor 2012). Furthermore,
the Ministry of Education provided suggestions on how to dedicate a class to the
theme of ‘the lesson of Stolypin’ in secondary schools (Ministry of Education
and Science of the Russian Federation 2012).
How can we explain this political institutionalisation of the Stolypin
memory as sketched above? Russian historian Igor’ Froianov asserts that the
process of ‘Stolypinisation’ (stolypinizatsiia) should be seen in parallel to the
renewed eﬀorts at de-Stalinisation (Froianov 2011). While I do not endorse
Froianov’s views (he goes on to argue how, in fact, the memory of Stolypin
can never measure up to the memory of Stalin and how he is a mere ‘pigmy’
when compared to the Soviet ‘giant’), the parallel development he points out
is an interesting observation. The peak in attention for Stolypin (2011/12) did
indeed come after the greatest leniency shown by the state towards a positive
re-evaluation of Stalin’s legacy abated (for a more detailed discussion on the
ﬁgure of Stalin in Russian memory politics, see the Introduction). However,
as the previous discussion has shown, and as will become clear from the
analyses that follow, it would be a mistake to see the Stolypin myth as, ﬁrst, a
new phenomenon and, second, a mere consequence of the need to ﬁll the void
left by the memory of Stalin. It is also more fruitful to consider the myth of
Stolypin together with the memory of the Time of Troubles rather than focus
on the limited number of characteristics shared by Stolypin and Stalin.
Film and television analyses
During the 1990s and the 2000s, Russian cinema and television showed a lively
interest in the pre-revolutionary period and, in particular, the ﬁrst two decades
of the twentieth century. Two themes connected to this period cleared the way
for the emergence of productions about Stolypin. The ﬁrst theme concerns
reﬂections on the period leading up to the 1917 revolutions in relation to the
last Romanovs. This imperial theme, often tinged with a hint of nostalgia, was
very much present in the 1990s (Govurukhin’s The Russia That We Lost [Ros-
siia, kotoruiu my poteriali, 1992] is an obvious example) and continued into the
2000s with, for example, The Romanovs: An Imperial Family (Romanovy:
Ventsenosnaia sem’ia, 2000), directed by Gleb Panﬁlov. Because of Stolypin’s
position close to the tsar, it was possible to insert a narrative about him into
this established narrative framework. His allegedly tense relationship with the
monarch, and the claims that Stolypin could have saved the empire and thereby
the lives of the royal family, increased the appeal of this combination.
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Yet the second theme into which the Stolypin memory could have been
ﬁtted – and indeed has been – appears to be more signiﬁcant: TV series and
ﬁlms about the Combat Organisation of the Socialist Revolutionary Party
(the members of which were the terrorists whom Stolypin came down on) and
the eﬀorts of the Okhrana, the secret police, to repress it. This group of pro-
ductions should be seen in the context of the general popularity of TV series
on the police and secret services in the 2000s. Examples include the ﬁlm The
Rider Named Death (Vsadnik po imeni smert’, 2004), directed by Karen
Shakhnazarov3 and the TV series Empire under Fire (Imperiia pod udarom,
2000) and The Sins of Our Fathers (Grekhi ottsov, 2004). Whenever Stolypin
makes an appearance in such a production, he is but one of many historical
characters and receives little particular attention. Moreover, he is a person in
need of protection, rather than someone who takes positive action to protect
others from harm. The single focus on Stolypin in the TV series under dis-
cussion in the next section, therefore, was unusual, a marked departure from
previously existing representations.
Petr Stolypin … The Undrawn Lessons (2006)
The historical dramatisation Stolypin … The Undrawn Lessons, a series
broadcast in 2006 by NTV, was the ﬁrst ﬁction feature to have Stolypin as its
leading character.4 Consisting of 14 episodes, the series covers the period
from when Stolypin was governor in Saratov up until his assassination in
Kiev in 1911. The scenario was written by Eduard Volodarskii, who also
wrote a historical novel, published in 2007, with the same title to accompany
the series. Drawing extensively on detective series’ tropes, it depicts the con-
stant struggle between, on the one hand, the Russian state as it attempts to
accommodate the outcomes of the 1905 revolution while preserving the tsarist
empire and, on the other hand, the Socialist Revolutionaries (SR) who con-
tinue to attack the state’s representatives with the aim of undermining the
empire’s stability. However, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the
state is not conceived of as a unitary actor. Rather, it is an intricate political
maze of conﬂicting interests among the tsar, the State Council, the Duma and
the Okhrana, through which Stolypin struggles to ﬁnd his way in order to
implement his vision of what Russia should be.
The series’ timing was signiﬁcant: it aired in the wake of the colour revo-
lutions in neighbouring Georgia and Ukraine, among other states. As was
explained in the Introduction, the Kremlin initiated a ‘preventive counter-
revolution’ to prevent a similar scenario unfolding in Russia. The TV series
reﬂects elements of this discourse, which intimated close cooperation between
Western states and Russian opposition groups in an eﬀort to undermine the
Russian state. In many ways, the series laid the groundwork for the thematic
constructions that have since become associated with Stolypin’s memory. The
narrative’s central aim is to demonstrate Stolypin’s personal and political
superiority and the tragedy of his untimely death, which, it is implied, had
52 Case studies
consequences equally tragic for Russia itself. According to the series’ director,
Iurii Kuzin, Stolypin … The Undrawn Lessons is about ‘a person, who was
killed by mistake’ (Epanchina 2006). He explains: ‘Stolypin was killed by
[Dmitrii] Bogrov, who was the son of a Kievan petty bourgeois, a Jew by the
way. But Stolypin actually defended the rights of minority groups, including
Jews. Therefore, Bogrov was mistaken. He killed the wrong person’ (Epan-
china 2006). It would have been better if Bogrov had shot the tsar, who was
also present in the Kiev theatre, instead of Stolypin. It is quite remarkable
how the series, which advocates an exemplary role for Stolypin for con-
temporary Russia, portrays those involved in the attacks. Their characters,
especially those of Evno Azef, his right-hand man Boris Savinkov5 and
Bogrov, have considerable depth and are sometimes depicted even more
emphatically than several of Stolypin’s political adversaries. While their
actions are not endorsed, these characters are endowed with complex emo-
tions of anger, love, remorse and spite and are shown to be passionate in the
pursuit of their ideals.
The central leitmotiv of the series is that Stolypin had been the single ﬁgure
capable of leading Russia, the one man who could have prevented its political
and social crises on the eve of the revolution and, ultimately, the revolution
itself; but adversaries on multiple fronts prevented him from fully imple-
menting his reforms. The argument is well summarised in the words of
Empress Mariia Fedorovna, the mother of the tsar, when she presses her son
not to accept Stolypin’s resignation. She argues that Stolypin is genuine, while
other high-ranking politicians (such as his predecessor Vitte) are hypocritical.
The empress warns her son: ‘If you lose Stolypin, revolution will break out in
two years’ time and all those who surround you now will betray you’. A few
scenes later in this episode, Stolypin has an audience with the empress and she
stresses her point once more: ‘only you can save Russia from times of troubles
and poverty, and set her on the right path’. The series emphasises the idea
that had Stolypin’s political adversaries not been focused on their personal
gains and ambitions but, instead, conceded that Stolypin’s policies were
correct, the state would not have collapsed. This is not to say that the
series completely ignores the political and societal problems existing in
late tsarist Russia. It acknowledges the tensions between the governing elite
and the majority of the agrarian population that culminated in the socialist
revolution. But Stolypin’s reforms are presented as the unacknowledged
alternative that could have addressed these issues along more gradualist
lines; they represented the golden mean between (extreme) conservatism and
revolutionary tendencies.
Stolypin the reformer and his (political) opponents
Petr Stolypin, played by Oleg Klishin, is a Janus-faced ﬁgure. On the one
hand he is the conﬁdent statesman, endowed with persuasive rhetorical skills.
On the other hand he is the dedicated family man, revealing a tender and
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sensitive character hidden behind his stern outward appearance. In each of
these roles Stolypin excels. His superiority emphasises how the opposition
towards his reforms, as well as his assassination, should be interpreted as a
tragedy for Russia, and underlines Stolypin’s exemplary function for con-
temporary Russia, a role suggested by the series’ title. Kuzin describes his
Stolypin as ‘a Renaissance man’: ‘he is a reformer, like Luther, like Peter the
First … . Therefore he has diﬀerent faces: with enemies he is severe, with
friends he is gentle, with his wife and children he is childlike and mischievous’
(Epanchina 2006).
Stolypin’s introduction in the very ﬁrst scene is crucial for his establishment
as a person of noble character. A young Stolypin rushes to a ﬁeld where his
brother lies dying as a result of a duel. To uphold his brother’s honour, he
then challenges his brother’s murderer to another duel. Stolypin is shot in
the arm but, when his turn comes to ﬁre, he deliberately misses his target. The
duelling motif is later repeated and again signiﬁes Stolypin’s noble personality.
One of the members of the Duma, the constitutional democrat (Kadet) Fedor
Rodichev, criticises the ﬁeld courts-martial that the prime minister has
authorised to counter the revolutionaries. Rodichev gives the hangman’s rope
the nickname ‘Stolypin’s necktie’, mentioned earlier, an expression that has
stuck to the memory of Stolypin ever since. Stolypin takes oﬀence and chal-
lenges him to a duel. After repeated public apologies by Rodichev, Stolypin
eventually forgives his opponent for the oﬀence. In another scene from the
ﬁrst episode, Stolypin singlehandedly disperses a revolutionary uprising in
Saratov, which demonstrates his natural ability to exercise authority over
people. Outpacing his security guards, Stolypin walks into a square where a
young man is inciting a crowd to revolt against the monarchy. He climbs the
platform to join the revolutionary and, after taking oﬀ his coat, he summons
the now confused agitator to hold it for him. Not in the least intimidated,
Stolypin proceeds to declare his achievements as governor and, slowly but
surely, wins over the crowd. While the assembled people are on his side, the
insulted revolutionary takes revenge by throwing a bomb that misses the
governor but injures some of the spectators. The outcome of the scene
adumbrates the challenges that Stolypin will face in the rest of the series when
dealing with the terrorist movement on the national level as prime minister.
At the same time, the scene establishes him as a resolute and fearless leader.
Explicit criticism can also be heard, mainly from the side of Stolypin’s
political adversaries. He is repeatedly accused of being a dictator, of con-
centrating power in his own hands and of bypassing the State Council and the
Duma in order to implement his reforms. Their criticism is undermined by
the constant idealisation of Stolypin already indicated above and by the
expressly negative portrayal of those expressing these reproaches. Their hos-
tility towards Stolypin is motivated not by a sincere renunciation of his poli-
cies, it is suggested, but rather by the fear of losing political inﬂuence and
privileges. Because they lust for power and behave in ways that show indif-
ference to the people’s needs, these reproaches are cast as hollow and self-
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serving accusations. Furthermore, some government oﬃcials, most notably
General Vladimir Trepov, a member of the State Council, attempt to under-
mine the tsar’s conﬁdence in Stolypin by deliberately misrepresenting the
accomplishments of his reforms, such as the level of economic growth in their
aftermath. During one of Trepov’s audiences with the tsar, Nicholas II dis-
misses the State Council’s proposal to discharge Stolypin on these very
grounds, stating that the recommendation is not based on sincerely held views
but rather derive from a personal feud against the reformist prime minister.
There is a grain of truth, however, in the claim that Stolypin transgressed
the powers invested in his position as prime minister. Taking advantage of
article 87 of the Fundamental Laws of the Empire, Stolypin, with the
cooperation of the tsar, twice dissolved the State Council and the Duma for
a period of three days, thus allowing the tsar to directly approve his reform
measures.6 Bending the law and circumventing the state’s representative
bodies are justiﬁed on two grounds in the series. First, it is claimed that
Stolypin is the only person who is not guided by his personal ambitions and
desire for gain and who knows precisely how Russia must be reformed in
order to prevent social upheaval and state collapse. Second, it is justiﬁed
since the State Council and the Duma continue to obstruct all proposals for
reform without oﬀering any vision of an alternative path, despite Stolypin’s
eﬀorts to cooperate with the members of these bodies. Thus, the series
appears to justify a high measure of autocracy in carrying out reforms.
Opposition within the political system, and especially that of the popularly
elected members of the Duma, is renounced as being self-centred, short-sighted
and obstructive.
It should be noted that Stolypin’s reforms are rejected both by conservative
monarchists in the State Council and the Duma and by liberals and socialists.
The former fear the undermining of the Russian Empire, while the latter ﬁnd
the reforms insuﬃciently far-reaching. Stolypin’s vision therefore comes across
as a middle course, the golden mean between (extreme) conservatism and
revolutionary tendencies. The idea that far-reaching reforms can be imple-
mented while maintaining political stability is very attractive to the con-
temporary viewer. Indeed, it sounds familiar. Numerous elements of the
programme’s outlook can be interpreted as drawing parallels with Putin’s
Russia. First and foremost, the series presents an intransigent Duma, whose
lack of cooperation with the prime minister is attributed to the former’s
obstructiveness, not the latter’s lust for power. What is more, it justiﬁes a
certain degree of authoritarianism via the claim that autocratic rule is neces-
sary in order to revive the country. In addition, the way Stolypin addresses
the Duma – using blunt language and much expressiveness and making jokes
at the expense of Duma members – is reminiscent of Putin’s appearances
before parliament.
The way the series’ writers have rewritten, combined and added to well-
known passages from Stolypin’s speeches to construct arguments that carry
particular resonance with contemporary Russia provides important clues
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about the political programme promoted by the production. Consider, for
example, Stolypin’s address to the Duma towards the end of the third episode:
A weak Russia – that is what our enemies dream of. We, among other
strong and powerful nations, are advised to turn Russia into a wreck. In
order to then build on these ruins a Fatherland that is unfamiliar to us (1).
The Russian state developed on its own yeast [drozhzha] (2): The Scy-
thians, Byzantium with its emperors, the Horde and Europe … . Who did
not knead the dough from which the coarse rye bread of Russian history
was baked? But our path, gentlemen, is still diﬀerent from the path of
Western democracies. Their fate is eternal movement, our fate is eternal
repose. You, gentlemen of the SR and Social Democrats, are in need of
great upheavals, but we, gentlemen, are in need of a great Russia! (3).
Most of what is delivered here can be traced back to actual speeches given by
Stolypin in 1907 and 1908 (printed in italics in the quote above). Extract 1
has been incorporated with minor adaptations but is placed in a new context.
The original passage is taken from a speech on the structure of agrarian life
and the farmers’ right to property and, thus, concerns explicitly internal
matters (Stolypin 1991: 90). However, in its new context, the word ‘enemies’
in the ﬁrst line, which extract 1 refers back to, appears to refer to foreigners.
This is conﬁrmed by the sentence on the Russian path being diﬀerent from
that of the Western democracies. The direct address to the SR and SD in the
ﬁnal sentence draws attention to the claim that there are also internal enemies
who threaten to undermine the stability of the Russian state. Hereby, the
impersonal construction ‘we are advised’ (predlagaiut nam) takes on a diﬀer-
ent connotation and is connected to the strong notion of ‘enemies’ lurking
within and outside Russia.
In the second extract, the ﬁnal words have been changed, though the sen-
tence retains its tenor. Again, the context has shifted. In the original, the idea
of Russia’s own unique roots is linked to the argument that Russia is predis-
posed to be a monarchy (Stolypin 1991: 107). The roots of the Russian state
are traced back to the autocracy of the Muscovite rulers, to Peter I, Catherine
II and Aleksandr II, each of whom represents a diﬀerent stage in the devel-
opment of supreme imperial power. Stolypin’s speech in the series lifts just
one sentence from the original and then invokes a quite diﬀerent deﬁnition of
Russia’s roots, derived from the Scythians, Byzantium, the Golden Horde and
European inﬂuences. This conception makes explicit appeals to such ideas as
Eurasianism, Russia as the Third Rome and the Europeanisation of Russia by
Peter I. The subsequent passage goes on to appeal to the idea that Russia’s
historical path is unique. Stolypin indeed expressed a similar position in a
speech from 1908, when he stated:
Our eagle, an inheritance of Byzantium, is a double-headed eagle. Of
course, single-headed eagles are also strong and powerful, but by cutting
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oﬀ the head of our Russian eagle that is directed towards the east you will
not turn it into a single-headed eagle; you will only make it bleed.
(Stolypin 1991: 129)
The speech ends with Stolypin’s most famous statement (extract 3). The often
quoted and paraphrased sentence is taken from the speech on agrarian
reform, just like extract 1. The sentences that precede it are markedly diﬀerent
than the original speech, but the two texts are largely comparable in meaning
(Stolypin 1991: 96). The elements that cannot be retraced to Stolypin’s actual
words are explicit references to the discourse on what or who constitutes a
threat to Russia in contemporary politics. Russia’s enemies, it is intimated,
fear the country’s return to strength. Through obstruction and criticism they
attempt to keep the state weak. The sentence arguing that Russia’s path is
very diﬀerent from that of the Western democracies explicitly responds to the
Western critique of the stalled process of democratisation and the centralisation
of power in Russia under Putin.
It is not wholly tenable, however, to assert a direct correspondence between
the two periods and make Stolypin a stand-in for Putin: Stolypin functioned
as a prime minister subject to the will of the tsar, whereas Putin was president
at the time the series aired. More generally speaking, it is to be doubted
whether it is productive to search for such one-to-one analogies with the aim
of understanding the political relevance of (ﬁctional) television productions.
And even if direct correspondence (which would allow us to pinpoint which
character has been shaped to resemble which contemporary politician) is
lacking, this by no means forecloses the possibility that a historical narrative
can put forth a message about governance. In this particular case, the
incompleteness of the analogy between Stolypin and Putin does not undo
the fact that the leadership qualities that the series puts forward can be
transferred onto the Russia of the twenty-ﬁrst century, even more so since
Nicholas II is portrayed as an indecisive ruler who, in fact, depends on Sto-
lypin to steer Russia towards salvation from revolutionary harm. But though
the Tsar is hardly Stolypin’s equal when it comes to leadership abilities, Sto-
lypin remains loyal and subservient, placing himself in the service of the state.
The series depicts the process of ‘democratisation’ following the 1905
revolution, a movement towards a system where governmental powers are to
some extent restricted by representative bodies. Yet the government is still
allowed to set aside the opinion of these bodies in order to directly implement
reforms. The argument that justiﬁes this (increased) level of autocracy stems
from the pressing need to counter subversive actions by oppositional forces
both within and outside the state apparatus, in order to preserve the condition
of stability that has been achieved and to prevent the weakening of the state.
Before delving into the depiction of Stolypin’s political adversaries
and, more speciﬁcally, their ties with foreign enemies, the second group of
opponents has to be introduced, the bombisty. The Combat Organisation
(Boevaia Organizatsiia), hereafter CO, the branch of the Party of Socialist
Petr Stolypin 57
Revolutionaries involved in terrorist attacks against state oﬃcials, is presented
as Stolypin’s main opponent. One of the policies most readily associated with
Stolypin, both in Soviet times and today, is indeed his harsh repression of
terrorist revolutionaries and the ﬁeld courts-martial he established to more
quickly put individuals suspected of revolutionary activities on trial (thus
‘Stolypin’s necktie’, referred to above). The series follows the CO extensively
in its preparation and execution of several attacks, among others on Prime
Minister Von Pleve, Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich and Stolypin himself.
Its members meet in smoke-ﬁlled, dimly lit drinking cellars, in private apart-
ments and in luxury restaurants where they indulge in champagne and deca-
dent suppers. The organisation consists mostly of young, idealistic men
inspired by nihilist, socialist or maximalist ideologies. They argue passio-
nately about who should be assassinated next, but are far removed from the
ordinary people whose interests they purportedly seek to defend. While their
ideals and motivation for joining the CO vary, they agree that terrorism is a
legitimate means of political action – indeed, the only eﬀective means of
challenging the tsarist state and bringing about substantial social change.
Fatal attacks are political deeds, not murders. They regard the loss of inno-
cent lives a necessary price to pay for the achievement of their goals. At the
same time, the series includes several episodes that argue that the revolution-
aries are mostly opportunists who will not stand by their ideals when faced
with resistance or oﬀered ﬁnancial beneﬁts. The recruiting of terrorists as
informers was a customary practice in the ﬁght against the revolutionary
movement. The series includes several such double agents, including one of
the main characters, Evno Azef.
The case of Evno Azef has become legendary. In the period covered by the
series, Azef headed the CO and was deeply involved in the planning and
execution of attacks. But he simultaneously leaked information about the CO
to the Okhrana. The pay he received in return for his inside information
allowed him to enjoy a lavish lifestyle. Furthermore, his links to the police
enabled him to eliminate enemies within the CO and maintain his position.
Azef, played by Aleksandr Stroev, is ﬁrst and foremost a person of excess. He
is smartly dressed, extroverted, engaging – a smooth talker who can turn
every situation to his advantage. He is a selﬁsh opportunist who does not care
whether his actions inﬂict damage on Russia or on the terrorist movement he
claims to believe in. Despite Azef ’s conﬁdent appearance, his way of life,
which requires him to play two opposing roles at the same time and run the
imminent risk of being unmasked, does not leave him unaﬀected. He is tor-
mented by an inner struggle that manifests itself through severe drinking and
frequent nightmares. He wakes up crying out to his imagined opponents to let
him go, begging his internal ﬁends to leave him in peace. The revolutionaries
who share an apartment in Moscow with him are driven to sleep-deprived
desperation, unable to rest because of Azef ’s nocturnal screaming. To the
outside world and especially to his contacts within the Okhrana he conceals
his anxiety, claiming to actually enjoy his double role: ‘I love to play games’.
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Most of what we learn about Azef ’s motives and his opinions about ter-
rorism is expressed in his discussions with Bogrov. He repeatedly emphasises
Bogrov’s Jewish background, linking it to his terrorist ambitions, and even
philosophises about the diﬀerence between Russians and Jews. Jews are too
sceptical, he thinks, while Russian have too much faith in Orthodoxy and the
tsar. Quite unexpectedly, Azef oﬀers up Stolypin as an example of this
‘weakness’ found in Russians. Whereas Bogrov speaks degradingly about
Stolypin (since he is only a governor at that time), Azef is more impressed
with him and even foresees that Stolypin will soon become a minister. But he
also predicts that if indeed Stolypin rises to power, terrorism will be done for.
In another discussion we learn that Azef is critical towards traditional reli-
gions and the materialist ideology of the Social Democrats (the future Bol-
sheviks) alike, and believes only in fate and death. This view is also expressed
in the way he speaks about the victims of terrorist acts. He ridicules Bogrov’s
scruples about trying to ensure that no innocent bystanders lose their lives in
the attacks; he sees their deaths as the necessary evil of terror. Indeed, the
absolutist state cannot be changed without the killing of innocents.
The motif of Jewishness is strongly expressed throughout the series. Indeed,
in the ﬁrst episode, not only is Bogrov’s religious background emphasised, but
Interior Minister Von Pleve actually calls upon a group of rabbis to stop their
youth from committing terrorist attacks. He dismisses their suggestion that
the situation can change only when Jews are given rights equal to those of
Russians (as Stolypin later attempts to do), and he warns that there will be
nationwide pogroms if they fail to control their followers. The anti-Semitic
undercurrent that intimates a direct relation between Judaism and revolutionary
inclinations has been discussed and criticised (Tsyrkun 2006; Kachkaeva 2006)
by, among others, the writer of the original script, Eduard Volodarskii. In an
interview in the renowned journal Iskusstvo kino (Balandina 2007), Volodarskii
distances himself from the series’ anti-Semitism via a direct oﬀensive against
Kuzin, whom he claims heavily rewrote the script without consulting him, to
such an extent that he can no longer agree with its content (ibid.). Kuzin has
responded angrily to this interview in several posts on his LiveJournal blog. He
denies having excluded Volodarskii from the project. Quite the contrary: he
claims that Volodarskii himself failed to comment on the extensive adaptation of
the script he proposed (Kuzin 2007a; Kuzin 2007b). Kuzin describes the script in
exclusively negative terms, calling it a ‘scenario that fell into a fainting ﬁt, swol-
len like a case of dropsy’ (Kuzin 2007b). Kuzin’s defence makes it clear that
Volodarskii might have been correct in claiming that he did not recognise his
writing in the end result:
The scenario E.R. Volodarskii wrote was incoherent and wordy and it
was impossible to ﬁt it to the format of 15 episodes. For starters, I cut it
in half. After substituting the oﬃcial jargon with words from the con-
temporary lexicon, I reworked the sluggish and archaic monologues; I
gave the scenes taken from Savinkov’s book an original look, placing
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emphasis on the characters of the historical personalities, their personal
lives. And all I have done was not out of a desire to annoy Eduard
Volodarskii, but because of the reluctance of the latter to cooperate with
the director.
(Kuzin 2007a)
Kuzin avoids the issue of Judaism and fails to address the accusation that he
added an ‘anti-Semite subtext’.
Azef ’s right-hand man Savinkov is, unlike Azef himself, truly committed to
the revolutionary cause and to terrorism. He is emotionally involved in his
mission and considers Azef to be his close friend: together they will shake the
foundations of the monarchy. The accusations against his boss lead him to
endure much anguished doubt, and he is unwilling to accept the unmasking
of Azef as a double agent for quite some time. According to Kuzin, Savinkov
is ‘conscientious. He is tormented with doubt, he feels the urge to get even
with himself ’ (Epanchina 2006). When Vladimir Burtsev mounts his accusa-
tions against Azef and the SR decides to investigate the case, Savinkov is
repeatedly shown taking a shower in an attempt to clear his head. The voice-
over of Azef reading a letter to Savinkov, in which he declares that he is loyal
to the state and not the revolution,7 and the intersecting shots of the pro-
ceedings of the SR trial demonstrate how he cannot shake oﬀ his doubts
about the loyalty of his purported friend. While the family background of
Bogrov is made explicit and, to a certain extent, presented as an explanation
for his revolutionary tendencies, Savinkov is not given a past. That Boris
Savinkov was actually Polish never comes up, even though the proposed law
on zemstvos in the Western provinces, aiming to decrease the political inﬂu-
ence of the Polish elite, features extensively in the conﬂicts between Stolypin
and the parliament. So while the overrepresentation of Poles is seen as a
threat to the position of ethnic Russians in the empire, they are not linked to
the revolutionaries. The possibility that the Polish region might secede never-
theless returns explicitly in the political testament dictated by Stolypin in the
ﬁnal episode (to which I will return shortly).
Enemies of the state as ‘foreign agents’
The CO’s foreign ﬁnancing and the terrorists’ frequent travels to Western
Europe are instrumental for the representation of their activities as a threat to
the Russian state. Indications of the links between foes abroad and domestic
enemies (the revolutionaries) can be found in almost every episode. Azef fre-
quently boards trains with their destinations explicitly shown, and the live
music played in the restaurants indicates which country they ﬁnd themselves
in. Berlin, Zurich, and Paris are favourite hideouts as they plan future attacks
beyond the reach of the Okhrana, so the series tells us. Finland is another
case in point. At the time, it was a Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire and
therefore enjoyed a considerable level of autonomy. In the series, the CO uses
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Finland as a safe haven for dynamite workshops and as a retreat to evade the
police. Because of Finland’s autonomous status, the imperial police forces
were not allowed to perform their duties on Finnish territory. In response to
successful attacks, the CO receives sizeable donations from (foreign) sym-
pathisers with the struggle against the Russian monarchy. The series indicates
two more sources of funding: attacks on money transports and funds received
from Western Freemasons.
Freemasonry, a classic bogeyman in Russian culture, not only ﬁnances ter-
rorist actions from the West. It turns out the organisation threatens the state
from inside its governmental apparatus as well. Indeed, Stolypin’s starkest
political adversaries are exposed as Freemasons. The masonic conspiracy
among high-proﬁle government representatives is introduced in a scene in
which a group of men, seated around a large oval glass table, roll a crystal
ball across the tabletop to call upon someone to speak. For the duration of
the entire scene, the camera follows the crystal ball as it passes from speaker
to speaker, showing the distorted reﬂections of the speakers’ faces in the glass.
Close-ups of the silver ring worn by one of the speakers indicate whom we are
dealing with here. Similar scenes follow in subsequent episodes and, even-
tually, the faces of the speakers are revealed. Among those involved in the
conspiracy are General Trepov and Pavel Kurlov, the head of the police
department. These men are also shown to be conspiring against Stolypin
during a church mass in the presence of the royal family and of Stolypin
himself, testifying to their audacity. In their ﬁnal meeting around the glass
table, the group reaches the decision that Stolypin has to be eliminated, and
Kurlov introduces his plan (see below).
The signiﬁcance of the Freemasons as an enemy of the state is underlined
by the eﬀorts of both the tsar and Stolypin to investigate the extent to which
Freemasonry is active in Russia, as well as masonic involvement in the revo-
lutionary movement and its threat to the Russian state. Stolypin sends his
close friend Ivan Alekseev, who is state counsellor with the Ministry of For-
eign Aﬀairs, to Western Europe to investigate the threat of war and the link
between domestic and foreign Freemasons. In France, Alekseev discusses
Freemasonry with a professor at the Sorbonne. He intimates that there might
be a link to Russians who have lived abroad in France and England, and
mentions the names of Herzen and Chernyshevskii. When his interlocutor
questions his claim that Chernyshevskii has lived abroad, Alekseev accuses
him of knowing nothing about Russian Freemasons. An interesting twist fol-
lows when the Frenchman subsequently (‘A propos …’) introduces Alekseev
to Lev Trotskii who has just wandered past, thus subtly reiterating linkages
between Freemasonry, revolutionaries and émigré Russians. In Germany
Alekseev is told that France is planning to go to war against Germany, but
England is reluctant to join the eﬀort without the involvement of Russia. If
they are successful in their concerted provocation, Russia would be forced to
clash with the German army. A meeting in a masonic lodge in Berlin sup-
ports Alekseev’s impression that the threat of war on Russia is imminent.
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Furthermore, he has discovered that Russian Freemasons keep in contact
with their foreign counterparts through international organisations.
Stolypin reports Alekseev’s ﬁndings to the tsar. For whom, the tsar asks,
would drawing Russia into war be beneﬁcial? ‘The revolutionary parties,’
Stolypin replies. ‘They need war like oxygen’. Thus, again, internal and
external enemies of the Russian state are presented as working in tandem. If
we place the series in the context of the year it was broadcast, it can be
argued that for the Russian viewer the argument described above would bring
to mind the law on non-commercial organisations that was adopted on 10
January 2006. The law required the majority of NGOs active in Russia,
including both domestic and foreign organisations, to re-register. This process
involved the submission of extensive information about their activities, ﬁnan-
cial sources and the organisations they had cooperated with, thereby giving
the state the opportunity to directly curtail the activities of human rights
organisations (Human Rights Watch 2008). In a similar fashion, the Free-
masons and the revolutionaries are presented as part of a complex network
of groups who seek to undermine the state; having permeated society, this
network must now be subjected to state control.
Enemies of Stolypin as enemies of the state
The scenes in Stolypin’s oﬃce introduce the viewer to a scale model of a
palace that Stolypin is building. This motif can be interpreted as oﬀering an
indication of Stolypin’s enemies and allies within the government. The model
is located in Stolypin’s oﬃce and, depending on the person he is receiving
there, the interaction with the model diﬀers. Some visitors (Kurlov, Azef) do
not interact with it at all. With others (Kokovtsev), the scene ends when Sto-
lypin walks over to the model and the visitor joins him. Alekseev is somewhat
more interested and either shakes hands with Stolypin above the model or
follows Stolypin’s example of kneeling beside it to take a closer look at its
details. The only person actually involved in building the model is Aleksandr
Gerasimov, head of the Okhrana in St Petersburg and the contact person for
Azef. The scale model makes its ﬁnal appearance after Stolypin’s death, when
a group of clerks is shown carefully documenting and archiving the posses-
sions left in his oﬃce. Still unﬁnished, the model is stacked away without
special notice. The way that the motif of the scale model recurs suggests that
it symbolises Stolypin’s vision for Russia. Over the course of several episodes,
he continues carefully and meticulously to work on it, and only a select few
support him in this process. His death means that the project of constructing
a new Russia has been halted prematurely – and, as with the scale model, his
plans were discarded by his successors. Stolypin’s palace under construction
can be contrasted with the model of a high tower kept by Nicholas II in a bell
jar, reﬂecting his conservative attitude towards the Russian state.
The series has the two groups of Stolypin’s enemies, the CO and the
masonic conspiracy within the Russian government, unite to commit their
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fatal attack on the prime minister. Although Bogrov has intended to kill Sto-
lypin for most of his time as a member of the CO, for reasons that never fully
become evident, only when he comes into contact with Kurlov does the per-
fect opportunity arise. Kurlov has come up with an intricate scheme in which
Bogrov will pretend to inﬁltrate a group of terrorists planning to assassinate
Stolypin. In response to his claim to prevent the bogus attack, Bogrov will be
given access to the theatre to point out the terrorists. On the basis of this
scheme, Bogrov is provided with a ticket in the capacity of an Okhrana agent.
During the ﬁrst act of the opera being performed in the theatre, Bogrov leaves
the hall in evident distress. He paces up and down the hallway, puts his hands
on his head and retreats to the bathroom to wash his face. When the bell rings
signalling the commencement of the second act, Bogrov returns to the hall as
audience members return to their seats. He walks up to Stolypin, who is
standing near the stage with his back turned to him. Bogrov takes a ﬁrst shot
that misses and injures a member of the orchestra. His second shot hits Sto-
lypin in the chest. Bogrov is seized by members of the audience while the tsar
disbelievingly watches the events unfold from his loge. In the midst of the
tumult, Stolypin looks up to the tsar and crosses himself as a ﬁnal testimony
of his loyalty. The audience starts to sing the national anthem as Stolypin is
carried out of the theatre. He dies in hospital a few days later.
Throughout the series Stolypin is given numerous warnings about the per-
sonal danger his political actions expose him to. Rasputin even twice foretells
his death in Kiev. Despite all this, Stolypin refuses to allow the Okhrana to
guard him and seems determined not to let himself become intimidated. But
the scene where he says goodbye to his family before departing on his fateful
journey to Kiev suggests that he sensed he would not return. This premoni-
tion is conﬁrmed by the fact that, while in Kiev, he orders his servant to write
down his political testament, to be given to the tsar in case of his assassina-
tion. His perseverance in issuing reforms in the face of these explicit threats
emphasises the idea that he has (literally) dedicated his life to safeguarding
Russia from imminent collapse.
The closing scene of the ﬁnal episode, and thus of the series as a whole,
vividly shows the consequences of Stolypin’s death for Russia. It reiterates the
frequently uttered claim that had Stolypin not been killed, Russia would not
have become involved in the First World War and the Bolshevik revolution
and subsequent civil war would not have happened. At several points in the
series such an outcome is predicted by, among others, Rasputin and Empress
Mariia Fedorovna. In the concluding scene, the royal family and Rasputin are
watching a ﬁlm screening. The fragments show military parades, religious
processions and images of the royal family. Then, the sound of a church mass
signals a shift in the images from those of peaceful Russia to those of the
First World War. As the tsar continues to watch the projection, it displays
images of warfare: explosions, trenches, cannons, tanks, zeppelins, crashing
airplanes and funerals. The intersecting close-ups of the face of the tsar show
emotions of confusion and distress. At the image of a sinking ship he closes
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his eyes. The subsequent images are evidently meant to indicate the destruc-
tion wrought by the revolutions of 1917 and the civil war. They show a
series of Orthodox churches as their cupolas are being pulled down. The
succession of images argues that Russia became involved in the First World
War as a consequence of the death of Stolypin. Moreover, it suggests his
death entailed the destruction of the monarchy and the Orthodox foundations
of the Russian state.
What, then, are the undrawn lessons of Stolypin? Several questions
addressed in the series, either in the parliamentary discussions or through the
representation of the revolutionaries, remain relevant today. Consider, for
example, the (political) relations between Russians and other ethnic groups
within the empire and the justiﬁcation of Russian political supremacy, and the
attempts to develop and populate Siberia. The apparent need for eﬀective
governmental control over the entire territory of the empire to prevent sub-
versive or secessionist movements, exempliﬁed by Finland, ﬁnds overt paral-
lels with contemporary Russia and the terrorist threats from within the
country’s territory. The two most telling lessons the series puts forward,
however, are the following. First, there is its characterisation of visionary
leadership combined with a high level of authoritarianism, which are asserted
as being essential to the proper governance of the new ‘democracy’. The
negative representation of the Duma as being ﬁrst and foremost an obstruc-
tion to the implementation of much-needed reforms, instead of an indis-
pensable representative of the people’s interests, is a further critique of the
superiority of a democratic system for Russia. Second, the series reiterates the
argument that the state’s domestic enemies, either within or outside the gov-
ernment, are facilitated or even guided by enemies in the West who envy or
fear the strength and potential of Russia. To counter these threats the state is
allowed to take strong measures. As Stolypin states in his defence of the Azef
aﬀair: a surgeon, to heal a sick person, must sometimes pick up a scalpel and
draw blood. While it is diﬃcult to prove that the representation of the CO in
Stolypin … The Undrawn Lessons was intentionally shaped to correspond to
and consolidate the notion that ‘foreign agents’ are insidiously working
against Russia’s interests, it is fair to argue that the portrayal of Stolypin’s
(and by extension, the Russian state’s) enemies resonates with political issues
dominating the public debate at the time when the series was ﬁrst broadcast.
Furthermore, this portrayal was the result of deliberate choices by those
involved in the production: it is quite possible to entertain other interpretations
of the historical material in question.
Apart from these implicit lessons, the ﬁnal episode also presents the viewer
with Stolypin’s political testament. In Kiev, as noted, Stolypin orders his ser-
vant, Kazimir, to transcribe a message to the tsar about how Russia should be
reformed should he be assassinated. From the scene in which Stolypin’s pos-
sessions are archived, we learn that this political testament has mysteriously
disappeared. The letter to the tsar was in Stolypin’s briefcase, which was col-
lected from the Okhrana. But its contents have gone missing. One of the men
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remarks tellingly that someone must have gotten there before them. The scene
also implies that, although early twentieth-century Russia was not spared the
tragedies that Stolypin’s visionary leadership would have prevented, twenty-
ﬁrst-century Russia can learn from the memory of Stolypin and thus should
not make the same mistakes. The way that state power (or at least the sensible
assertion of it for the beneﬁt of Russia) becomes personalised in the ﬁgure of
Stolypin in the series is very similar to the personalisation of power under
Putin. Therefore, the series appears to subscribe to the view that proper state
leadership is not dependent on a type of government or group of statesmen,
but rather is connected to a singular extraordinary leader.
In a discussion programme on Radio Svoboda commenting on the TV
series, the journalist and television critic Sergei Varshavchik concluded that its
director had a single idea in mind, namely ‘that the strengthening of the ver-
tical of power is impossible without intelligent, talented reformers’ (Kach-
kaeva 2006), an idea that was evidently aimed to draw a parallel with
contemporary politics. This linkage ties in with the genealogy of great Russian
reformers that was introduced earlier. Historian Nikita Sokolov, also taking
part in the discussion, added in a similar vein that the modern style of language
used in the series, not at all faithful to that of the time period portrayed, was
explicitly chosen to encourage the viewer to connect past and present:
I […] believe that this [the simpliﬁcation of the language in the dialogue,
M.W.] was done completely intentionally in order to pull it together with
the external situation as much as possible, and to embed a certain ideol-
ogy in the mind of the viewer: that this represents a strong power, and
that it should not be interfered with in any way but, rather, be allowed to
operate. The TV series […] The Undrawn Lessons of Stolypin [sic] appears
to say that one should not interfere with a great reformer. Not interfere
with a great man who assumes responsibility.
(Kachkaeva 2006)
There is little need to clarify whom Varshavchik’s immediate reply, ‘Even for
a third term in oﬃce’, refers to.
The TV series was broadcast on state television well before President Putin
began to refer to Stolypin as an exemplary ﬁgure on a regular basis, which
started around 2008. While a signiﬁcant number of the thematic constructions
developed in the series continued to be associated with Stolypin’s memory (as
will become clear below), certain connotations did not. The more extreme,
conspiratorial elements, especially those implicating Freemasonry, did not carry
over into subsequent TV portrayals or into the oﬃcial political discourse.
The Name is Russia (2008): Petr Stolypin
The cross-media project The Name Is Russia, which set out to elect the
greatest Russian of all time, prompted much Russian and even international
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discussion in 2008, as is explored in depth in chapter 4. While it came as a
surprise to many when Nevskii was crowned the winner, the runner-up may
have raised even more eyebrows. Before the project, Petr Stolypin was a
familiar name among historians and politicians, but his political legacy was
little known beyond these professional circles. As noted earlier, opinion polls
indicate that Stolypin has never been very popular (Gudkov 2010: 39), which
makes it all the more surprising that Stolypin was elected the second most
popular Russian of all time by the programme’s vote. The following analysis
limits itself to the arguments that were put forward in the live show about
Stolypin concerning his candidacy and to the way the project contributed to
the discursive and visual consolidation of his memory image (see chapter 4 for
a comprehensive analysis of the project). The broadcast exempliﬁes the cru-
cial role of remediation in the construction of new cultural memories. In this
case, the TV series examined above provided the visually appealing material
needed to boost the public’s familiarity with the long-dead politician.
It is fair to assume, though, that the TV series about Stolypin reached only
a limited audience when it was broadcast.8 Stolypin’s candidacy on The Name
Is Russia was therefore an important event in the eﬀorts to popularise his
memory, one that had the potential to decisively shape the public’s perception
of his political legacy. How the politician was characterised and portrayed in
the opening statement and clip is particularly signiﬁcant because of the
authoritative tone adopted by the programme: the introductory clip, a recur-
ring feature in all episodes, comes across as a more or less factual summary of
what is known about the person and what has shaped our understanding of
his or her acts (e.g. ﬁlms). It also outlines the themes and parameters for the
subsequent discussion. The introduction of host Aleksandr Liubimov reiter-
ates the frequently heard argument that Stolypin’s reforms might well have
averted Russia’s involvement in the First World War and the 1917 revolutions:
Stolypin was the person ‘about whom it was often said and continues to be
said: if he had lived, […] three or four years would have suﬃced and our
country would have would taken a completely diﬀerent path’.
The clip argues that Russia was in a state of crisis following the 1905
revolution and that times of crisis require a special type of leader: someone
who possesses a thorough understanding of urgent problems and is always
ready to act vigorously, someone who does not allow himself to be intimi-
dated by any kind of resistance. Tsar Nicholas II recognised these capacities
in Stolypin and appointed him minister, overruling Stolypin’s initial rejection
of the oﬀer. The state of aﬀairs when he took oﬃce is characterised as a
moment of political deadlock. Social unrest (high levels of unemployment,
revolutionary tendencies, strikes, pogroms) was severe enough to warrant
drastic measures, yet neither the tsar nor the (democratic) opposition was
willing to grant the population civil rights and both tended instead towards
the dictatorship of the state. Only Stolypin, it is claimed, acknowledged that
dictatorship was a dead end (tupik) and reform was necessary to resolve the
crisis; this, it is claimed, was also why he refused to cooperate with the
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opposition. Stolypin implements his reforms in the face of ﬁerce political
resistance and several attempts on his life, and the country starts to reap the
rewards of his bold action. As we see archival footage of streets bustling with
activity, railways, industry and long lines of women working eﬃciently, the
voice-over enumerates the excellent results of Stolypin’s reform package:
agricultural production increased dramatically and Russia’s economic posi-
tion as well as its industrial production improved signiﬁcantly. In fact, it is
claimed, the brief period under Stolypin was the most productive period of
the entire twentieth century in Russia.
His policies’ evident success was nevertheless insuﬃcient to stiﬂe adverse
criticism or halt terrorism. Failure to recognise the eﬃciency of his reforms
came from all directions, the clip asserts: Stolypin was portrayed as the
oppressor of revolution by forces on the left, the destroyer of the privileged
position of the nobility in state structures by those on the political right, and
the empress, for her part, felt that Stolypin undeservedly overshadowed the
tsar. As the camera slowly zooms in on a photograph of Stolypin as he lies in
state, his phrase that twenty years of stability would transform Russia beyond
recognition is reiterated with the addition that he was given less than ﬁve. It is
concluded, somewhat spitefully, that Stolypin did not receive the posthumous
honour he deserved, neither in the ﬁnal years of the tsarist empire nor there-
after. A modest monument, it is stated, was erected with funds raised by Altai
farmers, but destroyed soon after in 1917. As the voice-over summarises: ‘The
new Russia did not need Stolypin’.
The introduction incorporates extensive clips from the TV series: scenes of
Stolypin before the Duma and the State Council, his fearless confrontation
with revolutionaries in Saratov and the subsequent attempt on his life, Bogrov
aiming his pistol at the prime minister in the Kiev opera house and Stolypin
looking at his bloodstained hand after he has been shot. The scenes are
played in slow motion, without the original sound and with two scenes
superimposed onto each other. The theme of the scale model under con-
struction as a visual metaphor of Stolypin’s eﬀorts to (re)build Russia returns.
But whereas in the TV series the model was left unﬁnished and forgotten,
here it is eﬀectively destroyed. The narrative telling of Stolypin’s political acts
is interspersed with close-up shots of a hand piling up wooden blocks, placing
a knight to protect it and showing a toy train eﬀortlessly weaving its way
through the newly built fortress of wooden houses, symbolising the beneﬁ-
cence of Stolypin’s reforms. Following his assassination, however, the train
derails. The knight-ﬁgure is tipped over and brings down several towers in its
fall. A panning shot shows the model built by Stolypin as it lies in ruins. As
we return to the studio, Liubimov mentions the Fund for the Study of P.A.
Stolypin’s Legacy, whose activities were discussed above. He holds up one of
their publications on Stolypin and discloses that the Fund was closely
involved in the production of the show.
In his plea for Stolypin, Mikhalkov emphasises four elements: ﬁrst, he
addresses how the opinion of most viewers about the prime minister was
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shaped by Soviet education and was currently, therefore, pronouncedly nega-
tive. Here, he emphasises Russia’s dire situation at the beginning of the
twentieth century, the extensive threat posed by terrorists and the fact that
the number of people tried by the ﬁeld courts-martial is small compared with
the many that endured Soviet repression. Second, Stolypin was a visionary
who foresaw the rapid rise of China and completed the agrarian reforms
initiated by Aleksandr II (e.g. the actual transfer of land to farmers). The
eﬀect of these reforms was far-reaching since, according to Mikhalkov, the
population growth achieved under Stolypin of some thirty million people over
the course of a decade resulted from a renewal of faith among the people in
their potential and their future prospects. Finally, only Stolypin took action to
strengthen the Russian state instead of engaging in liberal talk or arousing an
insurgency among the population. Mikhalkov concludes by stating that Sto-
lypin surpasses other great heads of state, such as Aleksandr Nevskii, Alek-
sandr II, Catherine the Great and even Peter the Great, in his ability to
combine a visionary capacity with decisiveness: ‘He foresaw and was able [to
correct the country’s course] and for that he paid with his life’.
Mikhalkov explicitly calls for reading the turmoil of 1905 in parallel to that
of the Russia of the 1990s. After outlining the ailments of state and society
and summarising the time when Stolypin took oﬃce as the ‘roaring 1900s’ in
clear analogy to the common catchphrase ‘the roaring 1990s’ (likhie 90-e), he
points out how this era was very similar to the Russian experience of the
preceding twenty years. The statement is met with applause. The argument
about population growth is paired with the statement that, from 1994 to 2004,
there was zero population growth in Russia. According to Mikhalkov, the
solution to overcome such a state of crisis, both then and now, is ﬁrst to stabi-
lise the country and then to implement extensive reforms: ﬁrm action against
crime and corruption should be paired with a systemic reform package.
(Then) Metropolitan Kirill endorses Mikhalkov’s plea and provides a reli-
gious and spiritual rephrasing of its main points. He mentions that Stolypin’s
eﬀorts at religious reform, in parallel to European examples, was grounded in
the notion of freedom of religion. At the same time, however, he continues,
Stolypin understood the importance of Russian Orthodoxy to the Russian
people and the nation’s future, and regarded it as the ﬁrst among religions (we
will come across this argument again in chapter 4). Metropolitan Kirill
reiterates the idea that Stolypin was, anachronistically, a highly contemporary
politician. In fact, he states, his reforms should have been the foundation for
Russia’s restructuring following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in parti-
cular with regard to its spirit (dukh): reforms that fail to take into account the
needs and wishes of the people will not succeed, because the national character –
the nation’s ‘thousand-year old form’ – cannot be altered.
Viktor Chernomyrdin, the late politician who served as prime minister
from 1992 to 1998, echoes the claim that no other historical ﬁgure suits the
current era as well as Stolypin, who, he states, uniquely combined being a
reformer and a patriot (on par with Peter the Great and Aleksandr II).
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Stolypin’s reforms, he adds, continue to be relevant to all aspects of econom-
ics and governance, yet their implementation requires courage. Their eﬀects
could be drastic. Indeed, the implementation of Stolypin’s reforms in full
would have averted not just the revolutions of 1917 but the First World War
as well. Poet Iurii Kublanovskii goes so far as to say that if Pushkin is con-
sidered the zenith of Russian literature, Stolypin occupies this position in
politics. The tragedy of his death, he continues, equals that of the great poet.
Renowned painter Il’ia Glazunov praises the agrarian reforms and Stolypin’s
measures seeking to stimulate migration to Siberia. To underpin his views, he
recounts an anecdote from his visit to a village in Siberia founded around that
time. A local granny, he asserts, recalled how farmers had received as much
land as they could farm.
A recurrent theme is how, in Russian history, reformers tend to be mis-
understood by their contemporaries. The late physicist and television host
Sergei Kapitsa argues that in Russian history, reformers are tragic ﬁgures and
the occupation of prime minister is a dangerous one. The lesson to take away
from the memory of Stolypin, he concludes, is how urgently the relation
between reformers and the state apparatus needs to change. Andrei Sakharov,
the director of the Institute of Russian History, relates how opinion polls
demonstrate continued societal dissensus about reformers such as Stolypin.
This, he adds, is part of the ‘grievous path’ they are fated to follow: reformers
occupy the vanguard and have concrete ideas about addressing pressing mat-
ters, yet their actions are more rapidly transformative and far-reaching than
society and the establishment are willing to accept – a fact that many had to
pay for with their lives. According to Dmitrii Rogozin, the then representative
of the Russian Federation to NATO, Stolypin exempliﬁes the certain failure
of reforms in the absence of public support. As a direct result of his policies,
which simultaneously advanced liberalisation and ‘crushed’ the political elite,
Stolypin lacked the political and societal backing he needed. For those view-
ers who failed to notice that the discussion about Stolypin and the fate of
reformers in general is to be understood in reference to Putin, host Liubimov
at one point reminds the viewer that there is a link between the two men.
Somewhat out of place and without evident relevance to the ongoing discus-
sion, he points out that Putin used to work and live in Dresden, the German
city where Stolypin was born.
In the discussion, there are remarkably few arguments opposed to Stolypin.
One person who disagrees with the general sentiment of approval is Ziuganov,
who, as chairman of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation,
upholds Lenin’s assessment of Stolypin as the hangman-in-chief. This is not
so surprising since, within the format of the show, there is an obvious need for
a dissenting voice to make the discussion interesting. Ziuganov is the obvious
candidate for this role. Yet his criticism is relatively mild. He contradicts the
claim that the revolutionaries caused more bloodshed than Stolypin’s repres-
sive measures and quotes Lev Tolstoi’s negative appraisal of him. He also
argues that Stolypin should not have dismantled the obshchina – the
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traditional peasant communes – but should rather have taken its form to be
the foundation for a new structuring of the state, since it constituted a genu-
inely Russian type of societal organisation. But Ziuganov actually praises
Stolypin on several points, notably his recognition of the necessity of
addressing the agrarian population’s living conditions and actively devel-
oping Siberia. Dmitrii Rogozin cites the example of Sergei Vitte, Stolypin’s
predecessor, to frame his argument that there is indeed occasion for criti-
cism. In the opinion of Vitte, Stolypin’s liberal reputation by no means
corresponded to the reality of his actions. Mikhalkov objects to Rogozin’s
remark on the grounds that Vitte harboured a grudge against his successor
and therefore does not constitute a neutral source of information. Sergei
Kapitsa voices another reservation. He points out that Mikhalkov mis-
takenly idealises the economic progress achieved under Stolypin: in the
twenty-ﬁrst century, he states, the most successful economies are structured
in a fundamentally diﬀerent way, with an emphasis on service industries,
not agriculture. To imitate Stolypin’s reforms in any way would therefore
be erroneous.
Despite these instances of criticism, Mikhalkov takes advantage of his
position as chair to summarise the discussion in a positive light. He asserts
that of all the contenders, the discussion regarding Stolypin was most con-
cerned with debating the state of contemporary Russia and the problems it
faces. This is the case, he asserts, because Stolypin ‘concretely’ (real’no)
demonstrated the country’s potential for rapid development. He repeats the
claim that had Stolypin been given ﬁfteen or twenty years in power, Russia
would have become an entirely diﬀerent country. Therefore, he concludes,
Russia needs the memory of Stolypin ‘like oxygen’ (kak vozdukh). The sig-
niﬁcance of Mikhalkov’s sponsorship of the Stolypin memory should not be
underestimated. According to a 2008 poll commissioned by Kommersant and
conducted by the independent Levada Centre and VTsIOM, Mikhalkov
ranked seventh in the top 100 of the Russian elite, a list topped by Putin,
Medvedev and singer Alla Pugachova (Alekseev 2008). Polls by the Levada
Centre have shown that Mikhalkov was considered to be the most inﬂuential
person of the societal and cultural elite of Russia in 2010 and 2011, ranking
above Patriarch Kirill (‘Rossiiane nazvali predstavitelei elity strany’ 2012). In
the overall list, which includes politicians, businessmen, cultural ﬁgures, jour-
nalists, stars of popular culture and high-proﬁle athletes, Mikhalkov has been
ranked the eighth (2010) and seventh (2011) most inﬂuential person in Russia
(‘Rossiiane nazvali predstavitelei elity strany’ 2012). Moreover, his position as
chair of the jury allowed Mikhalkov to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the course of
the discussions and authoritatively summarise the meaning and relevance of
the candidates at the end of each episode. There is, however, reason to suspect
that Mikhalkov had a say in the production of the show in ways that go
beyond what is customary for a panellist. When, in the ﬁrst show, Mikhalkov
is instituted as chairman by unanimous vote, the host substantiates his capa-
city to occupy the position by referring to the role Mikhalkov played in his
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ﬁlm 12 (2007). Incongruously, given the ﬂow of the show, a clip from the ﬁlm
is shown: an obvious case of improper advertising.
In an interview published on the project’s website, Mikhalkov answers
questions from viewers and again emphasises that ‘Petr Arkadevich stood
before the exact same problems we face today’ (‘Rezhisser Nikita Mikhalkov
otvechaet na voprosy zritelei proekta “Imia Rossiia”’ 2008). Here it becomes
clear that Mikhalkov’s perception of the nature of Russian politics and culture
is more closely interwoven with religious elements than had been apparent in
the TV show. One of the questions concerns how to form highly educated
individuals with high moral standards in today’s religiously and nationally
multifaceted world. The answer, Mikhalkov claims, lies in an ‘Orthodox
upbringing’: ‘Not in the sense of a parish school, but in the sense of attach-
ment to those cultural traditions, roots, and moral criteria familiar to a Rus-
sian person’ (‘Rezhisser Nikita Mikhalkov otvechaet na voprosy zritelei
proekta “Imia Rossiia”’ 2008). This Orthodox upbringing should have as its
aim the fostering of resilience, a kind of ‘national immunity’ (natsional’nyi
immunitet) that enables one to act and think freely. This national immunity,
he continues, consists of
grandmother’s fairytales, of all that is absorbed together with the
mother’s milk, including the words of the Divine Liturgy on Sunday that
children and also adults do not always understand. But in this lies a
mystical connection across the centuries, because Aleksandr Nevskii and
Dmitrii Donskoi heard those exact same words. It is a sacred connection!
It is the bond [underlying] our national genetic code.
(Ibid.)
This ‘national genetic code’ view closely resembles the ‘civilisational code’
argument frequently used by (then) Metropolitan Kirill, including during The
Name Is Russia broadcasts. Mikhalkov invests great signiﬁcance in The Name
Is Russia and what a vote for Stolypin and, as is evident from his choice of
words, Putin would signify:
I believe that, in order to prevent such a disaster, we need enlightened
conservatism and armed evolution – and Stolypin is exactly that. There-
fore I vote for him and I advise you to do the same if you want to live a
normal life.
(Ibid.)
On 26 December 2008, in the ﬁnal days of voting, a discussion appeared on
the project’s LiveJournal blog on the likelihood of Stolypin winning the com-
petition. The author of the initial post ﬁrmly believed this would happen: the
Russian people, he proclaimed, have understood the importance of Stoly-
pin and will cast their votes for him, despite the eﬀorts of provocateurs to
meddle with the results to have Stalin win (ratnik07 2008. See also chapter
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4). One of the users responding to the post (0987655 2008) is equally
convinced Stolypin will be chosen, but for entirely diﬀerent reasons. He
summarises:
1 N.S. Mikhalkov is used to being ﬁrst (whenever possible) and would
not have agreed to take part in the project The Name Is Russia if he
had doubts about ‘the success’ of his ‘defendant’.
2 The voting results of this project are a peculiar ‘New Year’s present
and parting words’ for a person we all know.
If this project had taken place in, say, 2006 then, I assume, N.S.
Mikhalkov would have ‘defended’ Peter I or Aleksandr II for reasons
clear to all.
(0987655 2008)
In the end, however, Stolypin failed to secure the victory. Whether the out-
come of the project was rigged and the project was indeed a New Year’s pre-
sent for Putin remains diﬃcult to prove (we will return to allegations of
falsiﬁcation in chapter 4). What is certain, however, is that the project’s pro-
ducers did their utmost to support the candidacy of Stolypin – the outsider
who was evidently meant to be associated with the (then) prime minister.
Stolypin’s surprise appearance among the 12 ﬁnalists, along with his high-
proﬁle representative and unexpected (supposedly popular) success, serves as
an indication that, in 2008, a high-level eﬀort was underway to popularise
Stolypin’s memory among the general public. To do so, the project built upon
the previous TV series to shape and consolidate a visual and moving image of
the great reformer. The Name Is Russia demonstrates a deﬁnitive reorienta-
tion of popularisation eﬀorts from the intellectual and political elites, who
were to take direct inspiration from Stolypin’s policies and ideas, to the mass
audience, for whom the symbolic representation of exceptional leadership in
times of crisis took precedence. The shift from the policy to the symbolic
domain both necessitated and was facilitated by the creation of suﬃcient his-
torical and visual literacy concerning Stolypin: a clear, accessible and rela-
table set of images, catchphrases and explicit analogies with current issues.
The Name Is Russia catered to this need.
Petr Stolypin: A Shot at Russia (2012)
The documentary Petr Stolypin: A Shot at Russia, narrated and directed by
Nikita Mikhalkov, was broadcast by Russia 1 in 2012. Many of the themes
introduced in the 2006 TV series and via Mikhalkov’s plea for him on The
Name Is Russia reappear in the documentary. Two years before, Mikhalkov
had explicitly mentioned Stolypin in his political manifesto propagating
‘enlightened conservatism’ as one of the politicians who abided by its princi-
ples (Mikhalkov 2010). The documentary reiterates the main tenets of the
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manifesto, which emphasised the importance of a strong vertical of power,
gradual and state-guided reform, and the centrality of tradition and the
Orthodox faith in safeguarding the Russian nation. The documentary was
produced on the occasion of the Stolypin commemorative year and was
broadcast in prime time on 14 April, Stolypin’s birthday.9 As might be
expected of Mikhalkov, it is aesthetically pleasing and carries an emotionally
persuasive soundtrack. To increase its credentials, the documentary employs
multiple experts.10 While the production had most likely been initiated at an
earlier time (the plans for the Stolypin year were ﬁrst announced in 2010), the
concurrence of its premiere with the Russian protest movement of 2011/12
gives it particular relevance. As will become clear below, Mikhalkov has in fact
commented directly on the link between the protesters and the power struggles
faced by the pre-revolutionary politician. Therefore, the documentary should
be viewed in the context of the state’s response to the growing social unrest that
culminated in street protests during the winter of 2011.
The documentary describes Stolypin’s life from birth until death and comes
close to presenting him as a martyr. It is argued that after becoming minister
of the interior, Stolypin sought to cooperate with the Duma but all attempts
at collaboration were thwarted by the unwillingness of (several of) the repre-
sentative parties. Mikhalkov personally acts out several of the prime minis-
ter’s signature speeches in front of the Duma – that is, considerably
abbreviated and edited versions of them, as had also been the case in the TV
series. The image presented of Stolypin is an idealised one: apart from being a
political visionary, Stolypin is modest, economical, pious, generous, dedicated
to his country and the tsar, and a loving family man to boot. Repeated here is
the idea, which we saw in the TV series, that an aﬀectionate character is
hidden behind an outwardly stern appearance. The documentary by extension
implies that the same holds for Putin, who is commonly characterised by his
stern posture in public appearances. Meanwhile, while Stolypin is dedicating
his life to reforming his country, his future assassin, Dmitrii Bogrov, is pur-
suing his studies in Europe, eagerly reading anarchist literature – and, as it
turns out, he is not alone. According to Mikhalkov, cities like Munich and
Paris were inhabited by extensive groups of high-born Russians who enjoyed
criticising the state of Russian politics from a safe distance (‘It was fashion-
able’). To provide Bogrov’s character with some depth and explain how such
a fortunate young man might be capable of committing political murder, the
viewer is informed that he was Jewish, liked to gamble, and had the slightly
morbid hobby of collecting insects (an actor playing Bogrov emotionlessly
drives a pin through a beetle to attach it to a display board). Mikhalkov’s
reasoning is at times ﬂawed and based on hindsight – for instance, when he
explains that Bogrov chose to kill Stolypin instead of the tsar ‘because Stoly-
pin was more dangerous than the emperor. Because precisely he represented
what could have saved Russia from terrible revolution and bloody civil war.’
Implicitly and at times quite explicitly the documentary constructs the
political opposition to be enemies of the state. As a result, it provides
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justiﬁcation for repressive measures and the limitation of democratic rights.
Members of the opposition are portrayed as materialistic, selﬁsh individuals
who lack a real or viable vision for Russia, block the leadership’s attempts at
constructive reform and steer a path that will result in bloody revolution
(again viewed retrospectively). But in particular, and this is where direct par-
allels with the contemporary political discourse come to the fore, members of
the opposition are again depicted as ‘foreign agents’ who receive funds from
abroad and spend a lot of time in the West. In this sense, they are put on a
par with those fortunate Russian youth with anarchist inclinations who have
been educated in the West, such as Bogrov. Moreover, it is intimated that
they are willing to abandon the country as soon as they get the chance. In
other words, all forms of opposition are equated with treason towards the
national cause. This bears a striking similarity to the arguments used in
some propagandistic non-historical TV programmes of the time. For
instance, there are clear analogies between the representation of the early
twentieth-century opposition and terrorist groups and the discursive strate-
gies used to negatively depict the leaders of the Russian protest movement in
the two documentaries broadcast by NTV in 2012 under the title Anatomy
of a Protest (Anatomiia protesta). Consider, for instance, the claim that
Sergei Udal’tsov received funding from the Georgian state oﬃcial Givi
Targamadze, who allegedly was also behind the Orange Revolution in
Ukraine, to attempt to overthrow the current regime in Russia. Further-
more, the documentary about Stolypin echoes the opinions expressed in one
of the articles by Putin published in the run-up to the 2012 presidential
elections, in which he argues in favour of ‘stable development’. In addition
to an exposition of the beneﬁts of such a strategy, the article oﬀers a character
sketch of its main adversary:
A constantly recurring problem in Russian history is the pursuit of part
of its elite of rupture, of revolution instead of consistent development.
Meanwhile, not just the Russian experience, but also the overall global
experience demonstrates the malignancy of historical bursts: of rushing
forward and subversion without creation.
(Putin 2012a)
It is intimated that such ‘revolutionaries’ do not represent the will of the
majority of the population and, as a result, can rule only by making deceptive
promises of a brighter future. Such a situation, Putin claimed, is untenable,
even undemocratic:
There can be no real democracy without the acceptance of politics by the
majority of the population, without it reﬂecting the interests of this
majority. Yes, it is possible to capture a signiﬁcant part of society with
ringing slogans [and] images of a wonderful future for a short period. But
when people do not see themselves in that future afterwards they will
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turn away from politics and societal challenges for a long time. This has
occurred multiple times in our history.
(Ibid.)
Any kind of broad popular support for non-incremental change, even if
achieved in a democratic setting, should thus be seen as the result of the
public being deceived.
Despite Mikhalkov’s reputation as a monarchist, his depiction of Tsar
Nicholas II is markedly negative.11 The tsar is characterised as an alienated
ruler who has lost touch with his people and with the overall socio-political
reality that surrounds him. Unlike Stolypin, he fails to recognise the severity
and imminence of the revolutionary threat and its potential to disrupt the
very foundations of the Russian Empire. As proof, Mikhalkov reads an
inscription on one of the walls in the Winter Palace. Using Nicholas’s nick-
name, it reads: ‘Niki 1902. Looking at the Hussars. 7 March.’ As he stands at
the exact place where the tsar looked out from the palace window, Mikhalkov
fantasises about how it would have been that day, some two years before the
birth of Aleksei, the heir to the throne. The inscription was made sixty days
before the fatal attack on Interior Minister Dmitrii Sipiagin, when, as
Mikhalkov emphasises, ‘the terror’ begins. As the soundtrack takes on a
threatening tone and the viewer is presented with feature-ﬁlm excerpts of ter-
rorist attacks manipulated to appear aged, he claims that the inscription
demonstrates how the tsar was unaware of or blind to the impending uphea-
vals. Melancholically, he sketches the years leading up to the 1905 revolution
as the calm before the storm. Referring to Nicholas’s diaries, he claims that
the tsar lacked any interest in political matters, conservatively prioritised the
maintenance of stability and valued family life ﬁrst and foremost. Following
the attack on Stolypin’s dacha on Aptekarskii Island in 1906, the family moved
to the Winter Palace where, Mikhalkov asserts, the imperial family was eﬀec-
tively ‘in hiding’. At that time, he continues, the palace closely resembled a
crypt for the Romanov family. The tsar’s withdrawal from the people stood in
direct contrast to Stolypin’s drive to continue to engage with the ordinary man,
despite the risks this posed to his life.
To enliven and underpin its argument, the documentary draws upon docu-
ments of various types, visuals and material objects, making extensive use of
archival ﬁlm and photographs as well as feature-ﬁlm excerpts.12 Many of
these visual materials have been manipulated in some way: feature ﬁlm is
shown in black and white, photographs are altered to simulate depth.
Mikhalkov follows in Stolypin’s footsteps and visits all the signiﬁcant loca-
tions relating to his life and legacy (among others, the family estate, Saratov,
the Kiev opera and the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra). Letters from Stolypin and the
tsar are read aloud and, repeatedly, material links between past and present
are highlighted: Mikhalkov touches the very desk at which Stolypin sat when
the attack on the dacha occurred and shows the family mansion that has since
become a ruin, the (now) empty grand ballrooms of the Winter Palace; the
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camera zooms in on the very chair in the Kiev opera where Stolypin was sit-
ting moments before he was shot. The documentary continues to build upon
the visual image of Stolypin that was ﬁrst established in the TV series and
remediated in the introductory clip on The Name Is Russia. Instead of using
fragments from the TV series, however, Mikhalkov shot new scenes in which
the same actor, Oleg Klishin, plays Stolypin. What is striking about these
scenes is Stolypin’s silence. In a way, they function as the moving versions of
the photographs that are shown, as an animation of memory images or evo-
cations of the past. This eﬀectively establishes and aﬃrms temporal distance.
The only occasions when Stolypin’s ‘voice’ can be heard occur through the
intermediary of Mikhalkov. In a metaphorical sense, then, there are two Sto-
lypins in the documentary: a historical ﬁgure (in photographic images and
silent impersonation) and an anachronistic presence who literally speaks to
and from the present as Mikhalkov acts out key speeches. The high degree of
adaptation in the speeches aﬃrms the split of ‘Stolypin’ into a past (historical)
and current (memory) image: the original appearance is left intact (photo-
graphs, the static impersonation by Klishin, the showing of the pedestal from
which he delivered his speeches) even as its content is made more malleable
(in the rephrasing of statements and how they speak about the present).
Mikhalkov was not the ﬁrst to climb onto the Duma’s pedestal and read a
Stolypin speech on camera. In his historical TV series The Russian Empire
(Rossiiskaia imperiia, 2000–2003), Leonid Parfenov opted for the same set-up.
Yet Mikhalkov’s performance – his theatricality in acting out the speeches –
as well as his personal political ambitions create a potent association between
him and the historical ﬁgure he is reanimating.
Compared to Mikhalkov’s defence of Stolypin on The Name Is Russia, the
documentary places far greater emphasis on the prime minister’s noble birth
and religiosity. In fact, the documentary’s portrayal of Stolypin suggests that
Mikhalkov strongly identiﬁes with the politician on a personal level, as it
echoes important aspects of the image Mikhalkov has created of himself: both
are of noble descent, both are intelligent and ostensibly good-intentioned men
who, through circumstance and hard work, ﬁnd themselves close to the
powers that be. They use their privileged position in society to support and
strengthen the state instead of acting in opposition to it. It is intimated that,
in this respect, Stolypin, and by analogy Mikhalkov, diﬀers from those mem-
bers of the so-called intelligentsia who manoeuvre against state leadership as
if by default. They represent a ‘serious’ type of intellectual whose actions are
truly beneﬁcial to the nation as they balance rubbing shoulders with those in
power with maintaining a constructive critical stance on political matters. A
type of intellectual who is sympathetic to the well-being of the people and
also has a clear vision for the future development of the state and the nation.
Mikhalkov has commented on the connection between himself and the prime
minister in a local news item shot in Saratov, where he was recording scenes
for the documentary (‘Mikhalkov “zamakhnulsia” na gubernatora’ 2012). In
the interview he states that he has recently learnt that he is directly related to
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Stolypin on his father’s side. When exactly and in what context this discovery
was made (and whether he deliberately searched for this information) remain
unclear. In the interview, Mikhalkov reiterates the lesson to be drawn from
Stolypin’s tragic fate, namely that it should be acknowledged that, in Russia,
a strong power vertical is a necessary protective condition, without which the
country will slide into chaos. In apparent response to a direct question,
Mikhalkov asserts that Putin is the leader who comes closest to Stolypin.
On multiple occasions, Mikhalkov has demonstrated that his interest in the
memory of Stolypin is not so much historical as symbolic. According to
Mikhalkov, developments in contemporary Russia in many ways mirror those
of Stolypin’s time; if we fail to recognise and learn from the mistakes made a
century ago, history might well repeat itself. In a short article advocating the
contemporary relevance of Stolypin, Mikhalkov vividly sums up the condi-
tion the Russian state was in when ‘the great reformer’ took up oﬃce as prime
minister in 1906:
Corroded by the poison of Nechaev’s radicalism and liberal nihilism,
Russian society was falling apart. It could and would not unite out of
love for something. It united around hatred.
A weak power without authority that enabled a monstrous wave of
terrorism. A state system eroded by corruption. The disgraceful defeat of
the Russian army in the war with Japan. And even more disgraceful was
the attitude of the Russian liberal intelligentsia towards this defeat,
sending congratulatory telegrams to the Mikado.
An immense budgetary deﬁcit, impending ﬁnancial collapse, halting
business, outﬂow of capital abroad. Authorities are begging Western
governments and bankers for loans.
Separatism in the borderlands. Suppression of the peasants. Societal
feelings of hopelessness and disbelief, spiritual crisis, mass alcoholism, a
decreasing birth rate.
The tumultuous 1900s … . It rings familiar, doesn’t it?
(Mikhalkov 2012)
The choice of words in the ﬁnal sentence makes it abundantly clear that the
characterisation of the ﬁrst decade of the twentieth century is meant to refer
to the ‘tumultuous 1990s’ in equal measure. In Mikhalkov’s subsequent praise
for how the prime minister managed to ‘save the country’ from this state of
despair in a mere ﬁve years, the name of Stolypin appears to be interchange-
able with that of Putin. Furthermore, what Stolypin would have wanted for
Russia in the twenty-ﬁrst century is what Mikhalkov symbolically calls ‘the
Russian cross’: ‘the organically connected vertical axis of state power and
horizontal axis of culturе and civil society’ (ibid.).
In this vision of Russia, inspired by Stolypin’s legacy, there is no place for
an independent opposition. At this point in the argument, Mikhalkov aban-
dons the metaphorical intermediary of Stolypin and voices direct criticism of
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the Russian protest movement, whose members he condescendingly refers to
as ‘mink fur collars’ and ‘our satiated, glamorous “revolutionaries”’
(Mikhalkov 2012):
The self-appointed leaders of our cashmere opposition employ the
aﬀronted sense of justice felt by ordinary people for their own PR. But,
when they return from the raving rallies and get back behind the tall
fences of their Rublevskie dachas13 and London mansions, they are unli-
kely to ever give thought to how they themselves could help their not-as-
loudmouthed and considerably less fortunate compatriots.
(Ibid.)
Paraphrasing one of Stolypin’s most famous quotes, Mikhalkov drives home
the point of his dislike of persons such as Aleksei Naval’nyi and Kseniia
Sobchak: ‘Only they, who have somewhere else to go, are in need of great
upheavals. But they, who want to live here, are in need of a great Russia’
(ibid.). Interestingly, in the Saratov interview referred to earlier, he diﬀer-
entiates between the leaders of the protest movement (‘loudmouths and […]
political weathercocks and prostitutes’) and the majority of protesters, who,
he asserts, were simply demanding answers about certain issues and want to
cooperate with the state (‘Mikhalkov ‘zamakhnulsia’ na gubernatora’ 2012).
While the views of the ﬁrst group should be dismissed outright, Putin should
seriously reckon with the concerns of the latter body. Vladimir Nadein has
aptly summarised the collapse of historical time that Mikhalkov seeks to
achieve through the memory of Stolypin as follows:
This is why Mikhalkov needed Stolypin. To make it appear as if we
inherited identical legacies from the past and are therefore equally
obliged to cherish them. To stir up [our] historical experience with non-
systemic opposition: as if to say, Stolypin already cautioned the people
about [Boris] Nemtsov and [Valeriia] Novodvorskaia. But the premier
was shot and where are our two-three bedroom apartments, fur coats and
‘zhiguli’ [type of car, M.W.] now? Watch out, well-behaved, genuine Rus-
sians, do not miss [the target] again.
(Nadein 2012b)
The message that Mikhalkov seeks to put across to the viewer in his doc-
umentary deviates little from his other statements about Stolypin and Russian
politics in general made around the same time, although he does attempt to
stay close to the historical parallel. In the ﬁnal scene, he comes close to spel-
ling out the contemporary political relevance of Stolypin’s legacy. In the
scene, we see Mikhalkov standing in the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra, where Stolypin
lies buried. He explains how the Russian state collapsed and civil war ensued
after Stolypin’s death. Millions died and millions more were displaced, leaving
everything behind. Mikhalkov asks rhetorically: ‘Did these people think
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about how terribly their lives would change, all because they failed to listen to
the one person who knew what to do and was capable of stopping this
destruction?’ He cites examples of politicians who challenged Stolypin, only
to die ‘in poverty’ in exile, far from Russia. After a long, meaningful pause,
Mikhalkov continues:
But it was too late. And now, when we look back at that time, the feeling
arises that, maybe, today we need to remember Stolypin more than ever
before. It makes sense to remember this situation where everything was
on the brink [of collapse] but could still be saved. […] I believe it makes
sense to think about this and especially for those, who disdainfully, iro-
nically, spit upon their past, their present, without considering what the
future might hold for them after that. It is time to learn how to learn
from the past.
The message here is unspoken but clear: for Mikhalkov, learning from the
past means that the power and position of Putin – Stolypin’s contemporary
counterpart – should not be challenged. The memory of Stolypin provides
him with the narrative material he needs to shape and spread his view of
proper Russian governance.
Given Mikhalkov’s longstanding admiration for Stolypin, as well as his
reputation and his position in the ﬁlm industry – for example, the director of
the major production company TriTe, the chairman of the Union of Cine-
matographers of the Russian Federation – it comes as no surprise that he was
the person to give shape to the principle documentary on Russian television
that marked the government-backed celebrations of the Stolypin com-
memorative year.14 The political message put forward through his interpreta-
tion of Stolypin’s policies and personal characteristics is ﬁrst and foremost a
propagation of Mikhalkov’s own political manifesto. And while his ideas
about ‘enlightened conservatism’ are, to a large extent, compatible with the
current government line – and the oﬃcial interpretation of Stolypin as an
exemplary political ﬁgure – they are not the same thing.
Conclusion
With the incorporation of the memory of Stolypin into its symbolic reper-
toire, the Russian government deviated from the logic underpinning its
memory politics in two ways. First, it put forth a new cultural memory with
little remediation history or developed symbolism. Even the historical ﬁgure
of Stolypin was hardly known among the general public. Second, it exalted a
person who had been perceived negatively in Soviet historiography. This
negative appraisal of Stolypin had been disseminated via the history educa-
tion of the Soviet period, and for a large part of the adult population con-
stituted their only knowledge of the politician. Why, then, did the Kremlin
embrace the memory of Stolypin? The explanation lies beyond the Kremlin’s
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walls. The appropriation of the memory of Stolypin, in fact, demonstrates
how the Russian government’s memory politics is, in essence, opportunistic
and reactive. It simply jumped on the Stolypin bandwagon, riding the societal
momentum that other actors were creating. In this case, the momentum can
be attributed to two memory sponsors. First, the eﬀorts of the Foundation for
the Study of the Legacy of P.A. Stolypin contributed signiﬁcantly towards
stimulating (scholarly) interest in Stolypin and made resources available to the
general public in the form of, for example, publications. The foundation
actively lobbied the government to commemorate Stolypin’s achievements
long before the latter demonstrated serious interest in them. Second and more
decisive was the sponsorship by Nikita Mikhalkov. As one of the most inﬂu-
ential ﬁgures in contemporary Russia, he consistently and continuously
pushed the memory. Drawing upon his considerable network, societal stand-
ing and inﬂuence in the television industry, he explored several platforms to
reach a wide audience with his message. Some of these attempts turned out to
be dead ends, at least temporarily. The plan to erect a statue, for instance, was
only realised in an actual monument more than a decade after it had been
proposed. Other eﬀorts had great societal eﬀect. Mikhalkov’s appearance as
the representative of Stolypin on The Name Is Russia should be regarded as
a watershed moment in the development of the memory of Stolypin as a
‘political myth’.
Stolypin’s success in The Name of Russia, I would argue, gave the govern-
ment its ﬁnal push to develop a public, state-sponsored image of the pre-
revolutionary politician in earnest. The establishment of the P.A. Stolypin
Medal in spring 2008, as the initial online voting for the project had only just
begun, as well as earlier references to Stolypin in speeches by both Putin and
Medvedev, point to a pre-existing intention to move in this direction. Yet,
even the medal was closely linked to speciﬁc policy areas. The initiative is
likely to have been part of the liberal reorientation under Medvedev as he
took oﬃce as president. That is, it acknowledged the appreciation for Stolypin
in political circles. There is little to suggest that the medal aimed for wide
societal resonance. After The Name Is Russia, however, references to Stolypin
in a symbolic rather than historical sense became ever more frequent. This
was especially the case in statements by Putin. It was only then that the
memory of Stolypin acquired a more broadly deﬁned meaning: Stolypin as ‘the
great reformer’. The main tenets of this memory image were not developed by
the Russian government. They were taken from the cultural memory image of
Stolypin as it had been shaped on the television screen. This memory image,
with its roots in the immediate post-colour revolutions period, contained all the
ingredients necessary for its use as an anti-opposition narrative.
While the narrative of post-revolution, implicit in the myth of the End of
the Time of Troubles (to be discussed later), suited the political circumstances
of Putin’s ﬁrst and second presidential terms, the shift from consolidating to
maintaining political power required a reconﬁguration of the regime’s histor-
ical vocabulary. The ﬁgure of Petr Stolypin, constructed here as the great but
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unrecognised visionary leader of his time, has ﬁlled this gap in memory sym-
bolism. Stability ‘Stolypin-style’ became the new brand of stability-oriented
state patriotism, which taps into the societal fears and insecurities that are
connected to memories of the 1990s but is geared to ﬁt a situation in which
recent achievements have to be safeguarded against the perceived or imagined
threat posed by domestic rather than foreign enemies. Indeed, for the Russian
government, ‘[t]he constant threats of chaos and an internal ‘war of all
against all’ were intended to curb its own intrinsic contradictions’ (Penzin &
Budraitskis 2013: 122). It formed the core of its raison d’être, namely ‘stabi-
lity based on catastrophes’ (ibid.). Instead of promising a stable and prosper-
ous future, the Stolypin memory cautions that recent achievements can all too
easily be lost again. In this sense, the adoption of the memory of Stolypin,
and the particular way it was shaped, indicates that the regime correctly
anticipated that its next challenge would come from within in the form of
increasing societal opposition – which, indeed, culminated in the street protests
of 2011/12.
The Stolypin case study provides a signiﬁcant example of how television
preceded oﬃcial memory politics in the process of shaping a new political
memory ﬁgure in response to current political challenges. The remediation
among the three TV productions analysed above demonstrates how they all
recognised the importance of visual and narrative repetition for shaping and
consolidation a cultural memory where none had existed previously. If we
look at the political arguments that can be derived from the productions, we
can note that they (also) introduce arguments and associations that diﬀer
from the state-endorsed interpretation of the memory (both at the time and
afterwards). The TV series Stolypin … The Undrawn Lessons draws upon the
popular tropes of conspiracy theories and the detective genre to keep its
audience engaged. Mikhalkov’s documentary Petr Stolypin. A Shot at Russia
echoes the ﬁlmmaker’s own political manifesto of ‘enlightened conservatism’.
These productions nevertheless support and propagate its central tenets: the
importance of strengthening the vertical of power and implementing top-
down reform to maintain stability and prevent revolution, paired with a jus-
tiﬁcation of the (temporary) suspension of certain civic rights. In the case of
the memory of Stolypin, memory politics indeed extended beyond the poli-
tical domain and onto the television screen, yet the actual shape taken by the
narratives was not as strictly regulated as is often assumed. A measure of
deviation from the oﬃcial line was allowed, albeit within a – constantly
shifting and largely implicit – bandwidth of what is deemed permissible.
Notes
1 Earlier versions of parts of this chapter have previously been published as M.
Wijermars, ‘Memory Politics beyond the Political Domain: Historical Legitima-
tion of the Power Vertical in Contemporary Russian Television,’ Problems of Post-
Communism 63, no. 2 (2016): 83–94. Published online 14 January 2016, publisher
Petr Stolypin 81
Taylor & Francis, www.tandfonline.com, reprinted by permission of the publisher;
and, M. Wijermars, ‘The Making of a Political Myth: Stability ‘Po-Stolypinski’,’
The Ideology and Politics Journal 5, no. 1 (2015): 37–56. Reprinted with
permission.
2 The committee on architecture and city planning of Moscow (Moskomarkhi-
tektura) hosted an exhibition of the 42 competing designs where visitors could cast
their votes for their favourites. The Ministry of Culture rewarded the three most
popular designs with a prize of 400,000 roubles. A jury of experts had the ﬁnal say
in selecting the winning design.
3 The scenario of the ﬁlm was based on Boris Savinkov’s loosely autobiographical
novel The Pale Horse (Kon’ blednyi, 1909). For an analysis of the ﬁlm and its
production history, see Norris (2012): 251–68.
4 In the years preceding 2006, several minor TV documentaries on this topic were
broadcast, e.g., The Life and Death of Petr Arkadevich Stolypin [Zhizn’ i smert’
Petra Arkad’evicha] (Khotulev, 2002); Historical Chronicles with Nikolai Svanidze:
1911. Petr Stolypin [Istoricheskie khroniki s Nikolaem Svanidze: 1911. Petr Stolypin]
(Gusev, 2003); The Searchers: The Murder of Stolypin [Iskateli: Ubiistvo Stolypina]
(Nikolaev, 2004). The 2006 TV series, however, was the ﬁrst production in which
Stolypin’s life took centre stage and that was aimed at entertainment instead of his-
torical enquiry (and could therefore potentially appeal to a much wider audience).
5 Contrary to Stolypin, Boris Savinkov was featured in several Soviet ﬁlms, both as
member of the CO and in his capacity as member of the Provisional Government.
For example: The Vyborg Side [Vyborgskaia storona] (Kozintsev & Trauberg,
1938); Extraordinary Assignment [Chrezvychainoe poruchenie] (Kevorkov & Kar-
amian, 1965); The Collapse [Krakh] (Chebotarev, 1968) and its television remake
Sindicate 2 [Sindikat 2] (Orlov, 1981); No Distinguishing Features [Osobykh primet
net] (Bobrovskii, 1978) and its sequel The Collapse of Operation ‘Terror’ [Krakh
operatsii ‘Terror’] (Bobrovskii, 1980).
6 Oﬃcially, laws implemented by the tsar under article 87 (when the Duma was not
in session) had to be submitted to the Duma within two months. Because of the
failure to act accordingly, the dissolution of the Second Duma in 1907 is also
referred to as the Coup of 3 June.
7 The letter is not included in the published compilation of Azef ’s letters (Pavlov &
Peregudova 1994). It therefore appears to be a ﬁction that was most likely added to
the scenario to support the claim that Stolypin judged Azef ’s loyalty correctly and
successfully persuaded him to choose the side of the law.
8 The actual reach of the series is diﬃcult to estimate but may well be greater since
the episodes were, and continue to be (as of 30 June 2016) widely available online
for download or streaming on websites such as Youtube and Vkontakte. On the
basis of the comments on download websites, it appears The Name Is Russia project
actually provided an impetus to watch the 2006 TV series.
9 Reruns of the documentary aired on 3 and 4 July 2014.
10 The experts are historians Valentin Shelokhaev (associated with the Fund for the
Study of P.A. Stolypin’s Legacy), Aleksandr Logunov (Dean of the Faculty of
History, Politology and Law at the Russian State University for the Humanities,
RGGU), Natal’ia Shatina (RGGU) and Kirill Solov’ev (RGGU). The latter has
published extensively on Stolypin and also appeared on the talkshow The Trial of
Time (discussed in chapters 6 and 7) as an expert on Tsar Nicholas II and his
contemporaries.
11 Mikhalkov appears to particularly admire Tsar Aleksandr III, whom he imperso-
nated in his ﬁlm Barber of Siberia [Sibirskii Tsiriul’nik] (1998).
12 E.g. taken from A Rider Named Death [Vsadnik po imeni smert’] (Shakhnazarov,
2004).
13 Elite residential estates on Rublevskoe Shosse in Moscow.
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14 In 2015, Putin awarded Mikhalkov with the Order ‘For Merit to the Fatherland’,
‘for his contribution to the development of Russian culture, cinematic and thea-
trical art, and his many years of creative activity’. He received the highest class of
the award, a First Class Order, which is also the highest civilian decoration of the
state, having previously received the Fourth, Third and Second Class orders
(President of the Russian Federation 2015).
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4 Aleksandr Nevskii: The saviour of
Orthodox civilisation
Nevskii in the Russian historical and political imagination
On the occasion of the Day of National Unity, Patriarch Kirill opened an
exhibition called ‘My History: Riurikids’. He personally guided President
Putin through the show’s extensive multimedia displays (‘Patriarkh Kirill
otkryl mul’timediinuiu vystavku’ 2014). The exhibition, which ran from 5
to 20 November 2014 at the Moscow Manege, recounted the history of
Rus’ from its founder Riurik to Fedor, the last ruler of the Riurik dynasty.
According to Archimandrite Tikhon (Shevkunov),1 one of the exhibition’s
principal organisers, ‘[t]he era of the Riurik dynasty had a decisive inﬂu-
ence on the formation of statehood and all aspects of life of Rus’’, yet few
people today know its history (‘Vystavka “Riurikovichi”’ 2014). The exhi-
bition aimed to address this lack of historical understanding, as well as
provide ‘the attentive viewer with the unexpected key to understanding
contemporaneity’ (ibid.). Its language and style were indeed ﬁrmly embed-
ded in a contemporary worldview (I base my observations on my exhibition
visit on 10 November 2014). For example, one of the displays argued that
Ivan the Terrible fell victim to ‘the ﬁrst information wars in the European
press’, a clear reference to the portrayal of the events in Ukraine by Wes-
tern and Ukrainian media. The display about Aleksandr Nevskii exem-
pliﬁes the two political questions that his memory has been most closely
associated with in recent years: the place of religion, and speciﬁcally the
Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), in the Russian state and the political
challenges that result from striking a balance between West and East and
accommodating multiculturality within both the domestic and the interna-
tional frameworks. The main part of the display highlights Nevskii’s battle
against Western assaults on the state (military and religious alike) and his
decision to orient the state towards the East. At the top, Nevskii’s rule is
summarised as follows: ‘Strengthen the defence to the West, and search for
friends to the East’. Two banners ﬂank this display, bearing quotes by
Patriarch Kirill and Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs Sergei Lavrov that reﬂect
the religious and political aspects of the Nevskii memory. In the words of
the patriarch:
Aleksandr Nevskii embodies genuine patriotism, steadfast standing in the
fatherly faith, the strategic vision of a statesman, [and] a sense of
responsibility before God for the fates of the people, entrusted to him as
earthly ruler.
Lavrov’s quote points out the prince’s political legacy by stating that ‘Aleksandr
Nevskii laid the foundations of Russia’s multipronged diplomacy’.
Aleksandr Nevskii (1220–1263) became the Prince of Novgorod at the
tender age of 16 and later also served as Grand Prince of Kiev and Grand
Prince of Vladimir. He came to power at a decisive moment in the history of
Kievan Rus’, in the wake of its subjection to the rule of the Golden Horde –
commonly referred to in Russian as the ‘Tatar Yoke’. Along with the political
pressure emanating from the East, the integrity of Novgorod was under threat
from the West – most notably from the Swedes and the Teutonic Knights –
who sought to extend their inﬂuence in both political and religious matters.
The allegedly concerted eﬀorts by the Pope of Rome to convert the Orthodox
city-state to Catholicism2 are frequently quoted in today’s Russia to justify the
adoption of a defensive stance vis-à-vis Europe. Nevskii’s best-known military
achievements are the Battle on the Neva (1240) against the Swedes, after
which he was named, and the legendary Battle on the Ice (1242) on Lake
Peipus against the knights of the Livonian Order.
The remembrance tradition associated with Nevskii reaches back to the late
thirteenth century. Frithjof Benjamin Schenk (2004) has extensively explored
its development up to 2000 and has identiﬁed several stages: sacralisation
(thirteenth–ﬁfteenth centuries), russiﬁcation (ﬁfteenth–seventeenth centuries),
stateiﬁcation (eighteenth century), nationalisation (nineteenth century),
dethronement (1917–1937), recruitment (1939–1945), consolidation and criti-
cism (1945–1985) and pluralisation (1985–2000). The following paragraphs
will brieﬂy summarise Schenk’s argument to trace back the origins of the
concepts that Nevskii is associated with in contemporary Russia. In parti-
cular, Schenk’s interpretation of the evolution of the Nevskii memory during
the 1990s is essential for determining the characteristics that are unique to the
period after 2000.
While the memorialisation of Nevskii had already started to develop at an
earlier stage, in particular at local level in Vladimir where the saint lay buried,
the political importance attributed to him peaked for the ﬁrst time during the
reign of Ivan the Terrible. Subsequent peaks occurred under Peter the Great
and Stalin – and I would add, to a minor extent during the 2000s. For Ivan
the Terrible, Nevskii, posited as the founding father of the Riurik dynasty,
served the construction of a genealogy of the Moscow state. Moreover, he was
portrayed as the exemplary defender of the Orthodox state against its
Catholic and heathen enemies. Around the same time, the religious image of
Nevskii as a saintly ﬁgure was aﬃrmed and deﬁnitively established with his
canonisation by the Russian Orthodox Church in 1547. Thus a two-pronged
cultural memory was formed, encompassing a religious and a state-oriented
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component. The development of a multifaceted memory in the ﬁfteenth–
seventeenth centuries reﬂected the complementary notions of society then
prevailing:
Während Aleksandr Nevskij im Kirchlichen Diskurs die Idee der Sak-
ralgemeinschaft verkörperte, deutete er im dynastischen Diskurs auf ein
Gemeinschaftskonzept, dessen konstitutives Element der Herrscher und
sein Machtbereich war. Herrschaftsverband und Sakralgemeinschaft
waren die beiden Bestandteile der ‘Rus’-Konzeption’ (russkaja zemlja),
die sich das Großfürstentum Moskau als eigenes Konzept kollektiver
Identität vom Kiever Reich angeeignet hatte.
(Schenk 2004: 88. Italics in original)
Peter the Great was the ﬁrst to instrumentalise the memory for a speciﬁc
political goal. He posited Nevskii as an imperial ruler and deﬂected the
prince’s glory onto himself and the capital city he founded.
Nicht mehr die Würde der herrschende Dynastie oder die Heiligkeit der
russischen Kirche prägten – wie noch im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert – die
Ausrichtung des Aleksandr-Nevskij-Bildes. Im imperialen Petersburger
Diskurs hatte er auf die Person und das Amt des aktuellen Zaren und
Kaisers, auf die neugegründete ‘herrschende Stadt’ St. Petersburg und auf
das Rußländische Reich als Imperium zuverweisen.
(Schenk 2004: 125)
Nevskii became the northern capital’s patron saint and, to aﬃrm the bond,
Peter the Great ordered the construction of the Aleksandr Nevskii monastery,
where Nevskii’s relics were transferred in 1724 from the Rozhdestvenskii
monastery in Vladimir.
In the nineteenth century the memory of Nevskii acquired a third con-
notation, reﬂecting the development of nationalist discourse. Propelled by the
intelligentsia and drawing upon a newfound interest in folklore, the national-
ist image of Nevskii imagined him ‘nicht nur als Verteidiger des Landes und
des Glaubens, sondern auch der russischen Kultur, insbesondere der Sprache’
(Schenk 2004: 179). This third associated image, of military commander and
national hero would later resurface under Stalin to great eﬀect. In the period
following the October Revolution, the memory of Nevskii was viewed nega-
tively because the political ideas associated with it were incompatible with the
ideology of the nascent communist state – in particular, the sacral and
imperial discourses. Under Stalin, however, Nevskii and other historical ﬁg-
ures3 were rehabilitated. The memory of Nevskii acquired exceptional poli-
tical signiﬁcance in the late 1930s since it could easily frame how the Soviet
Union would successfully respond to the threat posed by Germany. The for-
merly multifaceted memory became fully desanctiﬁed, and the only part of it
to be preserved involved Nevskii’s role as military commander. The Order of
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Aleksandr Nevskii was reinstated in 1942 as a military honour, diﬀering little
in name from its tsarist precursor, the Imperial Order of Saint Aleksandr
Nevskii. In 2010, the military honour named after Nevskii underwent yet
another transformation. Its badge was redesigned to more closely resemble
the tsarist order and its purpose was reformulated as a civilian, rather than a
military, award.
In the Perestroika period, as constraints over historiography and – to a
lesser extent – religion were relaxed, a process of re-sanctiﬁcation began.
Nevskii’s relics, which had been moved to the Museum of Religion and
Atheism in St Petersburg,4 were returned to the Aleksandr Nevskii monastery
in 1989. Reﬂecting the manifold political ideologies and concepts of national
identity that were circulating in the late 1980s and especially the 1990s, the
memory of Nevskii became subject to pluralisation. The respective 750th
anniversaries of the Battle on the Neva and the Battle on the Ice in 1990 and
1992 heightened the already growing interest in the historical leader. The
federal government, the ROC, academic and amateur scholars, historical-
patriotic groups, the army and local governments all contributed to the post-
Soviet re-evaluation of Nevskii. Schenk emphasises that contemporary
memory images of Nevskii – the patriotic general, the local prince, the patron
saint – coexist and complement rather than rival one another.
Als Kollektivsymbol übernimmt Aleksandr Nevskij dabei eine wertvolle
Brückenfunktion. Der Held von der Neva ist eine ideale Integrationsﬁgur
im Sinne des ‘patriotischen Konsenses’. Er gilt sowohl als Zeichen der
vorrevolutionären, als auch der sowjetischen Zeit. Er repräsentiert einen
wehrhaften Staat und eine autoritäre politische Führung. Seine Bio-
graphie eignet sich als Projektionsﬂäche für Antiokzidentalismus und
Antiislamismus. In der Erzählung von seinen Heldentaten kann die Wir-
Gruppe sowohl als nationale, russische Gemeinschaft als auch als Gruppe
orthodoxer Christen beschrieben werden
(Schenk 2004: 468)
As will become clear later on, the religious element of identiﬁcation has
considerably strengthened since the turn of the twentieth century.
The memory of Nevskii is intricately connected to the city of St Petersburg,
where the majority of the material traces dedicated to him are located. In
2002 the infrastructure of remembrance was complemented by a statue placed
in front of the Aleksandr Nevskii monastery (‘Pamiatnik Sviatomy Blago-
vernomu Velikomu kniaziu Aleksandru Nevskomu’ n.d.). The equestrian
statue depicts the saint in full armour carrying a shield and spear. Its unveil-
ing took place on Victory Day in the presence of the Metropolitan of St
Petersburg and Ladoga, Vladimir, the governor of St Petersburg Vladimir
Iakovlev, and political and cultural representatives. In 2005, two bas-relief
plaques were added to the pedestal depicting the transfer of Saint Nevskii’s
relics to the monastery by Peter the Great and the 1240 Battle on the Neva.
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The combination of the design of the statue, the bas-relief plaques, its location
and its unveiling taking place on Victory Day (rather than, for example, on the
saint’s feast day on 6 December) all testify to the continued inseparability of the
religious, military and political aspects of the memory.
Such a long and rich tradition of remembrance, in combination with the
lack of historical sources documenting Nevskii’s life, has resulted in a cultural
memory that is largely mythic in nature, much more so than, for example, the
memory of 1812 or Petr Stolypin. Within the cultural domain, Sergei Eisen-
stein’s Aleksandr Nevskii (1938) has been key in shaping the image con-
temporary Russians have of the medieval prince, both visually and narratively
(the scene of the Battle on the Ice in particular).5 It is telling that the Stalinist
classic was favoured over a contemporary representation such as Aleksandr:
The Neva Battle (2008) to represent Nevskii’s rule in the ﬁlm festival accom-
panying the Riurikids exhibition (‘Na vystavke “Moia istoriia. Riurikovichi”
prodolzhaetsia programma pokazov rossiiskogo kino’ 2014).6
More recently, Aleksandr Nevskii has appeared in media other than ﬁlm,
sculpture and iconography. Over the course of three years, Unicorn Games
Studio released the video games XIII Century: Glory or Death (XIII vek:
Slava ili smert’, 2007),7 XIII Century: Rusich (XIII vek: Rusich, 2008)8 and
History of War: Aleksandr Nevskii (Istoriia voin: Aleksandr Nevskii, 2009).9
All three games allow players to engage in a classic battleﬁeld video game in
thirteenth-century style and diﬀer little in terms of gameplay (Arbatskii 2008;
Khromov 2010). Nevskii, and in particular the Battle on the Ice, were fea-
tured in the 2013 superhero comic The Monk (Inok).10 Its protagonist, Andrei
Radov, travels back in time to take part in various historical battles to protect
Orthodox civilisation from the numerous enemies (Mongols, Christians, the
devil) that seek to destroy it. In the comic, it is Andrei who purposefully
causes the ice to crack underneath the feet of the Livonian army and thereby
secures victory.
A beacon of Orthodox morality in the face of globalisation
The Russian Orthodox Church has been one of the principle driving forces
behind the renewed actualisation of the memory of Aleksandr Nevskii in the
post-Soviet era. This trend has continued and intensiﬁed in the 2000s. It has
to be noted that the ROC is an internally diverse institution. It consists of a
multitude of factions, each with their particular views on ecclesiastical matters
as well as on political questions.11 In this chapter, I mainly address the views
and actions of the ROC leadership, the Holy Synod and the Patriarch, whose
position tends largely to coincide with the so-called traditionalists within the
Church. The political orientation of the traditionalists can be described as
‘orthodox statism’, characterised by ‘the desire for a powerful Russian state,
with the renewal of Orthodox values as the source of the country’s strength’
(Papkova 2011: 47). In the chapter on Ivan the Terrible, I will turn my atten-
tion to ‘fundamentalist’ tendencies within the ROC, through the example of
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Orthodox Brotherhoods and their views on (memory) politics. The lack of
uniformity is an important factor when we seek to understand the ROC’s use
of historical references to support its policies: while the oﬃcial church has
increasingly been associated with the Kremlin and is perceived to be one of
the pillars supporting the concept of traditional Russian statehood, the poli-
tical views put forward by other, more fundamentalist movements are, in fact,
oriented towards undermining the state as it has been shaped during the Putin
era (see chapter 6).
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the ROC has successfully
re-established itself as the principal religious organisation in Russia
(Richters 2013). Both Yeltsin and Putin supported the restoration of
the Church and granted it signiﬁcant privileges in return for the legit-
imation the association with the ROC bestowed on their positions of
power. For Putin,
the Church as a social institution turned into another ‘cultural institution’
that was useful for the state in order to demonstrate to foreigners its
thousand years of tradition, to shore up its support for his xenophobic
policies, and to channel pro-Russian sympathies among Russian émigrés
in ways beneﬁting the government.
(Mitrokhin 2009: 319)
The ROC has become a highly visible component of political symbolism,
with high-ranking representatives taking active part in political ceremonies
such as the presidential inauguration ceremony.
The ROC views itself as the moral compass of the Russian nation in a
rapidly globalising world that threatens the foundations of Orthodoxy. Con-
sequently, it envisages its political role as
[helping the] post-Soviet regime build an eﬀective means of weathering, if
not outright resisting, the shocks of globalization, which is generally
regarded as a western-inspired weapon against Russia. The task is deﬁned
as a joint church-government project of ensuring the survival of a speciﬁc
Russian national and religious identity in a rapidly changing and hostile
world, through the spiritualization of Russian society.
(Papkova 2011: 48–49)
From the perspective of the ROC, church–state relations should ideally be
fashioned in line with the ‘symphonic model’ which implies close coop-
eration with the state, yet without state interference in the ROC’s internal
aﬀairs (Papkova 2011: 32), a relationship based on the theological notion
of symphonia, or harmony, that strikes a precise balance between the
opposing models of a state church and a secular society. The ideal of
symphonia between church and state is an ideal indeed, since it has never
been fully realised.
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The ROC’s outlook on how the Russian state should be organised largely
coincides with the priorities of the Putin regime. Yet with regard to certain
matters, their opinions diverge signiﬁcantly.
Many of these priorities – the strict moral censorship of television, a ban
on abortion, legislative restrictions on the activities of religious competi-
tors, the introduction of catechism in state education, and state support
of the institution of priests in social organizations – are not met with
understanding on the part of the Russian government and actually clash
with the current trends in domestic policy.
(Mitrokhin 2009: 319)
Since Patriarch Kirill became head of the Church in 2009, and increasingly
since Putin was re-elected president in 2012, these diﬀerences have become
less pronounced. The government has shown itself more willing to accom-
modate concerns expressed by the ROC, for instance by responding to calls to
intervene in cultural matters on the grounds that feelings of religious people
have purportedly been violated. The authorities have increasingly adopted
spiritual and religious terminology and symbolism and have placed an
emphasis on defending traditional values and the centrality of the nuclear
family. During Putin’s ﬁrst two terms in oﬃce, it appeared that Orthodox
beliefs could still be overruled by political objectives. Pragmatic considera-
tions prevailed over an unwavering embrace of Orthodoxy as part of the
state’s ideology. Since then, however, there has been a considerable shift, as
the neo-conservative turn in Russian politics that intensiﬁed after the
annexation of Crimea has augmented the relevance of and support for the
agenda set by the ROC.
The concept of tradition is of fundamental importance to the overlapping
interests of the state and the Church. Yet, in addition to the occasional
incongruence between their perceptions of what tradition actually entails, and
how it can be combined with features of modern society (e.g. the internet and
social media),12 there exist diverging deﬁnitions of ‘traditional society’ even
within the ROC itself. The seemingly condensed constellation of Orthodox
traditional values, upon closer scrutiny, turns out to be heterogeneous and at
times at odds with itself. The Church’s recent attempts to adapt to con-
temporary society and its mediatised nature have only enhanced some of its
internal divergences (Tolstaya 2014).
As it has sought to reconnect with the Russian diaspora and, more generally,
with Orthodox believers outside of the country, the ROC’s political objectives
have reached beyond national borders. The concept ‘Russian world’ (russkii
mir) is generally used to denote this extended sphere of inﬂuence (see Suslov
2018). For the state, cooperation in this sphere ‘for the purposes of expanding
and consolidating the Russian world’ (Payne 2010: 726) has been advantageous
since it has added yet another means to deﬁne its transnational sphere of
inﬂuence, especially in relation to the so-called Near Abroad: in addition to
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appealing to shared linguistic and ethnic categories (Russian speakers and
ethnic Russians living outside of Russia), the (Russian) Orthodox religion could
now function as a marker of association, suggesting the existence of an intrinsic
connection between Russia and Orthodox believers worldwide. For the
ROC, economic interests have been involved as well, since part of its concerted
eﬀorts with the foreign ministry have been aimed at the reacquisition of church
property seized during or following the 1917 revolutions (idem: 726).
Several scholars have pointed out that while the Church appears to hold a
position of political prominence, its ability to inﬂuence state politics remained
limited during the timeframe under discussion here (Anderson 2007; Mitro-
khin 2009; Papkova 2011). The state was the dominant partner in a relation-
ship that Anderson characterises as one of ‘asymmetric symphonia’
(Anderson 2007). The Church’s limited political leverage reﬂects the state’s
perception of the ROC’s measure of societal authority:13 ‘without over-
whelming support from the people it claims to serve and represent, [the ROC]
cannot have great authority with the state’ (Mitrokhin 2009: 318). Its close
association with the state is nonetheless advantageous. For example, the
Church has received government funding for certain of its research and media
projects (idem: 308).14 In 2010, a law was passed requiring the restitution to
the Church of property seized by the Soviet state. Furthermore, the ROC
achieved a long-awaited success with regard to the inclusion of religious edu-
cation in school curricula. The course ‘Fundamentals of Religious Cultures
and Secular Ethics’ was ﬁrst given as a trial oﬀering from 2009 to 2011 and
was subsequently included in the standard curriculum in 2012 (Richters 2013:
46–47; Clay 2015). Parents have the option to choose among modules on one
of the ‘traditional religions’ – Orthodox Christianity, Buddhism, Judaism and
Islam – or on secular ethics or world religions. The trial of Pussy Riot for the
performance of their ‘punk prayer’ in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour
(Ponomariov 2013) and the subsequent passage of a law making it a crime to
insult religious feelings marked an increasing sensitivity concerning religion in
the public sphere and the increasing say of the ROC in matters touching on
social values, which has intensiﬁed since 2012.
The Russian Orthodox Church and cultural memory
Similar to its eﬀect on Russian politics, the disintegration of the Soviet Union
compelled the ROC to explicitly conceptualise its identity and place in
society. Cultural memory has been an instrumental tool for substantiating the
assertion that the contemporary ROC should be viewed as heir of a long
Orthodox tradition and, consequently, could now, as a religious organisation,
reclaim its righteous position as the principal religion of the Russian state.
Both the distant and the more recent past were eﬀectively, yet not always
uniformly, utilised to place Russian Orthodoxy at the heart of the Russian
nation and to proclaim its importance as the principal driving force behind
‘the spiritual revival of the Fatherland’ (Garrard & Garrard 2008: 243).15
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The ROC’s restorative eﬀorts have taken many forms: the reclamation of
lost Church properties, as already mentioned; the restoration or reconstruc-
tion of churches that were damaged or destroyed under Soviet rule – most
notably, the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow16 – and the con-
struction of new churches in the traditional Russo-Byzantine medieval style.
With ‘Programme 200’, announced in 2010, the ROC set out to signiﬁcantly
increase the number of churches in Moscow – by at least two hundred, as the
programme’s name suggests – to improve accessibility for believers; this pro-
ject, once completed, will leave a noticeable mark on the city’s architecture.
One should also mention the (re-)establishment of religious practices such as
processions and pilgrimages (see, e.g., Rock 2014). A speech delivered by
Patriarch Aleksii II upon the completion of the construction on the Cathedral
of Christ the Saviour highlights the symbolic importance of the ‘resurrection’
of Orthodox landmarks that had been lost during the Soviet era:
The miracle of the resurrection of the Cathedral required several years of
concentrated, selﬂess and loving labour. The Cathedral now gloriﬁes
Christ and helps our long-suﬀering people return to their spiritual roots –
the Holy Faith of their ancestors.
(Garrard & Garrard 2008: 82)
The symbolic and tangible restoration of ‘Orthodox Russia’ complements and
supports the Church’s aim of political restoration, discussed above.
Referring to statements made by Patriarch Kirill, Mikhail Suslov argues
that there is an inherent paradox in the ROC’s ‘historical imagination’,
resulting from its being informed by two contradictory metanarratives: one
that emphasises the autonomy of Russia as a civilisation (which is defensive
and displays the inﬂuence of Slavophile thought) and one that views the
position of Russia in the world in messianic terms (which is oﬀensive and
shows traces of Eurasianist thinking) (Suslov 2013). In the skilful hands of
Patriarch Kirill, however, Suslov asserts, the opposing paradigms merge so
that the ROC’s array of objectives are deftly combined. As a result, Patriarch
Kirill, on the one hand, ‘emphasises, that Russia’s struggle with the external
enemy has always borne the character of a ﬁght for its civilisational authen-
ticity against the West: in 1612 the Russians defended their faith, in 1812 their
culture, [and] in 1942 their very right to existence’ (idem: 144). On the other
hand, however, ‘tying in the battles of the past with the war for the spiritual
frontiers of Russia that is going on today, Kirill outlines the parameters of
cooperation with the West in the context of Christian transnationalism’
(Suslov 2013: 144).
Two memorialisation practices deserve particular mention: the canonisa-
tion of Tsar Nicholas II and his family and the growing cult of the New
Martyrs and Confessors of Russia. Responding to societal sentiments, the
ROC went ahead with the canonisation of the imperial family in 2000. They
were sainted as ‘passion bearers’: a category that acknowledges their religious
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devotion and their resigned acceptance of their deaths, yet clearly distin-
guishes them from those ‘martyrs’ who lost their lives because of their faith.
The ROC found it important to thus diﬀerentiate them from those who could
have saved their lives by denouncing their faith. On the site where the Ipatiev
house once stood in Yekaterinburg – where the Romanovs were held captive
and later killed – the Church on the Blood was erected and consecrated
in 2003.
The ROC explicitly placed the canonisation of the imperial family in the
context of a second, much larger group of new saints, the New Martyrs and
Confessors of Russia (Garrard & Garrard 2008: 125). Since the turn of the
millennium, some two thousand individuals who were persecuted and killed
by the Soviet state because of their religious beliefs – both ROC clergy and
laity – have been canonised. This newly created memory culture within the
ROC has been actively aﬃrmed via the commissioning of icons of the new
martyrs and the dedication of numerous churches across the country to their
memory (Fedor 2014). New martyrdom is of particular signiﬁcance because it
is the only example of a memory practice commemorating the victims of
Soviet repression that has been condoned by the state.17 As Julie Fedor
explains, the inseparable link between the Putin government and the FSB on
the one hand, and those responsible for the acts of repression on the other,
hampers the authorities from taking an eﬀective stance on these crimes
without questioning their own legitimacy. Therefore,
[i]n fulﬁlling the role of custodian of the memory of Soviet state terror,
the ROC MP [Moscow Patriarchate, M.W.] is eﬀectively acting as a proxy
for the current state authorities, including the successor agencies to the
Soviet state security organs.
(Fedor 2014: 129)
The symbolic assumption of responsibility for the memory of the victims of
Soviet repression is reinforced on the material level by, for example, the
transfer of mass burial sites from the FSB to the Church. This appears to be
an attempt to provide closure to the question of remembrance:
by transferring these sites to the church, the state has […] eﬀectively
handed over to the church the problem of dealing with the Soviet past.
The ROC in turn has duly repeatedly declared the historical reconcilia-
tion of victim and perpetrator, thereby bestowing historical legitimacy
upon the current regime.
(Fedor 2014: 129)
On another occasion, however, the Church has shown itself surprisingly
accommodating towards the contemporary heirs to the communist past. In
2014, Patriarch Kirill awarded Gennadii Ziuganov, the leader of the
Communist Party of the Russian Federation, with the Order of Glory and
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Honour to the third degree (the highest) on the occasion of his seventieth
birthday (‘Patriarkh Kirill nagradil Ziuganova Tserkovnym ordenom’
2014).
On a number of occasions, the ROC has involved itself in cultural events
and productions about episodes in history that it associates itself with. For
example, the exhibition about the Riurikids, discussed in the introduction,
was organised by the Humanitarian Projects Fund. This fund was established
in 2013 on the initiative of Archimandrite Tikhon to organise a ﬁve-year
exhibition cycle around the theme ‘My History’, the ﬁrst of which was dedi-
cated to the Romanov dynasty (‘Proekt “Moia istoriia”’ n.d.). It works in
close cooperation with the Moscow Patriarchate, as well as the Ministry of
Culture and other federal, regional and local authorities. Archimandrite
Tikhon curated both exhibitions and serves as chairperson of the Fund’s
council of experts.
In the cinematic sphere, Vladimir Khotinenko’s The Priest (Pop, 2009) is a
prime example of Church involvement in cultural production. The ﬁlm nar-
rates the story of a group of Orthodox priests that was sent to the Pskov
region by the Metropolitan of Latvia from 1941 to 1945 to reopen churches
that had been closed by the Soviet authorities. As Pskov was German-occu-
pied territory at the time, the successful completion of their mission depended
on their cooperation with the occupying forces. The ROC has tried to replace
the Soviet narrative of collaboration with ‘one in which the priests of the
Mission are depicted as saintly men of God and true Russian patriots’ (Ane-
mone 2010). The Priest made an important contribution towards sharing this
patriotic reinterpretation with the general public. The Church was closely
involved in the production of the ﬁlm. It was made with the blessing of the
late Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, Aleksii II, and the ﬁrst screening
took place in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour.18 The Priest received direct
and indirect state funding.
In his review of the ﬁlm, Antony Anemone interestingly refers to the con-
temporary memory of Nevskii as a means to understand the reinterpretation
of the Pskov mission.
The key to the ﬁlm’s (and novel’s) ideological meaning is Aleksandr
Nevskii, the favorite saint of the hero of The Priest and the hero of
Eisenstein’s great anti-German movie of 1938. As the patron saint of
patriotism and Orthodoxy, Nevskii summarizes and suggests one way of
solving the historical paradox that stands at the heart of the Pskov
Spiritual Mission. The problem, brutally stated, concerns the admissi-
bility for Russian patriots of collaborating with the Nazis in order to
reintroduce Christianity to those parts of the land of the Soviets occupied
by the Wehrmacht. As the priest says at one point, neither the Germans,
nor the Bolsheviks are eternal: only Christ is eternal. Hence, the ultimate
goal of serving Christ can never be a mistake.
(Anemone 2010)
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The leniency allowed by this historical model for the sake of pragmatism
and compromise in the name of the Orthodox faith’s continued existence and
future prosperity can indeed beneﬁt Church oﬃcials as they seek to adapt
their institution to modern society and make the most of what it has to oﬀer.
Another much-debated example is the 2008 documentary The Fall of an
Empire: The Lesson of Byzantium (Gibel’ imperii: Vizantiiskii urok), broad-
cast on Rossiia 1. The documentary was written and narrated by, again,
Archimandrite Tikhon. It draws explicit parallels between Byzantium and
contemporary Russia to warn against the corrupting inﬂuence of the West.
Presented as the ‘spiritual heir’ of Byzantium, Russia should emulate the
conditions of the Orthodox empire in its prime: it was a centralised state
headed by a strong government, and an empire, moreover, in which Ortho-
doxy served as a unifying factor and dictated a path of development that was
diﬀerent from those of both the East and the West (Baïdine 2011: 105).
The memory of Nevskii has become an integral part of the ROC’s ‘memory
vocabulary’, both within the observed ecclesiastical canon and in the Church’s
media appearances. The feast day of Saint Aleksandr Nevskii, traditionally
celebrated on 6 December according to the Orthodox calendar (23 November
before the adoption of the Gregorian calendar), is but one element of the
saint’s contemporary veneration. The memory has been made to suit the ideas
on Russian society and state–church relations supported by the traditionalist
wing within the ROC, as well as its outlook on the world and on interethnic
and interconfessional relations. Then Metropolitan and now Patriarch Kirill
has personally supported the saint’s memory in a way that recognises the
complementary resonances of the multiple strands of memory identiﬁcation
associated with Nevskii – its state-oriented, military and patriotic interpreta-
tions, in addition to its religious and moral ones. Patriarch Kirill’s appearance
on the TV show The Name Is Russia, which will be discussed in detail in
the second part of this chapter, demonstrates the ROC’s dedication to the
memory of Nevskii, as well as its awareness of the potential impact of the
medium of television on the historical consciousness of the mass audience.
Building upon the popularity of the TV project, the ROC initiated the tra-
velling exhibition ‘Aleksandr Nevskii – The Name of Russia’. Despite its title,
the objects displayed – a series of icons produced with a special technique
involving powdered (precious) stones and artiﬁcial crystals, and paintings
depicting various aspects of the Russian landscape – bore little connection to
the show’s televised namesake (‘Vystavochnyi proekt “Aleksandr Nevskii –
Imia Rossii” startoval v Sankt-Peterburge’ 2009).
A recent addition to the material infrastructure of the cultural memory,
or its ‘memory hardware’ (Etkind 2009), deserves mention. Since 2013,
construction had been underway on a new church dedicated to St. Nevskii
near the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO).
Plans for constructing a church at the site were originally developed in
1999 and received the blessing of Patriarch Aleksii II in 2005, at which
point its devotion to Nevskii was decided. Yet suﬃcient funds for its
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construction were only secured within the framework of ‘Programme 200’
(‘O khrame’ n.d.). The church has been erected on the site where there
had previously been a small brick church, which was closed in the 1930s
and demolished in 1941. The design of the single-domed, white-plastered
brick church is very traditional, as is the case with many new churches
built over the past decades. The church was consecrated by Patriarch Kirill
in March 2016.
The Church’s active involvement in the negotiation of Nevskii’s memory,
combined with its self-appointed role as the moral guardian of the Russian
nation, occasioned a minor television scandal in 2006. The long-running
satirical programme Gorodok, broadcast by RTR, dedicated an item to
Nevskii on the anniversary of the Battle on the Ice. It shows the moment
when Nevskii comes up with his ingenious tactic that will win the battle: not
only will his troops confront the enemy on the ice, they will remove their
heavy armaments to gain an advantage. With a cheeky play on the words ‘We
will show them …’, the soldiers, standing in formation clothed only in felt
hoods and valenki,19 bare their genitalia as they salute their commander. The
chairman of the Orthodox-patriotic social movement ‘Aleksandr Nevskii’,
Viacheslav Ulybin, lodged a complaint with the procurator of St Petersburg
demanding the termination of the show on the basis of a violation of religious
sensitivities. According to Ulybin, in the sketch, ‘the feat of Russian soldiers,
defending the Fatherland, is ﬁled as some sort of action by animal-like
imbeciles, and the saintly knight, celebrated by the Orthodox Church, as the
leader of such [people]’ (‘Otets Vsevolod Chaplin: Rossii nuzhna Anti-
diﬀamatsionnaia liga’ 2006). The vice-chair of the Duma’s Committee on
Social Unity and Religious Organisations, Aleksandr Chuev, concurred that if
the complaint accurately described the show as it was broadcast, this would
amount to an insult to national saints, as well as a violation of the feelings of
Orthodox believers (‘Chuev: Siuzhety “Gorodka” o “Ledovom poboishche”
nado dat’ pravovuiu otsenky’ 2006). Chuev took the matter very seriously:
‘You can mock everything and subvert any ideals you want, but states in
which this is permitted and nations who allow themselves to do so, quickly
perish’ (ibid.).20
When asked to respond to the sketch, the (then) deputy head of the
Moscow Patriarchate department for external church relations, Vsevolod
Chaplin, without having seen the show, deemed it to be an example of the
harmful tendencies prevailing on Russian television:
Unfortunately, humoristic programmes that are broadcast during televi-
sion prime time, in particular on Saturday and Sunday evenings, quite
often express derogatory and oﬀensive appraisals with regard to Russia,
its history and its people. We need something like an anti-defamation
league that would monitor such occurrences and call oﬀenders to
account.
(‘Otets Vsevolod Chaplin: Rossii nuzhna Antidiﬀamatsionnaia liga’ 2006)
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After the court refused to open a criminal case against the show’s producers
because of a lack of corpus delicti, Ulybin turned to President Putin for sup-
port of his cause. In an open letter, Ulybin challenges the court’s decision and
asks, ‘If [showing] completely naked soldiers under the command of a saint,
shown on state television, is not considered a sneer at sanctity (which, in
addition, incites religious enmity) – then what is?’ (Ulybin 2006). However,
Ulybin’s eﬀorts were in vain.
Nevskii as the founding father of Russian foreign policy
In 2007, Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs Sergei Lavrov commented on the sig-
niﬁcance of Nevskii for Russian diplomacy during a meeting of the Board of
Trustees of the ‘Aleksandr Nevskii’ programme – a private initiative that will
be discussed in detail below. The meeting took place at the Moscow State
Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). According to Lavrov, Nevskii
focused his attention on two questions, each of which has equally preoccupied
the Russian government since the turn of the millennium: the ‘gathering of
the Russian lands’ – in other words, the reining in of any signs of separatism
and the reorganisation of federal structures while inﬂuence is simultaneously
maintained and extended over the ‘Near Abroad’ – and the strengthening of
the Russian state (‘Sostoialsia Popechitel’skii sovet programmy “Aleksandr
Nevskii”’ 2007). Apart from the similarities in policy objectives between
Nevskii and the contemporary Russian state, Lavrov singles out Nevskii’s
unique contribution to the development of Russian diplomacy as it is still
practised today: ‘The activities of Aleksandr Nevskii in the West and in the East
laid the foundations of what we call multi-vector diplomacy. In terms of foreign
policy, Russia should orient itself in all directions’ (‘Rossiiskie diplomaty budut
udostaivat’sia znaka sv. kniazia Aleksandra Nevskogo’ 2007).
In his appreciation of Nevskii’s qualities, Lavrov puts across a multifaceted
image yet refrains from using religious categories. The image of Nevskii is
mobilised to highlight the challenges Russia faces in eﬀectively organising its
ties and addressing existing tensions among national, ethnic and religious
communities, both within and beyond its state borders. Nevskii, he states, was
‘a legendary ﬁgure, a politician, military commander, diplomat and statesman’
(‘Sostoialsia Popechitel’skii sovet programmy “Aleksandr Nevskii”’ 2007).
During the meeting it was emphasised how the contemporary practice of
linking the ﬁgure of Nevskii to the sphere of diplomacy builds upon on pre-
viously established custom – an example of reclaiming lost tradition. Anatolii
Torkunov, who is a Russian diplomat, rector of the MGIMO and member of
the board of trustees, explicitly embeds the plans that they are discussing for
the establishment of an Aleksandr Nevskii distinction for diplomats (znak) in
historical practice:
Aleksandr Nevskii is the patron of Russian diplomacy; in the nineteenth
century, you could ﬁnd an Icon of Aleksandr Nevskii in every embassy.
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Peter I already established this tradition. And in the minds of many, vic-
tories in the diplomatic and military arenas were associated with the
name of Aleksandr Nevskii. There are churches in Soﬁa and Belgrade
that bear his name in honour of military victories of the Slavs.
(‘Sostoialsia Popechitel’skii sovet programmy “Aleksandr Nevskii”’
2007)
The plans for the distinction were realised, and at the ﬁrst awards ceremony
in 2009 it was again emphasised how this builds upon the tradition that
Empress Catherine I founded through the establishment of the Order of
Aleksandr Nevskii in 1725 (‘Evgeniiu Primakovu vruchena premiia Aleksandra
Nevskogo’ 2009).
While Lavrov adheres to the language of foreign policy in his statements
about Nevskii, politics and religion are continuously interwoven in the socie-
tal projects initiated in his memory. The ‘Aleksandr Nevskii’ programme
mentioned above is a good example. The Saint Andrew Foundation and the
Centre of National Glory initiated the programme in December 2006 with
support from the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ural Mining and Metallurgi-
cal Company (UGMK). Its aim is to increase societal awareness about this
‘key ﬁgure’ in the lead-up to the celebration of the 800th anniversary of
Nevskii’s birth in 2021 (‘Programma “Aleksandr Nevskii”’ 2014). More
broadly formulated, the programme’s main objective is to stimulate the
development of spiritual and moral values in Russian society and to foster a
worldview that emphasises selﬂess dedication to one’s country and people.
Nevskii is perceived as great military commander and protector of the
Fatherland, but to an even greater extent he is regarded as a man who lived a
holy life, as well as a statesman and diplomat.
The programme comprises multifaceted activities. First, it organises a tour
of Nevskii’s relics to cities in Russia and within the dioceses and archdioceses
of the ROC (e.g. those in Latvia, Belarus and the Czech Republic). Second,
facilitated by ﬁnancial support from UGMK, it is involved in the construc-
tion of churches dedicated to Nevskii in the borderlands of the Russian Fed-
eration – for example, on the island of Sakhalin and in the city of Baltiisk in
the Kaliningrad region. Third, annual ‘Aleksandr days’ have been organised
in several Russian cities, including various activities aimed at children.
Finally, the programme is active in the academic sphere through conferences,
fora and the publication of research volumes.
Since 2009, Patriarch Kirill serves as the honorary chairman of the pro-
gramme’s board of trustees. Its members are governmental representatives, clergy,
businessmen and representatives of societal organisations. In addition to the
patriarch, the board is co-chaired by Vladimir Iakunin – former director of Rus-
sian Railways and the chairman of the St. Andrew Foundation and the Centre of
National Glory – and Andrei Kozitsyn, the general director of UGMK.
The programme’s initiative for an Aleksandr Nevskii distinction for diplo-
mats appears somewhat remarkable at ﬁrst glance, given the ecclesiastical
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background of its founding organisations. Yet it asserts the mutual advanta-
geousness of state-church cooperation in the foreign policy domain: the
Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs strengthens its image by the association with a
morally superior type of foreign policy exempliﬁed by Nevskii, while the
Church is able to assert its inﬂuence abroad more eﬀectively through its close
relations with the ministry. Evgenii Primakov, minister of foreign aﬀairs in the
years 1996–1998, was the ﬁrst recipient of the award in 2009. The distinction
for diplomats is not reserved for members of the diplomatic corps and the
Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs. In fact, Patriarch Aleksii II had been chosen as
the ﬁrst laureate but passed away shortly before the ceremony was to take
place in 2008 (‘Evgeniiu Primakovu vruchena premiia Aleksandra Nevskogo’
2009). In 2010, the golden distinction was awarded to his successor Patriarch
Kirill in a ceremony at the MGIMO. Later meetings of the board of trustees
and the coinciding awards ceremonies have taken place at the Cathedral of
Christ the Saviour, for instance in 2014 when Patriarch Kirill awarded the
Aleksandr Nevskii distinction to Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs Lavrov. Hence,
all aspects of the Aleksandr Nevskii distinction aﬃrm the bonds between
Russian Orthodoxy and oﬃcial foreign policy – from its concept and its
laureates to its awards ceremony locales.
The 2010 meeting at the MGIMO was also the occasion of the unveiling of
a bas-relief plaque depicting Nevskii. Patriarch Kirill asserted: ‘This bas-relief
reminds those who study here of the fact that active state, diplomatic and
military action can be combined with earnest Christian ministry’ (‘Patriarkh
Kirill: “Aleksandr Nevskii – primer dlia budushchikh diplomatov”’ 2010).
The plaque, in combination with the newly constructed church on its grounds
(mentioned earlier) and the photography exhibition ‘Aleksandr Nevskii – The
Name of Russia’, on display next to the bas-relief in December 2011 (‘V
MGIMO proshlo otkrytie fotovystavki “Aleksandr Nevskii – imia Rossii”’
2011),21 testify to a deliberate close linkage of the ﬁgure of Nevskii and the
institution that educates Russia’s future diplomats.
While the government-endorsed image of Nevskii as a statesman and skil-
ful diplomat has been most closely associated with the Ministry of Foreign
Aﬀairs, his name has more recently been quoted within a more militaristic
context. In December 2013, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu oﬃcially
transferred a nuclear submarine named after Aleksandr Nevskii to the armed
forces (‘Vladimir Putin: Do 2020 goda v sostav ﬂota voidut vosem’ pod-
vodnykh kreiserov i vosem’ mnogotselevykh atomnykh podlodok’ 2013).
The state has demonstrated its future commitment to the memory of the
Prince of Novgorod in yet another way: by presidential ukaz, the 800th
anniversary of Nevskii’s birth will be celebrated in 2021 (President of the
Russian Federation 2014).
The political appropriation of Nevskii as an exemplary ﬁgure has been
limited, yet the narrative about him has demonstrated its potential to bridge
the religious and political spheres and establish common ground. This ﬁts
with the government’s tendency to ‘integrat[e] orthodox symbolism and
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cultural capital into both the construction of its own legitimacy and the con-
struction of a viable post-soviet national identity’ (Papkova 2011: 189).
In conclusion, it is worth noting that both the ROC and its associated
Orthodox organisations and government representatives emphasise that con-
temporary veneration of Nevskii reaches back to an imperial tradition and
generally steers clear of anything that would suggest Stalinist or other Soviet
associations.
Film and television analyses
In the years after 2000 very few cultural productions were dedicated to the
memory of Aleksandr Nevskii. A notable exception is the television doc-
umentary series Who Are We? Russian Reforms (Kto my? Reformy po-russki,
Lev Brodskii, 2000), broadcast by the Kul’tura channel, which dedicated an
episode to Nevskii. The show sought to counter the prevailing image of
Nevskii as a military commander and, instead, portrayed him as a political
reformer. It highlights how Nevskii adapted to the changing geopolitical
conditions of his time in order to save the ‘Russian soul’ from the dire
conditions that Kievan Rus’ found itself in. His deﬁnition of the state’s
policy towards the East and the West is earmarked as the essence of
‘Russian-style reform’. But the relative latency of the memory of Nevskii
on the big and small screens changed dramatically in 2008 when two
major productions brought the medieval prince back into the public eye:
the historical blockbuster Aleksandr: The Neva Battle and the TV project
The Name Is Russia22 that resulted in Nevskii being elected the greatest
Russian of all time.
Aleksandr: The Neva Battle (2008)
Sergei Eisenstein’s image of Nevskii is arguably the most widely known
(non-religious) representation of the medieval prince. The makers of the
historical blockbuster Aleksandr: The Neva Battle (Aleksandr. Nevskaia
bitva, 2008) avoided any direct comparison with Eisenstein’s iconic ﬁlm by
situating their narrative a few years earlier in Nevskii’s life. The ﬁlm
positions itself as a prequel to its Stalinist precursor, ending the narrative
where Eisenstein’s ﬁlm began. Yet whereas the Stalinist interpretation
stressed his might on the battleﬁeld, the post-Soviet Nevskii is ﬁrst and
foremost a morally superior ﬁgure and guardian of the Orthodox Russian
state. The ﬁlm was directed and co-produced by Igor’ Kalenov, who was
making his feature-length ﬁlm debut. He is also the founder and director
of the ﬁlm’s production company Nikola Film.23 The project was very
personal to Kalenov:
I became interested in the personality and deeds of Aleksandr Nevskii
when I was still a child after I got the wonderful colouring book ‘The
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Battle of the Neva.’ Thirty-ﬁve years later I got the opportunity to
realise my childhood dream of making a ﬁlm about the Novgorodian
prince.
(‘Nachalis’ s’‘emki ﬁl’ma o molodykh godakh Aleksandra Nevskogo’
2007)
Furthermore, he felt Nevskii’s story was timely: ‘I am convinced that our
society now needs historical examples that show that it is necessary to reach
compromises in order to resolve global problems’ (Ramm 2008).
Initially, Aleksei Karelin had been assigned to be director of the project,
but during production Kalenov decided to part ways with him and take on
the director’s role himself (Kvasha 2008). The ﬁlm was subsidised by the
Federal Agency for Culture and Cinema (Roskul’tura) and premiered in
Russian cinemas on 1 May, in the lead-up to the Victory Day celebrations.
Despite the favourable release date, its performance at the box oﬃce was
mediocre, drawing just over 577,000 viewers (‘Aleksandr. Nevskaia bitva’
n.d.).24 Its DVD release was more successful. Aleksandr topped DVD sales in
the last week of May 2008, and was in second and ﬁfth position for the pre-
ceding and subsequent weeks, respectively (InterMedia 2008a; 2008b; 2008c).
In interviews, Kalenov avoided making direct associations and comparisons
with Eisenstein’s Aleksandr Nevskii, stating that each director had ‘shot a
diﬀerent kind of ﬁlm’:
It’s not a poster or an epic, but a story about a boy who is entering
adulthood and learns to live by the rules dictated by politics. Our ﬁlm is
about what it’s like to be alone at the top. And with all that, as a future
politician, a future soldier, he contrives to preserve his mercy and
compassion.
(Ramm 2008)
During an interview for the website ﬁlm.ru, Kalenov was asked why he had
decided to shoot a historical ﬁlm and whether it had become fashionable to
do so – citing other examples, such as 1612 (Khotinenko. See chapter 5) and
Mongol (Bodrov), that had premiered the year before. Kalenov’s response to
this seemingly innocuous question is quite telling about the political sensitiv-
ities involved in making historical cinema. First, he denies being part of a
‘trend’ since in the preceding decade just one ﬁlm, 1612, had been produced
on Russian history. He attributes the overall increase in historical ﬁlms pro-
duced in Russia to circumstantial factors such as the advancements in
computer technology and the fact that ‘the political pathos has subsided
somewhat now’ (Kvasha 2008). Kalenov concludes by emphasising his
artistic independence:
And then they try to accuse me of [fulﬁlling] some kind of political order.
But we are just making a ﬁlm; moreover, we are shooting it not as a
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historical drama, a historical epic; we produce an ordinary contemporary
ﬁlm, a spy detective.
(Kvasha 2008)
Evidently, this particular interview was not the ﬁrst time the director was
confronted with the insinuation that Aleksandr was a case of goszakaz.
The question of goszakaz indeed remains complicated. Even if the govern-
ment does not directly solicit a production, a director or producer is often
inﬂuenced in his selection of projects to pursue by a sense of which topics or
genres are likely to be funded (Interviewee I). Indeed, Kalenov has stated that
it is easier to secure ten million dollars for a blockbuster production than
raise one million to shoot an intimate story about ordinary people (Ramm
2008). Therefore, unless a director is dedicated to the realisation of a parti-
cular idea and is willing and/or able to do so through alternative funding, a
measure of (anticipatory) conformity is likely to arise.
The ﬁlm’s narrative relates how Nevskii establishes himself as sovereign of
his court and becomes married to the daughter of the Prince of Polotsk.
Whereas in Eisenstein’s ﬁlm the Battle on the Ice takes centre stage, Kalenov’s
ﬁlm focuses on political intrigues and betrayals at the court. The military
confrontation with the Swedes serves as a meagre postscript. For the battle
scene, help was enlisted from historical re-enactment groups, which is
common in Russian historical ﬁlm production (Interviewee F). Not only is
there the diﬀerence in narrated events between the ﬁlms: Aleksandr demon-
strates few borrowings from the Eisenstein classic. The iconic imagery has not
been adopted or recontextualised in evident ways.
The young Nevskii (played by Anton Pampushnyi) is handsome and has a
calm but energetic demeanour. The producers deliberately cast a relatively
unknown actor in the leading role to prevent any external associations with
him (Ramm 2008). His most salient features are his sense of compassion and
overall good morals – which at times verge on the incredible. A crucial scene
of the detective plotline is the attempt to poison Nevskii at his wedding ban-
quet. A ceremonial goblet of wine is passed between the prince and his men
to celebrate the holy matrimony. The court jester, who has ﬂed under the table
after being bullied, notices how someone puts a few drops of poison into the
goblet and then passes it back. The goblet is reﬁlled and oﬀered to Nevskii.
As he delivers a speech and moves it toward his lips, the jester snatches the
goblet away, drinks its contents, then slowly succumbs to the poison as
Nevskii, now aware that a spy has inﬁltrated his court, holds his hand. The
death of the jester, who sacriﬁced his own life to save his monarch, torments
Nevskii and keeps him awake at night. As the search for the person respon-
sible for the poisoning intensiﬁes, Nevskii is ﬁrm that not a single innocent
death will be permitted. Despite the precariousness of the situation and the
risks involved in having a spy among his inner circle, Aleksandr overrules his
advisers as they move to punish those in charge of pouring the wine – just in
case. The young prince’s ability to act wisely and emphatically in times of
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crisis demonstrates his innate moral superiority – a quality that supports his
canonisation by the Orthodox Church.
The main geopolitical claim the ﬁlm puts forward is that Novgorod, and
the ‘Russian land’ in general, was the target of a concerted Western attack. It
is intimated that the Pope of Rome, the Teutonic Knights of the Livonian
Order (here often referred to as ‘Germans’) and Sweden are conspiring to
convert Novgorod to Roman Catholicism and bring it under their inﬂuence.
The opening scene spells out the intentions of Novgorod’s western neigh-
bours. In a voice-over, Andreas von Velven, one of the main spies in the nar-
rative, introduces himself as a knight of the Livonian Order who has been
sent on a special mission: to increase the Order’s inﬂuence over the ‘unciv-
ilised’ Slavic lands. Immediately, the scene is set for a confrontation that is as
much about preserving religious and cultural independence as it is about
fending oﬀ territorial expansion. Von Velven coordinates the eﬀorts to subvert
Novgorod by obtaining the military intelligence needed to launch an attack
through corrupt boyars – notably a map of the Neva indicating suitable
locations for landing and setting up camp – and enlists the military support
of the Swedes to carry it out. Christian monks visit the court to oﬀer the
Pope’s support against the Tatars, though in reality the aim of their visit is to
collect the map they have commissioned of the Neva.
The missionaries’ audience with Nevskii exempliﬁes a recurring motif
showing the alleged moral superiority of Orthodoxy over Roman Christianity.
In addition to delivering the Pope’s oﬀer of protection, the monks present
Nevskii with a Bible. As he intently thumbs through it, the camera repeatedly
pauses on miniatures depicting crusaders. The images show the violent sup-
pression and murder of heathens and adherents of diﬀerent faiths. The
soundtrack mixes Christian hymns and screams of suﬀering to create the
impression that Aleksandr is visualising the events described in the Bible.
Suddenly overcome with resolve, he slams shut the book of scripture and
reproves the monks for the Pope’s worldly politics. Orthodoxy, he tells them,
is respectful of other religions and would never attempt to impose itself on
peoples of diﬀerent faiths, let alone force them to convert by military means.
He angrily sends the representatives away and warns that he will no longer
receive them in the future. Just as Nevskii is onto the ‘true’ character of
Roman Christianity, he also sees through the Pope’s promises. Even if we
convert, he proclaims, they will not come to our aid when their military
assistance is needed.
Novgorod’s enemies in the West take advantage of tensions among Nov-
gorod’s boyars. The court is divided about Nevskii’s foreign policy, especially
regarding his cooperation with the Tatars. His benevolence vis-à-vis the
expanding Mongol empire is met with mistrust and is perceived as a serious
threat to Novgorod’s independence. His reserve in expanding relations with
the West is thought to be unfounded and damaging to trade relations. The
expansion of their trade interests is indeed the principal motive why the cor-
rupt boyars are cooperating with Von Velven. When they meet with him in an
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underground tunnel, one of them proclaims, ‘We seek the Western way of
living’ – a phrase with an unmistakable contemporary ring to it. When the
news comes about Swedish warships approaching the estuary of the Neva, the
subversive boyars are proved wrong. Not only have they failed to recognise
the true intentions of their Western trading partners and underestimated the
military threat emanating from the West, they have wrongfully questioned
Nevskii’s diplomatic competence in navigating good relations with the East.
The motif of betrayal surfaces in multiple contexts. Aleksandr’s closest
friend Ratmir violates his trust by falling in love with his bride and is brieﬂy
suspected of attempting to poison him. Prince Dmitrii, the son of exiled
Prince Iaroslav, inﬁltrates the Novgorod court and is the true culprit. After
his cover has been blown, he returns to his father at the Swedish court and is
sworn into knighthood. In return for his allegiance, the Swedes promise to
install him on the throne once Novgorod has been taken. The deceptions and
betrayals can be read as oﬀering direct parallels with contemporary political
intrigues, as becomes clear from Kalenov’s choice of words to describe the
‘spy detective’ component of the narrative: ‘We have spies who ‘muddy
the waters’ in Novgorod with the help of local ‘oligarchs’’ (Ramm 2008). One
critic took it upon himself to put forward some guesses: ‘You can look for
heroes of our time in the ﬁlm characters: the rogue prince – Berezovskii?
The corrupt rebel-boyars – the accused in the Iukos case? In fact, even
without [such] comparisons one is left with extremely obvious geopolitics’
(Liashchenko 2008).
The possibility of drawing such direct analogies notwithstanding, the jux-
taposition of Nevskii on the one hand and the corrupt boyars and Prince
Dmitrii on the other serves to highlight the diﬀerence between those who seek
a position of power and those who are actually worthy of occupying one. And
only a person worthy of having and exercising power, such as Nevskii, can
lead a nation in a wise and morally sound way during times of crisis (this
argument resonates with the myth created around the leadership qualities of
Vladimir Putin, see chapter 5).
The ﬁlm premiered in the wake of increasing tensions between Russia and
the Baltic states. In Estonia, these tensions escalated in April 2007 following
the removal of the ‘bronze soldier’, a monument dedicated to the Soviet sol-
diers who died in the liberation of Estonia from Nazi occupation. The relo-
cation of the statue led to several days of rioting in Tallinn and a diplomatic
row between Estonia and Russia (Bruggemann & Kasekamp 2008). Estonia
was targeted by an unprecedented cyberattack that caused a shutdown of
major governmental information portals and necessitated a complete cut-oﬀ
from international data ﬂows to restore national access to the Internet (Lesk
2007). The claim of Western countries conspiring against Novgorod further
resonates with Russia’s contemporary apprehensiveness about the bloc for-
mation of, for example, Poland and the Baltic states within the European
Union on policy matters pertaining to EU–Russian relations. Nevskii’s
accommodating stance on strengthening bonds with the Tatar Horde, then,
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should be read in light of the contemporary rapprochement between Russia
and China.
Aleksandr was poorly received by critics. One reviewer remarked that the
storyline was as (un)surprising ‘as a paragraph in a schoolbook’ (Gavrilova
2008). ‘One would have liked to see bold historical parallels, and some kind of
analysis of events’, the critic continues, concluding that acclaimed directors no
longer dare to take on such material in the way that Eisenstein had (Gavrilova
2008). The ﬁlm critic writing for Kommersant was equally unimpressed. In a
review humorously named ‘Aleksandr Iaroslavich doesn’t change confession’, a
play of words on the Soviet classic on Ivan the Terrible (see chapter 6), she states:
Any ancient battle miniatures, the ones that illustrated chronicles, […] also
captivate not with their reﬁnement of lines, their play with light and
shadow and psychological depth, but with their blank expression and naïve
unsophistication, allowing the small yellow circle of a nimbus to be painted
around the head of a still living Aleksandr Nevskii, galloping on his horse
holding a sword, and in that way with a minimum of eﬀort in one stroke
convey all of the grand meaning of this ﬁgure for Russian history.
(Maslova 2008)
A critic for the website Ruskino.ru welcomed the production of historical
Russian ﬁlms and praised their potential to contribute to the understanding
of history among the younger generation (Stepnova 2008). While this alone is
enough to demonstrate the value of Aleksandr, the critic reﬂects, its execution
could have been more convincing. She argues that the authors failed to
commit themselves to a single characterisation of Nevskii. Their attempt to
include all aspects of his multifaceted personality results in an unpersuasive
sequence of events lacking motivational coherence and depth. Unlike the ﬁrst
critic quoted above, she feels that one particular historical parallel was actually
too explicit:
And the phrase ‘There are so many enemies around us’ would be more
appropriate for a ﬁlm created in 1938 – at the height of spy mania – than
today. (Although, in the grim Stalinist times, Sergei Eisenstein shot a ﬁlm
about a patriot and military commander, and not [a ﬁlm] about a spy hunt).
(Ibid.)
Those viewers who shared their views online expressed highly diverse opi-
nions, ranging from high praise to crushing critique and everything in
between. Some questioned the ﬁlm’s historical accuracy by comparing it to
the events as they are described in medieval chronicles.
There are, of course, plenty of absurdities and speculations in the ﬁlm. It’s
strange that from the very beginning, Gavrila Aleksich ﬁghts on foot
during the battle on the Neva instead of hopping on a horse in pursuit of
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the enemies on the Swedish ship, as is reported in the chronicles. Overall
it’s a historically truthful, patriotic ﬁlm. Nowadays, ﬁlms about the
struggle of the Russians with foreigners [inozemtsami] are few and far
between. I’ve had enough of all their ethno political correctness.
(tsenitel’ istorii 2011)
Others conceded that the patriotic ideals embodied by the narrative make
up for these factual shortcomings.
It’s a terriﬁc ﬁlm! We watched it with the whole family, very instructive.
It’s lively, conveys the historical events pretty well. But most importantly
the character of Aleksandr is simply delightful – those are the kind of
leaders we need right now! It is exactly because of such godsend people
that Rus’ managed to survive! I even cannot believe it’s a Russian ﬁlm –
made with quality!
(Taiso4ka 2010)
And another example: ‘We need this kind of ﬁlm to raise our national
consciousness. Brilliant work on the part of the director, screenwriters and
actors. BRAVO RUSSIA!’ (zlo 2008). Comments about the narrative’s truth-
fulness to historic events at times elicited harsh responses. For example, the
comment ‘It’s a good ﬁlm: historically reliable, patriotic. Filmed soundly.
Watchable’ (Mario Puso 2008) received the following reply: ‘You are a fool
my friend, period! Use your brain!’ (meus 2008).
A certain one-sidedness in the depiction of the main hero did not escape
viewers’ attention.
I didn’t like how they portray Aleksandr in an exclusively positive way
and as right about everything (this error is made in a lot of ﬁlms lately).
It reminds me of commissioned cinema [zakaznoe kino]. I do not dispute
that he was great and all. It’s just that anyone who is in power has to
occasionally take tough decisions, but they have omitted this and don’t
show it.
(mig-24 2008)
Other commenters also criticised the somewhat simplistic patriotism; in the
words of one commenter: ‘Depressing ﬂag-waving [ura-patrioticheskaia] agi-
tation, incompetently done and without ardour. A waste of time’ (tourmate
2008). Another commenter complained: ‘Again they take us for cattle. As if
no one presses a key [on their keyboards, M.W.] and reads the real story
about who Aleksandr was on the internet. A catchpenny print style [lubochnaia]
story of kvass-patriotism’ (Andrei 2013).
Aleksandr: The Neva Battle portrays Nevskii as a morally superior leader
amidst corrupt boyars conspiring with the West. Supported by a small circle
of faithful men, Nevskii succeeds in exposing the collaborators and staves oﬀ
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the Swedish attack. Unlike the boyars who conspire with the West to further
their personal gains through trade, Nevskii correctly assesses the threat the
European powers pose to Novgorod’s political and religious independence.
The confrontation between Novgorod and the West is repeatedly and expli-
citly framed as a struggle to defend the Russian lands against religious
expansionism from outside. While the advance of the Mongol horde is no less
impending, Nevskii demonstrates a remarkable ability to negotiate beneﬁcial
conditions for Novgorod with Eastern peoples. Since Tatar advancement poses
no direct threat to the princedom’s religious beliefs, unlike with Novgorod’s
Western enemies, a cooperative approach is deemed to be more fruitful.
The latter argument to a certain extent echoes Eisenstein’s Aleksandr
Nevskii, where Nevskii proclaims that the danger from the Germans is more
pressing than the threat posed the Tatars since it cannot be warded oﬀ by
paying tribute. Another minor correspondence between the two ﬁlms is a
moment when it is rhetorically asked whether one would sacriﬁce the ‘Russian
land’ (russkaia zemlia) for the sake of trade opportunities. The major diﬀer-
ence lies in the importance attributed to religion in the representation of
Novgorod and ‘Russian civilisation’; in short, what Nevskii is called to
defend. In both ﬁlms the Western enemy acts explicitly in the name of
Christianity and seeks to attain its goals through acts of violence. Unlike in
the Soviet representation, where Russian Orthodoxy is featured primarily as a
circumstantial aspect of the historical setting, Kalenov’s Nevskii is devoted to
his faith and acts explicitly in its defence. His diplomatic and military feats
are framed in such a way as to bestow upon Nevskii the reputation of not
just the defender of the Russian people(s), but the defender of Orthodox
civilisation as such.
The Name is Russia (2008)
From May through December 2008, the Rossiia channel organised and
broadcast the cross-media project The Name Is Russia. Through several
rounds of online and telephone voting, viewers had the opportunity to elect
the greatest Russian of all time. After an initial narrowing of potential can-
didates from 500 to 12 on the basis of votes cast online, the ﬁnalists were
judged on their merits in 12 prime-time broadcasts and a ﬁnal episode. On 28
December, Aleksandr Nevskii was announced the winner. The project, which
bore the slogan ‘The historical choice of 2008’, followed in the footsteps of
international precedents, such as the 2002 BBC project 100 Greatest Britons,
where Winston Churchill was voted the winner, and the Ukrainian adaptation
of the format that saw Iaroslav the Wise being elected the greatest all-time
Ukrainian in spring 2008. Several types of interactive media (e.g. online and
telephone voting, a website forum, a LiveJournal page) were incorporated
into the project design to stimulate social participation in the election. In
addition, the online dimension increased its appeal to the younger generation.
As a result, the project should be viewed as ‘a carefully constructed and
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rigorously manipulated social project that aims to reify and reinforce Russian
national sentiment by oﬀering civic platforms of discussion and presentation’
(Strukov 2009: 33).
A jury of notable Russians consisting of politicians, scientists and artists
represented the 12 ﬁnalists. It appears that the ﬁnal composition of the jury
diﬀered somewhat from what was originally intended. In an interview pub-
lished in July 2008, VGTRK director general Anton Zlatopol’skii indicated
that Nikita Mikhalkov had given his preliminary consent to host the show
(Bandenko 2008). Aleksandr Liubimov, however, fulﬁlled the role of presenter
in the ﬁnals and Mikhalkov took a seat among the members of the jury.
Liubimov was ﬁrst deputy director general of VGTRK at the time and had
initiated the project (Strukov 2009: 32). Some last-minute changes occurred
with regard to the members of the jury as well. According to Zlatopol’skii,
‘Viktor Chernomyrdin will represent Peter the First, Valentina Matvienko will
speak on behalf of Catherine the Second. And Anatolii Chubais will make his
appearance with us, and many others …’ (Bandenko 2008). Neither Mat-
vienko, then governor of St Petersburg, nor Chubais, who led the process of
privatisation in the early 1990s, took part in the ﬁnals. The ﬁnalists and their
representatives are summarised below in order of broadcast.
Aleksandr Nevskii Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill
Peter the Great Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russian ambassador to Ukraine
Iosif Stalin Valentin Varennikov, Army general
Dmitrii Mendeleev Sergei Kapitsa, professor; vice-president of the Russian
Academy of Natural Sciences
Aleksandr Suvorov Sergei Mironov, Chair of the Federation Council
Fedor Dostoevskii Dmitrii Rogozin, Representative of the Russian Federation
to NATO
Catherine the Great Aleksandr Tkachev, governor of Krasnodar Krai
Vladimir Lenin Gennadii Ziuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the
Russian Federation
Aleksandr II Andrei N. Sakharov, director of the Institute of Russian
History
Ivan the Terrible Il’ia Glazunov, artist
Aleksandr Pushkin Iurii Kublanovskii, poet
Petr Stolypin Nikita Mikhalkov, ﬁlm director
With regard to the representatives, the participation of (then) Metropolitan
of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill – who thereby represented the ROC on a
prime-time TV show – is striking (we will return to his motives for doing so
later on). It demonstrates that the producers felt that politicians, artists and
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scientists would be most authoritative in questions concerning national his-
tory. The choice of an army general to represent Stalin is informative as it
aﬃrms the connection between veterans of the Second World War and the
memory of Stalin. Moreover, it is generally known that Varennikov was
implicated in the 1991 coup d’état against Mikhail Gorbachev. It is unclear
whether the selection of a man with such associations was a conscious deci-
sion on the part of the producers, or whether the choice was solely necessi-
tated by the need to ﬁnd a person of good social standing who was willing to
represent the Soviet leader on national television.
The competition sparked international controversy at an early stage when
Stalin topped the list in the online voting leading up to the television ﬁnals.
The programme’s production team attributed the apparent popularity of
Stalin to the involvement of hackers. They published two messages on the
website that explained how the voting system fell victim to a so-called denial-
of-service attack.25 In addition to ﬂooding the computer system with requests
that caused it to malfunction, ‘massive voting for I.V. Stalin was organised
from several internet sources’ (‘Imia Rossiia. FLOOD ATTACK’ 2008).
About a week after the event, on 17 July, a list of (user) names appeared on
the project website. The 22 listed ‘villains’, the post stated, had ‘turned Stalin
into a computer virus’ (‘IMIA ROSSIIA. “TOP 22 NEGODIAIA”’ 2008).
The user names are nondescript (e.g. ‘Grom’, ‘cyber’, ‘DND’) leading one to ask
what eﬀect was intended by publicising this ‘list of shame’. Zlatopol’skii has com-
mented on the uproar and has denied the allegation that the producers intervened
because Stalin’s lead in the polling was making them nervous. He stated:
It would be foolish to argue with the fact that we are talking about one of
the most iconic ﬁgures in the history of contemporary Russia. The
appearance of Stalin among the top positions in the rankings did not
surprise us; we were ready for that, what’s more, we were expecting
something to that eﬀect. [But] it’s a diﬀerent story when at some point the
technical means of the voting system cannot cope with the increased
attention from the audience, and we even had to suspend the operation of
the computers for several hours because failures had begun to occur. In
part, the interference was provoked by spammers who undertook a
coordinated attack on our website in order to sow chaos and disable the
system. We made it clear that we know the real names of the attackers
and will not let them behave like hooligans with impunity. Perhaps, you
mistook the harshness of our tone for nerves?
(Bandenko 2008)
The ﬁrst television broadcast, explaining the selection procedure, fore-
grounded the hacker incident as if to reassure the viewers that the results of
the selection process were fair. The incident and the publicity it generated
nevertheless undermined the project’s credibility and fed into rumours of
falsiﬁcation after the project drew to a close.
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During the televised stage of the election, a conscious eﬀort was made to
demonstrate societal resonance. In short video clips, (groups of) individuals
described who they were voting for and why. Thus, the programme created the
impression that the project was on the minds of the general public and Rus-
sian citizens felt personally connected to one or more of the ﬁnalists. One of
these segments contains a rare explicit acknowledgement that Lenin and
Stalin continue to enjoy popular support in some circles. At the beginning of
the episode on Catherine the Great, a group of communists in St Petersburg is
brieﬂy introduced. They are planning to cast their votes for Lenin, according
to the voice-over. However, the icon depicting Stalin that hangs on a wall
visible behind them and the fact that they have requested his canonisation
by the Russian Orthodox Church suggest that they have yet to make their
ﬁnal choice.
The general dynamics of the panel discussions underscore that the question
of how the Soviet past, including its propaganda and historiography, should
be valued has proved enduring. While the project may have aimed to deter-
mine a new national symbol, it largely turned out to be an occasion for the
public to scrutinise the legacy of Soviet narratives of gloriﬁcation. Because of
the diversity of historical ﬁgures who reached the competition’s ﬁnal stage, the
jury could not avoid evaluating the contemporary relevance of the Soviet past
and its heroes (Lenin, Stalin), as well as the Soviet gloriﬁcation of statesmen
from earlier periods of Russian history (e.g. Aleksandr Nevskii, Ivan the
Terrible, Peter the Great). Over the course of the discussions, Soviet mythol-
ogy is deconstructed, the ‘true’ course of historical events is supposedly
revealed on the basis of extensive quotations, and commonly held beliefs
about the virtues and vices of these great Russians are challenged so as to
establish more ‘historically accurate’ narratives.
Throughout the series, enduring Soviet characterisations and attitudes
towards history are called into question. In the episode on Catherine the
Great, for instance, it is repeatedly asked whether Krasnodar should be
renamed Yekaterinodar, its name before the Russian Revolution. Certain
judges, however, most notably Gennadii Ziuganov, defend the continued
honouring of the Soviet canon’s heroes – a position that is not without resonance
among (part of) the Russian population.
While the discussions mostly revolve around facts and their interpretation,
members of the jury at times demonstrate the need to explicitly position
themselves in certain ways with respect to the candidate being discussed. In
the cases of Ivan the Terrible and Stalin, some jurors appeared uncomfortable
with being ‘forced’ to consider these candidates as potential winners. The
apparent uneasiness was most likely prompted by the fact that the group of
ﬁnalists could be ‘split equally’ into ‘builders’ and ‘demons’, as jury member
Sergei Kapitsa remarks in the ﬁrst episode.
The question is rightly raised how the candidates, especially those from
earlier periods, should best be approached. On the one hand, their actions
have to be historically contextualised, viewed against the standards and
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circumstances of their day. Consider, for example, how the late Il’ia Glazunov
chooses to defend Ivan the Terrible by pointing out that several European
rulers of his era were responsible for the deaths of an even greater number of
their citizens. On the other hand it is argued that attempts of this sort to
reach historical understanding should not downplay crimes and overt acts of
cruelty. The question that forms the guiding thread through the project as a
whole, therefore, and one that remains unanswered, is: can a tyrant be
allowed to be named the greatest Russian of all time? The majority of the
jury’s members appear to answer this question in the negative, which endows
the project with a tension that is hard to resolve. Because if, through a fair
and transparent voting process, the audience selects, for instance, Stalin as its
winner, then who are these 12 jurors to decide that this is not allowed? It is
true perhaps, then, that the only diﬀerence between a Russian dictatorship
and a Russian democracy is that, with the latter, the people can choose by
whom they are exploited, as Mikhalkov jokes in the closing remarks on Ivan
the Terrible.
The jury’s members struggle to reconcile their understanding of historical
greatness with the selection of ﬁnalists put before them by the voting audi-
ence. With regard to Ivan the Terrible, Viktor Chernomyrdin, for example,
expresses his doubts as to whether a majority of the jurors would cast their
votes in his favour. Still, he continues, the Russian people did vote for Ivan
and this should be respected. The jury’s task, he generalises, is to discuss the
individuals whom the voters have put before it, not to question the right of
any of them to be there. The writer Viktor Erofeev has also touched upon the
fundamental diﬀerence between the Russian people’s understanding of history
and that of the so-called educated elite with reference to The Name Is Russia,
addressing in particular the popularity of Stalin:
Russian [russkoe] popular consciousness managed to prevail in various
spheres and for various reasons because it was not disenchanted by the
Enlightenment, and for the elite it was even disadvantageous to free it
from its illusions. Therefore our Russian [rossiiskoe] popular conscious-
ness reacts entirely diﬀerently to historical ﬁgures than European [con-
sciousness]. And we, as elites, [react] half this way, half that way because
we arose from the people – some up to the knee, some up to the waist.
[…] The popular self-consciousness greatly appeals to me: it is built on
imagination, on the negotiation of history. But it becomes monstrous
once we land in our reality.
(Buntman 2009)
One of the most insightful explanations for Ivan the Terrible’s place (and that
of several other candidates) among the ﬁnal 12 is put forward by jury
member Sergei Kapitsa. He argues that it signals the existence of a ‘spiritual
vacuum’ and deep-rooted diﬃculties with the adequate understanding of one’s
national history. Kapitsa draws attention to the tendency to impose
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contemporary value judgements onto the past and to let historiography be
guided by ‘historical feeling’ rather than by the search for truth. In an
apparent attempt to redirect the course of the discussion, Kapitsa concludes
that the jury is guilty of this very tendency in its attempts to somehow justify
the fact that Ivan the Terrible had been chosen. Mikhalkov’s closing remark
that, in judging such a complex historical ﬁgure, one should trust one’s gut
feeling (literally, ‘inner tuning fork’) demonstrates the accuracy of Kapitsa’s
observation. As the judges repeatedly proclaim that the jury’s task is to try
and understand why the public voted for these candidates – in other words, as
they attempt to bridge the gap between their understanding of exemplary
historical ﬁgures and the understanding of those who have cast their votes – it
becomes increasingly clear how great the distance is between the public and
this particular jury.
Aleksandr Nevskii
The television broadcast phase of the project opened with a discussion of the
candidacy of Aleksandr Nevskii. Eloquently and charismatically, Metropoli-
tan Kirill delivered a plea in favour of the Prince of Novgorod in which the
challenges of Nevskii’s rule were interwoven with considerations of con-
temporary political and societal issues. In various interviews he has elucidated
the motivation behind his participation on the jury. In addition to supporting
the basic tenets of the project, Metropolitan Kirill felt it imperative to have
the Russian Orthodox Church represented on the show:
And, of course, in such a discussion about iconic names in Russian his-
tory the voice of the Orthodox Church, whose role in the creation of
Russian civilisation and Russian culture is eminent and undisputed,
should necessarily be heard.
(‘“Postizhenie Rossii, ili Otkrytyi urok grazhdanstvennosti”’ 2008)
Television was familiar terrain for Metropolitan Kirill. Since 1994 he has
hosted the programme The Pastor’s Word (Slovo pastyria), which continues
to be broadcast weekly on Channel One. Nonetheless, Kirill felt it necessary
to receive the blessing of Patriarch Aleksii II before he agreed to participate in
The Name Is Russia and represent the views of the ROC within a non-religious
television format.
[The Name Is Russia] is a discussion, and upholding my position could
well be accompanied by a certain tension in the dialogue with others. But
the Church is called not to divide, but to unite. And therefore I thought,
do I have the right, as metropolitan, a hierarch of the Russian Church, to
enter a discussion that could divide people? And, unable to ﬁnd an
answer, I turned to His Holiness Patriarch Aleksii. After he heard me
out, he answered immediately. His Holiness the Patriarch did not always
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answer immediately. […] But here, to my surprise, he immediately said,
with a kind smile: ‘Lord [Vladyka], you should deﬁnitively agree – you
have to defend Aleksandr Nevskii.’
(‘V preddverii Novoletiia i Rozhdestva Khristova Mestobliustitel’
Patriarshego Prestola vstretilsia s radiozhurnalistami i predstaviteliami
informatsionnykh agentstv’ 2008)
In addition to his conviction that Aleksandr Nevskii should be named the
greatest Russian of all time, the saint’s memory appealed to Metropolitan
Kirill on a personal level. He had spent a great part of his life in St Petersburg
and would often ‘have recourse to his heavenly intercession’ in prayer at the
Aleksandr Nevskii monastery, where the saint’s relics are interred (‘“Post-
izhenie Rossii, ili Otkrytyi urok grazhdanstvennosti”’ 2008). Furthermore, it
was at the St Petersburg monastery that Metropolitan Kirill received his
ordination to the priesthood.
Host Aleksandr Liubimov introduces Nevskii as ‘warrior, ruler, a symbol
of courage [and] fortitude’. The introductory video clip that follows estab-
lishes the parameters for the discussion that ensues: a clash of (ideologically
informed) interpretations of distant history. Against a soundtrack of
resounding church bells, the voice-over begins: ‘Everyone knows St. Alek-
sandr Nevskii from Soviet cinema. A noble commander, illustrious warrior …
but by no means a saint.’ Accompanied visually by fragments from Eisen-
stein’s Aleksandr Nevskii, the narrator recounts the political realities of the
thirteenth century and the real Aleksandr Nevskii: this was an era char-
acterised by a battle of all against all, including the Russian rulers themselves.
In their rivalry the princes where guided by interests other than attaining the
ideal of the Orthodox nation. The Battle on the Ice, as the best-known event
associated with the memory of Nevskii, receives particular attention. Eisen-
stein’s representation of the battle scene is superimposed on the image of a
frozen lake smeared with blood. The soundtrack and intonation of the narrator
build up to create heightened suspense.
The clip argues that Nevskii’s politics aimed to establish control over the
Russian lands in order to unite them in a single state. His cooperative stance
towards the Horde was based on his pragmatic consideration of what was
beneﬁcial for Russia, regardless of what he himself could stand to gain from
the alliance. His willingness to forego opportunities for personal beneﬁt
inﬂuenced the moment when Nevskii assumed the role of monarch: Nevskii’s
accession to the monarchy only towards the end of his life was not due to any
disinclination on his part, the narrator asserts, but reﬂected his reluctance to
allow himself to assume such a position of luxury. The video segment con-
cludes by asking what remains of the historical ﬁgure of Nevskii in the var-
ious representations and interpretations of his rule that have since developed.
Of greater importance, however, than uncovering the historical truth within
these narratives of memory, the narrator continues, is an acknowledgement
that Nevskii – in all the facets of his character – is remembered today. In a
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somewhat surprising turn considering the clip’s opening sentence, the ﬁnal
lines proclaim that the true essence of Aleksandr Nevskii lies in his relation to
God. A portrait of Nevskii as saint and a sudden transition from minor to
major key in the musical score aﬃrm the divine connotation.
In his opening plea, Metropolitan Kirill presents Nevskii as ‘the saviour
and builder of Russia’. A leader, moreover, who does not require rehabilita-
tion or defending – like some of the other ﬁnalists – since all the stories about
his feats known to the Russian people are laudatory. Yet, Metropolitan Kirill
continues, the challenge lies in conveying his contemporaneity to a modern
audience. What sets Nevskii apart is the multifacetedness of his persona. The
plea summarises his merits as a ‘supreme strategist’ – a politician, ruler, phi-
losopher and military commander. In the opinion of Metropolitan Kirill,
Nevskii’s contribution to Russian history could not have been more decisive;
in fact, without him Russia and its ‘civilisational code’ would not exist today.
He recognised the imminence of the threats posed by expansionary foes from
East and West alike but, instead of ﬁghting against these adversaries, Metro-
politan Kirill argues poetically, he fought for the preservation of national
identity and consciousness. Nevskii succeeded in doing this by adopting a
‘delicate, courageous diplomacy’ that sought to accommodate the Tatar
Horde rather than take on an opponent that was too mighty to conquer. He
correctly understood that Tatar expansion was economically motivated and
would therefore have a limited impact on Russian society, whereas Western
expansion was not just economically, but politically and religiously moti-
vated. Metropolitan Kirill asserts that with respect to these enemies, whose
expansionist aims included the subjection of Russian civilisation to their
cultural norms, Nevskii allowed no compromise. Creating a clear contrast
with modern society’s capitalist values, Metropolitan Kirill emphasises
how the prince chose to sacriﬁce wealth in order to preserve his people’s
fundamental values.26
Besides saving Russian civilisation from impending ruin, Aleksandr was
exceptional in strength, wisdom and physical appearance. He was a young
and handsome man, Metropolitan Kirill proclaims, with no equal in the
Bible. Yet Nevskii’s most important virtue is his sanctity. Indeed, Metropoli-
tan Kirill asserts, if Russian history had seen a larger share of saintly rulers,
its course would have been markedly diﬀerent. The plea takes an interesting
turn when Metropolitan Kirill proceeds to argue that, through his skilful
engagement with the East, Nevskii laid the groundwork for a multiethnic
society – a claim he reasserts later on. The prince’s policies with regard to
international relations and the interaction among ethnic groups formed the
basis for Russia’s later development as a large state. In other words, it is with
Nevskii that the Russian imperial state, with its primacy of Orthodox Russians
among other peoples inhabiting the same land, has its origin.27
When Nikita Mikhalkov, as chair of the jury, asks Metropolitan Kirill to
further elucidate the contemporary relevance of Nevskii, the latter draws an
unexpected parallel between the symbolic importance of the Battle on the
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Neva and current Russian involvement in the military conﬂict between
Georgia and Abkhazia. Nevskii should be understood as a ‘post-Perestroika
ruler’, he states, though the Perestroika Nevskii had lived through was far
more invasive and bloody than its contemporary analogue, involving the
complete loss of the Russian state. Then, large states had disintegrated and
their peoples become weakened and demoralised, he continues, and this still
occurs. The sudden appearance of Nevskii, who took on the Swedes and
managed to defeat them, had a tremendously positive eﬀect on Russia’s con-
ﬁdence in its own strength and ability to defend itself. Metropolitan Kirill
then proceeds to introduce the contemporary parallel, but fails to make the
exact point of comparison explicit. He states that Russia now ﬁnds itself in a
period when it is accumulating potential strength. This amassing of power is
aimed not at waging war and pursuing territorial expansion but at evolving
into a great power. Whereas great power status is usually understood in mili-
tary and economic terms, here it is equated with being a powerful spiritual
organisation. A great Russia, Metropolitan Kirill continues, will serve as a
centre of civilisation within the globalising world.
A second historical parallel is then invoked: the incessant endeavours of
representatives of Western Christian civilisation to inﬂuence, dominate and
ultimately destroy Russian civilisation. Sergei Mironov links the memory of
Nevskii to the enduring debates about whether Russia should orient itself
eastwards or westwards and concludes that European Catholic civilisation has
been putting Russia under pressure for centuries and continues to do so today.
Here, a comparison with the conﬂict in Georgia is made once more. Ziuganov
argues that Roman popes deliberately tried to change Russian civilisation.
Today, he claims, the West continues to act along the same lines. Ziuganov
recounts a visit to Strasbourg (attending, most likely, a meeting of the Council
of Europe) where, he claims, some sixty delegates directed accusations at
Russia because the president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, backed by the
United States, had initiated a war against Russia.
Despite Metropolitan Kirill’s persistent attempts to steer the discussion in
the direction of a multifaceted but ﬁrst and foremost saintly memory image,
the image of Nevskii as military commander is repeatedly emphasised. The
established Soviet narrative and its emphatic visual portrayal appear to be
inescapable, even among a jury of educated men. The discussion explicitly
touches upon the diﬃculty of separating the man from the myth: who exactly
have the viewers voted for and whose merits should the jury judge? Being
furthest removed in time, Nevskii appears more a mythic ﬁgure than a ﬂesh-
and-blood individual – like the Russian bogatyrs, as Aleksandr Tkachev
points out.
Several commentators have claimed that the results of the popular voting
were falsiﬁed, not by hackers, but by the project’s producers themselves.
Liubov Borusiak has demonstrated how the leaders of the project not only
tried to inﬂuence online voting in the ﬁrst stages of the competition, but
actually manipulated results (by declaring invalid a large number of votes for
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Stalin because of the alleged hacker involvement), as well as selecting and
shaping the image of Nevskii, the eventual winner, to ﬁt their desired vision of
Russian identity (Borusiak 2008). Even if the voting results were not falsiﬁed,
the deliberate way the project was set up (the selection of representatives,
the programming of the episodes) appears to have aﬀected its outcome. This
line of argumentation has been put forward, for instance, by Anatolii
Golubovskii:
The viewers, who, from the ﬁrst programme of the series (Aleksandr
Nevskii), were impressed by the rhetoric of Metropolitan Kirill, were
[merely] waiting for the concluding beneﬁt performance by Mikhalkov
(Stolypin). They poorly remembered everything that happened in
between the ﬁrst and ﬁnal programmes. […] They remembered the ﬁrst
hero because he was ﬁrst, the last one because he was last. Their repre-
sentatives were Metropolitan Kirill and Nikita Mikhalkov, the most
vivid and distinct participants of the project, who were the evident lea-
ders among the jury. As a result: Nevskii in ﬁrst place, Stolypin in
second. And in third place came Stalin – some kind of compromise to
the real leader in public opinion. The sequencing in the format worked
neatly in this case.
(Golubovskii 2009)
In a similar vein, Nikolay Golev and Olga Yakovleva have argued that ‘the
project results are not identiﬁcation of the Russians’ real attitude to a historic
character but their attitude towards the project and its participants’ (Golev &
Yakovleva 2012: 1840). The death of Patriarch Aleksii II on 5 December
2008, as the project was drawing to a close, may have been a further impetus
to vote for (Saint) Nevskii.
The Name Is Russia project, and the societal questions it represented,
sparked discussion in both traditional and new media. Several counterprojects
soon emerged online, demonstrating both the general appeal of its underlying
idea – determining a contemporary cultural memory vocabulary for Russia –
and the disappointment with or distrust of such an election run by a state TV
channel. The website Russia without a Name (Bezymiannaia Rossiia) set out
to prove that the online voting results were manipulated (Strukov 2009: 38).28
Anti-Name of Russia (Anti imia Rossii) used the same preliminary list of 500
names but asked people to vote for the biggest antihero of Russian history.
This resulted in a top three consisting of Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Lenin and
Iosif Stalin (‘Anti imia Rossii’ n.d.). The Shame of Russia (Pozor Rossii),
created as a negative counterpart to the original project, gave users the option
of adding candidates without any restriction. Its top three names were Vladi-
mir Putin, Minister of Emergency Situations Sergei Shoigu and Berl Lazar,
the Chief Rabbi of Russia (‘Vse kandidaty’ n.d.). The Name of Russia – The
Historical Choice of Russia (Imia Rossii – Istoricheskii vybor Rossii) allowed
its users to vote for not one but two categories and yielded quite diﬀerent
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results, in part because it also listed living persons. The ‘Glory of Russia’
category was headed by scientist Viktor Skumin, the former special forces
commander Cheslav Mlynnik, and Stalin. The category ‘Shame of Russia’
was won by a large margin by the president of Belarus, Aleksandr Luka-
shenko, followed by Vladimir Putin and St Seraphim of Sarov.29 What is
particularly interesting is that many names appear on both lists, which reﬂects
a lack of societal consensus. Viktor Skumin, for example, also occupies four-
teenth place in the ‘Shame’ rankings, while St Seraphim takes seventh place
among the most glorious persons of Russian history. The administrators
described the project as follows:
‘The Name of Russia’ is an open project for those who are not indiﬀerent
to history, tradition, faith and the future of their Fatherland. Today, too
many people want to turn Russia into a faceless unity of citizens, con-
cerned with just one objective – the objective of personal enrichment.
Acting in this manner, these betrayers of their own people attempt to
depersonalise Russia. And it would seem there is no possibility to interfere
with their plans. But we say: Enough! The Name of Russia is Personality
and National self-consciousness.
(‘Imia Rossii’ n.d.)
They also expressed the concern that the television project, as well as the
politically oriented online counterprojects (expressing, e.g., ‘leftish’ views on
history) may well serve to divide rather than unite society. Finally, the website
The Names of Russia – The Historical Choice of … (Imena Rossii – Istor-
icheskii vybor …) has produced yearly rankings since 2009. In many ways, it
is an unoﬃcial continuation of the television project except that there is no
predetermined shortlist of names and users are free to vote for any person
they deem worthy of representing Russia. The resulting top ten is ﬁrst and
foremost a collection of popular cultural ﬁgures and professional athletes. The
2009 rankings list singer Vitalii Grachev, cultural icon Filipp Kirkorov and
hockey player Aleksei Cherepanov as its top three (‘TOP-100 reiting saita
“Imena Rossii” za 2009 god’ n.d.). The only politician who made it into the
top ten is Dmitrii Medvedev, in ﬁfth place.
In retrospect it can be said that the project did not succeed in the diﬃcult
task of electing a new symbol for Russia while navigating the diﬃculties
involved in any genuine discussion of the many facets of Russian history.
Mikhail Morozov argues that, precisely because its format eschewed
acknowledging the actuality of uncomfortable or painful questions, the project
should be regarded as ‘amoral’.
The laws of the talk show genre do not suit such a delicate, morally sen-
sitive matter like history, moreover a recent history where the victims of
Stalinism or their children are still alive. In the broadcast about Stalin
one of the judges begins: ‘Stalin was a genius …’ – the audience bursts
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into applause – ‘a genius of villainy’ – [and] the applause continues as if
nothing happened.
(Morozov 2009)
With the audience and the jury locked in fundamental disagreement, The
Name Is Russia was unable to reach a convincing verdict.
Yet the project did receive an enormous amount of media attention and
thereby greatly familiarised the general public with the historical ﬁgure of
Nevskii. Metropolitan Kirill has given his view on how the outcome of the
programme – its election of Nevskii – should be interpreted:
I viewed this project as the moral orientation of our whole society. We
say that we are an Orthodox people, an Orthodox country. But how do
we deﬁne this, how do we identify [ourselves]? I believe that the votes of
almost 50 million people attested that, miraculously after so many years
of godlessness and the destruction of sanctities, precisely sanctity remains
the dominant value of our people. Indeed, when we call Rus’ holy we
speak in the ﬁrst place about a system of values in which sanctity was the
characterising moral dominant, prevailing over all other values.
(‘V preddverii Novoletiia i Rozhdestva Khristova Mestobliustitel’
Patriarshego Prestola vstretilsia s radiozhurnalistami i predstaviteliami
informatsionnykh agentstv’ 2008)
In a somewhat contrived turn in his argument, he further claimed that people
of all faiths voted for Nevskii, and that this should be interpreted as a
promising sign for Russia’s future:
Therefore I am thankful for those who supported the name of Aleksandr
Nevskii – both Orthodox persons, Muslims, adherents of other faiths and
atheists – who in their hearts felt that if we elect Aleksandr Nevskii as the
name of Russia, we will have a future.
(Ibid.)
In the opinion of Metropolitan Kirill the project’s importance, therefore, was
its contribution to collective memory formation, since memory is what will
bind together the various peoples of Russia.
Conclusion
The cultural memory of Aleksandr Nevskii has a long and rich history of
remediation and political appropriation that has culminated in a varied spec-
trum of memory images. Interpretations of Nevskii as statesman, saint, mili-
tary commander and so on have ebbed and ﬂowed subject to contemporary
needs of symbolic state formation. Since Perestroika, the ROC has actively
stimulated a revival of Nevskii – to be precise, a revival of an Orthodox
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interpretation of the historical ﬁgure that draws upon pre-revolutionary cul-
tural memory. The saintly image of Nevskii aimed to counter his place in
Soviet memory culture, which emphasised his military achievements. The
memory of Nevskii provided a suitable vehicle to historically found the idea
of Russia as a traditionally Orthodox state and legitimise the increasingly
close relations between the ROC and the Russian state. The ROC has been a
driving force behind and consistent partner in state-supported eﬀorts to
acknowledge the contemporary relevance of Nevskii and popularise his
memory. In the memory of Nevskii the ROC and the Ministry of Foreign
Aﬀairs have found common ground to help spread their vision of Russia’s
active role in a globalised world, in particular with regard to the extension of
inﬂuence within the so-called Near Abroad. In oﬃcial memory culture,
Nevskii has come to represent a new strand of state patriotism that carries an
Orthodox overtone. His memory is connected to an understanding of Russia
as a civilisational stronghold within a globalising and secularising world, and
Orthodox Russians as benevolent primi inter pares within the Russian state.
The Nevskii memory was shaped to engage with the established discourse of
distrust of the West and to relate to contemporary political issues, such as the
challenges posed by the political, cultural and confessional accommodation
of national minorities.
Within the cultural domain, 2008 was a watershed year in the (re)popular-
isation of Nevskii with the general public. Analysis of the historical
blockbuster Aleksandr: The Neva Battle and the much discussed Channel One
cross-media project The Name Is Russia has demonstrated the opportunities
provided by remediation. Yet it also proved how a history of remediation can
restrict attempts to change existing historical understandings. Whereas active
remediation of established visual and narrative elements enhances recognisa-
bility, it also creates expectations. Both productions testify to a deliberate
eﬀort to consolidate an understanding of the Russian state as traditionally
Orthodox. This eﬀort links up with and revives the pre-revolutionary tradi-
tion of remembrance. Yet this line of interpretation clashes with the persistent
Soviet memory tradition, as was particularly evident in the panel discussion
on The Name Is Russia. The visual and narrative components of the Soviet
myth as it was shaped on the eve of and during the Second World War –
including distinctive scenes like the Battle on the Ice – continue to inform
contemporary understandings of Nevskii’s contribution to Russian history.
As a result, multiple interpretations coexist, to a certain extent merging into
a composite memory that can be viewed as an Orthodox reframing of the
predominantly military Soviet myth.
Aleksandr Nevskii has been used to propagate notions of preservation and
restoration rather than reform and modernisation, as was the case with the
memories of Petr Stolypin, discussed in the previous chapter, and the Time of
Troubles, the topic we will turn to in the chapter that follows: the restoration,
speciﬁcally, of the great Orthodox Russian state, tasked with protecting
Russian (Orthodox) civilisation against Western cultural encroachment.
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Therefore, Nevskii’s recent prominence is an early manifestation of the shift
to an increasingly conservative political orientation that followed Putin’s
election for a third presidential term in 2012. The political endorsement of
the eight hundredth anniversary celebration of Nevskii’s birth in 2021
should be viewed in light of these neo-conservative views on the Russian
state and the dramatically increased stress placed on ‘traditional’ – that is,
Orthodox – societal values and on Orthodoxy as a marker of national and
state identity.
Notes
1 Archimandrite Tikhon is generally presumed to be Putin’s confessor.
2 This claim has, however, been questioned by historical research. See Schenk (2004:
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(2015).
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15 On the ROC, patriotism in a broader sense and local patriotic church practices, see
Rousselet (2015).
16 For a detailed account on the history of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour – its
founding, destruction and reconstruction – see, e.g., Garrard and Garrard (2008):
70–100.
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17 Other attempts to investigate and pay tribute to those who fell victim to Soviet
repression, such as the activities of the Memorial Society, have repeatedly come
under pressure from state authorities. More recently, the state has signalled a
minor shift in its stand on the matter: a monument to commemorate the victims of
political repression in Russian history, entitled ‘The Wall of Grief ’, was unveiled in
Moscow on 30 October 2017, the annual Day of Remembrance of the Victims of
Political Repressions.
18 Patriarch Aleksii II endowed his blessing on several other ﬁlms as well, including
the documentary The Life of Saint Sergius of Radonezh [Zhitie prepodobnogo
Sergeia Radonezhkogo] (Novikova, 2005); Pavel Lungin’s The Island [Ostrov]
(2006); and, the animation ﬁlm Prince Vladimir [Kniaz’ Vladimir] (Kulakov, 2006)
(Norris 2013:178–179, 219).
19 Traditional Russian felt boots.
20 In a response to the ﬁled complaint, Il’ia Oleinikov, one of the show’s hosts,
ridiculed that if indeed their item about Nevskii was impermissible because of a
violation of the feelings of Orthodox believers, they should also be sued by the
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poorly dressed’ (‘Veruiushchie vorvalis’ v “Gorodok”’ 2006).
21 The touring exhibition was organised by the ‘Aleksandr Nevskii’ programme and,
among others, was exhibited in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, the Pskov
kremlin and the Church of All Saints in Yekaterinburg.
22 The name of the show is often translated as The Name of Russia even though this
is gramatically incorrect. The choice is understandable since The Name Is Russia
(Imia – Rossiia) is awkward in both English and Russian and was, in fact, heavily
criticised.
23 Nikola Film previously produced art house ﬁlms such as Kira Muratova’s Che-
khovian Motifs [Chekhovskie motivy] (2002) and Passions [Uvlechen’ia] (1994),
Aleksandr Sokurov’s The Sun [Solntse] (2005) and Father and Son [Otets i syn]
(2003), and 1990s cult classic Peculiarities of the National Fishing [Osobennosti
natsional’noi rybalki] (Rogozhkin, 1998).
24 With a budget of 8 million dollars, Aleksandr earned 2.9 million dollars in box
oﬃce returns in Russia (‘Aleksandr. Nevskaia bitva’ n.d.).
25 A denial-of-service attack is an attack aimed at the interruption or suspension of
services of a website or network by sending a massive number of requests to a
server that causes it to overload.
26 At this point, Metropolitan Kirill invokes the Russian philosopher Lev Gumilev to
support his argument. He states that the protection of the will of the people was a
necessary condition for Gumilev’s ‘ethnogenesis’ to take place. On the traces of the
philosophical concepts developed by Gumilev that can be found in the views
expressed by Patriarch Kirill, and in particular how they relate to the concept of
‘Holy Rus’’, see Suslov (2014).
27 The plea bears resemblance to the concept of ‘Holy Rus’’, which Metropolitan
Kirill has since placed at the centre of his vision as patriarch of the ROC; see
Suslov (2014).
28 At the time of writing the website was no longer hosted at the original url www.
unnamedrussia.com, nor available in cache.
29 Rankings consulted on 9 October 2014. On the memory of St Seraphim of Sarov
in post-Soviet Russia, see Garrard & Garrard (2008).
Aleksandr Nevskii 121
5 The Time of Troubles: The cyclical
return of chaos
In the run-up to the presidential elections of 2012, a music video by the Tajik
singer Tolibzhon Kurbankhanov went viral and collected more than 1.5 mil-
lion views on YouTube in less than a month. The song, entitled ‘V.V.P.’ in
reference to Putin’s initials, praises the accomplishments of Russia’s ‘saviour’.
The lyrics of the song perfectly sum up the central message of Putin’s
(memory) politics: ‘VVP – saved the country / VVP – protects / VVP – picked
Russia up [from its knees] and continues to develop it / VVP – saved the
nation / VVP – guards / VVP – while in power, he maintains stability’. Indeed,
the song was such a smitten homage that members of the opposition ﬁrst
thought it was a well-executed parody. The clip gave rise to heated online dis-
cussion, focused on identifying who was behind the propaganda stunt: the
Putin camp or its opponents. In an interview with Izvestiia, Kurbankhanov
maintained that the song was sincere and that he had recorded it on his own
initiative.1 He was, in fact, taken aback by the song’s reception:
I did not expect a negative reaction; I wrote from the soul, what I had on
my heart. […] And then they say some headquarters [shtaby] paid me
money for the clip. I read in your newspaper that someone even ﬁled a
complaint against me because I defamed Putin. For me this is very
insulting to hear!
(Maetnaia 2012)
The inspiration for the song, he continues, came from witnessing the street
protests in Moscow in late 2011: ‘I stayed with friends in Moscow in
December, watched these meetings of yours on Bolotnaia [Square] and
[Prospekt] Sakharova and wondered: how can you protest against a person
like Putin? He is very wise, modest, behaves with great dignity’ (ibid.).
In an almost overly laudatory, over-the-top way, Kurbankhanov’s lyrics
rephrase the essence of what can be called the Putin myth: ‘Let us remember
those years / When he was not there – there were only worries / The country
in crisis, the people suﬀered / And at that moment, God sent him.’ Memory
politics has played an important role in consolidating this image of Putin as
the national saviour and guarantor of stability. The cultural memory of choice
for its framing has been the seventeenth-century Time of Troubles, or smuta.
As we have seen in chapter 3, the memory of Petr Stolypin was used to sup-
port a comparable notion during the ﬁnal stage of Medvedev’s presidency, as
the political regime moved from consolidating its position of power towards
maintaining it.
The political appropriation of the memory of the Time of Troubles aimed
to turn a period in recent history, the 1990s, into a powerful rhetorical tool by
framing it in historical terms. The political myth that was created represents
the Yeltsin era and its political, economic and social upheavals as the latest
chapter in a historical sequence of recurring systemic crises (smuty). The
Putin regime could thus characterise the contemporary political situation as
the end of the Troubles of the 1990s. As Sander Brouwer rightly points out,
by recycling the narrative of the ‘Smuta-and-ensuing-liberation-in-1612’
the government is not only positioning itself as the new liberators of
Russia (with which you can agree or disagree), but, moreover, is present-
ing a model of history in which its own emergence is presented as
predetermined.
(Brouwer 2016b: 133)
The eﬀect of this framing, however, goes beyond attesting to the eﬀectiveness
of Putin’s political strategy during his ﬁrst term as president and thus
strengthening the regime’s legitimacy. The conceptualisation of post-Soviet
collapse as a Time of Troubles symbolically reintegrates the Soviet period into
an all-encompassing meta-narrative of Russian history that is characterised
by alternating periods of glorious might and turbulent upheaval. In this meta-
narrative, the Soviet period is just one variation on the historical theme,
another link in the chain of Russia’s cyclical history. As will become clear
from the subsequent analysis, the ad hoc transformation of this recent period
in history into cultural memory was facilitated by the rich remediation history
of narratives about the Time of Troubles. At the same time, the same
accumulation of memory texts created access points for the formulation of
historically framed political critique.
The memory of the Time of Troubles is typically singled out as the central
tenet of contemporary Russian memory politics in the period under discus-
sion here, in addition to the political establishment’s constantly shifting atti-
tude towards Stalin and the Soviet past more generally (e.g. Prozorov 2008;
Laruelle 2009; Vázques Liñan 2010; Hill & Gaddy 2012; Petersson 2013).
While this claim is correct, these studies have thus far largely ignored two
important aspects. First, they fail to address how the political usage of the
memory has evolved over time and how it relates to other circulating mem-
ories. Second, they omit the reception of the institutionalisation of the
memory and its associated cultural products, and insuﬃciently acknowledge
attempts by other actors to subvert oﬃcial memory culture. This chapter aims
to address these gaps. It ﬁrst outlines the remediation history of narratives
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associated with the Time of Troubles from the seventeenth century to the
present. Then, it examines the institutionalisation of the memory and the
documentaries and ﬁlm produced to support it. The chapter concludes with a
study of the ﬁlm Boris Godunov (Mirzoev, 2011) as an example of a sub-
versive remediation that aims to question oﬃcial memory culture.
The Time of Troubles in the Russian political and cultural imagination
With the death of Ivan the Terrible’s son Fedor in 1598, the ruling Riurikid
line came to an end. The succession crisis set the stage for a power vacuum to
emerge some years later as the rule of the elected Tsar Boris Godunov, who
had previously served as Fedor’s regent, came increasingly under pressure as a
result of famines (1601–1603) and rivalries among the boyar families. While
opinions diﬀer about the exact duration of the Time of Troubles, its beginning
is generally dated to the invasion of the First False Dmitrii in 1604, which
presented a serious challenge to the legitimacy of Godunov’s rule, and God-
unov’s sudden death the following year. The period was characterised by
anarchy and constant power struggles that had detrimental eﬀects on the life,
security and well-being of the population. There were numerous pretenders to
the throne, most notably the three ‘False Dmitriis’, each of whom claimed to
be the miraculously saved son of Ivan the Terrible. The young tsarevich had
died in 1591 – according to the oﬃcial version, from self-inﬂicted knife
wounds during an epileptic ﬁt, though the responsibility for Dmitrii’s death is
often ascribed to Godunov. As the political situation was constantly changing,
the boyar families vied to maintain and expand their political inﬂuence, con-
tinually shifting alliances. Finally, the course of events was inﬂuenced dramati-
cally by political interference by the Swedes and the Poles. The latter eventually
succeeded in placing Prince Wladislaw, the son of King Sigismund of Poland, on
the throne. The (symbolic) end of the Troubles is typically dated to 1612, when a
people’s militia led by Prince Dmitrii Pozharskii and Kuzma Minin, a butcher
from Nizhny Novgorod, succeeded in liberatingMoscow. The following year, 16-
year-old Mikhail Romanov was elected tsar by the Zemskii sobor. Since his
father was the nephew of Anastasiia Romanova, Ivan the Terrible’s ﬁrst wife, his
lineage made Mikhail a highly suitable candidate for the throne. Political and
social unrest nevertheless continued for several years after the tsar was crowned.
Only in 1617 was a peace treaty signed with Sweden and the city of Novgorod
returned to Russia. Troubled relations with the Poles persisted even longer,
including yet another (this time, unsuccessful) attempt to seize the throne in 1617.
The memory of the Time of Troubles supports a cyclical conception of
historical development because, despite having a revolutionary component, it
did not result in actual changes in governmental administration. As Maureen
Perrie points out, it was a conﬂict
fought out under the banners of competing claimants for the throne,
rather than of competing types of monarchy. Of course the various
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candidates represented diﬀerent styles and systems of rule; but they all
based their claims to the throne on their legitimacy as the ‘true’ tsar
rather than on any programme of social or political reform.
(Perrie 2006: 430)
The symbolic potential of the Time of Troubles has been recognised by many
rulers, all seeking to employ it to their advantage. Equally, the events have
inspired many Russian artists. The complexity of the events and the multitude
of actors has made the memory of the Time of Troubles and the ‘archive’ of
its representations highly diverse. It is best described as a memory cluster,
consisting of multiple, mutually interdependent narratives (see also chapter 2).
Over time, new narratives have been added, while others have fallen into
disuse or been explicitly challenged or rewritten as political and ideological
preferences shift. Within the existing accumulation of stories, paintings, sta-
tues, literary works and other memory texts on the Troubles, three core the-
matic topoi can be discerned. The ﬁrst is the struggle between Boris Godunov
and the False Dmitrii. The second concerns the peasant Ivan Susanin, who
sacriﬁced his life by leading the Polish troops in their search for Mikhail
Romanov into the forest under false pretences and thereby saved the newly
elected tsar from certain death. In these narratives, Susanin was made a
symbol of patriotism and devotion to the tsar. The third line of narration
describes the popular uprising led by Minin and Pozharskii and the expulsion
of the Polish-Lithuanian occupiers from Moscow in 1612. This narrative is
closely connected to the symbolic canonisation of the year 1613 as the
founding moment of the Romanov dynasty, the anniversary of which was
celebrated, for example in 1913 and, somewhat awkwardly, in 2013.
Not long after state order was restored, a commemorative practice to mark
the ending of the Troubles was established. Pozharskii ﬁnanced the construc-
tion of a wooden church on Red Square dedicated to the Virgin of Kazan, to
whose icon he had prayed during battle. A religious procession was held
annually on 4 November, the feast day of the Icon of Our Lady of Kazan.
Kazan Cathedral, as it is now known, was later replaced by a brick church
and after several expansions and alterations was ﬁnally demolished in 1936 as
Red Square was adapted for the presentation of military parades. The church
was rebuilt between 1990 and 1993. The image of the Time of Troubles as a
symbolic representation of the survival of the Russian state in the face of
foreign aggression took deﬁnite hold in the ﬁrst three decades of the nine-
teenth century. While earlier artistic works had been dedicated to, for
instance, the ﬁgure of Pozharskii, Russian involvement in the 1806/7 war with
Napoleonic France gave the memory eﬀort particular impetus. Artists such as
Gavriil Derzhavin, Sergei Glinka, Matvei Kriukovskii and Sergei Shir-
inovskii-Shikhmatov contributed to a body of poems and tragedies describing
the liberation of Moscow. The period started to be viewed as a ‘key event in
national history’, gradually eclipsing the perceived importance of the rule of
Peter the Great (Zorin 2001: 161). Indeed, ‘[i]n the ﬁrst half of the 1830s
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Minin and Pozharskii’s march on Moscow and the Zemskii sobor of 1613
were canonised deﬁnitively as the mythological genesis of Russian statehood’
(idem: 161).
The most visible monument to the events, the statue of Minin and
Pozharskii on Red Square, also dates from this period. It was initiated by
the Free Society of Lovers of Literature, Science, and the Arts in 1803.
The organisation proposed erecting a monument in Nizhny Novgorod,
where the people’s militia was formed, to commemorate the 200th anni-
versary of the liberation of Moscow. In 1808, Tsar Aleksandr I gave his
approval for the monument, but, because of the great historical impor-
tance of its subject, it was decided to erect the statue in Moscow instead.
The victory over the Napoleonic army in 1812 imbued the statue with
even greater patriotic signiﬁcance. The bronze statue of the two heroes,
which would become a symbol of the victory in the Patriotic War, was
ﬁnally unveiled in 1818. On the pedestal there are two relief plaques: one
that depicts Pozharskii ousting the Poles on horseback, the other the
famous scene of citizens donating their possessions to ﬁnance the military
campaign. The statue, as a highly recognisable visual symbol, later
appeared on banknotes and post stamps (and, more recently, on every-
thing from kitsch paraphernalia and posters announcing the Day of
National Unity to internet memes). In 1931 the statue was relocated from
its central position on the square opposite the entrance of what is now the
GUM building, to the side of the Saint Basil’s Cathedral, to make room
for the military parades. Troops of the Soviet army passed by the monu-
ment before marching oﬀ to the war front in 1941, the symbolism of
which is often alluded to.
Along our ﬁrst line of narration, which concentrates on the Time of Troubles
and Boris Godunov, Pushkin’s play Boris Godunov (1831) continues to be one of
the most inﬂuential cultural texts to date. The play had a troublesome beginning.
The original version – named Comedy about Tsar Boris and Grishka Otrepiev,
written in 1825/6 and inspired by the Decembrist rebellion – was censored and
could not be published until after the death of Tsar Nicholas I. The 1831 edition,
less politically controversial, ‘hewed more or less to [Nikolai] Karamzin’s politi-
cally safe view of the Time of Troubles’ (Dunning 2010: 243). Modest
Musorgskii based his opera Boris Godunov (1868–73) on Pushkin’s play as well
as Karamzin’s (then) authoritative work History of the Russian State. In the
opera, the role and destiny of the Russian people is emphasised, to such an
extent that, according to Burton Fisher, it ‘provides the essence of Russian
nationalism in music’. Fisher argues that
[a]lthough Tsar Boris, the guilty usurper of the throne, dominates this
pageant of Russian history, the principal protagonist of the opera is the
Russian people, for whom Musorgskii provided a remarkable dramatic
presence through forceful and compelling choral writing.
(Fisher 2002: 22)
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The opera was later revised by Nikolai Rimskii-Korsakov, whose version has
since become the standard for staged productions.
With regard to our second narrative theme, the opera A Life for the Tsar
(1836), composed by Mikhail Glinka, transferred the folkloric tale about
peasant Ivan saving the new tsar to the sphere of high culture. Use of the
story was suggested to him by Vasilii Zhukovskii. The poet also contributed
the words for the ﬁnal chorus. The opera, with its dedication to the tsar in
both title and story development, meshed particularly well with the political
and cultural climate under Nicholas I. The tsar granted his approval of the
work and gave the composer a ring set with precious stones following its
premiere (Brown 1974: 87). The opera was a great success, with con-
temporaries crediting Glinka with having created the ﬁrst national opera.
Moreover, ‘the myth of Glinka as the founding father of Russia’s national
music was already established among growing numbers by the end of 1836’
(Frolova-Walker 2007: 52).
The memory of the Time of Troubles again appeared in oﬃcial culture in
the late 1930s as part of the eﬀort to ‘[rework] the history of the Russian
Empire to create a heroic myth of Russian statism’ (Gill 2011: 122), together
with other evocations of pre-revolutionary Russia and its heroes, including
Aleksandr Nevskii and Ivan the Terrible (see chapters 5 and 7). The elements
of the memory that were irreconcilable with Soviet ideology – notably the
gloriﬁcation of tsarism and Russian Orthodoxy – were played down and the
role of the people in overcoming the crisis brought to the fore. In the context
of increasing political tensions and the imminence of war, two major cultural
productions gave shape to the Stalinist reworking of the memory. The ﬁrst
was the opera Ivan Susanin (1939), an adaptation of Glinka’s A Life for the
Tsar. By then several attempts had already been made to revise the successful
opera in such a way that its gloriﬁed monarchy would be replaced with a
more suitable object of admiration. Marina Frolova-Walker cites a 1926 pro-
duction Hammer and Sickle, staged in Odessa, with the action set during the
Civil War rather than the Time of Troubles; and Minin (1937), staged in
Baku, in which ‘all references to the Tsar [were replaced] with references to
the eponymous Minin’ (Frolova-Walker 2006: 200). However, these early
Soviet-era attempts at refurbishing Glinka’s opera did not make it onto the
stages of Moscow and Leningrad.
By 1937, however, the political situation had changed dramatically and, as
‘Stalin was carefully cultivating a new Russian nationalism, a revival of A
Life was perfectly suited to the new post-revolutionary state that was taking
shape’ (Frolova-Walker 2006: 201). The opera was revised considerably and,
most notably, it has Susanin lead the Poles into the forest in order to save, not
the young Romanov tsar, but Moscow and the Motherland. Interestingly, in a
feature article on the opera’s premiere in Pravda, B. A. Mordvinov invoked a
wider historical context to justify this particular adaptation. ‘This treatment
of the subject matter is completely justiﬁed both historically and dramati-
cally’, he writes. ‘Our historical consultants have identiﬁed a series of
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analogous circumstance in the Russian national past – both during the period
of the Polish intervention and during the Patriotic War of 1812’ (Mordvinov
2006 [1939]: 278). The connection linking the events of 1612, 1812 and
the Second World War that appears frequently in twenty-ﬁrst-century public
discourse, and to which I will return shortly, thus has a Stalinist precursor.
Remarkably, the opera was presented as a restoration of the composer’s
original conception rather than as a Soviet revision – a move aligned with the
Stalinist imagination of Glinka as ‘a man of the people who had to compro-
mise his vision because of Tsarist censorship’ (Frolova-Walker 2006: 201). By
blaming the original librettist, Baron Rosen, of having altered the opera
beyond the composer’s intentions, ‘the Soviet rewriting of the libretto and the
appropriation of Glinka’s music, which before the revolution had been regar-
ded as a Russian national treasure’, was justiﬁed (Beam Eggers 2006: 262).
The alterations made to the representation of the Poles, Susan Beam Eggers
suggests, indicate that Ivan Susanin was intended to be an anti-fascist narrative,
a response to increasing tensions with Nazi Germany.
In the libretto of Ivan Susanin, the lines between ﬁgurative and actual
enemy are intentionally blurred. Direct and indirect references to Ger-
many, as well as allusions to the thirteenth-century Teutonic invaders,
instruct the Soviet audience that the Poles should be seen as representing
an aggressive and reactionary Germanic culture.
(Beam Eggers 2006: 268)
Furthermore, the addition of a reference to Aleksandr Nevskii’s famous
Battle on the Ice created a connection with Eisenstein’s cinematic epic that
premiered the year before and its anti-German thrust (see chapter 4).
The other two heroes selected to personify the memory were captured on
the big screen in Sergei Pudovkin’s Minin and Pozharskii (Minin i Pozharskii,
1939). This ﬁlm shows the eﬀorts of these men to unify the people against the
enemy and includes a scene in which the citizens place their possessions on a
large pile set before Minin’s feet. This sacriﬁce on the side of the people is
mirrored by the depiction of Prince Pozharskii as a self-sacriﬁcing hero. In one
of the opening scenes, Pozharskii declines a large mug of beer oﬀered by
Minin, who is noticeably intoxicated, and instead lies down to sleep, seemingly
overcome with the suﬀering of his people. In the ﬁnal scene, Pozharskii bows
before the gathered crowd, signalling their importance in the victory that
has been gained. The closing image summarises the moral of the ﬁlm. As the
lines are shown on screen, the following text is sung, building up to a climax:
Do not forget, o beautiful Moscow
How we managed to deal with the enemy
In harsh times of battle
Rise, o immortal strength of the people
Strength of the people!
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To further substantiate the reinterpretation of the memory, Soviet historio-
graphy studied the Troubles predominantly as a ‘peasant war’ spurred by class
uprisings, a Marxist reading that has since been convincingly challenged
(Dunning 2001: 3).
Adaptations of Boris Godunov tend to appear in times of change. Consider,
for example, the Soviet-era cinematic adaptations dating from 1954 (an opera
ﬁlm directed by Vera Stroeva and based on Musorgskii’s work) and 1986,
directed by and starring Sergei Bondarchuk, one of the most celebrated
directors of (historical) ﬁlm in the Soviet Union. The engrained subversive
potential of the story is evinced by the fact that, in times of strict political
control, productions were obstructed or were followed by repercussions for
those involved. In 1984, for instance, the stage director of the Taganka
Theatre, Iurii Liubimov, was banned from the stage after producing ‘a deﬁant,
aggressively modernized production of Pushkin’s Boris Godunov, during which
the actors came down oﬀ the stage to accuse the audience of political passivity
and submission to a series of shabby pretenders’ (Emerson 1992: 547. Italics
in original). The close connection between the play and the reigning political
winds is evinced by the fact that by 1988, as Perestroika took hold, Liubimov
was allowed to resume the staging of the play at the Taganka. The revival of
Pushkin’s Boris Godunov subsequently continued throughout the 1990s. New
theatre and opera productions, partly developed in connection with the two-
hundred-year anniversary of Pushkin’s birth in 1999, resonated with the
fundamental cultural shift taking place following the Soviet collapse. According
to Nicholas Rzhevsky, ‘Boris Yeltsin, ‘selected by the people’, oﬀered a historical
juxtaposition to his tragic namesake as a central ﬁgure in the break with old
belief systems’ (Rzhevsky 2009: 237). Moreover, ‘The fall of the monarch
away from God in Pushkin’s narrative served to interpret contemporary history
and the post-Soviet devaluation of transcendent orientations, whether they
concerned religion or the abstractions of the Marxist-Leninist creed’
(Rzhevsky 2009: 237).
As for the other great opera, the original A Life for the Tsar replaced
its Soviet adaptation in the ﬁrst post-Soviet decade. Yet, in concert with
the increasingly positive reappraisal of Soviet history and culture under
Putin, its most acclaimed opera also returned to the Bolshoi stage and the
‘audience can now see the same spectacle that Stalin enjoyed, give or take
the occasional sprinkling of post-Soviet religious fervour’ (Frolova-Walker
2006: 215).
Institutionalisation of the memory: the Day of National Unity
In 2005, the Putin government took advantage of the memorialisation of the
1990s as a Time of Troubles as it had already developed in the arts and mass
media, as well as in political circles. The trope ﬁtted the need to symbolically
conﬁrm the success of Putin’s ﬁrst term; with little eﬀort, the historical par-
allel could be used to signify how under the president’s skilful guidance,
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Russia had ﬁnally found its footing on the right path. The narrative’s element
of far-reaching foreign interference now came to express how the ‘roaring
’90s’ had been overcome by cutting loose from Western advisers (e.g. the
IMF) and, instead, pursuing Russia’s ‘unique path’ of development. More-
over, it resonated with two additional issues that ﬁgured extensively in Rus-
sia’s relations with the West at the time: the wave of colour revolutions that
had swept across the post-Soviet space (and the alleged Western involvement
in them) and the 2004 enlargement of the European Union, which included
the accession of the Baltic states. As was also the case with the incorporation
of Petr Stolypin into oﬃcial memory culture (see chapter 3), this example of
memory politics is best described as reactive rather than proactive in nature.
It instrumentalised a mnemonic framework that was already actively circu-
lating in public discourse and, in this case, had become embedded in common
parlance. The principle marker of the institutionalised memory became the
Day of National Unity, to be celebrated on 4 November. The holiday was
explicitly framed as a reestablishment of the tsarist commemoration, cele-
brated annually on 4 November until 1917, of the expulsion of the Polish-
Lithuanian occupation force in 1612. In addition to reclaiming this ‘lost tra-
dition’, the chosen date was signiﬁcant for yet another reason. It enabled a
simultaneous government attempt to address the pressing question of repur-
posing the traditional Soviet-era 7 November holiday commemorating the
October Revolution. As such, the new holiday was intended to provide ‘a
foundation myth for the multinational and multiconfessional post-Soviet
Russia’ (Brouwer 2016b: 126).
The ﬁrst celebration of the holiday was marked by a ceremonial reception
at the Kremlin. In the presence of several hundred oﬃcials and representa-
tives of cultural and charitable organisations, Putin gave a speech in which he
outlined the meaning of the new holiday. First, in line with the holiday’s
name, he emphasised the vital importance of national unity. Referring to the
people’s uprising that had liberated the city of Moscow from the foreign
occupants, Putin stated: ‘It was a victory of patriotic forces; a victory of the
course towards the strengthening of the state through centralisation and
joining of forces; the formation of a world-power [derzhava] – great and
sovereign – began with this heroic event’ (Romanenkova 2005).
Yet the speech’s most important theme is the merit and longstanding tra-
dition of civic engagement and charitable work, placed in the context of a
more broadly deﬁned idea of civil responsibility and social cohesion:
Back then, the people themselves defended Russian [rossiiskuiu] state-
hood, showed genuine civic spirit [grazhdanstvennost’] and the highest
sense of responsibility; not under coercion from above but at the call of
the heart, people of various ethnicities [natsional’nostei] and confessions
united in order to, collectively and independently, determine their fate
and the fate of their Fatherland.
(Romanenkova 2005)
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In connection with this often-neglected aspect of the initial conceptualisation
of the oﬃcial memory, the youth movement Nashi organised a ‘Day of Good
Deeds’, with actions ranging from cleaning up and painting stairwells, fences
and benches to feeding stray animals (Vinogradov et al. 2005). In 2007,
together with another youth movement called Rossiia Molodaia, Nashi
organised a blood donation campaign in the same vein under the slogan ‘We
are all of one blood’. As Stephen Hutchings and Vera Tolz argue, the dona-
tion of blood has particular symbolic signiﬁcance when combined with the
holiday’s underlying idea of binding together a multinational state.
In the ‘one blood’ motif the spiritualization of the opolchentsy [the Peo-
ple’s militia, M.W.] uniﬁes the original act of ‘sacriﬁce’ in driving the
Poles from Moscow, the ‘unity in diversity’ represented by the opolchentsy
and Orthodox exhortations to give charity, thus embodying Russian’s
inherent self-sacriﬁcial generosity.
(Hutchings & Tolz 2015: 79. Italics in original)
The president laid ﬂowers at the statue of Minin and Pozharskii and
attended the unveiling of a close copy of it, sculpted by Tsereteli, in Nizhny
Novgorod. On that occasion, Putin referred to the ‘deep historical roots of
the holiday’ and emphasised how the uprising that had come together there
had united ‘representatives of various classes and nationalities’ (‘Putin: Istor-
iia Rossii svidetel’stvuet’ 2005). Furthermore, he asserted that the Time of
Troubles is but one example of civil unity decisively inﬂuencing the course of
Russian history.
All of Russia’s many-centuries-long history testiﬁes to the fact, that only
together, by uniting forces, can we adequately respond to the challenges
of the time, successfully resolve important, truly fateful problems. And
the unveiling of this monument pays tribute to our national traditions
[and] to the courage of our ancestors.
(Ibid.)
In response to the oﬃcial celebrations, a nationalist ‘Right March’ (Pravyi
marsh) was organised by the Eurasian Youth Union (Evraziiskii soiuz molo-
dezhi, see also chapter 6) and the Movement against Illegal Migration
(Dvizhenie protiv nelegal’noi migratsii) (Vinogradov et al. 2005). Several
thousand people participated in the march that has since become known as
the ‘Russian March’.2
The ﬁrst celebration was marked with ‘hesitant media fanfare’ (Hutchings
& Tolz 2015: 73) that, according to television critic Sergei Varshavchik, was
remarkably coherent across the major TV channels. News reports and doc-
umentaries dedicated to the 4th of November, he notes, all presented a similar
narrative about the holiday’s contemporary meaning, namely that ‘in our
troubled times’ a lesson should be drawn from the past about the ‘mature civil
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initiative originating from below’ that emerged in response to the foreign
occupants who had violated Russia’s national sovereignty (Varshavchik 2005).
While Varshavchik’s assessment is essentially correct, it obscures the fact that
the productions were, in fact, markedly diﬀerent – in both style and content
and in how they employed the language of cyclical return. Moreover, only
one of the documentaries explicitly mentions the Day of National Unity. I
will return to the documentaries that aired on the occasion of the holiday’s
inauguration in the second part of this chapter, where I also contrast them
with a more propagandistic documentary broadcast the following year.
While the Day of National Unity is often described as simply and solely
celebrating the ousting of the Poles, the religious component of the tsarist
holiday – the feast day of the icon of Our Lady of Kazan – was revived as
well. To do so was particularly advantageous for the state. Hutchings and
Tolz are right to argue that ‘[t]he re-appropriation of Orthodoxy within oﬃ-
cial patriotic discourse provide[d] an opportunity for the sanctiﬁcation of
DNU [Day of National Unity, M.W.]’ (Hutchings & Tolz 2015: 77). It cor-
roborated the illusion that the new holiday was actually a long-cherished
tradition. The Orthodox celebration was given a particular impetus by the
return of an eighteenth-century copy of the (presumably lost) icon, of which
the exact origins are unclear, to Moscow in August 2004. It was gifted by
Pope John Paul II, who had possessed the icon since 1993 when it was
transferred to him from Fátima, Portugal. The icon was subsequently
moved to Kazan where, since 2005, it has been carried in the semi-annual
processions that take place on the icon’s feast days of 21 July and 4
November. The procession itself is a pre-revolutionary practice, revived only
in the early 2000s.3
From the ﬁrst celebration of the new holiday, the exhibition ‘Orthodox
Rus’’ has been organised annually to coincide with it.4 In a letter addressed to
the participants of the simultaneously organised forum, Putin praised the
event and made a link between patriotism and ‘spiritual values’:
It is pleasing that you raise the topical and important questions of pre-
serving the historical, cultural and spiritual values of our multinational
people, original folk art, [and] the education of the youth in the spirit of
patriotism. Undoubtedly, these are the areas in which it is necessary to
strengthen the cooperation of governmental, societal and religious
organisations.
(Putin 2006)
Despite the exhibition’s explicitly Orthodox name, Putin thus initially framed
the event in multi-ethnic and, implicitly, multiconfessional terms. Already in
2007, however, Russian Orthodoxy received greater emphasis in his address.
While he still referred to the importance of developing a ‘constructive inter-
confessional dialogue’, Putin stressed how ‘in the history of our Fatherland,
Orthodoxy has always played a unifying role, has served the high goals of
132 Case studies
fostering patriotism, [and] the strengthening of spirituality and morality’
(Putin 2007). It is within the framework of the ‘Orthodox Rus’’ exhibition
series that the yearly multimedia exhibits ‘Russia – My History’, discussed in
chapter 4, have been organised since 2013. In this new format, the exhibitions
have become very popular, drawing some 300,000 and 250,000 visitors in
2013 and 2014, respectively. Its content and orientation increasingly indicate
the inﬂuence of the Orthodox Church.
The presidential speeches marking the commemorative date have varied in
emphasis and phrasing. For example, in 2011, Dmitrii Medvedev combined
previously established components of the memory with the vocabulary of
economic and technological innovation that was central to his presidency.
He stated:
Patriotism, civicism, love for the Fatherland – these are the fundamental
values that have always bound together the multinational Russian [Ros-
siiskoe] state. Even now, they form our moral foundation; a millennial
heritage, yet at the same time one of the symbols of young democratic
Russia, a country that is now dealing with fundamentally new challenges,
such as the formation of a modern and innovative economy, the techno-
logical re-equipment of industry, the modernisation of administration,
and even the modernisation of public life as a whole.
(‘V Rossii otmechaiut Den’ narodnogo edinstva’ 2011)
It is noteworthy that, in contrast to Putin’s speeches, Medvedev shows some
restraint in presenting Russia’s history as strictly continuous by suggesting
that the state’s current development constitutes both a continuation of history
and a distinct new stage.
The memory narrative and the cyclical model of historical development
it presupposes were picked up by Russian historiography. A joint publica-
tion of the academic journal Vlast’ and the Sociological Institute of the
Russian Academy of Sciences, on the topic of ‘The Nation and Power
during the Russian Smuta’ (Marchenia & Razina 2010), argued that the
history of contemporary Russia should be studied in parallel with the
other smuty, explicitly referring to the early seventeenth century and
the Bolshevik revolution.
In a completely diﬀerent genre, the gaming industry also hopped on the
smuta bandwagon. The strategy videogame Empire: The Time of Troubles
(Imperiia: Smutnoe vremia, Lesta Studio, 2009)5 covers the history of Rus’,
Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania between 1350 and 1650. Its scope,
therefore, goes far beyond the Troubles itself. It is a ‘global strategy game’, as
one reviewer describes it, recounting
the endless internecine bickering of Russian principalities, gradually
gathering into a uniﬁed kingdom of Moscow. In addition to the Russian
princes, the Tatars, Germans, Ukrainians, Swedes and all other
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inhabitants of the eastern edge of the civilized world try to chew oﬀ their
piece of the Eastern European pie.
(Prosvirnin 2010)
It is not the ﬁrst videogame set in the early seventeenth century, though. The
ﬁrst-person-shooter game Time of Troubles: The Living Dead (Smuta. Ozhiv-
shie mertvetsy, NewCom) was released in 1997. Using various weapons,
including an axe and a riﬂe, the player has to ﬁght oﬀ axe-wielding zombie
boyars to escape a subterranean labyrinth (Logos 2011).6 Players of more
traditional games can try their hands at two themed board games. Time of
Troubles: 1605–1612 (Smuta: 1605–1612, Casus Belli, 2011) is a highly
detailed strategy board game. Due to its historical ‘realism’, the game store
Mosigra warns, the rules are so complicated that the ﬁrst attempt to play it
will take around ﬁve hours (Mosigra n.d.). The release of the second game,
Times and Epochs: Time of Troubles (Vremena i Epokhi: Smuta, Gemenot,
2012), was timed to coincide with the bicentennial celebration of the libera-
tion of Moscow. In addition to the Russian Kingdom and Poland, players can
lead Sweden or the Crimean Khanate into battle and ‘write [their] name into
history’ (Vremena i Epokhi n.d.).
The memory narrative and, in particular, the holiday created to mark it
have resonated with the general public only to a limited extent, it seems.
According to opinion polls conducted by the Levada Centre, the percentage
of people who can correctly name the holiday celebrated on 4 November
increased from 8 per cent in 2005 to 43 per cent in 2012, but it still did not
exceed half of those polled (‘16% rossiian otprazdnuiut Den’ narodnogo
edinstva’ 2012).7 Interestingly, the poll shows the persistence of the new
name given to the 7 November holiday during the 1990s: 25 per cent of
respondents answered that 4 November was the Day of Accord and
Reconciliation in 2012, down from 33 per cent in 2005. Despite the fact
that the Day of National Unity became more well known, the percentage
of respondents who planned to actually celebrate the holiday has increased
little since its introduction, from 12 per cent in 2005 to 16 per cent in
2012. The poll outcomes furthermore demonstrate that the governmental
eﬀort to provide an alternative to the commemoration of the October
Revolution, to replace 7 with 4 November, had only limited eﬀect. In
2012, 18 per cent of respondents still planned to mark the 7 November
holiday (exceeding those who celebrate 4 November by 2 per cent), a mere
5 per cent drop compared to 2005. It has to be emphasised, however, that
the majority of respondents (61 per cent in 2012) did not plan to celebrate
either date. Eight years after its introduction, Lev Gudkov, the director of
the Levada Centre, summarised the public understanding of the Day of
National Unity as follows:
They view it as an initiative by the authorities to extinguish the memory
of 7 November. The initial ambiguity is disappearing; people agreed with
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the oﬃcial name but it does not evoke any emotions. A very small pro-
portion [of respondents] identiﬁes with this holiday.
(Goncharenko 2013)
The holiday’s failure to become the national celebration of Russia’s ‘rebirth
from the ashes’, as was intended, is also in part connected to the (ultra)
nationalist Russian March that soon overshadowed it (see also Zuev 2013).
Much earlier, as the government-backed cultural attempts to popularise the
memory were in full swing (including the release of the blockbuster ﬁlm 1612
that will be discussed below), opposing voices had already manifested them-
selves in public. The most notable of these can be heard in the theatrical play
1612 (2007) written by Elena Gremina, Kshishtof Kopka, Maksim Kurochkin
and Evgenii Kazachkov for Teatr.doc, the leading company in (experimental)
contemporary Russian theatre.8 The play reconstructs historical events, but in
an unconventional way. The production was staged in cooperation with the
Polish theatre company Ad Spectatores from Wroclaw; the roles of Polish
historical ﬁgures were played by Polish actors and spoken in Polish while
Russian characters were performed by Russian actors speaking Russian.
According to Gremina, who is also the co-founder and director of Teatr.doc,
‘in that way we can view it [the historical events, M.W.] from both sides’
(Vinokurov 2007). After its premiere in Poland, its Russian premiere took
place on 4 November 2007. In an interview with Radio Svoboda, Gremina
explained how the play ﬁtted the political-cultural situation at the time:
Clearly, we are now at a certain point where we have to remember what
happened to us, to imagine our history, to compose, perhaps, some new
myths or reevaluate old ones. And that, of course, is what this holiday
is about.
(Vinokurov 2007)
She points out that, contrary to its intended eﬀect of uniﬁcation, the holiday
has had primarily a divisive eﬀect.
[T]his Day of National Unity somehow rather divides people; because
people, compatriots who live in the same country, have completely
diﬀerent ideas about what is happening and what our path is; entirely
diﬀerent manifestations of 4 November are taking place.
(Vinokurov 2007)
The play she wrote, in fact, is part of this plurality of interpretations.
Contrary to the oppositional sentiment towards Poland or ‘the West’
engrained in the oﬃcial commemoration of the Time of Troubles, the play is
of a conciliatory nature. As a reviewer for Rossiiskaia Gazeta put it, the
merging of the two languages and the two theatrical companies on stage
draws out commonalities between the opposing sides in the conﬂict, rather
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than their mutual enmity: ‘And suddenly it becomes apparent how easily we
are able to understand a foreign language, as age-old neighbours in time and
space; how much you can hear in it that is native [rodnoi] and familiar’
(Karas’ 2007). When asked whether there will be a new Time of Troubles in
Russia, Gremina suggests that Russia has moved beyond this point – without
clearly indicating whether she feels that it does not apply to contemporary
Russian history or that the latest Time of Troubles has now ended (which
would be in line with the regime’s interpretation).
It appears to me that we have already passed the moment when it [a new
Time of Troubles, M.W.] could have happened. But now there is
instability… perhaps it is not one of the processes that can happen in our
society. I nevertheless believe that we are now going by some other
scenario. By which – that will become clear as time goes by.
(Vinokurov 2007)
Memory chains
Notwithstanding the government’s eﬀort to associate itself with the memory
of the Time of Troubles and its overcoming, the memory soon began to
appear in combination with other historic dates in oﬃcial statements. In par-
ticular, the pairing of 1612 and 1812 – the year marking the victory over
Napoleon in the Patriotic War – largely replaced the usage of the memory of
1612 on its own. Both historical events were included in the programme of
the Year of Russian History that was celebrated in 2012. The commemorative
year thereby aﬃrmed the central position the two dates occupy in oﬃcial
memory culture, as well the tendency to combine them. The decision to
incorporate 1612 into a memory chain (see chapter 2) can be explained by the
memory image’s failure to resonate with the general public in the way it was
intended, as the opinion polls indicate. Through association with 1812 the
weak memory image was strengthened. Moreover, this could all be done
without altering or negatively aﬀecting the core idea of the institutionalised
memory of 1612 and the holiday associated with it. In fact, the memory chain
further conﬁrmed the underlying notion that Russian history is cyclical in
nature. Consider, for instance, the following example. In a carefully orche-
strated ceremony on 29 August 2012 in the Catherine Hall of the Kremlin,
President Putin presented state awards to more than ﬁfty ‘outstanding Rus-
sian citizens’. In his congratulatory speech, Putin referred to episodes from
Russian history to frame the kind of patriotism exempliﬁed by the awardees.
I am certain that you love Russia and that, for you, this feeling is not
merely loud, oﬃcial words but, ﬁrst and foremost, it is the meaning of
life. This is exactly how true patriotism has always been understood: as a
profound awareness of one’s personal involvement in the fate of the
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country, as civil responsibility and the aspiration to dedicate one’s talent
to Russia [and] one’s fellow citizens, as the willingness to stand with one’s
Motherland at all times: in moments of triumph as well as in periods of
trial and adversary. The examples of this are the heroic events of 1612
that put an end to the Time of Troubles, and the Patriotic War of 1812.
(‘V Kremle vrucheny gosudarstvennye nagrady’ 2012)
The patriotism of today’s ‘Heroes of Russia’ is placed in a historical tradi-
tion that connects contemporary Russia to the Time of Troubles and the war
against Napoleon – even if the dangers Russia faces today are of a rather
diﬀerent kind.
The shift from 1612 to 1812 oﬀered yet another major advantage. The
victory over Napoleon provides an opportunity for pairing with the 1945
victory in the Second World War as well.9 This association is facilitated, in
particular, by the overlapping geographical locations of important battle-
ﬁelds and remembrance sites. The battleﬁeld at Borodino is a case in point.
The rolling hills west of Moscow were the site of the famous nineteenth-
century Battle of Borodino, presented in the oﬃcial account as a turning
point in the war with Napoleon. And it was also the site of particularly
intense ﬁghting against approaching German forces in 1941. One now
encounters, spread out across a territory measuring more than one hundred
square kilometres, more than three hundred memorial objects. Those com-
memorating the Battle of Borodino were erected in 1839 and on the occa-
sion of its centennial anniversary in 1912. Most of the monuments dedicated
to the 1941 battle date to the 1960s and 1970s. Both battles are commemo-
rated annually with historical re-enactments of key battle scenes: the battle
of 1812 on the Day of Borodino (the ﬁrst Sunday of September) and
the military clashes of 1941 during a historical-military festival held on the
second Sunday in October.10
In 2012, Putin attended the re-enactment of the Battle of Borodino. In his
speech, Putin praised the soldiers who had sacriﬁced their lives there. At the
same time, he foregrounded how the memories of the Patriotic War and Great
Patriotic War are connected and, at that particular location, overlap geo-
graphically. In fact, the commemoration of the Battle of Borodino was used
as an occasion to award the nearby villages of Maloiaroslavets and Mozhaisk
with the title of ‘City of Military Honour’, an honoriﬁc title generally asso-
ciated with the Second World War. ‘It is symbolic,’ Putin stated, ‘that pre-
cisely here, where ‘Russians gained the right to be unconquerable’ [a quote
from Napoleon, M.W.], the certiﬁcates conferring the honourable title of ‘City
of Military Honour’ will now be awarded to the cities of Maloiaroslavets and
Mozhaisk’ (‘Torzhestva po sluchaiu 200-letiia Borodinskogo strazheniia’
2012). The reason for bestowing the honour, he added, lay in the ‘deeds of
[the cities’] population and their defenders during the Patriotic Wars’ (ibid.
Emphasis added). Borodino provides yet another example of a reclaimed
tradition: at the 2014 re-enactment, the speaker repeatedly emphasised how
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the event not only brought the battle of 1812 back to life, but simultaneously
constituted a revival of the ﬁrst re-enactment that had taken place there in
1912. As the speaker repeatedly proclaimed, it was ‘a reconstruction of a
reconstruction’ (author’s visit, 7 September 2014). The same year, the political
instrumentalisation of the Patriotic War was aﬃrmed by the erection of a
bronze statue of Tsar Aleksandr I next to the Kremlin wall in celebration of
the 200th anniversary of the war’s conclusion. Conﬁrming how 1612 and 1812
are inextricably interwoven in the regime’s memory politics, President Putin’s
speech conveyed the essence of the political smuta narrative by pointing out
that in the battle against Napoleon ‘people of all classes, of diﬀerent ethnicities’
rose up to ﬁght (‘Otkrytie pamiatnika Aleksandru I’ 2014).
If we look at how the memory of the Time of Troubles has ﬁgured in
memory chains in the broader public discourse, it becomes clear that it is
actually part of two opposed memory chains. The ﬁrst is a positive chain
connected by the notion of the restoration of order, which corresponds to its
governmental usage. In this chain, the end of the Time of Troubles is linked
to the victory over Napoleon and the rule of Putin in the new millennium.
The victory in the Second World War, though sometimes added to the
memory chain, does not form an essential part of it. At ﬁrst sight, the fre-
quent omission of the Second World War from this constructed chain of
victories appears to be somewhat incongruous, given the prominent place of
1945 in contemporary memory politics. A possible explanation for the
absence of one of the primary vectors of national pride lies in the emphasis
placed on the importance of Russian Orthodoxy in uniting the people and
gaining victory: in the commemoration of the victory in the Second World
War, religion is at best a subsidiary aspect. The second memory chain pos-
sesses a negative connotation and focuses on the Time of Troubles itself –
that is, on the condition of disorder, anarchy and suﬀering during the
period. In this chain, the Time of Troubles is connected to the Russian
Revolution and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (1605–1917–1991).
One also comes across references to the Time of Troubles in connection to
the Stalinist terror and, speciﬁcally, the year 1937. The Soviet period, thus,
provides very important and indelible components of the negative, even
traumatic version of the memory chain.
To demonstrate how these two narrative strategies function in Russian
public discourse, let us consider the following statement by Patriarch Kirill,
which actually combines the two linking strategies:
I would like to say that what the country went through in the 1990s is
comparable to other signiﬁcant cataclysms in the history of our country,
with the Time of Troubles of the seventeenth century, the Napoleonic
invasion, with Hitler’s act of aggression and the Civil War, because in
each of these cases the very existence of the country, the existence of the
people, was in question.
(‘Stenogramma vstrechi’ 2012)
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In Patriarch Kirill’s statement as it is recorded in the oﬃcial transcript, he thus
interweaves Soviet and non-Soviet periods and frames all of them in a negative
light. The news coverage by Channel One, however, edits its coverage of the meet-
ing in which he made this statement in an important way. On the channel’s website,
the broadcast news coverage is accompanied by awritten transcript of the video. In
the video, the patriarch’s statement is edited in such a way that the historical com-
parison he puts forward consists only of the Time of Troubles, the Napoleonic
invasion and the Civil War. Filtered out is his mention of the Second World War
in a negative rather than victorious context. In the transcript, then, the chain of
history is edited even further to ﬁt the ‘victory format’ of 1612–1812–2012:
‘We would like to have a conversation with you [Vladimir Putin, M.W.] as
prime minister, but ﬁrst of all as a candidate for the position of President
of our country; what is more, the candidate that has, of course, the
greatest chance of actualising this candidacy into an actual appointment’,
remarked Patriarch Kirill. He compared the events of the ’90s with the
Time of Troubles of the seventeenth century, with the Napoleonic inva-
sion. ‘Because in each of these cases the very existence of the country, the
existence of the people, was in question. I believe, that it is very impor-
tant to understand that the emergence out of these diﬃcult ’90s repre-
sents a special page in the many-centuries-long history of our
Fatherland’, Patriarch Kirill stressed.
(Liakin 2012)
The relevance for contemporary politics is further emphasised by the place-
ment of the historical comparison directly after the Patriarch’s expression of
support for Putin’s presidential candidacy, which he had actually made much
earlier in the meeting.
In those cases where the memory of the Second World War is inserted into
the victorious narrative of emergence from crisis, the frame of the recurring
Time of Troubles appears to have a neutralising function; it serves to histor-
icise the memory of the war by integrating it with previous heroic deeds.
Consider, for example, Channel One’s coverage of the state ceremony where
President Dmitrii Medvedev awarded the cities of Vladivostok, Tver and
Tikhvin with the title of ‘City of Military Glory’. The reporter makes the
following comment about the city of Tver:
In the course of its history, going back almost nine centuries, the citizens
of Tver have more than once come to the defence of Russia; that was the
case during the Time of Troubles, during the invasion of the Poles, and in
1812, when the city formed the ﬁrst people’s militia.
(Krasnov 2011)
As a result, the historical periods that were portrayed under Yeltsin as dis-
parate eras – casting the post-Soviet as a departure from the Soviet period, or
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the Soviet period itself as a breach in the continuity of the (imperial) Russian
state – are reintegrated into a single historical narrative. The perceived ‘right’
to celebrate all of their victories, from the time of Kievan Rus’ up to now, and
to consider them one’s own is symbolically reclaimed. All the paradoxes and
incongruities of Russia’s ‘1000-year history’ are brushed away for the sake of
reviving the veneration of the Russian state itself.
Film and television analyses
TV documentaries on the occasion of the Day of National Unity (2005–2006)
On the occasion of (the introduction of) the Day of National Unity, sev-
eral state TV channels broadcast documentaries on the Time of Troubles
and its contemporary relevance. It is fair to assume that these programmes
were all produced on the initiative of the state to popularise the new
holiday. Nevertheless, they diverge considerably in both style and content,
and this merits notice. In what follows, I will analyse three documentaries
from 2005 and contrast them with a fourth documentary from 2006. As
will become clear, the latter is markedly more propagandistic in nature.
The measure of deviation among such ‘state-ordered’ documentaries tends
to receive little notice. Yet such divergence serves as a valuable reminder
that, ﬁrst, the production of (contemporary) television ‘propaganda’ is a
highly complex process that involves an extensive network of people
representing various backgrounds and agendas, thereby resulting in vary-
ing end products (showing indirect or diﬀuse top-down control); and,
second, that conversely this diversity is exactly what is needed to get the
message across to the various groups that make up the target audience.
Generational diﬀerences and other factors inﬂuencing viewing preferences
are thus taken into account, ensuring the diﬀusion of the core message to
the widest possible audience.
Russian Alarm (Russkii nabat, Ivanov, 2005), broadcast by Channel One, is
a rather unsurprising, fact-oriented documentary that simply narrates the
main historical events of the Time of Troubles. Images of tumbling church
bells and whirlwinds introduce the turbulent historical episode. At no point in
the discussion, however, is direct reference made to a contemporary parallel.
A ceremonial military parade in the Kremlin, shown at the beginning and end
of the documentary without commentary or indication of the occasion, is the
only element that connects past and present. As is the case in many Russian
documentaries, the narrator takes centre stage. Sitting in a library, leaning
over ancient-looking books, Sergei Shakurov recounts the Time of Troubles’
main incidents. Shakurov is a well-known Soviet and Russian actor, who, in
the spring of that year, had played Leonid Brezhnev in an eponymous TV
series (Brezhnev, Snezhkin, 2005). The scenes of direct narration are inter-
spersed with fragments from early and late Soviet ﬁlms and opera recordings.
For the most part, the original soundtrack of these productions is preserved.
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The opera sequences, therefore, leave a distinct mark on the overall feel of the
documentary. As it draws to a close, Orthodox hymns resound.
Time of Troubles (Smuta, Skoblin, 2005), broadcast by NTV, is markedly
diﬀerent in its argument and style. The opening titles introduce the topic in
unabashed terms. A thick red substance – that appears to be blood – slowly
spreads across the map of Russia as the voice-over summarises the problems
at hand: hunger and murder have become the lot of ordinary people; for
boyars and other servants of the court, betrayal is now the norm; the Mus-
covite state has lost vast stretches of territory, as well as half its population.
This disarray, the voice-over states, is what will later be known as the Great
Time of Troubles (velikaia smuta). The documentary is narrated by Vladimir
Menshov, well known for directing the Oscar-winning Soviet-era classic
Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears (Moskva slezam ne verit, 1979). Menshov
immediately makes clear that the term smuta should be used in plural form
and frames the Time of Troubles as a recurring phenomenon. He claims that
Russian history has known at least four such ‘Times’ – and invokes the Tatar
Yoke, the Time of Troubles itself and the October Revolution. The negative
memory chain that was discussed above is thus extended back in time, thereby
lengthening the perceived timespan of Russian history (approaching the cliché
tysiacheletie). The viewer is left to guess the fourth instance – which turns out
to be the most recent period – until it is revealed at the end of the doc-
umentary. In its description of the historical events, the documentary pays
particular attention to the topic of imposture (samozvanstvo) and the various
interests that may have played a role for those involved (e.g. the False Dmitrii;
Marina Mnishek and her family; and Marfa, the mother of Dmitrii who
aﬃrmed that the False Dmitrii was her son). A noteworthy aspect of the
documentary is its looking beyond the opposition of Russia and its enemies in
Europe. It places the confrontation between Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian
occupiers within a larger geopolitical framework that includes the Ottoman
Empire. Also, it informs the viewer that Marina Mnishek sought refuge from
Shah Abbas I of Persia. The Iranian ruler, however, refused her request since
he did not want to get tangled up in Russian aﬀairs.
The documentary further asserts that the period following the October
Revolution was in many ways similar to the Time of Troubles. In fact, as in
the early seventeenth century, it argues, impostors came to power. At this
point, historical footage of Vladimir Lenin is shown. More generally, the
Soviet authorities are portrayed as weak and insecure, all the way through the
1930s. One of the reasons the statue of Minin and Pozharskii had to be
moved, it is claimed, was that those in power feared it would incite a people’s
rebellion. Minin’s hand raised in the direction of the Kremlin and, more spe-
ciﬁcally, Lenin’s tomb and the platform used by Soviet dignitaries on oﬃcial
occasions would provoke hostile sentiments against the establishment. The
negative depiction of the ﬁrst decades of Soviet rule deviates markedly from
how smuta and the Russian Revolution are typically combined. The term
smuta is widely used to denote the societal impact and disruption caused by
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the Revolution and subsequent civil war, but not to negatively portray Lenin
or the inception of the Soviet state per se.
In Time of Troubles, Menshov provides his commentary from historically
relevant locations. His narration is complemented by a separate voice-over.
To boost the documentary’s credibility, there are interviews with several his-
torians, most with heavily laden bookshelves or computers in the background.
The documentary includes extensive images of artworks and cinematic frag-
ments, as well as historical ﬁlm footage drawn from various periods. Many of
these are overlaid with a yellowish ﬁlter, which blurs the images and takes
away the evident diﬀerences in origin and period between them. The original
sound is omitted. Unlike the previous documentary, the relation between the
images shown and what is recounted by the voice-over is not always clear. In
fact, because of the ﬁlter, it is sometimes diﬃcult to make out what exactly
the fragments depict. Because of the visual blurring, there is greater emphasis
on the voice-over narration.
Hieromonk Feofan, the only non-historian interviewed, reiterates that the
meaning of the Time of Troubles transcends its seventeenth-century historical
origin and that its ‘message’ continues to be relevant today. He states that in
diﬀerent times the country has faced diﬀerent enemies; but more important
than the identity of the adversary is the overcoming of these trials (ispytanie)
through the uniﬁcation of the people. The trial Russia endures at the moment,
he concedes, may be diﬀerent in nature from that of the earlier episode, yet it
requires the same national uniﬁcation. In the conclusion, Menshov returns to
the question of the fourth Time of Troubles. He asserts that, according to
historians, Russia is currently experiencing another smuta, which began with
the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Perhaps, he cautions, it is still going
on. After naming the symptoms evident in both periods – among them the
loss of a large part of the state’s former territory – Menshov ﬁnally arrives at
the state-sponsored line of interpretation. It appears, he assures the viewer,
that this most recent Time of Troubles is coming to an end. This is evinced by
the restoration of destroyed monuments and an increasing interest among
Russians in national history (here he refers to the great number of doc-
umentaries shown on TV). Menshov brieﬂy touches upon the criticism that
the date chosen for the national holiday bears little actual historical sig-
niﬁcance, yet emphasises how the need for the holiday itself is indisputable:
‘We need it in order to remember our history and take pride in it’. Only then,
he asserts, can our history evolve from one characterised by recurring Times
of Troubles into one of development and the unbroken ﬂourishing of the
state. Interestingly, Menshov thus suggests that the historical pattern char-
acterised by returning cycles of greatness and Times of Troubles can somehow
be transcended.
The third documentary from 2005, The End of the Time of Troubles
(Konets smutnogo vremeni, Kraus) broadcast by Rossiia, concentrates on the
ﬁnal years of the Time of Troubles and places considerably more emphasis on
the role of Russian Orthodoxy. The events leading up to the year 1610, which
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begin the narration, are recounted in broad brushstrokes. As in the previous
documentaries, the Time of Troubles is visualised through shots of paintings,
etchings, schematic visualisations of military manoeuvres and ﬁlm scenes
from Minin and Pozharskii and Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible Part I, often
overlaid with dancing ﬂames. In addition, it includes extensive re-enacted
scenes and shots of landscapes, turbulent skies, churches and monasteries.
Compelling symphonic music on the soundtrack, rapid cuts and an
authoritative voice-over provide intensity and suspense at regular intervals.
Compared to the other two documentaries, it includes more interviews
with well-known ﬁgures, including the late painter Il’ia Glazunov, who
went on to represent Ivan the Terrible in The Name Is Russia a few years
later (see chapter 4), and popular historical writer Boris Akunin. Whereas
the majority of those interviewed see times of troubles as a natural con-
sequence of momentary absences of authority in Russia’s ‘traditionally’
power-centric structure, Glazunov asserts that these periods of turmoil do
not arise of themselves but are organised. ‘Smuta’ and revolution are one
and the same thing, he claims. The documentary reiterates the standpoint
that the Time of Troubles was overcome because the Russian people
united against a common enemy. (Then) Metropolitan Kirill further stres-
ses the indispensable role of the Orthodox faith in the survival of the
Russian state. His position is supported by the manifold shots of Orthodox
churches, resounding hymns and ringing bells, and by the extensive discussion
of the fate of Patriarch Germogen and Orthodox monasteries. Historian Igor’
Andreev conﬁrms the importance of religion in this period. He summarises
the role of Orthodoxy as the ‘protection of national dignity and self-esteem’.
In fact, according to Andreev, the Church played a crucial role in inspiring
the idea of ‘national liberation’. As the voice-over later points out, the lead-
ing role of Orthodoxy, however, did not preclude support from other national
groups. All nationalities – Kalmyk, Tatars, Mari and so on – joined the
militia led by Minin and Pozharskii. And those peoples who did not take
part in the military eﬀort, it is claimed, contributed ﬁnancially.
Metropolitan Kirill draws attention to the symbolic importance of the end
of the Time of Troubles and establishes parallels with other periods in history,
in particular with the Second World War.
We have always fallen victim to outside aggression at times when we lost
internal cohesion and strength. And, as a matter of fact, Hitler also
attacked us, believing that Communist rule had led to the weakening of
the internal spiritual strength of the people. And that the German forces
simply had to come in and, as the internal wave of resistance to Soviet
authority was rising, that everything would fall apart. That was their
primary estimation.
Glazunov similarly invokes the memory of the Second World War, and
cites how only national heroes such as Aleksandr Nevskii and Minin and
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Pozharskii succeeded in mobilising the people. The viewer is then presented
with historic footage of the Soviet armed forces marching across Red Square,
its troops passing the statue of Minin and Pozharskii as they leave for the
front. Metropolitan Kirill is given the ﬁnal word and sums up how Russia is
fated to live through Times of Troubles, but will always return to greatness.
Russia is a great power [velikoe gosudarstvo]. Russia is a very wealthy
state in terms of resources and opportunities. And she is very attractive
[pritiagatel’na] to many. This wealth is very attractive to many. And you
have to be able to keep and protect this wealth. And it [the wealth, M.W.]
is so great that only a great power can keep and protect it. Therefore,
Russia can only be great, and we must add multinational, or she will not
be at all.
While the documentary presents the historical events so that they translate
easily to the political situation in the present, the parallel with contemporary
Russia is left implicit. The three documentaries broadcast by the main TV
channels on the occasion of the ﬁrst celebration of the Day of National Unity
thus diﬀer considerably in terms of style, as well as in the particular events
they recount and emphasise. Still, all three reiterate the motto of the holiday:
only through the uniﬁcation of the people can Russia overcome (recurring)
Times of Troubles and reclaim its natural position as a great power. Since the
TV productions were likely initiated because of the new holiday, it is note-
worthy that only one of them – The End of the Time of Troubles – is framed
this way. Russian Alarm even lacks explicit references to present-day
developments.
The 2006 documentary The Time of Troubles (Smutnoe vremia, Buturlin),
on the contrary, is far more explicit in its historical and political claims. As
one would expect on the basis of its title, the programme discusses the lead-up
to Time of Troubles, followed by the unfolding of its crucial events and ulti-
mately its ending. But the narrative takes several detours at important points,
suggesting that the topic is but a means to discuss larger issues of Russian
politics and, in particular, the relation between state and society. Even more
so than the previously discussed productions, the documentary exempliﬁes the
rhetorical importance of (remediated) visual elements, montage and inter-
textuality for the construction of a persuasive memory text. Narrator Mikhail
Leont’ev, a television host and political commentator notorious for his bold
statements, asserts that, for Russia, imposture has become a ‘chronic disease’
aﬄicting the country’s historical development and the way it has coped with
transitions in power. There have been three Times of Troubles in Russian
history, it is stated: in 1605, 1917 and 1991. Leont’ev thus reiterates the
standard negative memory chain. The documentary provides explicit com-
parisons between the seventeenth century and the 1990s in both image and
narration. The importance of the Orthodox faith for the Russian state is
emphasised and reinforced by many shots of Orthodox churches. The
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documentary employs a mix of archival and cinematographic moving images
taken from diﬀerent time periods. Some are highly recognisable, such as
scenes from Minin and Pozharskii; others are diﬃcult to place in time, such as
historical footage of fatally starved children that accompanies the narrative
about famine during Godunov’s reign.
The naming of the three periods in Russian history that are deemed to be
comparable and, to a certain extent, dictated by the rules governing Russia’s
historical development leads the way to a wide array of alleged historical
parallels: the death of Ivan the Terrible and subsequent shared political rule
by several boyar families is compared to the death of Stalin and the system of
collective leadership during the Khrushchev period; Boris Godunov is mir-
rored by Khrushchev; the Rule of the Seven Boyars (semiboiarshchina) is
equated with the level of political inﬂuence of the oligarchs in the second half
of the 1990s (semibankirshchina),11 and so on. A number of these parallels are
constructed solely through a montage of moving images – for example, when
a voice-over commenting on the death of Ivan the Terrible is accompanied by
footage of Stalin lying in state. The documentary argues that the crises of the
1990s and the early seventeenth century share yet another characteristic. The
existing power vacuum was not only exploited by a small group of political
elite to their personal advantage, it was exacerbated by foreign (i.e. Western)
interference. Images of packets of dollar bills, smiling politicians and signs
with anti-American slogans (‘Yankees, get out!’) indicate Western inﬂuence
over the process of democratisation and the transition to a market-oriented
economy in the (early) 1990s. It is argued that foreign ‘occupation’ tempora-
rily compensated for the ruling political elite’s lack of legitimacy. To end a
Time of Troubles, and for a strong Russian state to re-emerge, the foreign
‘occupier’ has to be expelled and state power restored.
The Russian state, according to the same logic that has it repeatedly slip-
ping into political chaos, also succeeds in eventually overcoming these periods
of near-collapse. But, so the documentary warns, emergence from a Time of
Troubles is a prolonged process. Two factors are outlined as decisive for the
restoration of political order: the will of the Russian people and the Orthodox
Church. Also here a parallel is drawn between 1612 and the transition from
the 1990s to the Putin era:
Without the spiritual sanction of the Church, which at the time was the
only remaining all-Russian legitimate institution, just like it was four
hundred years later, there would have been nothing on which to found a
people’s militia to restore the country.
In these concluding passages, the Soviet parallel that was featured throughout
the documentary remains absent and is also less self-evident. If, indeed, the
Russian Revolution was a Time of Troubles, when did it end? Which period
in the early history of the Soviet Union should be considered as the period of
restoration and, consequently, to be in some ways analogous to the present?
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This is but one example of instances where the divergent parallels drawn
between periods and historical leader-ﬁgures appear to be incongruous, even
mutually exclusive.
All four documentaries discussed above remediate visual memory texts to
support and enliven their narratives. Yet, whereas in the 2005 documentaries
the (audio-)visual materials served to visualise the particular event being dis-
cussed and, therefore, had an aﬃrmative eﬀect, in the latter documentary we
ﬁnd a recurrent discrepancy between narration and image. Here, rather,
remediation is a destabilising factor; it complicates the argument by implicitly
introducing additional historical parallels. The frequency of these incon-
gruences suggests that, ﬁrst, the documentary is as much about the relation
between contemporary Russia and its Soviet past and the overarching claim
of Russia’s historical continuity as it is about portraying the 1990s as a Time
of Troubles. Second, it is clear that the suggestive montage is a deliberate
strategy that is implemented throughout the entire documentary. Consider, for
example, the following sequence in which Leont’ev introduces the topic of
‘legitimate power’:
There exists such a concept of ‘legitimate power’; that is, power that is
lawful. Moreover, not only, and not so much as in the formal and legal
sense, but [as it is understood] in the collective consciousness of the
people. Only a legitimate power can be stable, only such a legitimate
power can endure the trial of crisis, only that kind of power has the right
to undertake tough actions against its enemies.
For the narrator, the mentioning of ‘tough actions’ suﬃces to leave behind the
topic of the previous passages, Boris Godunov, and to introduce Ivan the
Terrible, who is commonly held to epitomise this kind of cruelty exercised by
the state against its enemies. The narration about Ivan is, however, accom-
panied by scenes taken from the late Soviet ﬁlm Boris Godunov. So, while the
narrator recounts how Ivan the Terrible committed ﬁlicide, the viewer is pre-
sented with footage recounting the political repressions of a political leader
who reigned almost two decades after him.
The mixing of the two rulers in fact serves as a prelude to the subsequent
temporal leap to the twentieth century and the introduction of Stalin. Sud-
denly, and in image only, the narrative presents the viewer with a brief
sequence on Stalin and the Gulag. We see historical footage of Stalin standing
on a ship navigating the Belomor Canal, constructed by forced labour of
Gulag inmates, followed by a close-up of the Soviet leader facing the camera
and looking on with determination. A folkish, old-sounding tune accom-
panies the black-and-white images. As the music continues, the documentary
shows footage of a group of prisoners marching under armed guard. Then,
images of a train moving through the snow-covered landscape and the felling
of large pine trees suggests we are heading east into Siberia. Even though the
marching prisoners and winding train tracks would have suﬃced to indicate
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the topic to the viewer, the shot of prisoners behind bars being transported on
the train leaves little room for other interpretations. Instead of putting for-
ward a negative appraisal of the events shown, the optimistic music continues;
the train continues on its way. In the images that conclude the Stalin
sequence, the viewer again sees him, this time from the back, looking forward
across the water. The Stalinist intermezzo concludes as suddenly as it began.
The music ends and the narrator again highlights his central argument:
Nonetheless, according to the popular consciousness, Ivan Vasil’evich
was a cruel tsar but [acted] within his rights. In popular folklore, there are
no examples of a negative attitude towards [Ivan] the Terrible, because
Ivan was a legitimate [ruler] by the standards of the medieval tsar,
anointed of God.
As Leont’ev proclaims in the voice-over that Ivan the Terrible was a legitimate
ruler, notwithstanding his exceptional cruelty, one of the most famous scenes
from Ivan the Terrible Part I is shown. In this scene, Ivan, who has abdicated
the throne because of his mistrust of the aristocracy and has left Moscow, is
asked by the Russian people to return to the capital and reclaim his position as
tsar. Ivan eventually agrees, but only under the condition that he be invested
with absolute power. The absolute rule of the state leader is presented as a
‘social contract’ between the monarch and the people, who have asked for his
protection and guidance. As a result, the montage described above places Stalin
in the context of returning cycles of state violence and repression.
The argumentative power of (moving) images, as evinced by these doc-
umentaries, leads me to brieﬂy reﬂect on how such remediated audiovisual
materials interact with both individual and collective memory, and in what
ways it may inﬂuence viewer interpretation. As demonstrated above, reme-
diated materials are edited and processed in various ways, all of which inﬂu-
ence their respective meanings and aﬀective eﬀects. They can be used to
perform many functions, such as:
1 Fillers (‘random’ archival footage, period contextualisation, geographical
contextualisation)
2 Character builders (images/audiovisuals of speciﬁc persons to visually
complement and ﬁll out a characterisation provided by the voice-over or
narrator)
3 Enliveners (added sound eﬀects, acted scenes, scenes from feature ﬁlms)
4 Iconic images (images or audiovisuals that have become synonymous
with a period or character, e.g. Eisenstein’s ﬁlms, certain paintings). The
recognisability of such imagery helps to ease in the message and reduces
friction in the viewing experience.
5 Emotive triggers (speciﬁc images that have the potential to elicit a strong,
emotive eﬀect)
6 Justiﬁers (shots of documents or books, speciﬁc uses of archival footage)
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7 Cheats (material that has been manipulated for it to perform one of the
functions outlined above, e.g. manipulation of feature ﬁlm to appear black-
and-white and serve as periodisation (1) or authentic footage (1 or 6)).
All these functions were reviewed in passing as we discussed the four doc-
umentaries. Still, through montage, a fragment can also become a vital ele-
ment in a line of argument that transcends its direct content and referents, as
was the case with the suggestive sequencing in the latter documentary. In the
analysis of Vladimir Mirzoev’s Boris Godunov we will come across another
example of such argumentative juxtaposition of archival footage.
Which strategies to use, and to what extent they are employed (either con-
sciously or subconsciously), are decisions made by the director and, to a lesser
extent, the editor(s) involved. One of the professionals interviewed for this
study, a former archival editor for the Kul’tura channel, was responsible for
locating and selecting suitable video fragments to be included in doc-
umentaries and other productions (Interviewee A). The initiative in this
selection process, the interviewee asserted, lies with the director. This does not
necessarily mean that the ﬁnal selection is entirely intentional on the director’s
part. For example, the director’s understanding of the diﬀerent types of
available materials may not correspond with reality: the interviewee recalled
once receiving a request to supply a director with archival footage (khroniki)
of Karl Marx. With regard to the editing process itself, and with determining
how montage aﬀects the meaning and emotive impact of constitutive ele-
ments, the director is again decisive. According to Interviewee B, a television
video editor, the editor’s role is typically restricted to the technical execution
of edit cues from the director, with little or no personal input allowed.
While, for a director, archival footage and (dated) feature ﬁlm may simply be a
cheap and eﬀective means to visually ﬁll out a documentary, the potential aﬀec-
tive eﬀect of including such material on the viewer is signiﬁcant. Indeed, when
‘contemporary screen-representations of these historical periods make use of
visual material from well-known ﬁlms of the Soviet period’, as Sander Brouwer
argues with respect to two of the documentaries discussed above, such use ‘ﬁlter
[s] the ‘cultural memory’ of these distant events through the prism of the Soviet
“collective memory”’ (Brouwer 2016b: 123). How exactly the aﬀective structure
is inﬂuenced by the inclusion of these materials diﬀers (greatly) from one parti-
cular example to the next and deﬁes theoretical generalisation. Indeed, as we
have seen, the practice of remediation can work to either neutralise the opposi-
tion between the diﬀerent periods in Russian history (for instance, the ﬁlter
overlays in Skoblin’s Time of Troubles; the Ivan-Stalin sequence in Buturlin’s The
Time of Troubles) or, on the contrary, it can reinforce the diﬀerences.
1612: Chronicles of the Time of Troubles (2007)
In addition to the television documentaries discussed above, Vladimir Khoti-
nenko’s blockbuster historical ﬁlm 1612: Chronicles of the Time of Troubles
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(1612. Khroniki smutnogo vremeni, 2007) made a considerable contribution to
refreshing Russians’ memory about this turbulent episode in national history.
It makes extensive use of Hollywood stylistics, incorporates fantasy elements
(among other things, a unicorn) and is overﬂowing with special eﬀects. 1612,
therefore, had far greater appeal and, consequently, potential impact than the
documentaries discussed earlier, especially on the younger generation. As with
the documentaries, the ﬁlm is generally presumed to be a goszakaz, a pro-
duction commissioned by the Kremlin to explain the events commemorated
on the Day of National Unity. As the reviewer for Kommersant put it, it was
a ‘kinopodarok’ to the authorities, a cinematic gift (Maslova 2007). A glance
at the parties involved in the production appears to conﬁrm close links to the
powers that be. 1612 was co-produced by Nikita Mikhalkov (see also chapter
3), Leonid Vereshchagin (director of Mikhalkov’s production company TriTe)
and Viktor Veksel’berg, a patriotic oligarch involved in ‘the business of
blockbuster history’ (Norris 2012: 255). The production was backed by the
commercial bank VTB and the power holding company Uniﬁed Energy
System of Russia,12 and was subsidised by the Federal Agency of Culture and
Cinematography. In addition, Veksel’berg reportedly contributed four million
dollars to the production budget (ibid.). The date of the release, 1 November
2007, coincided with the holiday celebrations and conveniently preceded the
parliamentary elections that took place on 2 December that year. In an
interview with Izvestiia, Khotinenko argued that the Time of Troubles is one
of the most important periods in Russian history. Moreover, he stated, it
provides an essential historical parallel for understanding the post-Soviet
development of the country: ‘I am talking about the period after Perestroika.
We lived in another Time of Troubles for a long time. It even coincided
with the one in the 17th century in duration’ (Ramm 2007). According to
Khotinenko, the post-Soviet Troubles thus ended soon after Putin took oﬃce.
As was the case with the ﬁlm Aleksandr: The Neva Battle, discussed in
chapter 4, the production explicitly diverges from its iconic Soviet predecessor
to avoid coming across as a remake. In fact, unlike in Minin and Pozharskii,
the two heroes who liberated Moscow play only minor roles in 1612. The
main protagonist is an ordinary man, an enslaved serf named Andrei (Petr
Kislov). When ﬁrst introduced, Andrei is sold to a Spanish mercenary on his
way to join the Polish troops. When the Spaniard is killed, Andrei assumes his
identity and, together with his Tatar friend Kostka (Artur Smolianinov), plays
a decisive role in the military defence against the Poles. In the end, Andrei is
crowned tsar as Mikhail Romanov, based on a ﬁctional genealogy drawn up
by the boyars who elected him. Andrei’s motivation to take up arms in the
ﬁrst place is highly personal. He wants to save Godunov’s daughter, Kseniia,
with whom he has been in love ever since his childhood at the Godunov
court. She is held captive by the Polish lord Osina, who plans to use her to
make a claim on the Russian throne. This ﬁctional dramatisation of Kseniia’s
life is a pivotal element in the storyline. In eﬀect, Kseniia becomes the female
personiﬁcation of a Russia held hostage by the Poles. Osina forces her to give
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up her native language and convert to Catholicism, mimicking the (supposed)
attempts to assimilate Russia under Polish rule. Despite the ordeals she has to
endure, Kseniia ﬁghts to stay true to her Russianness and her Orthodox faith.
As her male counterpart, Andrei then comes to personify the Russian people
who rise up to the challenge of liberating her. The appearance of Minin and
Pozharskii is slightly awkward, as they do not take part in the actual action.
In the words of a reviewer for Russkii Zhurnal, ‘Why do we need Minin and
Pozharskii when we [already] have Andreiko [diminutive of Andrei, M.W.]
and his unicorn?’ (Maler 2007). Yet the fact that they are included at all
aﬃrms their iconic importance. The two heroes who stand immortalised on
Red Square continue to be the most recognisable personiﬁcations of the Time
of Troubles. As such they are an eﬀective memory trigger. The brief
appearance of the two heroes suﬃces to integrate the ﬁlm into the inter-
textual web of associations connected to the memory. The representation of
the Time of Troubles reiterates the core elements of memory established by
previous mediations. In contrast with the products of Soviet memory cul-
ture, 1612 presents the Orthodox faith as the unifying force behind the
Russian nation and as the keeper of Russia’s spirituality (dukhovnost’) in
times of political turmoil.
Khotinenko plays fast and loose with the historical facts; any illusions one
might have concerning the ﬁlm’s historical accuracy are soon shattered.
Indeed, the take-home history lesson boils down to a rather simplistic mes-
sage along the lines of ‘there once was a Time of Troubles and it ended in
1612 when ‘we’ kicked out the Polish interventionists’. In comparison with
Minin and Pozharskii, 1612 places more emphasis on the distinction between
the opposing sides in the conﬂict. For example, in the Soviet ﬁlm all char-
acters speak Russian, including the Poles. In 1612, members of each nation-
ality speak their own language. Moreover, Kseniia’s speaking Polish with
Osina is explicitly portrayed as a betrayal of her Russian roots. Second, the
conﬂict’s religious aspect is foregrounded; the Russian side has to wage battle
to preserve its religious independence. Here it is suggested that the Poles, in
turn, are inﬂuenced by the Pope. In the end, however, so the ﬁlm tells us, the
concerted eﬀorts of Russia’s Western enemies to subjugate Orthodoxy fail
and, thanks to the victory over the Polish-Lithuanian occupiers, Orthodoxy
continued to form a central element of Russian identity. We came across a
similar conspiracy of European states aiming to convert and culturally sub-
jugate Russia in Aleksandr: The Neva Battle (see chapter 4). There is one
exception to the strict opposition of religions and cultures: Tatar Kostka is
portrayed as a true Russian who is willing to ﬁght for his Motherland yet,
at the same time, adheres to his own cultural practices and beliefs. For
example, when Kostka decides to marry a Russian girl, the marriage is
performed according to the rules of his community through the public
proclamation ‘Wife, wife, wife!’ Kostka, thereby, becomes the poster boy
of Russian tolerance and singlehandedly establishes the Russian Empire as
a multinational polity.
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Khotinenko has denied the allegation that the Russian authorities com-
missioned the ﬁlm. ‘If there was [a state directive]’, he stated, ‘then it was
completely imperceptible to me.’
I discussed the goals of the ﬁlm with the general producer Nikita
Mikhalkov. Together we looked at the material, discussed it, he made
some comments. But he was extremely delicate in this. We reasoned like
this: ‘1612’ is shot for a contemporary young audience, so the story has
to be entertaining and humorous. There were no other goals.
(Ramm 2007)
While talking about his intentions for the ﬁlm, however, Khotinenko repeat-
edly gets tangled up in his own formulations. As he tries to articulate his
vision in a way that would circumvent any admission of government involve-
ment, he nonetheless ends up explaining how the ﬁlm’s style is aimed at
bringing across the new holiday’s message.
I could have shot a quasi-historical austere ﬁlm, but then a very limited
number of viewers would have watched it. And I would not have fulﬁlled
my task. No, not a directive from the Kremlin, but my own creative task,
that is more important to me. I really wanted as many people as possible
to learn about this period. So they know it is not just an arbitrarily
named holiday in commemoration of an age-old victory over the Poles. It
is not about the Poles at all. It is our concern [nashe delo], our history.
(Ramm 2007)
As a result, his denial lacks credibility. Arif Aliev, the writer of the script,
concedes more in his answer and grants that ‘[p]robably there was an order to
produce it’. He then hurries to downplay the negative connotations associated
with accepting state directives by pointing to historical precedents.
But if you visit Luxor [Egypt] and get to the bottom of how ancient
Egyptian architecture was built, you’ll be astonished to discover the strict
frameworks within which the architects created their buildings. All tem-
ples were created by government decrees. And yet they are rational, har-
monious, and emotional. So the strict framework helped the artist. If
there is no framework at best you get the Black Square. This would be the
death of audience-friendly cinema.
(Quoted in Norris 2012: 262. Italics in original)
It is interesting, in this respect, that not much in the ﬁlm actually informs
the audience about the historical events or, for that matter, the intended
meaning of the holiday. Moreover, the remainder diﬀers little from other
recent (Hollywood) fantasy action ﬁlms in everything from its narrative
structure to its character development, to its visuals and humorous interludes.
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Indeed, one reviewer criticised the ﬁlm because he felt the fantasy aspect
overshadowed its educational aim.
As a result, while watching you get the impression that you are watching
[…] a bad version of ‘Lord of the Rings’ […]. You get the suspicion that
they wanted to ﬁlm another fantasy story on alternative history, like
‘Volkodav’ [Wolfhound of the Grey Hound Clan, Lebedev, 2006, M.W.]
but then even more unreliable [nedostovernee], but then the opportunity
arose to turn it into a historical ﬁlm under goszakaz; therefore we now
have a Spanish cavalier alternating with unicorns in the fairy-tale forest
of indeterminate ancient Rus’ [neopredelenno-drevnei Rusi]. But what has
the year 1612 got to do with it? How is this about the national holiday?
(Maler 2007)
Notwithstanding its initially lukewarm reception by both viewers and
reviewers, 1612 has since become a new staple representation of the Time of
Troubles. In the years after its release, the major TV channels included
broadcasts of the ﬁlm in their programming to mark the Day of National
Unity and, on one occasion, Defender of the Fatherland Day (23 February).13
What, then, can the ﬁlm tell us about the aims, intended message and style
of ﬁlms produced in close rapport with the state in this period? Andrei
Archangel’skii convincingly argues that 1612 is in many ways an exemplary
product of contemporary Russian goszakaz. Lacking underlying ideological
convictions or values, he asserts, these ﬁlms aim to propagate the particular
type of patriotism that has been actively fostered since Putin ﬁrst took
oﬃce: patriotism that invests primary importance in the state for securing
the well-being of its citizens.
The cult of stability, and essentially the cult of power, is not a value, not
an idea. Today, goszakaz does not seek to change the individual [since] it
understands the futility of this task in an open society. All eﬀorts are
aimed at the instillation of a single thesis: that the concepts of ‘current
life’ and ‘power’, ‘power’ and ‘patriotism’, ‘power’ and ‘Motherland’,
‘power’ and ‘Russia’ are inseparable, equal, identical. And therefore the
state is sacrad and constitutes an a priori value. With the help of gosza-
kaz, the state now, ﬁrst of all, protects itself, tries to imbue [the viewer
with the notion] that it is more important than the individual, even
though it claims the opposite in words.
(Arkhangel’skii 2013)
State patriotism as a body of thought, then, allows itself to be woven quite
subtly into all kinds of stories and genres, ranging from historical entertain-
ments such as 1612 to documentaries, TV series and even talk-show formats
(as we have seen in the previous chapters). It provides a core motivational
structure for the narrative, beyond which there can be a great measure of
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diﬀerentiation in execution and style. The secondary emphases may diﬀer –
for example, the stress on the importance of national unity with regard to the
Time of Troubles, or exceptional leadership and the managing of oppositional
forces in the case of Petr Stolypin – but in the end they all invariably claim
primacy for the state. In the 2011 TV series on Peter the Great (Bortko,
broadcast on Rossiia 1) Peter Rollberg discerns a similar pattern. ‘Peter the
First: The Testament makes it abundantly clear what the tsar is ﬁghting
against, but not what is he ﬁghting for’ (Rollberg 2014: 353. Italics in origi-
nal). As a result, Rollberg argues, ‘[s]tate stability and continuity are con-
sistently invoked as values per se, needing no further legitimisation’ (ibid.). In
1612, the gloriﬁcation of the state security apparatus is further reinforced by
the casting in several of the supporting roles. For example, Mikhail Por-
echenkov, who plays Pozharskii, was generally known at the time as a
national security agent in popular Channel One TV series such as The Storm
Gates (Grozovye vorota, Maliukov, 2006) and the sixth season of Lethal Force
(Uboinaia sila, Snezhkin, 2005). For the role of Minin Andrei Fedortsov was
cast, an actor who had played leading roles in the ﬁlm Russian Special Forces
(Russkii spetsnaz, Mareev, 2002), its successor TV series Russian Special Forces
2 (Spetsnaz po-russki 2, Mareev, 2004) and all six seasons of Lethal Force. The
casting creates (yet another) direct connection between, on the one hand, the
Time of Troubles and those who succeeded in safeguarding the state back then
and, on the other hand, contemporary national security organs.
Furthermore, the ﬁlm demonstrates how the state has attempted to ‘eﬃ-
ciently [constrain] debate of such sensitive topics as imperial collapse’
(Condee 2008: 182) through its memory politics. The internalisation of this
narrative of collapse is highly paradoxical. As Nancy Condee rightly argues,
productions such as 1612 and the TV series Death of the Empire (Gibel’
imperii, Khotinenko, 2005) oﬀer evidence of how ‘patriots of today are
licensed to address, among other topics, Russia’s vulnerability to periodic
collapse’ (ibid.). Yet permission to show Russia’s weaknesses is granted only in
order to eﬀectively argue the contrary: ‘A simulacrum of risk, this institutionali-
zation of crisis strategically undergirds and strengthens precisely the myth of
imperial continuity over the centuries, at the behest of a highly centralized, statist
production structure’ (ibid.). The implicit and explicit references to the primacy
of the state and its security forces, which abound in the TV series mentioned by
Condee even more explicitly than in the ﬁlm, further aﬃrm the myth.14
Let us now move on from the state-aligned productions that, by and large,
supported governmental memory politics, and turn to a ﬁlm production that
sought to subvert its central premises in the concluding section of this chapter.
Boris Godunov (2011)
In contemporary Russian memory culture, memory clusters provide impor-
tant entrance points for the formulation of alternative and/or critical memory
narratives, as I argued in chapter 2. Shifting attention from one ﬁgure or
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narrative in the cluster – here, the end of the Time of Troubles – to another
associated memory – in this case, Boris Godunov – mobilises the subversive
potential engrained in the dynamic nature of cultural memory. This chapter’s
ﬁnal case study aims to elucidate how this subversiveness is enacted. It
examines how the memory of Boris Godunov was employed to provide a
counter-narrative to the state-sponsored interpretation of the contemporary
signiﬁcance of the Time of Troubles as it has been outlined above. A discus-
sion of the ﬁlm Boris Godunov (2011) directed by Vladimir Mirzoev forms the
core of the analysis. The ﬁlm builds upon and adds another chapter to the
long tradition of artistic representations of the reign of Boris Godunov. As
will become clear from the analysis that follows, Mirzoev’s contemporary
cinematic interpretation constitutes a decisive turning point in the political
signiﬁcance of Godunov’s memory in contemporary Russia. Yet he was not
the ﬁrst (art-house) director to address the topic in post-2000 Russia.
Acclaimed ﬁlm director Aleksandr Sokurov ventured beyond his familiar
terrain to direct a modern adaptation of Musorgskii’s opera for the Bolshoi
Theatre in 2007. Contrary to established tradition, Sokurov took the rarely
performed 1871 version of the opera as the point of departure. According to a
reviewer for Nezavisimaia gazeta:
For Sokurov, ‘Boris Godunov’ is yet another occasion for reﬂection on
the themes ‘power and personality’, [and] ‘father and son’ that are central
to his work. To him, ‘folk drama’ (in the style of Musorgskii) takes
second place; it rather becomes a context that helps to uncover the char-
acteristics of a person, of his personality, his actions and their
consequences.
(Gaikovich 2007)
In an interview with Izvestiia, Sokurov conﬁrmed that the play ﬁts in parti-
cularly well with his tetralogy on power, which includes the ﬁlms Moloch
(1999), about Adolf Hitler, and Taurus (2001), portraying Vladimir Lenin
(Babalova 2007). In Sokurov’s interpretation, Boris is not a madman – as he
is often portrayed – but a man who realised his dream of becoming tsar. This,
in turn, aﬀects the general tendency of the play:
We are not creating a depressing performance; we are not doing a per-
formance, where you should be in tears after the death of Boris. Our
Boris is a strong person. All of our characters are strong. It is a story
about worthy opponents, [about] diﬀerent yet very strong people.
Godunov accepts death without fear. Perhaps, with some sadness, but
without fear.
(Babalova 2007)
Mirzoev’s Boris, instead, draws upon the theatrical tradition and directly
contests the political use of the Troubles memory. More speciﬁcally, it
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contests the claim that the post-Soviet Troubles have come to an end under
Putin. Mirzoev takes Pushkin’s theatrical classic and transposes it to present-
day Russia. As the actors pronounce lines from the original text, the sky-
scrapers of Moscow-City provide the contemporary backdrop for its tale of
political intrigue. The temporal transposition makes it evidently clear that the
questions the narrative puts forward are no less valid today than they were at
the time of Pushkin’s writing. This is also why many interpreted it as a ﬁlm
critical of the state, despite Mirzoev’s denial that it was. The ﬁlm premiered
on the Day of National Unity and was screened in just one movie theatre in a
Moscow suburb. Already at the time of its release it was suggested that the
ﬁlm’s distribution had been deliberately hindered because of its potential
political resonance. For instance, in an interview with the director on TV
channel Dozhd’, an interviewer asks why the ﬁlm was only screened in one
out-of-the-way cinema (‘Vladimir Mirzoev: “Borisa Godunova” nikto ne
zapreshchal’ 2011). She interprets the ﬁlm’s not being shown in other (art-
house) cinemas as a clear sign of top-down obstruction. Mirzoev’s reply is
telling. He emphasises the pragmatic, economic concerns that informed their
decision to opt for a limited screening and aim for a television broadcast or
DVD release instead. As it is highly unusual to earn back production costs
through box-oﬃce ticket sales, he states, it would be senseless to spend
another million roubles on the advertising campaign necessary to get people
to go and see the ﬁlm in theatres. When a second interviewer again insists that
there must be a link between the ﬁlm’s ‘sharp political statement’ and its
limited distribution, Mirzoev replies that he and the others involved with the
ﬁlm did not intend to produce a political satire. Instead, they sought to
explore the eﬀect of clashing time periods, of the seventeenth century, Push-
kin’s time, and the present; to explore ‘denotations, associated with autocracy,
absolute rule, imposture, [that] turn out to be very relevant to us up to this
day’ (ibid.). It must be noted here that uploads of the ﬁlm were quickly
posted to YouTube and Vkontakte, which allowed anyone interested in the
ﬁlm to see it very easily regardless of whether its cinematic distribution had
been actively obstructed.
The delivery of Pushkin’s (well-known) nineteenth-century lines in a com-
pletely modernised setting has two contradictory eﬀects. The easy merger of
both worlds – visual and verbal – reveals the continuing relevance of the story
and its underlying questions, and how the Putin regime is perhaps less ‘post-’
than it would like to appear. There are a few instances, however, where the
narrative feels (intentionally) awkward. The scene where Godunov accepts the
throne in the presence of the Patriarch and boyars is the most explicit exam-
ple of such an eﬀect. Godunov speaks laconically and without conviction. His
declaration sounds ‘fake’, in stark contrast to actor Maxim Sukhanov’s per-
suasively passionate performance throughout the rest of the ﬁlm. How to
interpret this moment, where what you see and what you hear are ‘unlinked’,
is determined, I would suggest, by the scene’s recognisability. A comparable
image of a long table, presided over by the head of state who is ﬂanked by
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state oﬃcials in business suits and the patriarch, appears frequently on the
Russian news. The intertextual referentiality – from ﬁlm to news image and
back – enables a similar transposition of the feeling of awkwardness from
‘historical’ ﬁction onto contemporary political reality. By making the viewer
experience the artiﬁciality of political speech, such statements are exposed as
being merely part of a modern façade disguising the age-old driving forces
that, in reality, continue to motivate Russian governance.
In addition to its modern setting and strict adherence to Pushkin’s original
lines, the ﬁlm stands apart from previous adaptations in two important ways.
First, Godunov is not simply tormented by feelings of guilt but is actually
haunted by the ghostly appearance of Tsarevich Dmitrii, for whose death he
is allegedly responsible. As a memory text, the ﬁlm therefore is yet another
example of the pervasiveness of ‘ghostware’ (Etkind 2009) – vampires, ghosts
and other uncanny apparitions – in post-Soviet Russian culture. As Alexander
Etkind argues, these ‘uncanny’ appearances are symptomatic of the lack of
acknowledgement for the crimes committed by the Soviet authorities against
their own population. ‘In a land where millions remain unburied’, he writes,
‘the dead return as the undead’ (idem: 182). While Etkind’s conceptualisation
of ghostware is primarily based on the (ghostly) return of victims of the
Gulag, the tsarevich’s outﬁt and haircut reveal that Mirzoev is speaking to yet
another traumatic event. Dressed in a marine costume, the ghost of Tsarevich
Dmitrii evokes memories of that other murdered tsarevich, Aleksei, who was
often pictured that way. The death of this heir to the throne in 1918, Mirzoev
appears to suggest, came at the beginning of another Time of Troubles: the
Russian Revolution and subsequent Civil War. If we follow Etkind’s line of
argument, Aleksei’s return as an ‘uncanny’ presence can be interpreted as a
reﬂection of the fact that members of the murdered imperial family did not
receive proper burials until the late 1990s. The remains of the tsarevich and
one of his sisters were located and exhumed from a forest near Yekaterinburg
only in 2007. In addition, the apparition points towards the ongoing proble-
matic nature of public condemnation of the crime. For example, in November
2015 the inhabitants of Moscow voted against a proposal to rename metro
station Voikovskaia, named after one of the organisers of the execution
Petr Voikov, in an electronic referendum (‘Moskvichi progolosovali protiv
pereimenovaniia “Voikovskoi”’ 2015).
The allusion to Tsarevich Aleksei forms an important element in the
second distinctive feature of the ﬁlm as well: the merging of temporal layers
goes beyond establishing a connection between the Time of Troubles and
today’s Russia. The citation of Pushkin, of course, subtly introduces a nine-
teenth-century subtext. More importantly, however, is a sequence that rein-
forces the evocation of the early twentieth-century history by the ghostly
appearance of Tsarevich Aleksei. As the False Dmitrii marches on Moscow,
shots of the actors ﬁghting from trenches are interspersed with archival ﬁlm
footage of an unidentiﬁed battleﬁeld, likely dating from the First World War.
The footage shows charging groups of foot soldiers, the ﬁring of cannons and
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machine guns, and tanks and explosions. The explanation for including these
images can, of course, be simply budgetary. Unlike Bondarchuk’s 1986 pro-
duction of Boris Godunov, which features extensive battle scenes with cavalry
and plenty of foot soldiers, Mirzoev had to work with a minimal cast and an
equally limited budget. The archival footage, then, is an eﬀective substitute
for these indispensable, but budget-wise unattainable shots of battleﬁeld
action. The highly dated visual materials, however, suggests there was more
informing the selection than simply practical concerns. Moreover, it has a
highly signiﬁcant eﬀect: since the images are obviously from neither then (the
seventeenth century) nor now (the twenty-ﬁrst), the battleﬁeld becomes an
abstract, de-temporalised space. Without recognisable features, it can be
whenever and wherever. As a result, memories of other, more recent wars and
their (documentary or ﬁctional) visual representation are drawn into the nar-
rative (e.g. the Chechen wars and the Russian military intervention in Geor-
gia). On the contrary, the grand battle scene in Bondarchuk’s Boris, showing
outdated ﬁghting techniques, was obviously placed in the past and thereby
created temporal distance for the viewer.
That the ﬁlm was not actually banned top-down from reaching a wide
audience becomes clear from its being aired in 2013 by one of the major
state TV channels, Channel One, albeit just after midnight. It was part of
the programme Private Screening (Zakrytyi pokaz).15 The format of the
show begins with a brief introduction of the ﬁlm and its director, followed by
a full-length broadcast of the ﬁlm, which is then discussed by a panel of
specialists in the presence of the director and members of the cast. The
panel is divided into two groups, those in favour of the ﬁlm and those
against it. As can be expected of any panel of Russian experts discussing a
cinematic interpretation of a Pushkin play, they are mostly concerned with
whether it is a correct rendering of Pushkin’s original. But, interestingly, this
programme on state television also shows the ﬁlm being perceived as a
reﬂection, rather than critique alone. The show’s host, Aleksandr Gordon,
expresses the opinion that Mirzoev is an ‘anti-romantic’: he does not adhere
to the romantic worldview, which interprets reality in terms of absolute laws,
patterns and divine harmony. Instead, he highlights the absence of such
laws, and therefore the impossibility of judgement – the impossibility of
diﬀerentiating between right and wrong. According to Gordon, Mirzoev
does not paint a distorted picture of the present. Rather, he holds up a
mirror to the viewer, who is then confronted with the fact that there are no
absolute principles by which to interpret the meaning of his direct reﬂection.
Mirzoev appears to agree with this analysis and connects it to the ﬁlm’s
central topic of autocracy. He states:
If we acknowledge that the world is now fundamentally heterogeneous,
polyphonic, polysemantic and so on, then how can one person, […], even
a great person […], be the absolute focal point of the history and fate of a
vast country? This is unrealistic.
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It is clear that Mirzoev’s observation implicitly refers to Putin. Still, the sub-
tlety of the clash of time periods indeed points towards a reﬂexive intention,
an intention to transcend the immediate political context and contemplate
persistent patterns in Russian governance. The eagerness of critics, of con-
servative and oppositional orientations alike, to read political critique into the
ﬁlm partly obscured this aspect. Also, it testiﬁes to the polarised nature of the
public debate as tensions increased in late 2011.
The continuing power of the ﬁlm was more recently acknowledged at a
conference on theatrical adaptations of literary classics held on 31 March
2015 by the Likhachev Research Institute of Cultural and Natural Heritage.16
Examining the merits of so-called experimentalist interpretations, Mirzoev’s
ﬁlm was put forward as an example of an adaptation straying too far from
the original. According to Aleksandr Uzhankov, a professor of the Literary
Institute, Pushkin is nowhere to be found in Mirzoev’s rendering. He states:
[Mirzoev] seems to take a historical layer, the same characters, but [sud-
denly] there appears some boy in a sailor suit, implying that this is
already not the 17th century, but the 20th, an allusion to the revolution.
And Boris Godunov is not the one who came to the throne, and not an
allusion to Yeltsin, but already an allusion to some ‘New Russian’ who,
by principle, cannot rule the whole world.
(TASS 2015)
Other recent theatrical productions based on Pushkin plays receive equally
condemnatory judgements. The experts conclude that, while directors cannot
be coerced to relate to their subject matter ‘like Pushkin, with love for Russia’
because that would be a form of censorship, they strongly advise the Ministry
of Culture to ﬁnance only those productions that ‘do not destroy tradition,
but, instead, contribute to the upbringing of a generation’ (TASS 2015).
One of the plays that gave particular oﬀence to the experts was a con-
temporary interpretation of Pushkin’s Boris Godunov directed by Konstantin
Bogomolov, which premiered at the Lenkom Theatre in Moscow in 2014. In
many ways, this built upon the aesthetics developed by Mirzoev and
employed similar tactics: collapsing historical time, modernising the stage
setting and incorporating the visual aesthetics (and here, also the language) of
the mass media (author’s visit, 29 September 2014). Contrary to what Mir-
zoev does, Bogomolov’s play deviates freely at times from Pushkin’s lines in
both language and narrative content. Large screens on either side of the stage
were used to make implicit historical parallels unmistakably clear. For
instance, as Boris Godunov placed the Monomakh Cap on his head, images
of the presidential convoy on its way to Putin’s inauguration ceremony were
shown on screen; when Ivan the Terrible was mentioned, the screens lit up
with an image of Stalin; at the mention of Andrei Kurbskii, the boyar who
betrayed Ivan the Terrible by defecting to Lithuania, the audience was pre-
sented with a picture of Boris Berezovskii. The play actively engages the
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audience in such a way that it creates tension. When Boris Godunov, played
by acclaimed theatre actor Aleksandr Zbruev, appears on stage, a person
from the audience yells ‘Aleksandr Viktorovich, aren’t you ashamed of your-
self for taking part in such postmodernist nonsense?’ In response, Zbruev
draws a pistol and shoots the man, who, it is then revealed, is part of the
show; the shooting is a simulation, not an actual assassination. Another
moment of noticeable discomfort among audience members occurred as the
‘people’ await the arrival of their tsar. The scene’s spatial organisation invites
the audience to associate itself with the people. In a painfully protracted
scene, the screens repeatedly showed the lines ‘The people are stupid cattle’
and ‘The people patiently wait to be told what will happen next’. While the
play is more direct and radical in its execution than Mirzoev’s ﬁlm, its poli-
tical argument largely coincides with the latter’s. Placing equal emphasis on
the cyclical nature of historical development in Russia, it paints a grim pic-
ture of the prospects for actual political change in the near future.
Mirzoev’s perceptiveness about political mythmaking is conﬁrmed by a
play he directed for the controversial theatre company Teatr.doc in 2013. The
play Tolstoi – Stolypin: Private correspondence is based on a script written by
Ol’ga Mikhailova. It embeds historical documents – the correspondence
between Stolypin and Tolstoi – within a ﬁctional narrative framework that
has the two men come together in the city of Penza to aid a peasant woman
put on trial. There, they engage in a polemic ‘about private property, the
court, the role of the state in man’s life, matrimony and violence’ (Matvienko
2013: 96). The play approaches its topic in a way comparable to Mirzoev’s
ﬁlm: it draws out points of historical convergence and enduring socio-political
tensions, yet its authors are reluctant to provide their audience with conclusive
take-home answers to the fundamental political questions posed.
Mirzoev, with his love for transformations, leaves the message implicit
[and] multi-faceted. The story, which gravitates, it would seem, to an
unequivocal conclusion, becomes blurred by the changeable nature of his
directing. And this, as a result, reconciles some with the bitter fate of the
peasant woman, who is protected by neither justice, nor even Tolstoi and
Stolypin, and others with the untimely death of the reforms that were not
fated to gain a foothold in the fertile Russian soil.
(Idem: 97)
The topic and timing of the production, staged shortly after the state eﬀorts
to promote Stolypin peaked in 2012, testiﬁes to Mirzoev’s continued willingness
to provide a counter-narrative to such state-supported memories.
Conclusion
In 2014, Putin was presented with a secondary school history textbook enti-
tled The History of Russia 2014–2045 at the infamous Seliger patriotic youth
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camp.17 The book, published in ‘2045’, was prepared by scholars of the Peo-
ple’s Friendship University of Russia and describes (or forecasts, if you will)
Russia’s near future. In its rosy depiction of what lies ahead, the textbook
reiterates the central elements of the oﬃcial political and national identity
discourse. Yet it deviates on one meaningful point. The Constituent Assembly,
it writes, conﬁrms the end of ‘the third Time of Troubles’ in 2019 (Voronin
et al. 2014: 14–15). Why does this evidently Kremlin-loyal publication place
the end of this third smuta in the future, moreover at a ﬁve-year distance?
What ever happened to the claim that Putin has already succeeded in over-
coming the Troubles of the 1990s in his ﬁrst presidential term?
With the establishment of the Day of National Unity, the Russian govern-
ment had tried to capitalise on the (by then established) practice of inter-
preting the turbulent 1990s as a Time of Troubles. The cultural memory and
its underlying cyclical conception of historical development were used to
symbolically ground the contemporary Russian state in history and undergird
Putin’s legitimacy on the basis of his success in delivering Russia from its
latest return to chaos. To underscore the claim of historical continuity linking
the pre-revolutionary, Soviet and Russian periods, the ‘invented tradition’ of 4
November was explicitly introduced as a ‘reclaimed tradition’, as re-estab-
lishing a tsarist commemorative practice. As Sander Brouwer correctly points
out, ‘[b]ehind the Smuta-talk there really is the Empire-talk, a form of state-
hood presented as peculiarly Russian – so as to include the Romanov as well
as the Soviet period, plus the modern Russian Putin regime’ (Brouwer 2016b:
138). It is an attempt to foster an understanding of patriotism that grants
primacy to the state. Moreover, it is an eﬀort, at times awkward and con-
trived, to reconcile a multi-ethnic (imperial) ideal of state governance with the
attribution of a privileged status to and leading role for Russian (Orthodox)
culture within that state. As time progressed, the balance between these
seemingly opposing ideals increasingly favoured the primacy of Russian
culture, language and heritage, which has, more recently, come to dominate
the political and mainstream media discourses.
As a tool for political rhetoric, the mnemonic framework of the Time of
Troubles works two ways: it can either assert that stability has been restored
and Russia has once again emerged as the great power it is destined to be, or
it can be used in a cautionary sense to warn that, in Russia, there is inevitably
a constant risk of revolution and a return to chaos, such that anyone who
rocks the boat and threatens the status quo should be repressed. While the
usage of the memory typically combines both aspects, the emphasis gradually
shifted from aﬃrmative to cautionary over time. That the ﬁctional history
textbook places the deﬁnitive end of the ‘third Time of Troubles’ in 2019 ﬁts
this pattern: against the backdrop of the (then) upcoming presidential elec-
tions in 2018, the second aspect of the memory is invoked to caution that
the Russian state can only fully re-emerge if the regime is given suﬃcient
time to deal with the foreign and domestic enemies who seek to undo its
accomplishments.
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As one of the main tenets of the regime’s memory politics, this instru-
mentalisation was at once successful and unsuccessful in the period analysed.
It was unsuccessful in the sense that the initiative failed to gather popular
support. Opinion polls demonstrate that, by 2012, still only a small propor-
tion of the population could correctly name the holiday and even fewer
actually celebrated it. Moreover, the celebration was soon overshadowed by
the nationalist marches that negatively aﬀected its reputation. The regime’s
acknowledgement of this fact is evident from the shift towards integrating
‘1612’ into a memory chain with ‘1812’ (and, in some cases, ‘1945’). The
linking of the victories was aﬃrmed by their parallel celebration in the Year
of Russian History in 2012. The simultaneous marking of the 1,150th anni-
versary of Russian statehood further emphasised how the new pantheon is
dedicated to glorifying state patriotism, not national patriotism. Even as
Russian Orthodoxy and the Russian nation have increasingly become central
to the state’s conception of post-Soviet identity, it continues to be formulated
in terms of a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional ‘imperial’ state structure.
The holiday and its narrative of ‘unity in diversity’ may largely have failed to
take hold and, in fact, often did more to expose inter-ethnic tensions than to
remedy them (Hutchings & Tolz 2015: 73–96), but the intended political eﬀect
was nonetheless achieved: the consolidation of Putin’s image as the bringer
and guardian of stability, the able protector of the Russian state (and its
people[s]) against foreign enemies and their Russian accomplices who aim to
plunge Russia back into the vortex of troubled times. Therefore, on a more
abstract level, it succeeded in realising its main goal, which was to consolidate
the regime’s position of power.
With regard to the mediation of memory politics and its societal dynamics,
this case study shows a signiﬁcant degree of variation within the initial media
campaign. The documentaries and ﬁlm that were part of the ‘smuta-propa-
ganda’ range from factual to insinuating and employ a wide range of stylistic
approaches. Notwithstanding the variation in execution, style and content, all
adhered to the central components of the smuta memory (and by extension,
the Putin myth). In addition, the case study has shown that there were, in
fact, counter-narratives – for example, in theatre and cinema – that were
enabled by the cultural memory’s remediation history and the rich cluster of
associated memory narratives. The memory of Boris Godunov in particular
was used to frame political critique and question the state’s memory politics.
The question remains, of course, how great the reach of these critical pro-
ductions is, since they typically appeal to the liberally oriented, educated elite.
With a limited audience, can such niche productions aﬀect public opinion in a
way that translates into real-world political consequences? In this respect, it is
useful to recall that it was the educated middle class that took to the streets in
the winter of 2011 and shook the political system. Also, it is no coincidence
that since Putin’s re-election in spring 2012, alternative cultural productions
have increasingly been obstructed or targeted by harassment. With regard to
theatre, the repeated evictions of Teatr.doc is the best-known example (a
The Time of Troubles 161
similar tactic was employed against oppositional TV channel Dozhd’). With
regard to cinema, indirect measures aﬀecting, among other things, ﬁnancing
and distribution now make sure that producing critical ﬁlms has become
considerably more diﬃcult or even impossible. These measures include the
2014 profanity law that forbids swearing in cinema, theatre and other media
and the law against Nazi ‘revisionism’ and the spread of ‘false’ information
about the role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War (I will return to
these measures in the Conclusion). They reveal that the authorities recognise
and fear the subversive potential of alternative cultural productions, as their
outspoken or sometimes, on the contrary, highly subtle critique threatens to
burst the imaginary bubble of stability created by the Putin regime.
Notes
1 That same year, Kurbankhanov recorded two more songs praising Putin in no less
laudatory terms, ‘Thank you, God, for Vladimir’ and ‘Congratulations with your
anniversary, Mister President!’
2 Estimates of the number of people who participated in the original russkii marsh
range from two thousand to ten thousand participants (Vinogradov et al. 2005).
3 The icon of Our Lady of Kazan has since ventured far beyond Russian territory.
On 7 April 2011 it reached the International Space Station where it was tempora-
rily kept in the Russian section of the vessel.
4 Exhibitions under the same name were organised by the Russian Orthodox Church
in smaller and diﬀerent formats in St Petersburg, and later Moscow, since 1995.
The scope of the event, however, was signiﬁcantly widened and reformulated in
2006.
5 Released internationally under the name Reign: Conﬂict of Nations in 2010.
6 A gameplay video of the game by user ‘Quarantineism’ can be viewed on You-
Tube: ‘Smuta. Level 1–2: The russian ghostbuster strikes back’, 15 August 2010,
accessed 1 March 2016, www.youtube.com/watch?v=M3wqfvqUOsI&feature=
youtu.be.
7 To his number one could add the 3 per cent of the respondents who answered,
‘Day of the Liberation from the Polish-Lithuanian interventionists’.
8 The play was directed by Mikhail Ugarov and Ruslan Malikov.
9 With regard to the Time of Troubles, the opportunities for establishing such a
direct link with the ‘Great Patriotic War’ are limited to and necessarily remediated
by means of Stalinist wartime propaganda, including the Soviet army parade that
marched past the statue of Minin and Pozharskii before heading to the Western
front in 1941, mentioned earlier.
10 The ﬁrst re-enactment of the battle of 1812 took place in 1987 as part of the 175th
anniversary celebrations. Since then, the re-enactment has expanded and pro-
fessionalised. The military festival commemorating the 1941 battle was ﬁrst orga-
nised in 1999.
11 The term ‘semibankirshchina’ was ﬁrst coined in 1996 in reference to the group of
oligarchs that helped Yeltsin secure victory in the presidential elections (Brouwer
2016b: 126).
12 The company, headed by Anatolii Chubais, eﬀectively had a monopoly on the
Russian electricity market at the time but has since been reorganised.
13 Reruns of the ﬁlm were broadcast by Channel One on 4 November 2008 and 4
November 2009; by NTV on 23 February 2009 and 4 November 2010; and by
Channel Five on 4 and 10 November 2013.
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14 For an analysis of Death of the Empire, see Condee (2009).
15 The programme aired on 31 May 2013 at 00:15 hours.
16 This organisation was founded in 1992 to further the protection of UNESCO
World Heritage sites in Russia. Aﬃliated with the Ministry of Culture, its tasks
have more recently (in 2013) been expanded to include, among other objectives, the
study of contemporary art and its perception by professional and mass audiences.
17 The Annual International Youth Educational Forum at Lake Seliger has been
organised by youth movement Nashi since 2005. For a detailed description and
analysis of the Seliger camps, see Mijnsen (2014) and Hemment (2015).
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6 Ivan the Terrible and the Oprichnina:
Subversive histories
On 21 June 2012 a memorial plaque dedicated to Ivan the Terrible was
unveiled on one of the central streets in Arkhangelsk, a city founded during
his reign (IA REGNUM 2012). The plaque features an engraved image of the
famous statue by Mark Antokol’skii of the tsar seated on the throne that is on
display in the Tret’iakov Gallery. The inscription reads:
To the founder of Arkhangelsk, Great Prince of Moscow Ivan IV the
Terrible, the ﬁrst Russian tsar, initiator of the democratic reforms of the
16th century, patron of book printing in Rus’, from the grateful people of
Arkhangelsk.
At the time of its unveiling, the plaque was the ﬁrst and sole public monu-
ment to Ivan the Terrible in Russia.1 The lack of public remembrance of the
ruler who succeeded in massively expanding the territory of the Russian state
indicates the controversial nature of his memory. Few tsars are as heatedly
debated as Ivan, whose legacy never fails to divide an audience (a quality
shared by, most notably, Peter the Great and Stalin). Such discussions revolve
around the question of whether his geopolitical triumphs should outweigh his
reputation as a tyrant. The memory carries a particularly intense emotional
charge because of its close connection with the memory of Stalin. The latter
included Ivan in his pantheon of national heroes in the 1940s. Yet Stalin
himself was and continues to be condemned for the repressions he orche-
strated through a comparison with Ivan’s historical image. It is hardly surpris-
ing, therefore, that the Russian government has shied away from associating
itself with the Terrible Tsar.
The praise of Ivan’s ‘democratic reforms’ on the memorial plaque una-
voidably seems a strained interpretation of events. Indeed, to apply the con-
cept of democracy to developments in sixteenth-century Russia is problematic
in and of itself. Yet the claim illustrates how Ivan the Terrible is one of the
prime subjects for writers of ‘alternative history’, a line of revisionist thinking
that contests the veracity of established historiography. As a ‘misrecognised’
ruler with a record of historical documentation that leaves ample room for
creative interpretation of the facts, Ivan has attracted the attention of various
marginal groups who use his memory to propose alternative types of govern-
ance for contemporary Russia. As this chapter will demonstrate, the memory
of Ivan has proved to be the historical framework of choice for those at the
extremes of the political spectrum who seek to challenge existing state
structures.
Ivan the Terrible in the Russian historical and political imagination
Ivan IV (1530–1584) succeeded to the throne at the tender age of three, after
which the boyar families at court struggled for power and his mother Elena
Glinskaia acted as his regent until her death in 1538. Crowned Tsar of All
Russias in 1547, Ivan was the ﬁrst ruler to carry the imperial title. As a sta-
tesman, he is most noted for the territorial expansion he achieved, including
the conquests of the khanates Kazan and Astrakhan in the 1550s and the
expansion into Siberia. In addition, he is credited with administrative and
judicial reforms. Despite his early successes, the protracted Livonian war,
which aimed to push the Russian state westward and gain access to the Baltic
Sea, was eventually lost. In 1565, following the defection to Lithuania of
Prince Kurbskii, one of the tsar’s closest boyars, and motivated by his
increasing suspicion that the boyars who remained were treasonous, Ivan
divided the country in two by establishing the oprichnina: a part of the state’s
territory placed under the tsar’s direct control and administered by the
oprichniki, Ivan’s elite guard. The remainder of the state, referred to as the
zemshchina (the ‘land’), Ivan left to be ruled by a council of boyars. Until the
disbanding of the system in 1572, the oprichniki terrorised the state’s residents
by using exceptionally cruel methods to suppress any form of (suspected)
resistance. The massacre of the inhabitants of Novgorod, thought to be con-
spiring with the king of Poland, stands as a particularly brutal episode in the
reign of terror conducted by Ivan during this period. As an exceptional type
of state organisation (as well as because of its conspicuous cruelty), the con-
cept of the oprichnina has gained symbolic signiﬁcance that exceeds far
beyond its original historical context. Interpretations of its nature still vary
widely. While for some, the oprichnina signiﬁes the (necessity of the) use of
strong means by the state to create unity, for others it represents state terror
directed against one’s own population and the aristocracy or political elites.
As Maureen Perrie shows in her study on the image of Ivan the Terrible in
Russian folklore, the popular appreciation of the tsar was for the most part
favourable. While the folkloric narratives acknowledge the state’s acts of
cruelty committed during his reign, his involvement in such acts is justiﬁed by
shifting the blame from the tsar onto his entourage:
Alongside the ‘good tsar’ motifs are descriptions of Ivan’s cruelty not
only towards treacherous boyars and corrupt oﬃcials, but also towards
innocent victims. Yet Ivan is not criticized for this: the blame lies not so
much with the tsar himself as with the evil informers who have led him
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unwittingly to commit injustice. […] Ivan’s image in folklore, therefore, is
a generally sympathetic one. […] Yet the paradox remains, that his image
in folklore is much more favourable than his historical reputation would
seem to warrant.
(Perrie 1987: 114)
What is, perhaps, even more surprising is how pervasive these very motifs
continue to be in twenty-ﬁrst-century memory discourse. We will come
across similar lines of reasoning in the television and ﬁlm productions that
are discussed in the second part of this chapter.
The foundational text for later representations of Ivan the Terrible is
Nikolai Karamzin’s History of the Russian State (1816–1826). This early
nineteenth-century depiction of Ivan proved both novel and enduring. As
Kevin Platt points out in his study on the interconnected myths of Ivan and
Peter the Great as symbols of terror and greatness in Russian culture,
to the eighteenth-century Russian historical imagination, Ivan had been
known as a severe but pious ruler, who had earned much glory by his
conquests. Karamzin, relying on previously little-known sources, created
the modern tradition in which Ivan’s name was synonymous with unbri-
dled despotism.
(Platt 2011: 22)
The ﬁgure of Ivan thus became emblematic of tyranny in the nineteenth cen-
tury. In addition to painting a gruesome picture of the tsar’s personal invol-
vement in torture of various kinds, Karamzin’s work gave rise to the ‘good
tsar – bad tsar’ motif: the division of Ivan’s rule into benevolent and mal-
evolent periods, with the transition from the former to the latter marked and
motivated by the death of Ivan’s ﬁrst wife, Anastasiia. As the intellectual
debates between the Westernisers and the Slavophiles unfolded in the middle
of the nineteenth century, new aspects of Ivan were highlighted. While, on the
one hand, the ‘Asiatic’ characteristics of Ivan’s personality were explored,
some Westernisers, such as the historian Konstantin Kavelin, ‘interpret[ed]
Ivan’s reign as a concerted but ultimately unsuccessful eﬀort to reform [Rus-
sia’s] archaic social principles’, namely the fundamental conﬂict of interests
between the state (in the ﬁgure of the grand prince) and the boyars (idem: 70).
In this view, the violence of Ivan’s rule is interpreted as a necessary evil dic-
tated by the forces of historical progress; or, to rephrase this in terms of con-
temporary political discourse, Ivan employed repressive measures for the sake
of modernisation.
Two well-known artistic representations of Ivan date to the last decades of the
nineteenth century: the statue of the seated Tsar sculpted by Mark Antokol’skii
(1871) mentioned earlier, and Il’ia Repin’s painting Ivan the Terrible and His Son
Ivan, 16 November 1581 (1885), which dramatically depicts the moment when
the tsar realises he has (accidentally) killed his son by striking him on the head
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with his sceptre. Repin painted the work as an allegorical response to the assas-
sination of Tsar Aleksandr II in 1881 and the public executions of those held
responsible. Through historical association, the painting places the reactionary
policies implemented by Aleksandr III in response to the assassination in the
context of the tragic murder that had taken place exactly three hundred years
earlier. Thereby, Repin ‘condemns violence and calls for a reconciliation’ to avert
further bloodshed, as this could endanger the future existence of the state (Platt
2011: 114). According to Platt, by choosing the act of ﬁlicide to frame his poli-
tical commentary, the painter furthermore hinted that the ‘root cause of the
bloodshed of the present is to be found not in the rebellious conspiracies of ter-
rorists but in the age-old, reﬂexive violence of the autocracy’ (ibid.). During the
ﬁn de siècle, the perception of the medieval tsar shifted once more. Now, the
ambivalence towards the ﬁgure of Ivan, and the ‘ironic amalgamation of terror
and greatness’ engrained in his historical myth, became the primary prism
through which to view his legacy (Platt 2011: 132). The duality found in Ivan
came to be seen as indicative of the opposing forces shaping the development of
Russian collective identity.
Much of the complexity in the contemporary usage of the memory of Ivan
lies in its continuously being intertwined with the remembrance of Stalin.
Indeed, ‘reference to Stalin and his era is pre-loaded into any contemporary
representation of Ivan’ (Platt 2010). The link between these rulers was gra-
dually established from the 1930s onwards. The state-sponsored rehabilitation
of Ivan, part of the wider revival of patriotic narratives in Stalinist Russia,
developed ‘with input “from below” as well as “from above”’ (Perrie 2001:
196). Historiographical and artistic representations and re-evaluations of Ivan
began to appear as early as the 1930s. The rehabilitation was then aﬃrmed by
the state in 1940/41, when Sergei Eisenstein and Aleksei Tolstoi, who had
both already proved their skill at adapting historical ﬁgures to current ideo-
logical needs,2 were commissioned to produce a ﬁlm and a play on the topic.
The image of Ivan sought by Stalin in these productions was ‘an analogue of
his own self-image as a heroic and far-sighted ruler’, and in both cases he was
personally involved (idem: 194). It was not, at this point, the intention to
justify Stalinist repression. In fact, the rehabilitation campaign took pains to
place the cruelty of Ivan’s rule into historical perspective by pointing out how
the norms governing state conduct were diﬀerent in his time. Therefore, ‘a
more apologetic stance (i.e. using Ivan’s bloody rule as a legitimating pre-
cedent for the Stalin era’s excesses) was not part of the oﬃcially sanctioned
line’ (Brandenberger & Platt 2006: 166).
It was within the context of this Stalinist eﬀort at patriotic mobilisation
that Sergei Eisenstein created the epic depiction of the Terrible Tsar in the
ﬁlm classic Ivan the Terrible (Ivan Groznyi, 1945). As German troops
approached Moscow, a large part of the ﬁlm industry were evacuated to
Alma-Ata. The preparations for and the shooting of the ﬁlm (intended to be
part of a planned trilogy) therefore took place in Kazakhstan. Part I ﬁnally
premiered in January 1945 to positive reviews and was awarded the Stalin
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Prize. Part II, however, met the opposite fate. Following the oﬃcial screening,
the ﬁlm was heavily criticised and its release was put oﬀ. Eisenstein was
allowed to continue working on it so as to address the criticisms Stalin had
raised about its depiction of Ivan and his oprichniki. But as a result of
Eisenstein’s severe health problems the project was never ﬁnished. Part I
contains direct references to the ongoing war against Nazi Germany. For
example, Ivan’s suggestion that the English trade ships sail to the White Sea
instead of approaching Moscow through the ports in the Baltics mirrors ‘the
importance of Great Britain’s Arctic convoys during the Second World War’
(O’Mahony 2008: 179). Ivan is shown to have a darker side, yet even when
committing sins he acts for the sake of uniting Russia and warding oﬀ
domestic and foreign enemies. The depiction of the tsar’s personality and
motives is markedly grimmer in Part II, where it is suggested that ‘Ivan’s
cruelty has been driven less by political necessity than by his childhood trau-
mas and a continuing desire to maintain personal authority’ (idem: 183). It is
this aspect that most likely impeded the ﬁlm’s release. As Mike O’Mahony
concisely states, ‘[i]n the wake of the Purges of the late 1930s and the new
post-war campaign to re-impose Stalin’s authority, such a presentation of
tyranny was, at best, a high-risk strategy, and it is hardly surprising that the
ﬁlm was banned’ (ibid.). The ﬁgures of Ivan and Stalin remain inextricably
connected to this day, in the form of a mnemonic parallel that had already
taken shape during Stalin’s lifetime. Indeed, as Maureen Perrie remarks, ‘[s]o
intertwined have the reputations of the two rulers become that it is diﬃcult to
see how any future rehabilitation of Ivan can avoid being received as an
attempted apologia for Stalin or as a justiﬁcation for a latter-day strongman’
(Perrie 2001: 196).
The image Eisenstein created of Ivan is equalled in familiarity only by the
Soviet comedy Ivan Vasil’evich Changes Profession (Ivan Vasil’evich meniaet
professiiu, Leonid Gaidai, 1973), based on Mikhail Bulgakov’s play written in
the mid-1930s but only published in 1965. In the ﬁlm, engineer Aleksandr
Timofeev is building a time machine in his Moscow apartment when he cre-
ates a time vortex. Accidentally, he sends the building’s warden Ivan Vasil’e-
vich Bunsha and the petty burglar George Miloslavskii into the sixteenth
century. Tsar Ivan the Terrible, for his part, gets transported to the twentieth
century. Since Bunsha is the spitting image of the tsar, he disguises himself as
the medieval Ivan Vasil’evich while Timofeev works to repair the time machine.
The most radical interpretation of Ivan’s rule has been proposed by the
mathematicians Anatolii Fomenko and Gleb Nosovskii as part of the ‘New
Chronology’. According to this theory, the reigning chronology of history is
fundamentally incorrect and results from centuries of falsiﬁcation. The dif-
ferent stages in Ivan the Terrible’s reign can be explained, they claim, by the
‘fact’ that Ivan IV is actually a composite of four subsequent rulers. It was the
third ‘Ivan’ (according to the theory, Ivan IV’s son Ivan Ivanovich) who
established the oprichnina under the inﬂuence of his pro-Western relatives, the
Zakhar’in-Romanovs. The proponents of the New Chronology assert that
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several members of the oprichnina, including Maliuta Skuratov, were actually
‘anti-oprichnina activists’ (Halperin 2011: 8). The Romanovs are responsible
not only for the establishment of the oprichnina but for the later falsiﬁcation
of historical events to cover up their tracks. As Charles Halperin explains, this
act of falsiﬁcation is central to the ‘logic’ of the four Ivans theory:
To hide the Romanov role in the oprichnina the Romanovs rewrote the
reign of Ivan IV as a single ruler who was responsible for the terror. In
the process they viliﬁed anyone who had opposed the Zakhar’in faction
during the reign of ‘Ivan IV.’ Thus Skuratov and [Vasilii] Griaznoi
became oprichnina thugs, reversing their actual opposition to the
oprichnina propagated by the Zakhar’ins.
(Idem: 9)
While the New Chronology has been ﬁercely criticised by academics from
various disciplines and is commonly branded pseudo-history, publications
propagating its line of thinking can be found in most Russian bookstores and
have proved remarkably popular.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, political elites steered clear of
any association with Ivan, a tendency that largely continued into the 2000s
(except for certain more marginal groups that will be discussed below). In the
cultural and, in particular, historiographical domains, competing images of
the Tsar ﬂourished, albeit with ‘enormous interpretational looseness’ (Platt
2011: 261). The most notable development was the call for Ivan’s canonisa-
tion as an Orthodox saint in the context of the religious revival in the late
1990s, to which I will return shortly.
One of the best-known mobilisations of the memory of Ivan in con-
temporary Russian culture is Vladimir Sorokin’s dystopian novel Day of the
Oprichnik (Den’ oprichnika, 2006). In direct response to political develop-
ments, and in tune with far-right political discourses that will be addressed
below, Sorokin remediated the oprichnina myth to ‘challenge the neo-tradi-
tionalist political and cultural discourses that […] moved into the mainstream
during the Putin era’ (Lipovetsky & Wakamiya 2014: 273–274). Set in a near
future when the Russian Empire has been restored and is protected by a great
wall along its borders, the narrative describes a day in the life of an oprichnik.
Much like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich
(1962) had described the painful reality of life in the Soviet labour camps,
Day of the Oprichnik delivers its most potent political critique through the
apparent normalisation of the cruelty it exposes. When combined with the
historical framework of the oprichnina, this business-as-usual attitude reveals
the inherent dangers of historicising political action. As Mark Lipovetsky and
Alexander Etkind assert:
Without fail, historical explanations of political processes remove
responsibility from those who take and implement decisions in the
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present. [Andrei] Komiaga, the oprichnik of the 21st century, practises
state banditism, not because someone in the very same place practiced
the same activities ﬁve hundred years earlier. He pillages, rapes and kills
because his superiors order him to, and because they taught him to do so
at the history department, and also because he simply is a bastard. In this
elementary sense, the depth of historical explanations only distracts from
direct political, ethical and legal judgements.
(Lipovetsky & Etkind 2008)
Therefore, the novel should be considered a critique of the Putin regime’s
memory politics and its increasingly authoritarian political course.
Sorokin openly acknowledged that the novel was intended to comment on
current political developments, though even he could not have imagined how
prophetic his vision would prove to be. In an interview with Der Spiegel,
Sorokin remarks that in terms of the relation between the state and its people
and, in particular, the ‘sacred willingness to make sacriﬁces’ demanded by the
state of its citizens, Russia continues to function according to the state structure
developed by Ivan the Terrible (Doerry & Schepp 2014 [2007]: 278):
In my book, I am searching for an answer to the question of what dis-
tinguishes Russia from true democracies. […] Germans, Frenchmen, and
Englishmen can say of themselves: ‘I am the state.’ I cannot say that. In
Russia only the people in the Kremlin can say that. All other citizens are
nothing more than human material with which they can do all kinds of
things. […] In our country there are special people who are permitted to
do anything. They are the sacriﬁcial priests of power. Anyone who is not
a member of this group has no clout with the state. One can be as pure as
can be – just as magnate Mikhail Khodorkovskii was – and still lose
everything in a ﬂash and end up in prison. The Khodorkovskii case is
typical of the ‘oprichnina’ – the system of oppression I describe.
(Idem: 278–279)
Sorokin’s novel illustrates how Ivan’s oprichnina can function as a persuasive
mnemonic framework to criticise the state’s encroachment on societal free-
doms. The mere mention of the word oprichnina within any discussion of
current aﬀairs will commonly be understood to imply condemnation, parti-
cularly among the educated elite. Yet, as we see below, the opposite attitude –
that is, praise of a strong hand in political aﬀairs, prompted by the same
memory image – also has its adherents. The divide between the opposing
sides typically mirrors (and is understood to be implicitly connected to) the
positions taken with regard to the appreciation of Stalin.
According to opinion polls conducted by the Levada Centre, Ivan con-
tinues to appeal to a particular segment of Russian society. When asked to
name ﬁve to ten of the most successful persons of all time drawn from all
countries in 2008, 5 per cent of the respondents mentioned Ivan IV (a slight
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increase from 4 per cent in 1991, 1994 and 1999) (Gudkov 2010: 39). In the
election of the greatest Russian of all time on The Name Is Russia the same
year, the medieval ruler took tenth place (see chapter 4). The positive reap-
praisal of Ivan the Terrible and the application of his memory to frame a
conceptualisation of Russian statehood are most prominent among two
groups. First, there are the Orthodox fundamentalist patriotic groups who seek,
among their other political objectives, to canonise Ivan. Second, the legacy of
Ivan is utilised in ultranationalist circles to formulate a radical political agenda
that, if implemented, would undermine existing state structures. It is to the
latter group of philosophers, historians and politicians that I turn ﬁrst.
The concept of ‘Novaia Oprichnina’
In contemporary Russia, the memory of the oprichnina has been used both to
criticise the increased authoritarianism and the silencing of the opposition
under Putin and to advocate an even stronger vertical political structure. The
idea of establishing a new oprichnina in Russia, referred to as novaia oprich-
nina or neooprichnina, 3 has been proposed in earnest by a group of con-
temporary political thinkers and publicists. They argue that the oprichnina
represents a truly Russian way of modernisation and is the only available
means to overcome the vices of the current political system – most notably,
corruption. As we will see, this concept’s main proponents are not minor ﬁg-
ures. Although these individuals long operated on the margins of political
discourse, their thinking has more recently been adopted by parts of the
mainstream. Before exploring two conceptualisations of how the oprichnina
should be implemented in contemporary Russia as a political system, it is
useful to sketch three distinct dichotomies that characterise the term’s usage
in public debate. First, novaia oprichnina is used either as a ﬁgure of speech or
as an actual model for emulation. For example, back in 1998, the chair of the
Russian Agrarian Youth Union used it to frame the organisation’s objective:
‘Let our union in some way be a new oprichnina for Russia, a peasant
oprichnina, ruthlessly sweeping all that impedes the peasant to live out of our
house!’ (Zhelenin 1998). An article published by RBK Daily under the head-
line ‘Putin’s new oprichnina’ was a response to a statement by President Putin
that, after the 2008 elections, a group of new people will come to power
(‘Novaia oprichnina Putina’ 2007). Here, in a more politicised application of
the term, oprichnina denotes a ‘rotation of the political elite’ – that is, a
moment when the current elite is replaced by a new ruling elite. Such a rota-
tion can occur gradually through individuals’ upward political mobility, or it
can come about through a revolutionary change. The article claims that the
rotation forecast to come after the 2008 presidential elections has precursors:
the original oprichnina under Ivan IV, the forced ‘rotation of elites’ that took
place both under Peter the Great and Stalin and, ﬁnally, the replacement of
leading oﬃcials by individuals from Putin’s St Petersburg network of trustees
at the beginning of his ﬁrst presidential term.
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Second, the term is used either as part of a cautionary expression or with
the aim to mobilise. The journal Russian Entrepreneur, for instance, employed
the term in 2002 in its assessment of the goals and strategies of the newly
founded United Russia party. The establishment of a ‘mass parliamentary
party’, it asserts, is a logical and – based on global experience – necessary
step to ensure the survival of a federal type of government and to centralise
control. Yet, referring to the case of United Russia, ‘here it in fact concerns a
kind of ‘silent oprichnina’, within the framework of which an immense part of
the political sphere is placed under the control of ‘appanage [udelnykh] prin-
ces’’ (Lutomin & Sergeev 2002). On the mobilising end of the spectrum we
ﬁnd, among others, Aleksandr Dugin, who advocates the creation of an
extra-systemic ‘Russian order’ modelled as a new oprichnina to fundamen-
tally change the political structure of the Russian state (I will return to this
point shortly).
Third, in articles that use the term in the cautionary sense and that tend to
be located on the liberal side of the political spectrum, oprichnina is often
equalled with other (Russian and Soviet) state security organisations, such as
the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the People’s Commissariat for
Internal Aﬀairs (NKVD). For example, in a radio interview, the opposition
journalist Oleg Kashin uses the term in response to the tightening of poli-
tical control following Putin’s re-election in 2012. Listing the groups of
‘extremists’ who have managed to secure their place within the top echelons
of power, he states:
[T]he new security oﬃcers [siloviki], [and] also the, as they say, ‘new
middle class’, […] people, who constitute a substantial power base
nowadays, a gigantic number of people and then, you know, the MVD
[Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs, M.W.], FSB, other special forces, FSO
[Federal Guard Service, M.W.], the federal taxation service, and so on,
and so on, they are a kind of new oprichnina altogether.
(Dymarskii & Larina 2012)
Much earlier, and in a markedly diﬀerent context, an article from September
1991 had used the term to denote and conceptualise the Communist Party as
a social institution in the wake of the August coup d’état by communist
hardliners (Korzhavin 1991). As we will see, articles that use the term in an
eﬀort to mobilise, on the contrary, tend to adhere to nationalist and/or con-
servative political orientations. Here, the oprichnina is conceptualised as an
organisation that still has to be founded and that will operate outside the
existing state structure. Eventually, it will undermine and transform the state’s
very foundations. Thus we have two competing understandings of the oprich-
nina concept as it pertains to contemporary Russian politics: ﬁrst, as a means
of state repression (from a liberal, oppositional perspective) and, second, as
an extra-governmental means to fundamentally alter the existing political
structure (as invoked by right-wing nationalist and conservative groups).
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The permeation of these ideas into the mainstream media was and remains
limited, however. A survey of the major print-media outlets using the Inte-
grum World Wide media database returns a mere 34 hits for ‘novaia oprich-
nina’ and just one mention of the term ‘neooprichnina’ within the 12-year
period from 2000 to 2012.4 Moreover, in the majority of these articles the
term is used in a cautionary sense. A notable exception is its use in the weekly
newspaper Zavtra, an oppositional and increasingly nationalistic publication.
In addition to Zavtra, the circulation of these concepts takes place in con-
ferences, lectures and round tables, through book publications and, increas-
ingly actively, online. Anyone with an interest in the topic can listen to hours
of lectures and interviews on the oprichnina and related themes on YouTube,
Vkontakte and other video-sharing platforms.
Aleksandr Dugin appears to have ﬁrst used the term novaia oprichnina in
2000.5 In an article in Zavtra, Dugin speaks of creating a new ‘KGB’: a ‘new
cast [or] social stratum’ that should be formed outside of party structures, the
bureaucracy and business circles and have the aim of ‘[t]ransferring the
country onto the track [relsy] of patriotism, the preservation (and strength-
ening) of territorial integrity and sovereign development along its own
national path’ (Dugin 2000). The members of this still-to-be-formed ‘con-
tinental KGB’ will make up the ‘backbone of a Eurasian Renaissance’ in the
struggle against American domination in global aﬀairs. Here, the term ‘new
oprichnina’ appears in a more or less metaphorical sense towards the end of
the argument:
[T]he Eurasian secret services will inevitably be something completely
new – conservative, on the one hand, and revolutionary, on the other … .
It has to be a kind of ‘new oprichnina.’ Especially in the ﬁrst and most
diﬃcult phase when the citadel of strong agents of inﬂuence, entrenched
in the essential sectors of our society, has to be crushed. This new class
has to be delegated powers in the same proportion as during the conduct
of military operations.
(Ibid. Italics in original)
In addition to its political purpose, Dugin’s oprichnina is thus a military force
operating outside of existing state structures. By 2005, the term had become a
central element of his doctrine and political agenda. Dugin now calls for the
creation of a ‘Russian order’ (russkii orden), which he equates with a new
oprichnina. In an article published in Ogonek, Dugin’s phrasing of the issue
directly appeals to the political tensions that arose in the wake of the colour
revolutions and, in particular, the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. The
opening paragraph thus formulates the necessity of a new oprichnina:
The Russian oprichnina is both a historical and a meta-historical phe-
nomenon. […] In contemporary Russia the oprichnina has become mani-
festly unavoidable. The situation is similar to the 16th century: external
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threats (onset from the West, expansion of NATO, ‘orange processes’ in
the CIS) and domestic decay of the vertical of power (a hitherto unim-
aginable level of corruption, moral decline, alienation, incapacity of
the elite).
(Dugin 2005a)
Since ‘Putin is no [Ivan] the Terrible’, the oprichnina will gather behind ‘Holy
Rus’, which lies hidden underneath the rubble and sediments of history’ (ibid.).
The commitment to the term oprichnina was conﬁrmed at the founding
congress of Dugin’s youth movement, the Eurasian Youth Union we already
come across in chapter 5, that same year. The congress took place at Ivan’s
former residence in Aleksandrovskaia Sloboda, the ‘birthplace’ of the oprich-
nina, and framed its members as ‘new oprichniki’ whose mission is to counter
the spread of the ‘orange plague’ in Russia (‘Evraziiskaia oprichnina vos-
stanovit v Rossii sakral’nuiu vlast’’ 2005). The Eurasian Youth Union con-
tinued to use the term, for example during their ‘Easter imperial march’ on 8
April 2007, when they carried large banners with the slogan ‘Hail the
oprichnina!’ (Kozenko 2007). During the congress, Dugin presented a paper
on the ‘metaphysics of the oprichnina’, his most detailed exposition of the
concept. This lengthy document dwells extensively on the multi-layered (and
in Dugin’s rendering, mystic) symbolism associated with Ivan’s oprichnina as
well as later emulations of the model, in particular with regard to Stalinism.
Ivan, as the ‘tsar of the Eurasians’, is presented as a direct model to emulate:
‘[Ivan] the Terrible began to bring Russian Byzantism to its full realisation in
conjunction with the Horde covenant of empire-building of Genghis Chan.
He modernised Rus’, but it was modernisation without Westernisation’
(Dugin 2005b. Emphasis added). Here, with Dugin, we thus ﬁnd a con-
ceptualisation of a ‘Russian’ approach to state modernisation that is simulta-
neously complementary to the state’s memory politics in its anti-Western
stance and in direct conﬂict with the regime’s primary interests as it seeks to
undermine the power that be.
According to Dugin, the members of the oprichnina dedicated themselves
not to the state or to their own interests but to a higher purpose, which he
refers to as the ‘sacrality’ particular to Ivan the Terrible’s rule (groznaia sak-
ral’nost’). To serve this sacrality (which, in short, amounts to a Eurasian
interpretation of the Orthodox messianism we saw in chapter 4), the oprich-
nina has to bring about a rotation of the elites, a term we came across earlier
in the overview of the public debate. If necessary, this process has to be
enforced through violent repression:
If there are ways of raising new fresh people from the bottom to the
heights of power, that is a good thing, but if not, then [these ways] have to
be artiﬁcially created. In rigid [zhestkikh] societies, repressions serve this
purpose. The oprichnina, in this sense, was a chord in the rotation of the
elite in Russian society. Moreover, this sociological function was
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subordinate to its geopolitical function – the strengthening of tsarist
power – and its metaphysical [function] – the service to ‘terrible sacrality’.
Here the parallel with Stalin again suggests itself.
(Dugin 2005b)
In this quote, Dugin puts the common association between Ivan and Stalin as
repressive rulers to good rhetorical use. The brief sentence invoking Stalin
suggests the existence of a universal rule concerning ‘elite rotation’. And by
thus justifying the violent acts committed by these two heads of state on the
grounds of ‘geopolitical’ necessity, Dugin suggests that, when conditions so
dictate, the same principle should apply to present-day politics. Indeed, Dugin
asserts that the oprichnina’s task – ‘passionate service to the sacred Mother-
land, the Absolute Motherland, its unity, its greatness, its might’ – is as rele-
vant today as at any point in the past (Dugin 2005b). The ‘neooprichnina’,6
therefore, is the ‘model for a Eurasian conservative revolution’ that should
and will necessarily take place, even if the majority of Russian citizens are
against it (‘Motherland Rus’ goes above all else’), or if it would require a
direct confrontation with the powers that be (ibid.). In case the ruling elite
understands the necessity of structural change and chooses to work towards
its implementation, the new oprichnina will serve as a ‘conservative-protective
force’ to safeguard the process (ibid.).
A competing operationalisation of the concept was proposed by Andrei
Fursov, Maksim Kalashnikov and Vitalii Aver’ianov in The New Oprichnina,
or Russian-style Modernisation (Fursov, Kalashnikov & Aver’ianov 2011).7
The publication was prepared for the Institute of Dynamic Conservatism, an
organisation established in 2009 as a neo-conservative think tank that merged
into the Izborsk Club in 2012. The latter now unites the most ‘prominent
conservative right-wing intellectuals of modern Russia’ and propagates the
belief that ‘post-Soviet identity has to encompass both the technocratic Soviet
element and the mystical Orthodox one’ (Engström 2014: 361). All three
authors have established reputations. Fursov is a prominent historian and
sociologist. Kalashnikov, whose real name is Vladimir Kucherenko, is a pub-
licist and nationalist political writer. In his books, with titles such as Towards
USSR 2.0 (2003), he praises the Soviet Union and criticises the current Rus-
sian regime. Finally, Aver’ianov, the director of the Institute, is an Orthodox
writer and philosopher. The book in many ways is a collection of various
writings, building upon the previous works of the contributing authors that
are also referenced throughout, and it contains some previously published
material. For example, the chapter ‘The Innovative Oprichnina of Lavrentii
Beriia’ had been published the year before by Kalashnikov as a paper entitled
‘We Need a New Beriia’ in Zavtra (Kalashnikov 2010).
The book oﬀers an extensive discussion of the oprichnina as a historical
phenomenon (with overt contemporary political connotations) as well as
the various groups and individuals who have been responsible for the ‘mis-
representation’ of Ivan and the oprichnina. The image of Ivan in historiography,
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the authors assert, is not simply incorrect; it even conﬂicts with common sense.
The primary explanation for this distortion of historical facts lies in Western
attempts at falsiﬁcation.
In the case of Russia, the West and especially Latin Rome start to employ
a new method of struggle from the 16th century onwards: psychological
propagandistic warfare. The public opinion in Europe during the Livo-
nian war was formed by means of manifold ‘ﬂying leaﬂets’ that pictured
Tsar Ioann as a monster and the Russians as aggressors and ﬁends. But
the propaganda was not limited to this, of course. Because of the histor-
ical and political circumstances, Ioann the Terrible came under heavy ﬁre
in a new type of war. Discrediting him became a matter of honour to the
enemies of Russia, both during his lifetime and after his death. He
messed up the plans [sputal karty] of the Western strategists, the Roman
missionaries, Livonian knights, Polish and Swedish aggressors (yet
another characteristic that connects him with Stalin). But the particular-
ity of this propagandistic war is the fact that it does not diminish [deak-
tualiziruetsia] over time.
(Fursov, Kalashnikov & Aver’ianov 2011. Bold in original).
The claim that the alleged disinformation campaign against Ivan has not
diminished ﬁts within the accusations of information warfare that have since
come to dominate mainstream media (and that, vice versa, European coun-
tries accuse Russia of waging, with good reason). Among the Russian names
that are mentioned as accomplices in the mistreatment of Ivan’s memory are
Nikolai Karamzin, who is described as a ‘fabulist’ with a liking for gothic
narratives, and Vladimir Sorokin and Pavel Lungin (the director of the 2009 ﬁlm
Tsar, discussed later on in this chapter), who are both accused of entertaining
‘particular sentimental-intimate relations with Western countries’ to account for
their negative appraisals of Ivan (Fursov, Kalashnikov & Aver’ianov 2011). In
other words, anyone who voices criticism of Ivan is not a true patriot.
The diagnosis here of the problem of contemporary Russian politics is lar-
gely identical to what Dugin proposes – namely, corruption. The oprichnina,
able to cleanse the political system in a way that the system itself cannot, can
move the state from its current state of degradation and stagnation towards
innovation, the authors argue. Here we again ﬁnd a direct reference to the
Orange Revolution in Ukraine to demonstrate the need for exceptional
measures:
The most dreadful thing is that the governmental apparatus of the RF
[Russian Federation, M.W.] can no longer independently cleanse itself of
total corruption. Avaricious beings have ﬁrmly lodged themselves in it,
and do not allow honest and competent ones to enter. ‘Anti-selection’ was
and is going on. The sad experience of the ‘orange revolution’ in Ukraine
(which, in eﬀect, is the same kind of society [sotsium]) has shown that no
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liberal-democratic procedures can eradicate corruption or the omnipo-
tence of the criminalised ‘elite’.
(Fursov, Kalashnikov & Aver’ianov 2011)
In comparison to what Dugin imagines, the vision put forward by Fursov,
Kalashnikov and Aver’ianov is less militant and more technocratic, and lacks
Dugin’s mysticism. Since the publication is a collection of varied writings
rather than an argumentative whole, there is no uniﬁed vision of how exactly
Russia should be structured in the future. The most detailed description of
Russian society during and after the proposed establishment of a new
oprichnina can be found in the chapters written by Kalashnikov. He envisions
the oprichnina as a fully developed parallel system of governance that in a
true and distinctively Russian way, he claims, will be democratic in serving
the interests of the state and the people, rather than those in power. While the
oprichnina will have at its disposal a secret security service and a small army,
these resources form only a part of a much wider system of ‘structures of
innovation’:
The central concept is simple: it is necessary to establish a dictatorship of
honest, patriotic people, who stand above the government. People, who
are devoid of self-seeking motives, who are preoccupied with the great-
ness of the country and safeguarding the people. They have to construct a
closely knit society capable of controlling the state apparatus, of moving
their people to key leadership positions, [and] shaping the judiciary, the
prosecutor’s oﬃce, secret services and top administration of the MVD
[Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs, M.W.]. […] It is a kind of corporation of
‘stern judges’. Stern, but fair. What is more, it should be based on the
structures of civil society and local self-government, cooperating with
them. Such a corporation should recruit individuals from all layers of
society, selecting those who combine intelligence, patriotism and self-
lessness in their service to the common cause. And the selection of worthy
candidates is performed by the wise, strong and incorruptible members of
the corporation.
(Fursov, Kalashnikov & Aver’ianov 2011)
Contrary to the territorial division into oprichnina and zemshchina established
under Ivan, the new oprichnina will give rise to a parallel system operating
throughout the entire territory of Russia. This network of advanced cities
(futuropolisy), the author clariﬁes, will be similar to the system of closed cities
of the Soviet military-industrial complex. Kalashnikov attaches great impor-
tance to advances in psychology and information technology to establish this
neo-Soviet ‘democratic dictatorship’. Modern psychotechnologies, he claims,
make it possible to select ‘thousands of absolutely [kristal’no] honest and
noble-minded individuals’ to ﬁll the ranks of the oprichnina. As a result, those
who are deceitful, who strive for power for the sake of power or have sadistic
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inclinations will be ﬁltered out. Modern technology, he concludes, will
thereby help avoid the pitfalls of the oprichnina as established by both Ivan
and Stalin.
While this plan is no less rich in anti-Western sentiment than Dugin’s
writings, the opposition with the West is not solely confrontational in this
case. The West, in particular the United States, is depicted as a separate civi-
lisation that harbours a negative attitude towards Russia. At the same time,
however, it is recognised and at times emphasised that both are subject to the
same detrimental global trends that have to be overcome (among them cor-
ruption and other vices of capitalism). The combination of these two lines of
thinking (eternal opposition and common problems) results in the view that
the current race between Russia and the US will be decided by which nation
succeeds in decisively addressing these issues ﬁrst. To do so in Russia, the
authors assert, the new oprichnina is the only available means.
Both conceptualisations of the new oprichnina thus attack the state-sup-
ported notion that stability is a necessary requirement for development, a
premise central to oﬃcial memory politics. Instead, it is argued that the cor-
ruption of the ruling political system is pronounced enough to jeopardise the
future existence of the Russian state. (Conservative) modernisation is essen-
tial, yet it can be achieved only through a fundamental reform of the system
undertaken from outside the established power structures. Thus, reform must
still be a top-down initiative, but one not instituted by the Kremlin. In rather
vague (and in the case of Kalashnikov, somewhat naïvely optimistic) terms, a
truly Russian type of democracy is envisioned as the end goal. The authors
behind these two conceptualisations of a new oprichnina are among the
‘founding fathers’ of the so-called conservative turn in Russian politics since
2013 (Engström 2014), along with television journalist Mikhail Leont’ev (see
chapter 5), archimandrite Tikhon (see chapter 4) and Sergei Kurginian, whose
activities will be discussed towards the end of the current chapter.
The memory of the oprichnina has been used to critique political develop-
ments in a non-mobilising manner as well, as we have already seen with
regard to public discourse and to Sorokin’s dystopian ﬁction. To conclude this
section, I would like to oﬀer another example. The oppositional art collective
Voina, from whose ranks Pussy Riot later emerged, has drawn upon the
oprichnina concept in their performance art. They targeted Mikhail Leont’ev’s
restaurant Oprichnik in Moscow (now closed) in an art action named ‘The
dogs’ heads of Russia, or The goldﬁsh’.8 On the night of 28 December 2008,
the doors to the restaurant were welded shut with metal plates, locking the
customers inside.9 As the action was unfolding, members of the collective
shouted various slogans, such as ‘Give us the Iron Curtain!’, ‘No to the
oprichnina!’, ‘We will strike Russia on its dogs’ heads with an electric welder’
and ‘Canonise Ivan the Terrible! Misha Leont’ev – to the stables!’ (plucer
2008). In line with Voina’s usual postmodern eclecticism, the action was
deﬁned as a protest against ‘oprichnina, glamour, wild boar in raspberry wine
and personally against the union of Misha Leont’ev with Ivan the Terrible’.
178 Case studies
Art activist Oleg Vasil’ev interpreted the action in a more directly political
sense. Addressing President Dmitrii Medvedev in a blog post published on 31
December 2008, Vasil’ev drew a parallel between Ivan’s temporary abdication
of the throne to Simeon Bekbulatovich in 1575 and Putin’s handover of power
to Medvedev in 2008. He asks whether Medvedev will return the throne to its
‘rightful owner’, as Bekbulatovich had before him:
Art group ‘Voina’ gives Dmitrii Anatol’evich the chance to become the
real president of all of Russia; art group ‘Voina’ closes the symbol of a
connection between ages and situations, the symbol of the return of the
oprichnina. Just like the army of the Crimean khan Devlet Girai [1551–
1577, M.W.] that brought an end to the history of the ﬁrst oprichnina, art
group ‘Voina’ closes the restaurant ‘Oprichnik’, owned by ‘journalist’
Mikhail Leont’ev, one of the principle dogs of the Putin oprichnina. […]
Dmitrii Anatol’evich, on the eve of the New Year the group ‘Voina’ gives
you the chance to put an end to the new oprichnina, another shameful
episode in Russian history. Will you seize it?
(Epshtein 2011)
The comparison to Bekbulatovich was widely made during Medvedev’s pre-
sidency. For example, in the online petition ‘Putin has to go’, ﬁrst posted in
March 2010 and signed by more than 150,000 people, Medvedev is referred
to as an ‘obedient locum tenens’ and ‘the contemporary Simeon Bekbulato-
vich’ (‘Putin dolzhen uiti’ 2010). As became clear in 2011, Medvedev’s occu-
pation of the presidential ‘throne’ was indeed temporary: Putin returned to
power in 2012.
Ivan the Terrible and Orthodox fundamentalism
In addition to the renewed interest in the concept of the oprichnina within
nationalist and neo-Soviet circles, Ivan espouses particular appeal to certain
marginal groups adhering to fundamentalist conceptions of Russian Ortho-
doxy. These adherents of so-called Tsarebozhnichetsvo ‘sacralise the Russian
sovereigns as divine recruits, chosen by God to ensure for Russia the realisa-
tion of her messianic destiny as the protectress of Orthodoxy on earth’
(Knoppe 2006). One of their objectives has been to push for the canonisation
of Tsar Ivan IV. The ‘extremist, populist, and imperialistic elements’ within
the Russian Orthodox Church, where this initiative originated, assert that all
accusations against Ivan are simply false; they are the result of incorrect
interpretations of available historical sources combined with slander voiced by
Ivan’s contemporaries and enemies (Bodin 2009: 101). As Per-Arne Bodin
points out, the argument in favour of Ivan’s canonisation ‘demonstrates […] a
highly conspirational way of thinking [that is] characteristic of Russian pop-
ular political discourse’ (idem: 100). So much so that Bodin labels the accu-
mulation of materials in favour of Ivan’s sanctity and the exposure of
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purportedly false accusations against him as the creation of a ‘counter-his-
tory’ (idem: 101). The canonisation bid was rejected by the ROC in 2004,
along with a similar proposal regarding Grigorii Rasputin. Canonising Ivan,
it was argued, was out of the question due to Ivan’s persecution of the
Church. Indeed, the main obstacle to canonisation is that it would sanctify a
person held responsible for the death of a saint (Metropolitan Filipp). Hypo-
thetically speaking, so the ROC reasoned, canonising Ivan would require the
canonisation of Filipp to be undone. Another complicating factor is that
the debate on Ivan tends to interweave itself with the perhaps even more
controversial debate surrounding the canonisation of Stalin (Bodin 2009: 106).
Within these fundamentalist Orthodox circles, Ivan is lauded as the ﬁrst
tsar of the Russian Empire and praised for his contribution to the develop-
ment of the Russian state, his military victories and territorial expansion. In
addition, and this is what sets them apart from nationalist movements, they
glorify autocracy and (God-ordained) violence. Their political views tend to
be anti-establishment, with regard to both the ROC and the state. As they do
not recognise the position of the patriarch, these Orthodox communities exist
on the fringes or outside of Church structures and many are considered
splinter sects by the ROC. Anti-Putinist rhetoric is a common though less
essential element. As such, their political position corresponds to how Kathy
Rousselet characterises the attitude of local, patriotic religious groups towards
the state more generally:
They are often very critical towards the social and economic situation of
Putin’s Russia, but they do not necessarily question the established status
quo. Many reject any form of political action in the partisan sense of the
term. However, they call for a moralisation of the country. Although
morality is part of the Soviet heritage, it seeks to overturn its original
foundations. The patriotism of believers is multifaceted: while this same
patriotism echoes oﬃcial calls, in some respects it also diverges from
these calls.
(Rousselet 2015: 66)
Here it has to be emphasised that, in their gloriﬁcation of empire and ‘strong
and cruel’ leadership, the patriotism of such groups typically is openly anti-
Semitic and xenophobic (Bodin 2009: 106).
Various Orthodox brotherhoods worship Ivan the Terrible across Russia.
The social organisation of these communities (characterised by, e.g., seclusion
from society, gloriﬁcation of the head of the brotherhood) appears to support
their designation as religious sects. A notable example is the ‘Oprichnoe
brotherhood in the name of the blessed Tsar Ioann the Terrible’, an Orthodox
community located in the city Liubim and the nearby village of Kashcheevo,
some 100 kilometres northeast of Yaroslavl. The community, which consists
of several families and is supposedly structured after Ivan’s oprichnina, is led
by a man named Andrei Shchedrin. Writing under several pseudonyms,
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Shchedrin actively agitates against both the patriarch and the state in a
leaﬂet (‘Oprichnyi listok’) that the ‘oprichniki’ hand out and circulate
across the country. Their starkly anti-Semitic ideology sees the president
and the patriarch as servants of the antichrist.10 In 2005, the local
administration in Liubim decided to erect a statue of Ivan as the city’s
founder. As was reported in the press, its representatives approached the
famous sculptor Zurab Tsereteli with a commission to design the sculpture
(Radulova 2005). Whether Shchedrin was involved in the initiative is
unclear. The plan elicited criticism from the Yaroslavl eparchy of the
Russian Orthodox Church. The archbishop of Yaroslavl and Rostov Kirill
addressed a letter to the governor, procurator and the head federal
inspector of the region to warn against the possible negative consequences
of the planned monument, citing the presence of the Oprichnoe Brotherhood
in the locality as an aggravating factor.
[T]he initiative by the head of the Liubim local branch, Koshkin A.V., to
erect a monument to Tsar Ivan the Terrible in Liubim can have very
unpredictable consequences. Please note that the controversy surrounding
the ﬁgure of Ivan the Terrible and the possibility of his ecclesiastical
veneration is one of the destabilising factors of the ‘near-Orthodox’
[okolopravoslavnoi] community. The erection of a monument in the city of
Liubim will lead to the settlement of a great number of mentally unstable
persons in the city, which will undoubtedly worsen the crime situation in
the district. In the city of Liubim, its vicinity and the Pervomaiskii dis-
trict the totalitarian sect ‘Oprichnoe Brotherhood’, whose unlawful acts
were subject of investigation by the prosecutor’s oﬃce and the FSB,
already operates.
(IA REGNUM 2005)
It is unclear whether the Archbishop’s appeal resulted in any action on the
federal level to overrule the decision by the local administration of Liubim.
The statue, in any case, was not erected.
Soviet-era Estrada singer Zhanna Bichevskaia is one of the public ﬁgures
who strive for a positive reappraisal and canonisation of Ivan in various
media. She has dedicated several songs to ‘Saintly Ioann’, in which she sings
to his glory and comments on the contemporary lack of positive appraisals of
him.11 According to Aleksandr Dvorkin, an expert on sectarianism in con-
temporary Russia, Zhanna Bichevskaia acts as the ‘vocal cords’ of the alter-
native Orthodox groups who see the monarch as the head of the church
(Skoibeda 2013). The song ‘The Terrible Tsar’, for example, reiterates the
notion that the monarch is created by God and answers to Him only (‘The
tsar does not belong to the earthly court / he is answerable to God alone’).
The lyrics recall Ivan’s rule as a period of glory, whose memory has been
made murky by ‘boyar thieves’ (‘In admiration of the Tsar, the people pray /
the Tsar is frightening to the thief-boyars / and in the byliny songs [Ivan] the
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Terrible appears / as a righteous sovereign’). The ﬁnal verses emphasise the
link between respect for Ivan and patriotism:
I am proud of the achievements of our ancestors
The decisive moment has come for the Russians
Tsar Ioann the Fourth the Terrible
Among the saints, is praying for Rus’ to God.
Another song called ‘Tsar Ioann’ pictures Ivan’s submission to serve God
and ‘the native land’. The ﬁnal verses again address the listener and spur
them to remember, ‘in this wicked, most dangerous hour’, how the ‘God-
anointed Tsar Ioann […] defended and saved our faith.’ While her views
support the centralisation of power, Bichevskaia is by no means a Putin sup-
porter. Rather, she advocates the restoration of the monarchy under a direct
descendant of the Romanovs (Sobakin 2012).
Another public ﬁgure who has come out in defence of Ivan is the businessman
and societal actor Vasilii Boiko, who renamed himself Boiko-Velikii (which
translates as Boiko the Great) in 2009 by adopting his mother’s maiden name
(Velikaia).12 A strict adherent of (fundamentalist) Orthodox principles, Boiko is
an eccentric ﬁgure who typically dresses in a ‘Russian’ costume consisting of a
decorated caftan (predominantly in white, blue or red, the colours of the Russian
ﬂag) and elegant boots. In 2010 his (at that time) extreme views on Russian
society sparked public outrage when he enforced a series of religiously derived
rules of conduct on the employees of his dairy concern, Russian Milk. Among
other measures, these rules stipulated that employees who have had an abortion
or who facilitate the termination of a pregnancy would be dismissed (Novose-
lova 2010).13 Boiko-Velikii openly criticised Pavel Lungin’s ﬁlm Tsar in an open
letter published in Izvestiia, in which he accuses the director of blasphemy and of
insulting the Russian people (I will return to Boiko’s criticisms later on). He was
also one of the main signatories of an open letter addressed to the Minister of
Culture and the director of the Tret’iakov Gallery demanding that Il’ia Repin’s
painting Ivan the Terrible and His Son Ivan be taken down and locked away in
the gallery’s storage room. In a clear reference to the legislation protecting the
sensitivities of religious believers that was adopted in June 2013,14 the signatories
claimed that the painting falsiﬁes history (since, they assert, Ivan did not kill his
son) and ‘constitutes blatant slander of not just Tsar Ivan but also the Russian
Orthodox Autocracy [russkoe Pravoslavnoe Samoderzhavie], of the entire Rus-
sian people’ (Mil’shtein 2013). The director of the Tret’iakov Gallery, Irina
Lebedeva, refused to comply, stating that art is not intended to be an ‘illustration
of history’ but rather is an expressive act.
Boiko-Velikii was, in addition, the force who initiated the consecration of a
small chapel in honour of (the non-canonised) Tsar Ivan the Terrible in
December 2011. The chapel is located on the premises of an auto repair fac-
tory in Moscow owned by an investment company headed by Boiko. In his
speech at the opening ceremony, Boiko-Velikii claimed that Ivan had
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performed a miracle on the factory’s grounds. On 15 December 2009 the
factory was attacked by raiders who sought to seize the property, Boiko-
Velikii recounts – but then he prayed to Ivan and the seizure was mir-
aculously averted (‘V Moskve osviashchena chasovnia v chest’ sv. blgv. Tsaria
Ioanna Groznogo’ 2011). The Russian Orthodox Church has distanced itself
from the veneration of Ivan by pointing out that the cleric who performed the
consecration, Aleksei Aver’ianov, does not oﬃcially belong to the Church. In
a letter to Boiko-Velikii, obtained by the information agency Interfax,
Metropolitan Ilarion stresses that Aver’ianov was stripped of his status as
priest in 1996. According to the agency, Aver’ianov stands at the head of the
Orthodox community to which Boiko-Velikii belongs (‘V Tserkvi napomi-
naiut o nekanonichnosti klirika’ 2012). The Orthodox eccentric has since
founded the political party ‘People’s movement ‘Holy Rus’’ (Narodnoe dviz-
henie ‘Sviataia Rus’’). Contrary to the fundamentalist Orthodox groups dis-
cussed earlier, Boiko-Velikii does not necessarily aim to undermine the
political regime. In fact, he is the recipient of multiple state awards and, as
conservatism has more recently become part of the political mainstream, ﬁnds
himself increasingly close to the powers that be.
The contemporary debates employing the memory of Ivan the Terrible
discussed above draw out a number of unpleasant and controversial aspects of
Russian society: from the anti-Semitism of Ivan’s Orthodox proponents, to
the inextricable connection, to (the gloriﬁcation of) Stalin and the racist con-
texts in which his name is at times used. For example, during a hockey match
in Magnitogorsk in 2007 against the Kazan club ‘Ak Bars’, supporters of the
local club Metallurg held up banners with the slogans ‘We will not disgrace
Ivan the Terrible’, ‘Ivan captured Kazan, and we will capture it’ and ‘1380’,
the date of the Battle of Kulikovo Field. The supporters also chanted ‘Beat
the Tatars!’ (‘Rasistskii intsident na khokkeinom matche v Magnitogorske’
2007). Both circles discussed above, who propagate the memory of Ivan and
the oprichnina from diﬀerent sets of convictions, can be considered socially
marginal. Yet, as some additional examples below will conﬁrm, some of the
proponents of these views have had signiﬁcant access to the public domain
through various media. Moreover, several of them (e.g. Dugin, Kurginian)
and the ideologies they represent have since moved considerably closer to the
mainstream of political debate in Russia, in particular since the re-election of
Putin in 2012 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Film and television analyses
In the period 2000–2012, the domains of cinema and television made a con-
siderable contribution to the remediation of the memory of Ivan the Terrible,
including its inherent controversies and politically subversive potential. The
remainder of this chapter discusses three examples that show the variation
among these productions. The ﬁrst, the historical TV series Ivan the Terrible,
was produced for state television. The feature ﬁlm Tsar, by contrast, targeted
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both national and international audiences with a more artistic depiction of
Ivan’s rule. Finally, The Trial of Time is a particularly insightful example
of the proliﬁc talk-show genre. The analyses aﬃrm how reinterpretations of
Ivan’s rule are taken to imply direct commentary on current political aﬀairs
and rarely fail to cause a stir.
Ivan the Terrible (2009)
The television series Ivan the Terrible (Ivan Groznyi, 2009), consisting of 16
episodes, was broadcast by Rossiia in May 2009. The ﬁlm recounts the story
of Ivan from before he was born up to his death. The series was directed by
Andrei Eshpai, who also oversaw the TV adaptation of Anatolii Rybakov’s
famous Children of the Arbat (Deti Arbata, 2004). The producer, Vladimir
Dostal’, has been involved in numerous historical television productions,
including the TV series Stolypin … The Undrawn Lessons discussed in chapter
3. The director of the latter TV series, Iurii Kuzin, states on his LiveJournal
blog that Dostal’ initially approached him for the Ivan project in 2006. Kuzin
provided him with his director’s interpretation of the script and published
fragments from this document on LiveJournal in November of that year
(Kuzin 2006). The collaboration, however, did not work out. In a blog entry
posted on 20 May 2009, after the TV series was ﬁrst broadcast, Kuzin
severely criticises the ﬁnal result and appears to place the blame for it on
Dostal’:
How could it happen that TV Channel ‘Rossiia’, […] thought it possible
to broadcast a series of such questionable quality? In 2006, by the way,
Vladimir Nikolaevich Dostal’ invited me to work on this project and even
asked me to write an explication of the scenario by Aleksandr Lapshin,
which I did, oﬀering my conception of the tyrant’s personality: ‘Ivan the
Terrible – A Bastard on the Throne.’ The conditions under which I
agreed to work on the series did not suit V.N. Dostal’ since they required
the producer to provide what he is unaccustomed to give: a qualitative
scenario! Qualitative editing! Qualitative production! All of this, alas, I
was deprived of [when working on] ‘Stolypin’ [Stolypin … The Undrawn
Lessons, M.W.] and I can only sympathise with Andrei Eshpai.
(Kuzin 2009)
The project was, indeed, a diﬃcult one for Eshpai because of the nature of its
subject matter as well as the scope of the production. Yet, as the director
remarks in an interview, for him the eﬀort was worth it:
I think that we did not go through all of this in vain: [I have] the
impression that the appearance of the ﬁlm was conditioned by time itself.
Ten years ago it could not have been made – even from a material point
of view. Neither now, in times of crisis. That means we chose the most
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opportune moment for looking into the past and understanding our
present.
(Khlobystova 2009)
As is often the case in such interviews, the director is (intentionally) vague
concerning the particular contemporary developments illuminated by such a
turn to the past. The speciﬁc aspect of Ivan’s character that sparked the
director’s fascination provides us with an important clue here. According to
Eshpai, what sets Ivan apart from other oppressive rulers in Russian history
(and history in general) was his propensity to repent later in life:
Not one of the tyrants started to have doubts before passing away; nei-
ther Peter I, nor Stalin, nor Caligula. But with Ivan this was the case. He
perceived the death of his son [Tsarevich Dmitrii Ivanovich, M.W.] as
punishment. It convinced him that he was doing something wrong. The
letters, death bills in which he commemorates all who had been mur-
dered, and of course also his own pains and illness started to tell him that
he was not God. He started to question himself. Exactly in that moment,
when I understood this, I became interested in analysing his deeds.
(Khlobystova 2009)
Eshpai, in fact, frames the project as an exploration of human nature itself,
which also has direct implications for understanding contemporary political
reality. In our souls, he asserts, we all harbour both the magniﬁcent (pre-
krasnoe) and the uncanny (zhutkoe). The only diﬀerence between then and
now is that we are now conditioned not to give in to our passions. To glimpse
into the past, therefore, can help us reach a greater understanding of our-
selves – the heights to which a person can climb and how far one can fall:
‘After all, humanity is so often mistaken acting upon their beliefs, and that is
a very sad thing’ (Khlobystova 2009). According to Eshpai, the aim of revi-
siting history should ultimately be to learn from historical mistakes and
overcome our inner propensity for evil:
If we understand where we erred, understand to what we are entitled and
to what we are not, if we repent – that would already be a big step for-
ward. Otherwise we will commit even more terrible mistakes than before.
And this is particularly frightful when it concerns those in power. You
understand perfectly well what would happen in that case … .
(Khlobystova 2009)
The allusion to the crimes committed by Stalin’s regime in this remark is
unmistakable. Yet, in equal measure, this call for self-reﬂection and the over-
coming of historical patterns clearly alludes to twenty-ﬁrst-century politics.
The TV series contains many violent scenes, some of which are uncomfor-
table to watch. Throughout the series, and particularly in the episode on the
Ivan the Terrible and the Oprichnina 185
oprichnina, the characters engage in various types of torture, (mass) murder
and rape, all of which are depicted fairly explicitly. Even as a teen, Ivan is
involved in the abduction and rape of young women and on a few occasions,
as tsar, personally takes part in torturing suspects and convicts. While the
series in no way excuses these violent acts, it oﬀers a framework to under-
stand the tsar’s acts of cruelty against his allies, enemies and citizens. Shortly
before he assumes the throne, Metropolitan Makarii, a close advisor to Ivan,
endows the young tsar with a higher mission. Reminding him of his glorious
descent – from the Roman emperor Augustus, Riurik, and the emperors of
Byzantium – Makarii asserts that in Ivan, as in all Russian princes, the two
historical Romes are united: the Rome of the Caesars and that of Byzantium.
‘Byzantium has fallen under the Turkish yoke but,’ the Metropolitan states
with a meaningful pause, ‘the city [grad] of Moscow remains. The Third
Rome! And as the last remaining [ruler] you must preserve it!’ Ivan protests
that he is not ready to take on such a responsibility, but Makarii insists:
Byzantium passed the beacon [ogon’] of faith on to us. We are the last to
preserve her ﬂame [svet]. And the tsar is like the highest igumen [abbot,
M.W.]. Understand, grand prince, that this is not about you, but about
Christianity, [it is about] how the apostles, martyrs and saints preserved
it. The most simple person, the very last, can live freely because they bear
responsibility only for themselves before God. But you … you are
responsible for all of the people. […] Understand, lord, that the Russian
state cannot exist without a monarch. […] because we are the heirs of
Greek Orthodoxy, which Byzantium has now betrayed under pressure
from the Ottoman yoke.
Ivan’s actions, he urges, will decide the fate and survival of both the Russian
state and the Orthodox faith. It is only upon Makarii’s insistence that Ivan
agrees to ascend the throne. Throughout his life, he perceives the crown to be
a burden and on repeated occasions asks rhetorically to be released from his
predestined duty. His self-sacriﬁce for the sake of the state’s survival and his
purported lack of power-seeking behaviour at ﬁrst resonate strongly with the
myth that has formed around Putin’s ascension to power and his selﬂess
acceptance of the ‘burden’ of state leadership.
The series reiterates the standard narrative’s division of Ivan’s rule into
distinct phases: the good tsar, the cruel tsar and the repentant tsar. The
endorsement of Karamzin’s characterisation of Ivan is aﬃrmed by the con-
cluding shot of the series, where the historian is quoted. Ivan’s somewhat
troubled youth is presented as a formative phase, contributing to the beha-
viours he adopts later in life. His exposure to violence and the behavioural
patterns he picks up from observing court life shine through during the
German language lessons the young boy receives from his mother. When she
asks him to translate the verb ‘to hang’, Ivan replies, ‘Hang whom?’ In a
similar vein, the boy wonders whether the object of the verb ‘to cut’ (rubit’)
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would be a cabbage or a head. Another telling moment is when Ivan fails to
remember the German word for ‘goodness’, but is able to instantly oﬀer
translations for ‘evil’, ‘state’ and ‘power’. The word ‘European’ (evropeets)
prompts the boy to think about Russia’s identity and somewhat confused, he
asks, ‘Mama, and who are we then? Asians?’ She replies, reassuringly, that
they are Russians (Rusi): ‘Also Europe, but [a] diﬀerent [Europe]’ (Tozhe
Evropa, no drugaia). Growing up, the relationship with his regent, Ivan
Shuiskii, who he considers oppressive, is particularly problematic. Ivan’s ﬁrst
wife, Anastasiia, on the other hand, has a pronouncedly positive, calming
eﬀect on his mental state and actions. Despite the serious diﬃculties they
encounter in raising an heir to the throne (two of their children die at a young
age), their marriage is portrayed as a union of love. When Anastasiia dies as
a result of poisoning, Ivan is heartbroken and his character takes a turn for
the worse. Apart from Anastasiia, the portrayal of all female characters is
markedly negative. Driven by their lust for power, they manipulate their
environments and, time and again, turn out to be the driving force behind
conspiracies and crimes committed by men.
The transition between the phases – from troubled youth to benevolent
ruler during his ﬁrst marriage, and ultimately to the outright cruel despotism
that follows his wife’s death – is mirrored by changes in his entourage. In
visually comparable scenes, the viewer sees his closest circle of advisors
change in composition: the boyars and clergy at the beginning of his reign
yield to the new oprichniki who come to make up half of his advisors; then
the council consists solely of oprichniki only to revert, ﬁnally, back to a small
group of boyars. The appearance of Maliuta Skuratov in particular signals a
turning point. As Ivan’s main executioner, Maliuta is depicted as having a
twofold negative inﬂuence. First, Maliuta advocates an alternative moral
standard to that of forgiveness, which he had adhered to under the inﬂuence
of metropolitans Makarii and Sylvester and his ﬁrst wife. Under the sway of
Maliuta, Ivan soon adopts the executioner’s motto, ‘an eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth’. Second, Maliuta implements a system of intelligence col-
lection that exacerbates Ivan’s paranoia. As reports on alleged conspiracies
against the tsar continue to mount, Ivan becomes overwhelmed and starts to
distrust even his most loyal advisors. However, the intelligence Maliuta gath-
ers does actually constitute systematic disinformation: on several occasions it
is suggested that accusation letters are false (for example, because they are
not signed) and that the oprichniki have planted incriminating materials on
innocent suspects to warrant taking repressive action against them.
In addition to the inﬂuence of his entourage, a second factor aﬀecting
Ivan’s behaviour is the ‘heavenly response’ to his actions. Medieval Russia is
portrayed as a society guided by superstition, signs, premonitions and hea-
venly signs in the clouds. When the city of Moscow burns down, Ivan inter-
prets the calamity as a punishment for sinful behaviour. Conversely, acts of
benevolence are rewarded with the conquest of Kazan and the birth of an heir
to the throne. While Ivan and various other characters are routinely shown
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praying, the notion of ‘the repenting tsar’ features only in the episode on
Metropolitan Filipp. The issue of (excessive) confession and repentance is
made explicit once, when Filipp remarks that Ivan has turned confession into
a habit. His repentance, therefore, lacks substance. As long as Ivan fails
to change his actions – the sign of actual repentance – Filipp refuses to
pronounce his blessing.
Proponents of Ivan typically cite his education, eloquence and desire to
develop his country intellectually; therefore, he could not have been a com-
plete madman or outright tyrant (see the analysis of The Trial of Time
towards the end of this chapter for examples of this argument). The topic of
his intellectual sophistication appears in the TV series in a slightly forced
manner. As a young man, Ivan demonstrates interest in books, and his
knowledge of many languages is mentioned. Moreover, he is complimented
on his writing. But the motif of Ivan’s educated nature largely disappears as
soon as he ascends the throne. A second narrative line, connected to this
argument, concerns the deacon Ivan Fedorov who is sent to Cracow to study
and on his return to Moscow establishes a print works. The printing of reli-
gious books encounters stark resistance from the Church, which seeks to
prosecute Fedorov and his partner, Petr Mstislavets. After the print yard has
burned down as a result of arson, Fedorov asks the tsar for assistance and
protection. Notwithstanding Ivan’s support for the printing practice (recall
how Ivan is called the ‘patron of book printing’ on the memorial plaque in
Archangelsk), Fedorov and Mstislavets ﬂee to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania
to escape persecution.
The episode in which Ivan abdicates and retreats to Aleksandrovskaia Slo-
boda, iconically depicted in Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible, is rewritten to
follow the historical account more closely. Instead of agreeing to return to
Moscow upon the request of the Russian people (as the Stalinist interpreta-
tion had it), the entire episode is presented as a clever political play to force
the boyars into submission. Unable to exert control over the citizenry in the
tsar’s absence, the boyar envoy agrees to grant the ruler absolute power. In its
representation of the oprichnina that is established upon the tsar’s return,
there are no traces of the ‘new oprichnina’ discourse described earlier. The
oprichnina is but a means for absolutism and, above all, for carrying out state
terror. After its establishment, stories of betrayal dominate the narrative.
While some conspiracies are real, many more are false – based on contrived
allegations. As mentioned, the stream of intelligence reports (often of doubt-
ful accuracy) intensiﬁes Ivan’s paranoia. Therefore, while on the one hand it
is evident that Ivan acts violently against loyal state servants (and their inno-
cent families), the portrayal of his involvement in the system of intelligence
gathering to a certain extent places the blame elsewhere. He acts upon the
information he is given, information that – the viewer knows – is incorrect. It
is interesting to note that ‘arch-traitor’ Prince Andrei Kurbskii is portrayed as
loyal. The series suggests that the motivation for defecting to the enemy lies in
the atmosphere of (false) allegations and conspiracies at court. As even the
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loyal boyars, one after the other, suﬀer the wrath of Ivan and his oprichniki,
Kurbskii is convinced he will be next. To the viewer, the case of Kurbskii can
be read as a reference to more recent examples of those who have fallen out
of favour with the regime or have chosen refuge in the West, such as Boris
Berezovskii and Mikhail Khodorkovskii.
The depiction of Russia’s foreign policy, in particular, suggests con-
temporary parallels. Russia’s relations with the West and the East as they
are depicted in the series are based on opposed logics. The countries
beyond its western border – in particular Lithuania, Sweden and Ger-
many – are seen as enemies who are seeking to expand their inﬂuence
eastward (cf. the eastward expansion of NATO). The countries to the east,
on the contrary, are perceived not as enemies but as targets for Russia’s
own expansionary policy. In addition, there is a measure of diﬀerentiation
with regard to the group of Western states, as becomes clear when Ivan’s
court is visited by foreign envoys dispatched by Queen Elizabeth of Eng-
land and, on another occasion, the Pope of Rome. The contrast in their
visits’ purposes, as well as in Ivan’s response to their requests, echoes the
polarised depiction of court envoys in Aleksandr: The Neva Battle (see
chapter 4). The English envoy seeks to establish trade relations, primarily
to obtain the natural resources needed for the construction of a naval ﬂeet,
a proposal the tsar gladly endorses. Yet, as the troubled journey of the
delegation to Moscow conﬁrms, there are political obstacles to overcome:
since the Swedes and ‘Germans’ obstructed naval passage across the Baltic
Sea, the delegation was forced to take the hazardous northern route, and
two of its vessels were lost (an echo of Eisenstein’s Ivan). As the envoy
points out, they share interests and enemies, as England aspires to expand
to the east and Russia to the west. Under the pretext of trade relations,
Ivan thus forms a strategic alliance in support of his eﬀort to gain access
to the Baltic Sea. The strategic pragmatism of the arrangement resembles
Aleksandr Nevksii’s negotiations with Tatar delegates.
The envoy from Rome, to the contrary, is portrayed as deceitful. While
ostensibly oﬀering assistance in Ivan’s military pursuits, his true aim is to
convert the Russian people. Ivan is not deceived, however, and refuses to
abandon the religion of his ancestors. In a telling confrontation, the envoy
argues that while Russia strives to be part of Europe, it will never be treated
as an equal because its people live ‘in barbarity’. Enraged, Ivan counters the
accusation by pointing out that it is the Catholics who engage in barbaric acts
and seek to (violently) subject the whole of Europe to their control. In a
similar vein, Aleksandr Nevskii cited violence and expansionism to express
the (moral) superiority of Orthodoxy over Roman Catholicism. The two
Western envoys represent opposing foundations for Russo-European relations
in the twenty-ﬁrst century. The ﬁrst is a type of pragmatic relationship, in
which Russia is treated as an equal partner. This is the scheme that the
Kremlin would like to see realised. The second envoy, in contrast, epitomises
the attitude that the regime accuses the West of adopting in its stead and that
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the Kremlin perceives as threatening: a Europe that imposes its belief system
on Russia and refuses to accept the country as its equal.
Television critic Sergei Tsyrkun correctly points out that the series is a
radical departure from previous cinematic interpretations in how it represents
Ivan’s character: neither conﬁdent nor mad, Eshpai’s Ivan is ﬁrst and fore-
most tormented by doubt and self-questioning. In Tsyrkun’s reading, this
doubt originates from the tsar’s frustrated desire to change Russian society:
You get the impression that it is not the belief in his own strength, but the
feeling of powerlessness in relation to the cycle of life surrounding him
that evokes some kind of panicked aggression in the tsar. […] We are not
used to seeing Ivan this way. The Terrible Tsar is usually depicted as
sublime (velichestvennym) and self-conﬁdent, as Nikolai Cherkasov
played him [in Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible, M.W.]. However, in reality,
there were other sides to him as well. […] The authors of the ﬁlm suc-
ceeded in laying bare the human qualities of Ivan the Terrible by turning
him into a conversation partner for the viewer. In one of the scenes he
suddenly asks his ﬁancée Anastasiia: ‘Do you pity me?’ This question
appears to be directed to the viewer.
(Tsyrkun 2009)
The dependence on guidance from his entourage noted earlier is clearly linked
to the fear and uncertainty Tsyrkun highlights in his review. As a result, the
TV series chips away at the Stalinist image of Ivan, while simultaneously
adopting a somewhat apologetic stance with regard to the excessive violence
he inﬂicted. In this respect, it is important to remind the reader that this
position echoes the government’s positive reappraisal of the legacy of Stalin
during the period when the series was produced (see Introduction). At the
same time, however, by showing the excesses to which autocratic rule can
lead, the series also makes an (admittedly modest) argument against the
concentration of power and its far-reaching consequences. As we will see, the
ﬁlm Tsar, released the same year, introduces yet another reinterpretation of
Ivan’s personality and motives by focusing on Ivan’s eschatological beliefs
that, in a way, express the same innate fear highlighted by the TV series.
Unlike the series, however, the latter production clearly formulates a
political critique.
According to TNS Gallup Media, Ivan the Terrible was the third most
popular TV series in Russia during its ﬁrst week. Some 19.5 per cent of the
total viewing audience tuned in to the episode broadcast on 13 May (‘Tele-
reitingi’ 2009a). The ﬁnal episodes attracted a markedly lower number of
viewers: an absolute drop from 6.9 to 5.6 per cent of the sample group,
representing 16.7 per cent of the total number of viewers during primetime on
21 May (‘Telereitingi’ 2009b).15 Online viewer comments on the websites
Kinopoisk, Ruskino, Kino-teatr and Imkhonet show a mixed audience
response. Some commenters greatly appreciated the series. For example,
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‘Diadia Patrik’ remarks, ‘Great series. The few historical mistakes do not
harm it at all’ (Diadia Patrik 2010). Another commenter concludes, ‘Here you
have everything in one…Classic Russian historical cinema! It has it all: and
drama, and beauty and love…Wonderful!’ (akini 2009).
The review of comments reveals that many viewers approached the series as
a ﬁlm about history and therefore set out to assess whether or not it depicts
Ivan ‘correctly’, rather than as an exploration of character – the more likely
intention of the series. For example:
The ﬁlmmakers [kinoshniki] made a heinous lampoon about Russian his-
tory. Their Ivan is a hysterical alcoholic, whose intellectual level corre-
sponds to the average goat butcher [drunk] on beer and vodka. But the
real Ivan was a poet and composer, he had a wonderful library, and
generally he was a wise ruler who expanded the borders of Russia further
than any other. […] All accusations from the side of the westerniser
Karamzin and his less articulate followers are founded on the letters of
traitor Kurbskii and other resentful persons. And that is like writing the
history of the Patriotic War on the basis of the books by [Viktor] Rezun-
Suvorov [Russian historical revisionist writer, M.W.], ignoring other
available sources.
(Gost’_Vladimir Panteleev 2009)
The author of the comment continues by placing the TV series in the context
of a continuing anti-Russian smear campaign orchestrated by the West.
All nations constantly emphasise their historical achievements, albeit out
of a feeling of self-conservation, but only our socialist traitors, led by the
West that is deadly afraid of us, not only pull out the most problematic
episodes in our history, but even cover them generously with their unso-
phisticated speculations and outright lies. It is understandable, when
various pugs in the Baltics, Georgia and so on do such things, but
when an openly anti-Russian ﬁlm is shown on channel ‘Rossiia’ it is
bitter and oﬀensive.
(Gost’_Vladimir Panteleev 2009)
The revisiting of darker periods in Russian history and the humanisation of
Ivan are thus seen to be aspects of an ‘anti-Russian’ act driven by the West.
What is particularly relevant with regard to my analysis is that commenters
indicate various parallels between the TV series and other historical events, as
well as with older cultural productions. For instance, one commenter was
simultaneously reminded of multiple phases in the development of Soviet
cinema.
The actor who plays Vasilii, the father of Ivan, looks very much like a
secretary of the partkom [Party Committee, M.W.] or the director of a
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kolkhoz in Soviet ﬁlms of the likes of ‘The Eternal Call’ [1973–1983 TV
series, M.W.]. And the actor who languidly plays Ivan as an adult looks
like [Igor] Tal’kov [Soviet singer, M.W.] … . His hair and beard are cut in
a contemporary style and he does not look like Tsar Ivan but like some
boy-majeure [son of well-to-do parents, M.W.] in an ’80s ﬁlm, spoiled by
his wealthy parents.
(Frigiriﬁco 2009)
Particularly noteworthy is the following remark: ‘The duet between Mal-
iuta and the tsar smacks of the duet between Beriia and Stalin’, referring to
the balance of power between the Soviet leader and the head of the NKVD
(vitalyklichko 2009). The comment is unsurprising given the longstanding
tradition of conﬂating Ivan and Stalin, which I noted earlier. Yet it would be
problematic, of course, if the authors really intended Ivan and Maliuta to be
read as an allusion to Stalin and Beriia. It would mean that, in parallel with
the series’ depiction of Ivan and Maliuta, a similar shift of responsibility for
the systemic violence from ‘tsar’ to ‘executioner’ would apply to Stalin. If the
suggested parallel holds, Stalin would have to be seen as being duped by the
web of misinformation created by Beriia. While some viewers may have also
read parallels with Putin’s Russia in the depiction of Ivan, the picture that
emerges is complex and not necessarily positive: while certain acts of repression
are excused by placing the blame on Ivan’s entourage and, in particular, Maliuta,
the personality of the tsar as it is depicted in the series is quite the opposite of
the image that has been cultivated of Putin as head of state. Therefore, as a
(pro-Kremlin) political statement, the series is ambiguous at best.
To conclude, two matters deserve mention. First, the suggestion that
Dostal’ was already working on the project in 2006 gives us an important clue
about the initial incentive for the TV series. It would mean that the produc-
tion was conceived in the wake of the ﬁrst peak of oprichnina discourse
(associated with, in particular, Dugin) and within the context of policy chan-
ges instituted in response to the colour revolutions. This is also around the
time that Sorokin published his anti-utopian novel Day of the Oprichnik.
Second, when viewed in light of the year in which it was eventually broadcast,
the TV series largely echoes the core elements of oﬃcial memory politics at that
time, as well as the regime’s foreign policy objectives. Still, as the online discus-
sions about the TV series demonstrate, the memory of Ivan does not easily lend
itself to political mobilisation, even if the state had intended it to. The sheer
divergence of opinions and interpretations, and the varying viewing strategies
they reveal, testify to both the complexity of the memory and the lasting impact
of previously mediated images on the appreciation of later representations.
Tsar (2009)
That same year, on 4 November, Pavel Lungin’s feature ﬁlm Tsar (2009) had
its Russian premiere. The ﬁlm competed in the Un Certain Regard section of
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the Cannes Film Festival in 2009 and was generally well received inter-
nationally. In 2010, it was awarded two Nika awards16 for ‘Best male role’
(Oleg Iankovskii) and ‘Best art direction’ (Sergei Ivanov), and was nominated
in two more categories, including ‘Best ﬁlm’. Unlike the TV series, the ﬁlm
concentrates on a particular episode during Ivan’s rule: the period when
Filipp served as metropolitan of Moscow and deﬁantly criticised the tsar’s
violent repressions via the oprichnina. The moral and, by extension, political
confrontation between Ivan and Filipp stands at the heart of the narrative. By
isolating the conﬂict with Filipp, the director takes the notion of ‘multiple
Ivans’ out of the equation; because the evil he exposes is not counterbalanced
by earlier successes or stints of nobler behaviour, it has to be taken at face
value. To Lungin, Ivan symbolises the recurrence of state-sponsored violence,
as well as the ‘somewhat masochistic love’ that dictators such as Ivan and
Stalin continue to receive in Russia (Shigareva 2008).
In general, [Ivan the] Terrible is one of the key themes to our country
because precisely he changed the entire history of Russia. His ghost
looms over us to this day; sometimes drawing closer, at other times
receding. Currently it is receding, thank God. But there were times, when
it ﬂew up very close. Ivan the Terrible is Russia’s eternal temptation.
(Shigareva 2008)
Lungin’s perception that the ghost of Ivan is receding is highly signiﬁcant
for the evaluation of the ﬁlm’s political intention.
Lungin’s depiction of Ivan, who is played by the actor and singer Petr
Mamonov, sparked harsh criticism from various groups in society. As the
reviewer for Novaia gazeta noted:
Not just the Orthodox and deputies are arguing about the ﬁlm, which
touches upon the metaphysical layers of national history, but also serious
scientists, philosophers, clergymen. The main stumbling block is the
representation of Ivan Vasil’evich. In the ﬁlm, the tsar is compared with
the Antichrist, with a Caesar breaking faith, [or] even a vampire: he is
frightening, with a single tooth glistening, falling from the ecstasy of
prayer into the ecstasy of murder.
(Maliukova 2010)
Lungin indeed presents a terrifying image of a tsar driven by apocalyptic
religious beliefs and paranoia (though the description ‘vampire’ does perhaps
not do justice to the complexity and depth of Mamonov’s performance).
Metropolitan Filipp, played by Oleg Iankovskii, one of Russia’s most famous
actors, who passed away shortly before the premiere, functions as his negative
image; he grasps reality, is composed, acquiescent and morally superior. In a
way, the ﬁlm is as much about (Saint) Filipp as it is about Ivan, which is
conﬁrmed by the fact that Iankovskii sought the blessing of Patriarch Aleksii
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II for playing the role. By depicting Filipp’s martyrdom, the ﬁlm acts almost
as a twenty-ﬁrst-century hagiography. Filipp’s composure and actions are
saintly in every way: he is unyielding in his moral beliefs, unfazed by direct
confrontations with evil that threaten his life. He even performs a miracle
shortly before he gets killed. Filipp’s ability to act without political intent is
thus markedly diﬀerent from the at times pragmatic ways in which the ROC
has deﬁned its relation to the state in post-Soviet Russia (see chapter 4).
Despite the pervasive Orthodox overtones and the ROC’s oﬃcial support,
the production was ﬁercely contested in certain Orthodox circles, as will be
discussed later in greater detail.
The confrontation between tsar and metropolitan plays out against the
backdrop of relations triangulated among ruler, entourage (boyars, oprichniki,
clergy) and the people. The ﬁlm thereby engages with three current political
matters of great signiﬁcance: ﬁrst, the increasingly close relations between the
state and the ROC; second, the struggle between the president and the oli-
garchs; and ﬁnally, the concentration of power in the ﬁgure of Vladimir Putin
and the question of popular support. The ﬁlm can be seen as a critique on all
three counts. With regard to the latter issue, the subjugation of citizens and
their dependence on the ruler’s guidance is epitomised in a scene that makes a
direct reference to Eistenstein’s Ivan the Terrible. The scene is set shortly
before the tsar summons Filipp to his court to replace the previous candidate
for the metropolitan throne, whom he rejected for his criticism of the oprich-
nina. Ivan publicly laments that there is no metropolitan in Moscow and is
joined by his subjects in a long procession. As the tsar is pulled across the
snow on a carpet, the people form a winding line behind him. The image
Lungin creates is reminiscent of the procession gathering at Aleksandrovskaia
Sloboda to beg for the tsar’s return in Eisenstein’s classic depiction of sub-
jection to the monarch. The visual quotation reinforces the contradictory
message. As Kevin Platt vividly asserts: ‘[W]hile the original shows the
common people longing to submit to the order of their tsar […] Lungin’s
remake shows the Russian people being swept along with Ivan in his foam-at-
the-mouth madness’ (Platt 2010). When read as a critique of current political
issues, the recasting of the relation between ruler and subjects, as one based
not on a ‘social contract’ but rather on the exploitation of dependency and
emotion, would directly challenge the Putin myth (see chapter 5).
As was the case in the TV series, Ivan is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by his
entourage. The dynamic between the tsar and his closest group of oprichniki
at times resembles that of a gang of young men, here dressed in black and
dark blue with their hoods pulled down, provoking one another to make the
next move in their tyrannical game of violence. Filipp tries his best to coun-
teract this spiral of violence but Ivan is past redemption. As the struggle
between ruler and metropolitan unfolds, it becomes increasingly clear that
Ivan has lost all moral sense. Reinforced in his paranoia by Maliuta, he is
unable to objectively reﬂect on his actions. Lungin allows for a hint of tra-
gedy, as Ivan appears to be yearning for guidance but, when given counsel, is
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unable to accept it. The tsar masks his overruling of Filipp’s advice by quoting
the scriptures and in other ways undermining the position of the metropolitan
as a moral authority. Here we can see a clear reﬂection of the one-sided prag-
matism with which the Russian government has long approached its relations
with the ROC, seeking closer ties as far as it has suited its domestic and foreign
policy ends (see chapter 4). As tsar, Ivan maintains, he is accountable to God
alone, not to His worldly servant. He furthermore diﬀerentiates between how
he should be judged as a man and as ruler. The condition of exceptionality
Ivan creates for himself refutes the moral restrictions on his behaviour sug-
gested by Filipp. More generally, his perception of the world around him is
selective and made to ﬁt his preconceptions. Ivan thus creates his own truth,
particularly with regard to the tortures and murders committed by the oprich-
niki. For example, whenever the tsar benevolently grants mercy to a suspect,
Maliuta and his squad execute the order not by returning him to freedom but
by killing him. And as Ivan acts upon confessions obtained ‘without torture’,
these have, in reality, been extracted through violent intimidation. Ivan’s pre-
tence of ignorance concerning (the excesses of) the rampage led by Maliuta is
shown to be a self-induced delusion.
Whereas in the TV series Ivan was ﬁrmly in control of the political game,
albeit growing increasingly volatile and paranoid, in Tsar he often appears to
have completely disconnected from reality. Withdrawn into his mind and
absorbed in his obsessive mental ramblings, Ivan is seemingly unaware of
what goes on around him. In one of the scenes, he sits outside in the court-
yard. As he reads out loud from the scriptures, people are being chased and
assaulted around him. Immersed in his reading, Ivan is seemingly unaware of
the ongoing brutalities. Filipp enters the courtyard and is appalled by what he
sees; here, he acts as witness to the systematic cruelty that Ivan is no longer
able or willing to take note of. At times, Ivan even appears to be hallucinat-
ing. After granting mercy to one of his boyars (who was granted freedom via
death), the tsar wakes up in the middle of the night and starts talking to
himself, acting out both sides of a conversation with his victim. The night-
mare of guilt is a clear indication that, in reality, Ivan is well aware of how
Maliuta executes an order of purported benevolence.
I agree with Kevin Platt that the ﬁlm’s political message is both self-evident
and contradictory. On the one hand it ‘debate[s] the relationship between
subjects and state and the legacy of despotic authoritarian politics in Russia
today’ and should be regarded as ‘a manifesto on contemporary society and
politics’ (Platt 2010). At ﬁrst glance, the unforgiving depiction of Ivan ‘would
appear to unite it with other anti-tyrannical representations of Ivan and
Stalin, such as Sorokin’s Day in the Life of an Oprichnik, which warn against
a possible resurgence of tyranny’ (ibid.). While the ﬁlm unmistakably warns
against the concentration of power in the hands of a single individual, Lun-
gin’s remark about the receding ghost of Ivan’s tyranny, quoted earlier, sug-
gests that his criticism of the regime was less pronounced than, for instance,
Sorokin’s (or that Lungin was optimistic about the changes brought about by
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the presidency of Medvedev). At the same time, however, as Platt points
out, Lungin’s ‘critique is also aimed at the anarchy, amorality and spiritual
emptiness of the present’:
In this latter aspect, it participates in the current backlash against the
excesses and anarchy of the 1990s and resonates with the longing for
traditional patriotic values and order that dominates much political
rhetoric in Russia these days – tendencies that have supported the con-
solidation of power in Putin’s ‘sovereign democracy’.
(Platt 2010)
Lungin has indeed noted that the resemblance between contemporary Russia
and the latter stages of Ivan’s rule lies in how the lack of a sense of purpose
(smysl) has brought society to a breaking point:
On the basis of some complicated calculations, the year 1566 somehow
rhymed with the number of the Devil, 666, to them [Russian society at
that time, M.W.]. And the whole country was ﬁrmly convinced their ﬁnal
days were approaching. And, in a strange way, this feeling of the end of
the world, of Doomsday, the feeling that, in expectation of the Last Judge-
ment all is permitted, is very familiar to us. Evidently, today, just like almost
ﬁve centuries ago, we are once again reaching a low point. And after this we
will start to ascend; towards a life, full of some kind of meaning.
(Shigareva 2008)
The ﬁlm thus simultaneously challenges and reiterates the central tenets of the
regime’s political discourse; it acknowledges that Russian society is in need of
a cure, but disapproves of the treatment it has been given.
As mentioned earlier, the ﬁlm elicited harsh responses. The journalist and
historian Viacheslav Maniagin, who has published extensively on Ivan the
Terrible’s reign, even addressed an open letter to President Medvedev
demanding that the ﬁlm be taken out of cinemas. He argued that it maligned
the founder of the Russian state and falsiﬁed history.17 The choice of
words here is hardly coincidental since a copy of the letter was also sent to
the Commission against the Falsiﬁcation of History. According to Mania-
gin, allowing the ‘false’ depiction of Ivan the Terrible to circulate freely
would be not just undesirable but harmful to Russia and especially to her
image abroad:
But if you believe that the founder of our state was such a tyrant, then it
is also possible to believe that contemporary Russia, as they say in the
West, is a stronghold of totalitarianism, tyranny, an antidemocratic,




Maniagin is not the only public ﬁgure to take oﬀence at the ﬁlm. In an open
letter published in Izvestiia on 13 January 2010, Boiko-Velikii, who was
already introduced above, accused Lungin of falsifying history and commit-
ting blasphemy. In the letter, he enumerates each point where, he claims, the
storyline of the ﬁlm is not supported by historical evidence. For instance, he
argues that the depiction both of Ivan’s character and of the oprichnina itself
is faulty and deceptive:
The oprichniki did not drench the country in blood. The oprichnina was
aimed at eradicating boyar treason and the Heresy of the Judaizers
and concerned only individual boyar families, part of the clergy that had
lapsed into heresy and those representatives of the capital, Tver and
Novgorod ‘elites’ who were willing to cooperate with catholic Rome. The
Russian people preserved the memory of Tsar Ivan as a just Tsar in their
chronicles, songs and byliny.
(Boiko-Velikii 2010)
In the opinion of Boiko-Velikii, the oﬀence committed by Lungin through his
interpretation of the events at Ivan’s court is exceptionally grave – even graver,
he claims, than the betrayal by Prince Andrei Kurbskii:
Tsar Ivan Vasil’evich Groznii was already slandered during his lifetime:
by the traitor and deserter Andrei Kurbskii and many others, and after
his life a ﬂood of defamations descended upon him. But Pavel Lungin,
Aleksei Ivanov, Petr Mamonov and others who were involved in the
scenario and creation of this ﬁlm have exceeded, in our opinion, all
slanderers and villains that have accumulated over the course of ﬁve
centuries.
(Ibid.)
Boiko’s strong response exempliﬁes how Ivan’s contemporary proponents
counter any form of critical assessment of his legacy by labelling it an anti-
patriotic act (a type of rhetoric that has become problematically pervasive
during Putin’s third presidential term).
Some weeks later there was an incident at the award ceremony for ‘Person
of the Year 2009’, organised by information agency RBK, where Lungin
received an award for his contribution to the development of Russian cinema.
Boiko-Velikii, who was also among the awardees for his contribution to
developing a tradition of Orthodox maecenatism, seized the opportunity to
criticise Lungin’s ﬁlm in his acceptance speech. According to a reporter for
Nezavisimaia gazeta, Boiko urged contemporary sponsors of culture to
reconsider the types of projects they were investing in, stating that ‘Lungin is
a good director, but Tsar is an awful and unreliable ﬁlm’ (Volchkova 2010).
For one of the actors, the criticism had personal consequences. Ivan Okhlo-
bystin, a popular actor and (since 2001) Orthodox priest who played the role
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of court jester Vassian, asked Patriarch Kirill to release him from his priestly
vows in response to the critique the ﬁlm and he himself had received. He felt
he could no longer credibly combine both aspects of his life (‘Otets Ioann
Okhlobystin khochet ostavit’ sluzhenie sviashchennika’ 2009).
Nikolai Uskov, a medieval historian and (then) the editor-in-chief of the
Russian journal GQ, commented on the ﬂood of criticism in an opinion piece
for Nezavisimaia gazeta. In a highly critical piece, he challenges the ‘self-pro-
claimed patriots’ who were attacking Lungin by arguing that ‘[Ivan], of
course, was white and ﬂuﬀy, murdered very few people and did so solely for
the sake of the greatness of Russia’ (Uskov 2009). Uskov argues that no
‘thinking person’ would voluntarily support the state-centred, destructive type
of patriotism espoused by these individuals. In fact, the admiration for ﬁgures
such as Ivan the Terrible, he claims, is indicative of fundamental issues that
continue to hamper the development of Russia into a modern society. To do
credit to Uskov’s argument, I quote him here at length. The position that
Uskov sketches in the ﬁrst few lines corresponds to the core message of the
state’s memory politics and its supporters.
Ancient people said: ‘Our motherland is there, where life is good.’ Our
patriot has begotten something paradoxical: ‘Our motherland is there,
where life is bad.’ From his point of view, the worse, like in the times of
Ivan the Terrible or Stalin, the better. The thinking individuals […]
induce panic, they say Russia can disappear, that domestic and foreign
enemies will rip her apart, will tear her into pieces. To prevent this, all of
us have to stand with our pants pulled down as well. I always wanted to
object to these thinking individuals. Perhaps, just let that kind of country
[takaia strana] disappear. Perhaps, after centuries of forcing the people to
stand with their pants pulled down and contriving all sorts of theories
about the sublime mission of extraordinary ghouls [vydaiushchikhsia
upyrei] it has been enough. Because I believe that no one is threatening
Russia; who needs our problems, except for us? In these times, we have to
remember one thing: that, in your motherland, life has to be good. In the
globalised world, countries compete with each other for human capital,
for the most highly educated, energetic, creative people. The individual
does not exist for the government but the government exist for the indi-
vidual – that is the foundational principle of modern society. Otherwise,
the little men [liudishki], as Ivan Vasil’evich would put it, will run away.
Of course, in such a system it will be considerably harder for thinking
individuals to pass their own interests oﬀ as mystical ones and, generally,
will have to work and not just nag. But, gentleman, that is exactly why
you are thinking individuals.
(Uskov 2009)
Uskov’s appeal to ‘thinking people’ to break the repetitive cycles char-
acterised by the repressive submission of the Russian people to the needs of
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the state appeared at a time when memory politics activity was peaking in
Russia. Indeed, his plea should be read as a direct response to and critique of
its core elements. The heated debates surrounding the ﬁlm expose mounting
tensions regarding the state’s patriotic rhetoric, in particular among the cul-
tural elite. While the increasing reliance on patriotism and the historical jus-
tiﬁcation of politics was criticised by some as being merely a façade to
legitimise an authoritarian system of governance – the opinion expressed by
Uskov – for others such as Boiko-Velikii, the regime, on the contrary,
remained insuﬃciently conservative and traditionalist.
The Trial of Time (2010)
The sharp polarisation of opinions about Ivan’s legacy and how these stand-
points are assumed to reﬂect one’s political orientation are most evident in the
ﬁnal example I want to discuss. The talk show The Trial of Time (Sud vre-
meni) aired in the second half of 2010 on Channel Five, which at the time was
a TV channel with a distinctly liberal orientation. Mimicking the format of a
court of law, the show put historical personalities and events on trial. The
political relevance of the historical questions under discussion was heightened
by the evident political leanings of the show’s hosts – the well-known televi-
sion journalist and historian Nikolai Svanidze in the role of judge, and jour-
nalist Leonid Mlechin and political ﬁgure and theatre director Sergei
Kurginian as prosecutor and defence attorney. What is particularly insightful
about this case is that a telling discrepancy soon became apparent between
the results of the studio-audience vote – siding with the liberally inclined
Mlechin – and the opinion of viewers at home as expressed through online
and telephone voting – supporting the ‘pro-Soviet’ conservative views of
Kurginian. Whereas typically the discussions about history are the object of
societal commentary, here it was the voting dynamics that triggered debate.
So much so, in fact, that the producers felt compelled to dedicate a special
broadcast to the issue. As will be discussed in the next chapter, dedicated in its
entirety to the show’s revealing production history, this broadcast, which was
appropriately named ‘The Trial of The Trial’ (Sud nad Sudom), set out to
discuss the ‘incorrect’ (i.e. anti-liberal) voting of the home audience and how
it should be interpreted. Why was the audience of a liberal TV channel not
siding with the liberal standpoint represented by Mlechin?
The talk show was cancelled after only a few months, despite its popularity
and evident societal resonance. In part this was the direct result of a man-
agerial takeover and rebranding of the channel (I demonstrate how Channel
Five was thus ‘brought in line’ with state interests in chapter 7). But in a
surprise turn of events, the show made a comeback on state-owned Channel
One. I will return to ‘The Trial of The Trial’ special broadcast and the show’s
cancellation and reappearance in the next chapter since it shows the politics
of television programming at work. Also, The Trial of Time is a rare case
where it is actually possible to directly trace the interaction between the levels
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in memory politics, namely those of the state, political and cultural elites,
media and audiences. Within the context of the current chapter, however, my
discussion of the programme limits itself to the three-part episode about Ivan
the Terrible.
To fully appreciate the signiﬁcance of the show and its discussions, it is
important to point out that Kurginian has since used the popularity of The
Trial of Time as a springboard to create his own political platform. After the
show was cancelled, he launched a series of online video lectures on history
(in particular, the collapse of the Soviet Union) and associated political mat-
ters under the name ‘The Essence of Time’ (Sut’ vremeni). In Russian, the
diﬀerence in name is but one letter and the two words (sud vs. sut’) sound very
similar. The online community that formed around the lectures soon devel-
oped into an oﬄine social movement under the same name, complete with
weekly newspaper and regular participation in rallies. In 2012, Kurginian
published the book The Essence of Time: The Philosophical Rationale of
Russian Messianic Pretences in the 21th Century, which outlines the founda-
tions for the movement’s political agenda. He is one of the driving forces
behind contemporary Russian messianism, which has increasingly inﬂuenced
the state’s political discourse. The Trial of Time, as well as its successor that
will be discussed in the next chapter, proved to be a suitable platform for one
of the ‘godfathers of post-Soviet conservatism’ to mediate his views on
Russia – past and present – and rally support for his view of Russia’s future,
which Maria Engström has summarised as ‘The Soviet Union 2.0’. (Engström
2014: 359).
Ivan the Terrible
As already noted, the debate about Ivan the Terrible on The Trial of Time
illustrates the polarisation of views on his legacy in contemporary Russia.
Pitching liberal against conservative understandings of his rule, the show
revolves around the question of the permissibility of repression and state
violence under exceptional circumstances. The confrontation between Kurgi-
nian and Mlechin reﬂects a fundamental diﬀerence between state-aligned and
oppositional memory politics. As I indicated brieﬂy in the introductory
chapter, state-aligned forces tend towards the opinion that certain restrictive
measures are necessary to safeguard stability and stave oﬀ revolution. Those
holding oppositional views, to the contrary, turn this black-and-white oppo-
sition between order and chaos inside out and recast such enforced, top-down
stability as repression. The debate thereby points towards a fundamental
point of contention between liberal and conservative views on the role of the
Russian state. Here it has to be stressed, however, that Kurginian’s position is
signiﬁcantly more extreme than that of the central government at the time.
In the programme, in response to the central question ‘Ivan IV: bloody
tyrant or successful political actor?’, three main issues emerge as the debate
develops. The ﬁrst two reﬂect key aspects of the memory politics debate:
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whether modernisation must go hand in hand with authoritarianism and to
what extent violence can be justiﬁed by exceptional circumstances. Regarding
the issue of modernisation, the question is posed whether is it possible to
carry out substantial reforms without increasing state control and enacting
(excessive) violence. Kurginian argues that this is, indeed, an unavoidable fact
of historical political development. Mlechin, on the contrary, asserts that this
is only partly the case. To carry out fundamental reforms, a certain measure
of authoritarianism may indeed be required; yet, he argues, one has to take
into consideration the cost exacted by such progress. In particular, Mlechin
feels that certain excrescences of authoritarian rule, such as waging war
against one’s one people, are unnecessary and can harm state interests. Such
unwarranted acts of violence should therefore be condemned rather than
condoned or rationalised. His argument clearly refers to contemporary attitudes
towards Stalin as well as Ivan.
The second dominant issue concerns the historical contextualisation of
Ivan’s rule and, in particular, how his actions compare to those of other,
equally bloody medieval rulers. Was Ivan an exceptionally violent ruler, or
was he simply a product of his time? For example, after enumerating the
number of victims of sixteenth-century state repression in England and
France, Kurginian concludes that Ivan acted in accord with the norms of the
era; therefore, any claims about extreme cruelty are ﬁctitious ‘fantasy’ (fen-
tezi). His line of argument mirrors how Il’ia Glazunov chose to defend Ivan
on The Name Is Russia (see chapter 4). Moreover, he argues that the oprich-
nina (and, by extension, all acts of cruelty associated with Ivan’s reign) should
be viewed as an historical anomaly. Displaying a clear disregard for the
crimes committed by the Soviet state, Kurginian maintains that the oprichnina
was a unique deviation from the ‘special Russian path, which is particularly
peaceful, particularly humanistic, [and] in which atrocities never occurred’.
Mlechin does not go along with the reductionism of the proposed logic. In
the discussion of tyranny, the inevitable comparison between Ivan and Stalin
is eventually raised. For instance, the ﬁlm director Pavel Lungin, who is called
as a witness by Mlechin because of his work on Tsar, comments: ‘We can talk
about tyrants. We can talk about Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin. But no one
asserts that Iosif Vissarionovich went into some cellar and personally took
part in tortures. [But] he [Ivan the Terrible, M.W.] personally performed tor-
tures.’ The comparison between Ivan and Stalin is not explored in detail,
however, and appears to be purposefully circumvented by both Mlechin and
Kurginian.
The ﬁnal issue that is repeatedly raised is the enduring question of whe-
ther Ivan suﬀered from mental illness. The debate revolves around the
argument, introduced by Kurginian, that Ivan’s intellectual and artistic
talents would refute allegations of insanity (though he leaves open the pos-
sibility that Ivan was schizophrenic). Kurginian’s lyrical praise of Ivan’s
‘mastery of the word’ and ‘almost encyclopaedic’ knowledge evokes a stark
response from Svanidze:
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The talents of Ivan the Terrible are beyond doubt. […] But, you know, it
so happens that Hitler was a pretty good artist. Stalin wrote poetry. Mao
Zedong wrote poetry. Pol Pot studied at a French university. They were
all very bright, creative individuals.
That Ivan possessed exceptional intellectual and artistic capacities, therefore,
says little about his mental stability, nor does it prove ‘ethical adequacy’. In
Kurginian’s propagandistic style of reasoning, however, rhetorical eﬀect
takes precedence over logic. What is particularly alarming, then, is the home
audience’s unfaltering support for Kurginian’s position.
At several instances, the discussion goes beyond an analysis of the past and
the exploration of subtle historical parallels and evolves into a direct com-
mentary on present-day socio-political issues. For example, as he addresses
the question of waging war against one’s own people, Kurginian links the
topic directly to the danger posed by separatism and terrorism to the terri-
torial integrity of the Russian Federation today. Such ‘separatist hotbed[s]’, he
claims, typically end in the break-up of a state. To underscore his argument,
Kurginian evokes with evident exaggeration the traumatic experience of the
dissolution of the Soviet Union:
You have already seen this happen once, when the break-up of the Soviet
Union caused millions of deaths, about which simply no one speaks. You
already saw how these separatist tendencies ended in – of course not the
[actual] burning of people at the stake – but with chopping of heads with
blunt grub axes.
Here he refers to his personal experience when visiting the Central Asian
cities of Fergana in Uzbekistan and Osh in Kyrgyzstan. Yet, he warns, this
potential contagion could all too easily spread to Russia as well.
And you see that the Russian Federation crumbles as well. A place you
should ﬁght for as if it were the last stronghold. A place where you
understand that further disintegration will be ﬁnal. And [you understand]
that you simply give away your state and your civilians to the delight of
whichever terrorist gangs. You start to ﬁght a war. That is horrible. It is
tragic. It should not be gloriﬁed. But isn’t it a historical necessity?
His argument echoes the rhetorical opposition between stability and col-
lapse that forms the foundation of governmental memory politics, but ampliﬁes
it to the extreme.
Kurginian’s emotional appeal is one of several instances where past and
present are interlaced. Lungin even directly refers to the contemporary debate
that frames the oprichnina as a typically Russian way of modernisation that I
discussed earlier. He summarises the argument as follows: ‘Fortunately, we do
not have [Ivan] the Terrible [Groznogo], but we do have the oprichnina. It is a
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norm of life in Russia! This is our modernisation.’ Lungin disagrees, however.
‘Wrong!’ he says, ‘Russia is not that kind of country!’ Lungin’s ﬁnal verdict
about the tsar is emphatically negative: Ivan is ‘the author of the Time of
Troubles’.
Kurginian’s rhetorical methods deserve particular attention. In the debate
with Mlechin, as well as in his interaction with the experts invited as ‘wit-
nesses’, he habitually adopts a cynical stance. When the historian Igor’ Pav-
lovskii, a professor at the Moscow State University, points out that Russia
was in a state of ‘moral decline’ under Ivan the Terrible, Kurginian under-
mines Pavlovskii’s credibility by ridiculing the sources this claim is based on.
‘How can we quantitatively demonstrate the moral decline of the people in
this period? With focus groups? Sociological questionnaires? Neurolinguis-
tics?’ Kurginian asks. The enumeration of objective-sounding sociological
research methods, all of which are of course unavailable to the medieval his-
torian, has the desired eﬀect: the fact that Pavlovskii has based his estimation
on period memoirs now comes across as speculative and unreliable. On other
occasions, Kurginian takes the logic underlying the opposing party’s position
and pushes it to the extreme. For example, Mlechin criticises Ivan’s waging of
war against his own population, which was not, moreover, in the service of
direct state interests. He argues that Ivan’s implication in the resulting deaths
should, therefore, be viewed as a particular kind of serial killing, rather than
as the unfortunate but inescapable by-product of medieval state conduct.
Kurginian then connects the question of a war waged against one’s people to
the American Civil War. Should, then, the generals involved and the actions
taken to counter the secession of the Southern states also be denounced as
‘not humane’? It was, after all, ‘a civil war in the super democratic United
States’ (emphasis added). He ends such ‘logical’ arguments with a series of
rhetorical questions: ‘But exactly from this, contemporary America was born.
And now let’s ask ourselves the question. But what if it had not happened?
Then there would be no state. And what would have come in its place?’
The aim of such logical interventions is to suggest that the liberal position
is overly optimistic or even naïve about the recurrence and necessity of vio-
lence in historical development. Such accusations exacerbate the negative
image of liberalism in Russia resulting from the experiences with neoliberal
‘shock therapy’ reform during the 1990s. Here, Kurginian also accuses Mle-
chin of applying double standards and, consequently, of violating scientiﬁc
norms. Russia is judged harshly while similar violent episodes in other coun-
tries are glossed over, so he claims. While Kurginian’s appeal for adhering to
scientiﬁc standards ﬁnds little actual cause in Mlechin’s argumentation, the
accusation is no less rhetorically persuasive.
Both sides agree that, to reach a ﬁnal conclusion on Ivan’s rule and legacy,
the outcomes of his rule should be a principal factor. Their perceptions of the
outcomes are, however, radically opposed. To Mlechin, the two phases of
Ivan’s period of power represent two paths of development. The ﬁrst, the
‘establishment of a normal system of life’, merits emulation while the second,
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‘war against one’s own people’, has to be rejected. The end result of Ivan’s
rule, Mlechin concludes, was ‘monstrous for Russia’. For Kurginian, the
hackneyed cliché of territorial expansion is suﬃcient ground to judge the
outcomes positively. The tsar who ‘uniﬁed Siberia’, captured Kazan and
Astrakhan and ‘in fact, thereby established the state’ should necessarily be
considered successful. Kurginian refers to other historical leaders with com-
plex legacies to argue that their ‘plusses and minuses’ are a fact of history that
has to be accepted; acts of violence, he asserts, do not preclude political
greatness. In fact, it would be ‘absurd’ to characterise ‘he, who won the Battle
of Poltava and defeated Sweden’ (i.e. Peter the Great) and ‘he, who did some
other things [kotoryi sdelal chto-to eshche] and won the Great Patriotic War’
(i.e. Stalin) as tyrants.
I despise tyranny no less than those, who exclaim their hatred of it here!
And precisely to prevent tyranny we need our history in its entirety. We
need to return to our own history! To understand it and recognise that we
have a lot of great historical ﬁgures, great politicians. Outstanding [ﬁg-
ures] with their plusses and minuses. And as we understand and relive this
[history] we will ﬁnd our path! We will rise to our feet. We will no longer
be a country with a broken historical backbone.
The voting results are unsurprising. While the majority of the studio audi-
ence (73 per cent) believe Ivan the Terrible was a ‘bloody tyrant’, the over-
whelming majority of viewers (87 per cent) deem him a ‘successful political
actor’. In his concluding remarks, Svanidze comments on the positive appre-
ciation of Ivan in folk songs and tales, including those originating in Nov-
gorod where the repression was particularly merciless. ‘Nowadays,’ he
remarks, ‘this would be called Stockholm syndrome’, referring to the psy-
chological condition where a hostage develops sympathy for his captor.
Moreover, he adds in evident reference to contemporary debates regarding the
need for a strong hand in politics, it is a condition which periodically repeats
itself in Russia.
Conclusion
Around the time when the TV series and feature ﬁlm about Ivan were
released, various memes began to circulate online in which a photoshopped
version of Repin’s painting Ivan the Terrible and His Son Ivan shows the
Terrible Tsar ‘killing’ all kinds of persons and, in particular, other artworks.
In these memes, the distressed tsar pressing his son’s lifeless body against him
becomes a vampire-like ﬁgure, sucking the life out of whatever he gets his
hands on: from Ivan Kramskoi’s Portrait of an Unknown Woman to Kuzma
Petrov-Vodkin’s Bathing of the Red Horse and Vladimir Malevich’s Black
Square.18 More recently, the motif reappeared in the context of the conﬂict in
Ukraine. This time, it is the nation of Ukraine – depicted via the country’s
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outline in yellow and blue – that suﬀers the tsar’s wrath (JoyReactor 2014).
The meme illustrates the versatility and recognisability of the ﬁgure of Ivan,
as well as the complexity and extremely politicised nature of his memory.
While for some Ivan stands for the might and supremacy of the Russian state
(or, indeed, of Russia as a Eurasian empire), for others he symbolises the
atrocities committed by this very state and the extreme toll that Russian
imperial greatness has taken on its population throughout history. As this
chapter has shown, the meanings attributed to the oprichnina are contra-
dictory. What the groups and individuals who mobilise this particular cultural
memory have in common, however, is their highly critical stance towards the
political establishment. Taking various political, ideological and religious
beliefs as points of departure, they employ the memory of Ivan and his oprich-
nina to challenge or undermine the current regime and the political system in
which it operates. As a cultural memory with a particularly subversive potential,
the ﬁgure of Ivan allows itself to be exploited for divergent political agendas,
from re-establishing the Orthodox monarchy or creating a Soviet Union 2.0. to
demanding democratisation and respect for fundamental civil rights.
The complexity of the memory, which is the direct result of its remediation
history and the memory chain it invokes, makes it highly unstable. The con-
ﬂation of Ivan and Stalin further exacerbates this volatility. Whereas, in the
cases of the Time of Troubles and Aleksandr Nevskii the fact that the
memory of each had been mobilised as part of Stalinist propaganda had a
somewhat positive eﬀect on its employability in the interests of the regime, the
opposite is the case for Ivan. Why this is the case parallels in many ways the
state’s paradoxical attitude towards the memory of Stalin. To be able to ben-
eﬁt from the powerful patriotic symbolism of the victory in the Second World
War, governmental memory politics has attempted to separate Stalin, the
commander of the Red Army who secured victory in the war, from the Stalin
who orchestrated terror against his own population. While the memories of
the end of the Time of Troubles and Aleksandr Nevskii are related to the
positive former aspect of the memory of Stalin, it is to the second image of
tyranny that the memory of Ivan is inescapably bound. Therefore, as long as
the conﬂicting representations of Stalin remain unresolved, the memory of
Ivan will similarly continue to polarise audiences.
Notes
1 The absence of commemorative infrastructure altered dramatically in 2016 and
2017 when statues of Ivan the Terrible were erected in Moscow and Orel, see
chapter 8.
2 Namely, Eisenstein with the ﬁlm Aleksandr Nevskii and Aleksei Tolstoi with the
novel Peter I.
3 Novaia oprichnina, neooprichnina and new oprichnina are used interchangeably
from hereon.
4 I used the Integrum World Wide media database to quantitatively analyse the
number of times the relevant terms were mentioned in the central printed press
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(dataset ‘SMI: Tsentral’naia pressa’). The query was performed on 18 March 2016
for the intervals corresponding to the presidential terms (1: 31.12.1999–06.05.2004;
2: 07.05.2004–07.05.2008; 3: 08.05.2008–06.05.2012; 4: 07.05.2012–31.12.2012).
The query returned the following results in absolute numbers: ‘novaia oprichnina’:
respectively 4/11/15/4 mentions; ‘neooprichnina’: respectively 0/0/1/0 mentions. By
comparison, during Putin’s third presidential term (up to the date of query) the
terms were mentioned twelve times and twice, respectively. An initial survey of the
results using the query terms ‘oprichnina’ and ‘oprichnik’ revealed predominantly
historical, factual usage of the terms, which undermines their value as quantitative
indicators.
5 Dugin used the word ‘oprichnina’ before this date, in particular to describe certain
aspects of Bolshevik rule. Yet, these examples do not imply the creation of a ‘new
oprichnina’, nor do they amount to a mobilising usage of the word. See, for
example, Dugin (1998).
6 Dugin switches from ‘novaia’ to ‘neo-’ at this point.
7 In 2011, Mikhail Deliagin published a book titled The Path of Russia: The New
Oprichnina, or Why You Do not Have to ‘Get out of Russia’ (Put’ Rossii: Novaia
oprichnina, ili Pochemu ne nuzhno ‘valit’ iz Rashki’). Despite the direct reference to
the oprichnina in the title, the author appears to use the term mostly as a rheto-
rical ploy and its development as a political concept is superﬁcial compared to the
two (groups of) author(s) I discuss here.
8 Oprichnik was a restaurant serving ‘old Russian’ cuisine in a luxuriously decorated
space, complete with dog’s heads, brooms and other oprichina-themed decorations.
9 A recording of the action can be found on YouTube: www.youtube.com/watch?fea
ture=player_embedded&v=GfCTdH_AsyI (accessed 21 January 2018).
10 For a detailed analysis of the ‘ideology’ propagated by Shchedrin, see Dvorkina
(2004).
11 The lyrics are written by Gennadii Ponomarev, Bichevskaia’s husband.
12 I want to thank Birgitte Pristed for bringing Boiko-Velikii to my attention.
13 To avoid violating the law, the ‘dismissal’ would technically take the form of
declaring the position held by the employee redundant.
14 The bill to ‘counteract the insulting of religious convictions and feelings of believ-
ers’ was signed into law by President Putin on 29 June 2013.
15 TNS Gallup Media provides two markers of popularity: rating and share. Rating
refers to the percentage of participants of the survey who watched the programme.
Since the sample size is static, it is an absolute ﬁgure that can be used to compare
programmes broadcast at diﬀerent times. Share is the percentage adjusted for the
total number of viewers at time of broadcasting, which indicates the programme’s
relative popularity in relation to shows broadcast at the same time.
16 The Nika Award is Russia’s most important ﬁlm prize, awarded annually by the
Russian Academy of Cinema Arts and Science. Since 2002, the Russian Academy
of Cinematic Arts has hosted a competing awards ceremony – the Golden Eagle
Award – for cinema and television productions.
17 For an analysis of the historical and historiographical sources Lungin’s ﬁlm draws
upon, see Halperin (2013).
18 For a compilations of examples, see meme database JoyReactor (2010).
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7 The Trial of Time
The previous chapter introduced the talk show The Trial of Time and dis-
cussed the tensions between liberal and conservative views on Russian state-
hood revealed by the debate on Ivan the Terrible. In this ﬁnal chapter I take
the programme’s production history as my point of departure to examine
state interference in television programming about history. What conclusions
can be drawn about the developments within state television during the
second half of Medvedev’s presidency on the basis of the talk show’s cancel-
lation and its subsequent ‘upgrade’ to Channel One? The case is of particular
signiﬁcance to the overall aim of this study since it illustrates how media
outlets, in this case Channel Five, have been ‘brought into line’ with state
interests. In addition, the show is a rare case where the diﬀerent levels of
memory politics – those of the state, elites, media and the general public –
come together. I will ﬁrst provide some further information on the aims and
format of the show, before turning to a detailed analysis of the societal
debates the programme unleashed. I then continue with a discussion of the
show’s cancellation and subsequent reappearance and conclude by asking
what insights this case provides us into the politics of television programming
in Russia.
The Trial of Time premiered on Channel Five in the summer of 2010 as
one of several shows to debut during the oﬀ-season. It replaced the talk show
Freedom of Thought (Svoboda mysli), presented by Ksenia Sobchak, who
would go on to become one of the faces of the protest movement in the
winter of 2011/12 and later on, in 2017, announced to stand in the 2018 pre-
sidential elections. The Trial of Time was recorded in the same studio with
few or no changes to the set. Mimicking the format of a court of law, the
show put historical personalities and events on trial. As we have seen, history
is almost by deﬁnition perceived to be political in contemporary Russia. In
this particular case, the relevance of the historical questions under discussion
was heightened even further by the evident political dispositions of the show’s
hosts – Nikolai Svanidze in the role of judge and Leonid Mlechin and Sergei
Kurginian as prosecutor and defence attorney. While many oﬀ-season pro-
grammes fail to be renewed, The Trial of Time soon proved popular. In
addition, the societal divisions it appeared to uncover stirred heated
discussions: while Channel Five had a distinctly liberal proﬁle at the time, the
show’s viewers at home were voting in support of the conservative ‘pro-Soviet’
views of Kurginian, instead of those expressed by the liberally inclined Mle-
chin. At the same time, the members of the studio audience were voting
‘correctly’ – that is, they sided with Mlechin. According to Vera Tsvetkova,
writing for Nezavisimaia Gazeta, viewers and television critics alike found the
show’s ‘intellectual discussion’ to be emotionally captivating: ‘Some even
believe ‘The Trial of Time’ is more than just a show; in any case, this talk show
has become the television [event], and perhaps even the societal event of the
summer’ (Tsvetkova 2010). Sergei Muratov, in his annual review of Russian
television for Iskusstvo Kino, praised it as ‘the most poignant, controversial
and, in my opinion, one of the best shows of the decade’ (Muratov 2011).
The objectives of The Trial of Time reﬂect the image of Channel Five at the
time as a critical alternative to Channel One and other state-aligned channels.
According to producer Natal’ia Nikonova, the show’s principal aim was to
‘ﬁnd the truth’ and rid it of ‘mythological layers’ (Dykhovichnyi 2010). To
clarify the project’s objectives, Nikonova juxtaposes it with the 2008 project
The Name Is Russia that was discussed in chapter 4:
So if we diﬀerentiate it from the programme ‘The Name is Russia,’ [the
latter] was truly a grand project that singled out something primary for
Russians, something important. That is, it did not delve into details and
detailed elaboration was not important; what was important was to clar-
ify what is essential in the present, which person, which hero is important
for Russians. Our program is suﬃciently detailed and reconstructs in
detail the event that is important to the program and tries to reveal the
truth. I realise that it is a principally diﬀerent project; it is a completely
diﬀerent framework of analysis.
(Ibid.)
Vladimir Khamynia, the general director of National Media Group Televi-
sion (NMG), Channel Five’s majority shareholder, agreed that countering
existing ‘myths’ about Russian history should be one of the show’s main
objectives.
We turn to history in order to understand our contemporary self […] The
ﬁrst challenge is […] to peel away, if not to remove the outer shell of all
kinds of myths, stereotypes, clichés, [and] labels that have been attached
to this or that person in our history, to this or that event [or] this or that
decision during various periods of our lives. After all, even in my lifetime
[…] the appraisal of [various events in Russian history] changed multiple
times. I am not even talking about people who are older; they already
[encountered] several of such, so to say, opposite [poliarnykh] appraisals
of one and the same historical event.
(Ibid.)
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The show’s hosts were known to have outspoken political views, and the
assignment of opposing sides on the topic under discussion was directly rela-
ted to their political dispositions. As a result, the debates conﬂate past and
present in two respects. First, historical parallels are drawn out and the sub-
ject is often placed explicitly within the context of current aﬀairs. Then, these
pseudo-historical debates are organised along evidently political lines (liberal
vs. conservative) and, at times, revolve entirely around a discussion of the
present. The potential for the show to function as a platform for political and
not just historical discussion in this way was enhanced by its strategies for
viewer engagement. The participation of viewers through internet and tele-
phone voting, in addition to the (most likely carefully screened) studio audi-
ence, signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the show’s dynamics and societal resonance. The
voting results, without fail, demonstrated a clear-cut opposition between the
home and studio audiences. Consider, for example, the response to the ques-
tion of whether the Bolsheviks saved or destroyed Russia. The result of the
online vote was 88 per cent in favour of ‘saved’. In similar fashion, 72 per cent
of the telephone votes supported the positive appraisal of the Bolsheviks. Of
the studio audience, on the contrary, 71 per cent was of the opinion that the
Bolsheviks destroyed Russia.
The trial of The Trial of Time
To discuss the ‘incorrect’ (i.e. anti-liberal) voting of the home audience and
how it should be interpreted, a special broadcast was aired, appropriately
entitled the ‘Trial of The Trial’ (Sud nad Sudom). On 7 October 2010, the
special episode was broadcast in which the talk show judged itself rather than
Russian history. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this remarkable act of
self-reﬂection on television occurred in direct response to the uproar caused by
the talk show’s debates and, in particular, its voting practices. As occasional
host Nika Strizhak summarises in her introduction:
[t]he forum went out of its mind, the telephones went crazy, viewers
starting calling us, [and] critics started to scorch us. Some accused us of
enforcing liberal ideas, [while] others said we trampled liberal ideas. They
were even saying that we have somewhat incorrect viewers and that the
channel has the right to, you know, to cheat somewhat and to alter the
[results of the] voting somewhat.
(‘Stenogrammy suda vremeni’ n.d.)
The special broadcast aimed to examine these voting patterns, to explain
them and draw the necessary conclusions about how the programme should
continue. During the special broadcast, emotions ran high. According to
someone at the taping, some of the more heated clashes were even cut from
the ﬁnal edit (Larina 2011). What is particularly signiﬁcant for the overall
aim of this study is that the discussion touches on the social function of
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television and, in particular, of Channel Five as a liberally oriented channel;
on the importance of history in contemporary Russia and what the attitudes
towards the Soviet past say about the ‘success’ of post-Soviet democratisation
and liberalisation; and on the perceived divide between the ‘intelligentsia’ and
the general public. The explanations put forward by the invited guests and
experts underline why it is essential to take public opinion into account when
examining memory politics. Otherwise, it is not possible to assess the recep-
tion or impact of the political mobilisation of history. At the same time, the
discussion also demonstrates the inherent limitations in reliably assessing
popular sentiments. Can the voting results of The Trial of Time indeed be
interpreted as a valid representation of public opinion and, moreover, as a
direct reﬂection of its viewers’ political preferences?
According to one line of interpretation, the voting results prove that a gap
exists between the more liberally inclined metropolitan ‘elite’ – represented by
the studio audience – and ‘ordinary people’ – the viewers at home. Iurii
Poliakov, the editor-in-chief of Literaturnaia Gazeta, for instance, argues that
the studio audience consists for the most part of ‘representatives […] of the
Moscow intelligentsia or future Moscow intelligentsia, mostly oriented on
liberal values or closer to these values. And their views diﬀer greatly from the
views of Russia’. Here, a liberal political disposition is thus equated with anti-
Soviet views, while a positive appraisal of the Soviet era is thought to corre-
spond to a conservative political outlook. Daniil Dondurei, the late editor-in-
chief of Russian cinema journal Iskusstvo kino, further argues that the voting
results showcase how little actual change has occurred in people’s thinking
over the last two decades. He asserts that it shows that
[t]he reforms haven’t started yet. That the majority of the population does
not even live in the year 1991 but sometime considerably earlier. That in
our country the overwhelming majority does not accept the regime
described in the Constitution.
Assuming the same equation of an anti-Soviet stance on Russian history and
liberal political views, a connected argument sees the voting results as proof
that liberal-democratic thinking has failed to take hold in Russia. Yet, as
Ekho Moskvy radio commentator Vitalii Dymarskii remarks, a 25 per cent
share in support of the liberal ideal actually signals quite a signiﬁcant change:
‘And if this 25 per cent, these voters in favour of the liberal idea, would have
the opportunity to vote for this liberal idea not only on television, then it
would not even be that bad,’ he adds.
Others question whether it is correct to make such far-reaching assump-
tions on the basis of the voting results, and with good reason: lacking proper
systemic execution, the polls can hardly be regarded as a scientiﬁcally reliable
sociological indicator. Among other things, the ‘sample group’ is insuﬃciently
large to be representative of the population (in particular, the studio group)
and was not collected randomly. Also, the questions were suggestively phrased
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and one could vote multiple times. The experts in sociological research who
were present in the studio agree that there are some methodological reasons
to take issue with conclusions drawn from the process; the voting was simply
not intended to be a sociological survey. However, when the voting results are
compared to formal opinion polls on similar questions, the latter show ten-
dencies that clearly overlap with the home voting results. The main diﬀerence
is that the formal polls are somewhat less polarised because they include a
third option – ‘diﬃcult to say’.
After it has been established that the trend suggested by the voting results
conﬁrms certain sociological ﬁndings, a number of additional questions must
be raised. For instance, it is suggested that the voting results also point to
fundamental fault lines between age groups in Russian society. According to
this argument, telephone voters tend to be older viewers, online voters are
more likely to belong to the younger generation, and the studio audience
would largely be of working age. The latter group, then, would be more lib-
erally inclined, while the older and younger generations, it is argued, tend to
have a more positive stance on the Soviet past. This claim, again, appears to
be conﬁrmed a poll conducted by Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie that is cited
on the show. When asked a similar question about the outcomes of the Bol-
shevik takeover, the responses, when split into age brackets, show that the
oldest age group views its impact positively. The age group of 40-to-50-year-
olds interprets the Bolshevik legacy negatively, while the younger generation
(including the ‘Putin generation’) is undecided.
The latter outcome has important implications pertaining to the state’s
eﬃcacy in employing memory politics in support of its legitimacy. It means
that the polarisation of society on matters of history along political lines, as
the show’s voting patterns appeared to indicate and which all the experts
featured on the show agreed to be the case, had at that time not yet taken
root among the younger generation. On the one hand, the undecidedness of
this generation can be taken as a positive sign with regard to the possibility
that a truly diverse public debate may develop in Russia (in other words,
that a functioning civil society will emerge and evolve). That the largest
anti-governmental protests in recent Russian history took place not long
afterwards aﬃrms this potential. On the other hand, however, it also points
towards the existence of a very large group whose opinions could still be
shaped. The regime’s emphasis on patriotic education demonstrates its
recognition that its potential to inﬂuence views on history and, by extension,
politics, was greatest within this group. With the beneﬁt of hindsight, we now
know that the balance shifted in favour of increased polarisation rather than
increased diversity of public discourse.
Finally, the special broadcast highlights the role played by media, and in
particular television, in shaping the political views of their audiences. Some of
the guests point out that the diﬀerence between the studio and home audi-
ences may be connected to the audience members voting at the end of the
programme – that is, after they have listened to the debate in its entirety;
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viewers at home (could have) started voting as soon as the show begins.
Therefore, they assert, the home vote is more likely to be based on pre-
determined preferences instead of a careful consideration of the arguments.
In other words, the viewer’s opinion depends on the host they identify
most strongly with. Indeed, as is evident from the vote count shown on
screen, viewers started voting even before the topic was introduced. The
large majority of these votes were in support of Kurginian. Here it is
worth recalling that in the case of The Name Is Russia (discussed in
chapter 4), the popularity of the representatives also appeared to have
been a signiﬁcant factor inﬂuencing the voting results. Irina Petrovskaia, a
television critic, argues that this eﬀect was exacerbated by diﬀerences in
presentation style. Kurginian’s expressive debating method, she claims,
appeals to viewers more strongly than Mlechin’s more rational appearance
of composure.
Sergei Kurginian operates in the style of a soapbox orator, of a rally type
of person, who is more likely to appear at rallies or on squares with the
corresponding use of all such methods. He often shouts; he gets wound
up. I once saw a show where he promised to hit one of his opponents in
the face. This is a highly advantageous position and is almost always
happily accepted by the majority of our population. Because, perhaps,
people often do not even hear what they are saying. This aesthetics is
near to them; this manner of behaving is near to them.
The actual argumentation, then, is only of secondary importance. That
Mlechin was no match for the propagandistic style of argumentation in
which Kurginian excels, even on a show broadcast by a liberal TV channel,
corroborates this conclusion.
Cancellation and reappearance
Notwithstanding the intensity of the debate just described, the format of The
Trial of Time remained unchanged up until the talk show was cancelled at the
end of the year. According to the oﬃcial account, The Trial of Time fell
victim to Channel Five’s management takeover and subsequent rebranding.
The channel’s general director, Arkadii Solov’ev, was replaced by Aleksei
Brodskii, who was brought in from Channel One.1 The apparent reason for
the change in management was the channel’s continued proﬁtability issues
(‘“Piatyi kanal” vozglavil top-menedzher “Pervogo”’ 2010). Here it is worth
mentioning that NMG, Channel Five’s majority shareholder, also holds 25
per cent of the shares of Channel One.2 The Trial of Time was indeed not the
only show to get the axe. The show Oil Painting (Kartina maslom), hosted by
the outspoken public intellectual Dmitrii Bykov, for example, suﬀered the
same fate, as did journalist Svetlana Sorokina’s Program Guide (Programma
peredach). Nikonova was dismissed and the shows she produced were
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terminated. This production and others were part of a brand-new slate of
programming that had been launched only months before in March 2010.3
Sorokina dismissed allegations that the decision to terminate her programme
was politically motivated (Bocharova & Bacharev 2011). The change in
management simply coincided with the decision not to prolong her contract,
which, she stated, was a mutual agreement: ‘My programme was not political
but a retro programme. They (the new management) are now considering
what they want to do with the channel. Why would they automatically prolong
the contract?’ (Bocharova & Bacharev 2011).
While the termination of individual shows may, indeed, have been eco-
nomically rather than politically motivated, the managerial ‘takeover’ appears
in equal measure to have been directly related to Channel Five’s content. In
fact, there is suﬃcient reason to believe that the takeover aimed to bring the
channel in line with state interests. According to Svanidze, for example, the
‘actual director’ of the channel is Konstantin Ernst, the general director of
Channel One, who through the rebranding sought to leave his mark
(pocherk) on it (Bocharova & Bacharev 2011). A source cited by Gazeta.ru
as a ‘manager close to the channel’ directly links the channel’s liberal proﬁle
to the takeover:
The new management has its ideas about what would be great and is
realising them. Now they decided to change the system. Above all, taking
into account the production capacities and resources of Channel One.
The last year was a continuation of what the team of Troepol’skii (the
previous channel director) found there; the channel was intelligent,
informative, with a Petersburg touch. It focused on history, reﬂection,
[and] discussion; ‘living history’ became its main hero. But now ‘Golden
gramophones’ and ‘Old songs about the main thing’ made their
appearance there.
(Ibid.)
The latter title refers to a series of popular music shows, developed by Ernst,
that capitalised on nostalgia for the Soviet era. That these programmes, which
were originally commissioned by Channel One, were now broadcast as reruns
on Channel Five raises questions since there was no oﬃcial association
between the two channels at the time. Another source associated with NMG
is quoted as saying that the ‘most important criteria’ in the decision-making
process were ‘not business, not the media, but the relation to those in power
[sviaz’ s vlast’iu] and the desire not to oﬀend anyone’ (Bocharova & Bacharev
2011). In an article with the telling name ‘Channel No. 5: The New Fragrance
from Konstantin Ernst’, Marina Naumova directly links the rebranding to
Channel One’s general director.
Such a replacement [of management, M.W.] is explained by interlocutors
of Slon.ru in unanimous fashion: the government has given Ernst the task
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to turn Channel Five into a political instrument; Ernst will now work on
this part-time, without detracting from [Channel] One.
(Naumova 2011)
Sources cited by Delovoi Peterburg likewise claim that Channel One’s top
management was directly involved in the management change and rebranding
at Channel Five (“‘Piatyi kanal’ vozglavil top-menedzher ‘Pervogo’” 2010).
Set against the background of the alleged direct involvement of Channel
One’s management in Channel Five’s overhaul, the reappearance of The Trial
of Time on Channel One as The Historical Trial (Istoricheskii protsess) from
August 2011 to June 2012 appears to support this claim. It also gives rise to
two possible scenarios to explore. The ﬁrst scenario would be the (political)
approval of the show and its transfer to Channel One, despite the pro-
gramme’s ‘liberal roots’, in order to save it. The second possible scenario
would involve the recognition of the format’s potential to engage the general
audience (that is, to serve as ‘a political instrument’) as the motivating factor
behind its renewal. The nature and extent of changes to the format, which I
will discuss shortly, appear to support the latter scenario.
The new project was again produced by Nikonova. Having worked for
Channel Five for less than a year, she thus returned to Channel One, where she
had previously been director of the studio for special projects (‘Natal’ia Niko-
nova s “Pervogo kanala” stala general’nym prodiuserom “Piatogo”’ 2009).
While instantly recognisable as the continuation of the original, The Historical
Trial adopted a format that was diﬀerent from that of its predecessor in two
respects. First, one of the original hosts, Leonid Mlechin, did not return to the
show.4 His role was taken up by Svanidze. In the new set-up, Svanidze and
Kurginian went head-to-head without a judge or host serving as an inter-
mediary.5 Second, the topics under discussion were formulated more broadly and
explored diachronically. Instead of discussing a single event or historical ﬁgure,
the show scrutinised a given phenomenon or issue as it had appeared throughout
Russian history. For example, ‘Legal security: from the Stalinist exceptional
troika’s to the Magnitskii case’; ‘Political prisoners: from the Decembrists of
Senate Square to the ‘Decembrists’ of Bolotnaia’; and ‘The state and private life:
from the Soviet law on homosexuality to today’s anti-gay law’. As a result,
the links to contemporary political and social problems were reinforced. The
change of broadcast channel and alterations to the format had little eﬀect on the
viewers’ voting; the home audience continued to side with Kurginian.6
What direct eﬀect was exerted by the move to Channel One on the topics
the show touched upon is a complicated matter. For example, The Historical
Trial did not avoid politically sensitive issues. Its fourth episode, for
instance, on the accumulation of capital, directly addressed the Iukos case
and the trial of Mikhail Khodorkovskii. In fact, whereas The Trial of Time
remained ﬁrmly embedded in historical examination, its successor moved
signiﬁcantly closer to current aﬀairs. Television critic Irina Petrovskaia
noted the following:
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History is absolutely a pretext to discuss current issues. And the show
about Khodorkovskii, in particular, showed that they only use it as a
springboard and subsequently the conversation is absolutely about what’s
contemporary and current. This is very important, because even on
shows that regularly claim to be about themes that are either social or
close to the political this is not the case. They do not manage to [address
current aﬀairs, M.W.] exactly because, clearly, there are a lot of these
barriers, [dictating] what is not allowed, where you cannot go. But in this
case I have the feeling that in the process of this discussion people are still
relatively free and apparently even the editorial scissors do not mangle it
much. Otherwise this would have been obvious and noticeable to all.
(Larina 2011)
How, then, should we interpret the fact that the Khodorkovskii case – talk of
which had long been taboo on state television – could be openly discussed on
the show? Petrovskaia suggests that it would be mistaken to take the discus-
sion of Khodorkovskii, while remarkable, as proof of a loosening in policy; it
is unlikely that it resulted from a desire to contribute to public opinion about
the man or the case. Rather, she argues, it shows that Khodorkovskii was no
longer seen as a threat. By allowing the case to be discussed, the channel
accommodated a (liberally oriented) minority in society concerned with
human rights. Kseniia Larina, journalist for Ekho Moskvy, places the Kho-
dorkovskii discussion in the context of the other little-discussed topics
addressed on The Historical Process. She makes an important and, I would
argue, largely correct observation about the show’s political orientation:
I believe there is also some kind of rather primitive hidden intent behind
this. To once again demonstrate to the public and our leaders that the
liberal share of our population is negligible. That it is unnecessary to fear
them; that it is unnecessary to worry about this. The people are on the
other side; the people are on the side of Kurginian and his companions. I
believe that, among other things, the program was supposed to demon-
strate this. You have the negligible numbers siding with Svanidze and
those who can say something in defence of Khodorkovskii; and on the
other side you have this people’s tribune, the mouthpiece of public anger,
that is designed to once again deliver a crushing blow to liberalism and
these derelicts.
(Larina 2011)
The ‘hidden intent’ signalled by Larina is diﬃcult to prove. Yet I think that
the explanation for the continuation of the show can indeed be found in the
particular way it functioned as a platform for political debate. Despite its
origins at ‘liberal’ Channel Five – which, it appears, was rebranded partly as
a result of political concerns – the format allowed proponents of liberal and
conservative views to clash with each other in a controlled environment. In this
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way it could contribute to developing the appearance of open discussion on
Channel One and to enhancing the ‘democratic image’ of Russian state tele-
vision in general. Since the voting results consistently demonstrated that the
home audience sided with the conservative standpoints put forward by Kur-
ginian, this was a safe bet. Moreover, the changes in format reinforced Kur-
ginian’s dominance on the show. With the departure of Mlechin, the
programme’s truly liberal face disappeared. Also, the lack of a judge to
organise the ﬂow of the discussion meant that greater preparatory coordina-
tion among the hosts was necessary, thus stiﬂing the spontaneity of discus-
sion. More importantly, it gave the expressive and emotional Kurginian even
more opportunity to display his showmanship. With no judge to restrain him
when emotions ran sky high and no one enforcing limits on speaking time,
Kurginian was given pretty much free rein. Protracting his own pleas as long
as possible, objecting visibly and vocally to the arguments of the opposing
party and making interjections at every turn, Kurginian clearly ran the show.
One could ask whether the programme’s alterations in his favour were even
necessary, since, as soon as the show’s opening titles ran, the telephone voting
count shown on the screen started to climb frantically in support of his posi-
tion. The talk show, as a controllable simulation of genuine public debate,
was perfectly suited to support the state’s memory politics.
Notes
1 At Channel One, Brodskii served as the vice-director of informational programs.
2 The remaining shareholders around that time were the Russian state (combined
51%) and OOO ‘ORT-kb’ (24%). Data concerns 2012, accessed via INTEGRUM
Business database. Both NGM (named OOO ‘Rastr-Kom-2002’ as shareholder) and
OOO ‘ORT-kb’ are connected to Roman Abramovich (total share of 49%).
3 General director Aleksandr Rodnianskii, brought in from STS-Media in 2009, was
in charge of the change in programming. His eﬀorts to improve the performance of
the channel followed substantive rebranding attempts that had been carried through
by his predecessors Vladimir Troepol’skii (brought in from VGTRK in 2008) and
Marina Fokina in 2004. For a discussion of the programs mentioned here and,
more broadly, the new image of Channel Five they were thought to introduce, see
Kachkaeva (2010).
4 In media reports it is suggested that Mlechin’s participation in the show was pre-
cluded by his position as one of the faces of the channel TV Tsentr.
5 Kurginian was later replaced by Dmitrii Kiselev.
6 The Levada Centre conducted an opinion poll about the show among 1600
respondents in 45 regions of the country. The poll showed that 6 per cent of the
respondents watched The Historical Trial regularly, while 20 per cent tuned in
occasionally and 73 per cent never watched the show. When asked which side they
supported most, 22 per cent answered Kurginian and 33 per cent Svanidze, while 20
per cent supported both in equal measure, 14 per cent answered ‘neither side’ and
10 per cent found it diﬃcult to answer (Levada Centre 2011).
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8 Conclusion
Let us return to where this story began: in the Alexander Gardens. In addi-
tion to the restored Romanov memorial obelisk, there have been two more
additions to this well-tended garden of state symbolism. Combined, the three
monuments constitute the ﬁnal aﬃrmation and closing act of the regime’s
memory politics as it developed between 2000 and 2012. The ﬁrst is a statue
to commemorate Patriarch Germogen, who died as a martyr in 1612 and is
often thought to have inspired the people’s uprising that brought an end to
the Time of Troubles. The statue’s history, like that of the obelisk, reveals
much about the constant struggle over political symbolism in Russia. Twice,
initiatives to erect a monument to Patriarch Germogen failed: ﬁrst in the
1810s, in the wake of the war against Napoleon, when the statue of Minin
and Pozharskii was erected in reference to the events of the seventeenth cen-
tury, and later in the period around the time of Germogen’s canonisation by
the Russian Orthodox Church in 1913. In the latter case a competition was
held to design the statue but the realisation of the monument was prevented
by the advent of war in 1914. The initiative for the current statue was taken in
2008 as memory politics peaked and the objectives of the ROC aligned with
those of the state. In 2012, the Year of Russian History, Patriarch Kirill laid
the foundation stone; the bronze sculpture was unveiled in 2013.
The second addition to the Gardens is a statue of Tsar Aleksandr I,
already brieﬂy mentioned in chapter 5, erected in 2014 in commemoration
of the 200th anniversary of the victory over Napoleon – in itself, a pecu-
liar afterthought to the state’s elaborate celebrations that had marked that
occasion a mere two years earlier. The bronze bas-reliefs that are mounted
on a separate monument across from the statue of the tsar are a clear
attempt to cover up the apparent inconsistency of celebrating a similar
anniversary in nearly consecutive years: they show the 1812 battles of
Borodino and Berezina, the 1813 Battle of Leipzig and the tsar’s trium-
phal entry into Paris in 1814. The primacy of the two cultural memories –
the end of the Time of Troubles and the victory over Napoleon – was thus
symbolically aﬃrmed. The casting in bronze of these dominant narrative
lines of memory politics also marks a turning point. In response to Putin’s
return to the presidency and, more importantly, the conﬂict in Ukraine
and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, both the tenor and the
images of the state’s engagement with history have started to shift. The
case studies examined here have revealed some of the origins of this ‘con-
servative turn’ in Russian politics since 2012 (Makarychev & Yatsyk 2014)
as well as of the strands of contemporary Eurasian thought – aptly char-
acterised by Dina Khapaeva as ‘post-Soviet neo-medievalism’ (Khapaeva
2016) – that inform it. In fact, the monument to Tsar Aleksandr I – who,
after a brief infatuation with liberalism, was a markedly conservative
ruler – also marks the deﬁnitive end of the pseudo-liberal discourse under
Medvedev and the return of a strong hand to the Kremlin.
As in a historical ﬁlm based on a true story, this study can only conclude
by summarising how its protagonists have fared after 2012. Also, before
turning to my main conclusions, I must oﬀer some brief remarks on the
impact of the recent dramatic (geo)political developments on the political use
of cultural memory in Russia. With regard to the memory of ‘1612’, the most
signiﬁcant event – the statue of Patriarch Germogen – has already been
mentioned in the introductory paragraphs. The animated ﬁlm The Fortress:
With Shield and Sword (Krepost’: shchitom i mechom, 2015, Dmitriev)
deserves mention since it adapts the Time of Troubles myth to a young audi-
ence. Supported ﬁnancially by Fond Kino, the ﬁlm recounts the adventures of
a young boy who helps defend the city of Smolensk to prevent the advance-
ment of Polish troops to Moscow. While the argument of restored stability,
which the memory of the Time of Troubles served to symbolise, continues to
occupy a central position in the regime’s claim to legitimate power, it now
predominantly takes the form of its negative image. The regime has pressed
on with the shift in the direction of cautionary warnings about ‘revolution’
looming on the horizon and the impending loss of the stability the govern-
ment claims to have achieved, which I signalled in the chapter on Stolypin.
Meanwhile, the concept of (neo-)oprichnina continues to pop up from time
to time in public discourse, in both its cautionary and mobilising capacities.
For instance, upon the announcement that the government was establishing a
National Guard in April 2016, commenters were quick to draw parallels with
Ivan’s oprichnina. The head of the new internal security corps, Viktor Zolo-
tov, was referred to as the contemporary incarnation of Maliuta Skuratov.
The absence of commemorative infrastructure connected to Ivan the Terrible,
described in chapter 6, has since been undone: giving rise to much controversy
and protest, there are now three monuments to Ivan the Terrible on Russian
soil. The ﬁrst, a large bronze statue of Ivan on horseback raising an Orthodox
cross, was unveiled in Orel in 2016. In 2017, two more were erected in
Moscow: a bust of the tsar was included in sculptor Tsereteli’s Alley of Rulers,
where it stands alongside the busts of some forty Russian rulers from Riurik
to Gorbachev, while a full-size statue was placed near the Alley’s entrance. In
an act of protest against the erection of the statue in Orel, an artist in Kansk
erected an ‘alternative’ monument in the form of a ‘wooden stake dripping
with blood-red paint’ (Shamanska 2016).
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In Volgograd, work has begun on the reconstruction of the Aleksandr
Nevskii Cathedral, scheduled for completion in 2020. The six-domed chapel
will closely resemble the original church that was torn down in 1932. The
‘restoration’ has met with signiﬁcant societal resistance and, in a way, the
construction echoes the restoration of the Romanov obelisk. The church was
consecrated only in 1918; the period of its absence following its demolition
now far exceeds the number of years it was actually a recognisable part of
Volgograd’s architecture. Apart from the planned celebration of the 800th
anniversary of Aleksandr Nevskii’s birth in 2021, his role as the principal
‘Orthodox’ national ﬁgure within governmental memory politics appears to
have been taken over by Prince Vladimir. The shift is directly related to the
annexation of Crimea. Indeed, as part of the justiﬁcation of the ‘reintegration’
of the peninsula into the Russian Federation, Russian media have framed the
ancient Crimean city of Khersones, where Vladimir the Great was baptised,
as the cradle of the Orthodox Russian nation. A massive statue of Prince
Vladimir bearing a sword and a cross was unveiled near the Kremlin on 4
November 2016.
Finally, even if Stolypin should have failed to win the hearts of the general
public, the political mobilisation of his memory continues. For instance,
paraphrasing Stolypin, the quote ‘We do not need great upheavals, we need a
great Russia’ was adopted as the slogan of the Anti-Maidan Movement. The
movement, formed in January 2015, was initiated by, among others, the
nationalist writer, politician and inﬂuential blogger Nikolai Starikov and
Aleksandr ‘the Surgeon’ Zaldostanov, the president of the Kremlin-loyal
Russian motorcycle club the Night Wolves. The movement formulates its aim
as the prevention of ‘“colour revolutions”, street riots, chaos and anarchy’
(‘Manifest’ n.d.). The press conference related to its founding, hosted by RIA
Novosti, was covered by all major television stations. A second example is the
exhibition series ‘My History’ that we came across in the case studies and
which has now found a permanent home at the VDNKh complex in Moscow.
It advertises the section covering the period 1917–1945 with the headline
‘From Great Upheavals to a Great Victory’ and features a portrait of Stoly-
pin in its advertisements. A new statue of Stolypin has also appeared, this
time in the city of Cheliabinsk. After being installed on its pedestal in Sep-
tember 2017, the monument, gifted by the Fund for the Study of P.A. Stoly-
pin’s Legacy, stood covered with a cloth for months in anticipation of its
ceremonial unveiling by President Putin during a visit of Kazach President
Nursultan Nazarbaev on 9 November. The ceremony was dropped from the
programme, however, and the statue ﬁnally unveiled in absence of its honorary
guests two weeks later.
A particularly important development, and one which suggests that Stoly-
pin’s name will linger on in coming years, is the establishment of the Stolypin
Club. The group presented its programme ‘The Economics of Growth’ in
October 2015, expressing the aim to become an expert platform on economic
reform for the formulation of the government’s strategy for 2025 (Nikolaeva
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2015). The club includes individuals wielding direct political inﬂuence, such as
Adviser to the President Sergei Glaz’ev. Their weight is such that a commen-
tator for Nezavisimaia Gazeta characterised the discussions in the Presidential
Economic Council regarding the 2025 strategy as a debate between ‘Stolypi-
nites’ and ‘Kudrinites’ – those who side with the vision proposed by Aleksei
Kudrin, former ﬁnance minister and now vice-chairman of the Council
(Bashkatova 2016).
In general, there has been a pronounced intensiﬁcation of memory politics
on the part of the state and state-aligned actors. The opening ceremony of the
Sochi Winter Olympic Games in 2014, as the apex of public diplomacy
during this period, testiﬁes to the regime’s continued eﬀort to place itself
within an extended, uniﬁed historical narrative. As the quintessential event for
the display of a state’s vision of itself to the world, the ceremony focused
squarely on Russian history and its achievements in the cultural sphere.
Directed by Konstantin Ernst, the director of Channel One, the spectacle
reiterated the symbolic continuity of Russian history in broad sweeps of retro-
pop showmanship. It later became known that Ernst had originally planned
to include a minute’s silence in the ceremony to commemorate the Soviet
soldiers who died during the Second World War (Kolesnikov 2014). The sec-
tion of the ceremony would have had members of the audience – that is, sport
fans from all over the world – hold up portraits of fallen Soviet soldiers. This
element had to be cut after the International Olympic Committee objected to
its evident political connotations. The idea indicates how the heightened
attention to history in Russia since 2012 has centred on the memory of the
Second World War. Since 2014, in particular, its public commemoration has
become intertwined with the expression of ‘pro-Putin “patriotic” attitudes’
(Malinova 2017: 46). The Immortal Regiment parade, a relatively new com-
memorative ritual in which individuals carry photographs of relatives who
fought or perished in the war (cf. the plan for the Olympics’ opening cere-
mony mentioned above), is now a core element of Victory Day celebrations.
The movement gained prominence in 2015 when Putin, carrying a placard
with the photograph of his father, headed the parade as it marched across
Red Square (Fedor 2017). The memory of the Second World War also func-
tioned as the primary mnemonic source for framing the conﬂict in Ukraine
by denouncing the Maidan protesters and, later, Ukraine’s new government
as ‘fascist’ (see, e.g., Gaufman 2017: 103–123).
The shrinking of the public sphere and a dramatic increase in restrictions
on the freedom of expression and the freedom of press in recent years mean
that there is now less room for alternative voices in memory politics to be
heard. With regard to the Second World War in particular, the peak in the
political mobilisation of the memory has gone hand in hand with restriction
of public debate on the topic. In a clear break with previous practices, the
state has moved from a reliance on self-censorship to the implementation of
legal measures to curb undesirable interpretations of history. In April 2014,
for instance, the Duma passed a law criminalising the ‘rehabilitation’ of
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Nazism as well as the spreading of ‘false information’ about the conduct of
the Soviet Union during the Second World War.
The importance the Russian government continues to attribute to cinema is
clear from one of the Kremlin’s ﬁrst measures to ‘reintegrate’ Crimea follow-
ing its annexation: to invest in its ﬁlm industry and organise local ﬁlm festi-
vals (‘Russia Will Revive Crimean Film Industry’ 2014). Since the
appointment of Vladimir Medinskii as Minister of Culture in 2012, there has
been an overall increase in government meddling in cinema production. On
the one hand, the state is more outspoken about the types of ﬁlms it seeks to
ﬁnance, and its preferences are more politically motivated than before. For
example, whereas in 2011 the annual call of the Ministry of Culture for ﬁlms
to compete for funding included the rather general theme of ‘ﬁlms of histor-
ical, military and patriotic content, developing a sense of pride in one’s
country’ (Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation 2011), the calls from
2013 to 2016 formulate multiple speciﬁc historical themes. The call for 2015,
for instance, welcomes submissions for ﬁlms on ‘Crimea and Ukraine in the
thousand-year history of the Russian state’ (Ministry of Culture of the Rus-
sian Federation 2015). On the other hand, Medinskii himself harshly criticises
ﬁlms he deems ‘anti-historical’, ‘anti-Russian’ or ‘anti-patriotic’. For example,
he publicly denounced the ﬁlm My Good Hans (Milyi Khans, dorogoi Petr,
2015, Aleksandr Mindadze), about the friendship between a German and a
Soviet man on the eve of the Second World War, and ‘tried (unsuccessfully) to
shut down its funding’ (Muchnik 2015). Foreign ﬁlms thought to present an
‘incorrect’ rendering of history have been banned from Russian cinemas. For
instance, the distribution of Child 44 (2015, Espinosa) was prohibited on
grounds that it was Russophobic. In January 2018, the Ministry of Culture
revoked the distribution license of the British-French comedy The Death of
Stalin (Iannucci, 2017) shortly before its scheduled release for containing
‘extremist materials’. With regard to television, a parallel development has
taken place to obstruct those oppositional media outlets that remain. Most
notably, the oppositional TV station Dozhd’ was targeted for an opinion poll
it conducted about the siege of Leningrad. The poll asked whether the Soviet
Union should have surrendered Leningrad to the German army to save the
lives of the city’s inhabitants. As a result of the political backlash created by
the poll, all major Russian television providers discontinued their broadcasting
of the channel, and Dozhd’ was forced to move online.
The aim of this study has been to look beyond the Kremlin walls and
explore how various groups in Russian society, including the state, have
mobilised cultural memory to legitimise, question or challenge the political
regime and propagate their vision of Russian statehood. In my analysis I have
paid particular attention to: 1) which cultural memories have been employed,
by whom and to what end; and 2) how these actors have drawn upon existing
interpretations and representations of various cultural memories to shape
their contributions to the debate on history and political legitimacy. Based on
the evidence provided by the case studies, the answer to these questions falls
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into four parts. First, the state has quite successfully relied on memories with
rich histories of cultural representation and political instrumentalisation to
portray itself as traditional. The government actively aimed to support and
expand its legitimacy by stimulating the development of a type of patriotism
connected to the state. While this state patriotism is essentially present-oriented,
the historical dimension is vital to its strengthening, showing it to rise above
ideological breakpoints and to emphasise, instead, the unity of the historical
development of the Russian state.
The guiding logic of state-sponsored memory politics in the period 2000–
2012 was to claim the existence of a typically ‘Russian’ type of governance. In
his Address to the Federal Assembly in December 2012, Vladimir Putin, in
fact, literally stated that ‘Russia is characterised by a tradition of a strong
state’ (Putin 2012b). Russian memory politics was shaped, furthermore, by
the purported reclaiming of lost commemorative traditions dating back to
both tsarist and Soviet times. Within this unitary concept of the Russian state,
the regime departed from the premise that Russian history is characterised by,
ﬁrst, cycles of stability and revolution and, second, a continuous threat ema-
nating from groups in society that seek to undermine the stability of the state,
typically supported or guided by external, and in particular Western, forces.
The institutionalisation of the memory of Petr Stolypin forms an exception to
the rule since it could only draw upon cultural representations from recent
years, most notably Stolypin’s inclusion among the ﬁnalists of The Name Is
Russia. The case study in that instance made it evidently clear why this is a
disadvantageous circumstance. Despite substantial symbolic investment on
the part of Vladimir Putin and cultural heavyweight Nikita Mikhalkov, it has
proved diﬃcult beyond certain political circles to counter the negative image
of Stolypin that had been established by Soviet historiography.
Second, I have found that the regime’s memory politics should in some
cases be characterised as reactive rather than proactive – it co-opts existing
societal and cultural initiatives – and that it is adaptive rather than static –
that is, it is continually revised in response to changing (geo)political circum-
stances and domestic needs. All acts involving memory politics by the state,
however, give evidence of the same strategy: to keep popularity ratings up
while also keeping the general public passive. The anti-mobilisational purport
of the political mobilisation of memory has gone hand in hand with an
increasing reliance on conspiracy theories in state-aligned media and other
strategies of inducing fear, uncertainty and overall confusion.
Third, my analyses have shown that the state is far from the only player
involved in the circulation of political claims through historical narratives.
Instead, we can speak of a complex, interactive process of memory negotiation
that takes place on multiple levels – from the state to social and religious orga-
nisations, and from state-aligned and (semi-)independent media to cultural
actors and individuals who have access to public discourse and succeed in gen-
erating national media exposure for themselves. Opposing and alternative voices
existed and continue to exist. For most of the period under discussion in this
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study, these voices could also be heard, albeit mainly through channels outside of
the mainstream. Although the subject of the Soviet past has not been directly
covered in this study, I want to emphasise here that the relative freedom to
express divergent opinions did not apply to eﬀorts to examine and com-
memorate the crimes committed by the Soviet state (e.g. there has been a con-
tinuous obstruction of the work of the human rights group Memorial).
With regard to the representations of the selected memories in state-aligned
television and cinema productions, I have found a considerable measure of
deviation. The variety in interpretations should not be mistaken as a sign of
full authorial freedom, however. Such deviations from the oﬃcial line tend to
be more extreme, conspirational and propagandistic, which has a double
eﬀect and a clear function. First, they suggest a greater measure of authorial
freedom than is actually the case. And second, such sensational and at times
absurd narratives actually make the regime’s uses of history come across as
unassuming and sensible. By allowing these extremes to exist, the government
actually reinforces the credibility of its claims.
Fourth, it is evident from all the case studies that remediation – including
the particular forms of remediation that I have named memory chains and
memory clusters – is both a ubiquitous and highly signiﬁcant element of the
strategies employed in Russian memory politics. In particular, the remediation
of (iconic) visual elements plays a vital role in framing historical analogies
and facilitating the circulation and transfer of preferred interpretations.
Recognisability is key, as it helps to bridge the gap between collective and
individual memory. Therefore, it is fair to argue that the lack of remediation
history is one of the primary reasons why the government’s eﬀorts to sponsor
the memory of Stolypin failed to catch on with the general public. On the
other hand, as I have demonstrated on the basis of the example of Vladimir
Mirzoev’s Boris Godunov, the accumulated meanings of these memories also
greatly increase their potential to be used in politically subversive ways. To
appreciate why this is the case, it is important to remember that memory
politics in many ways resembles mythologisation. If we follow Roland
Barthes’ classic deﬁnition of myth, the aim of mythologisation is to normalise
and eternalise history through simpliﬁcation (Barthes 1973). Remediation,
memory chains and memory clusters interfere with this process of simpliﬁca-
tion. They thus provide access points for formulating historically framed
political critique. As in the example of Boris Godunov, a simple transposition
of memory frames can serve to challenge the oﬃcial line and undercut the
purported naturalness and timelessness of the regime’s mythical claims.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the combination of case studies has also
allowed me to reﬂect speciﬁcally on the relevance of Soviet preconﬁguration.
Already in 2006, Kevin Platt and David Brandenberger made the following
observation:
Many of the watchwords and catch phrases of present-day mythmaking
were last deployed as politically signiﬁcant symbols under Stalin. Today’s
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enthusiasts of the pre-revolutionary past no doubt imagine themselves
reaching back to the roots of the Russian political tradition – to a ‘true’
wellspring of Russian national pride that predates the Soviet era. Yet in
reality, this dialogue with the past – ostensibly conducted ‘over the heads’
of seven decades of Soviet history – borrows heavily from the cultural
norms of the Stalin period. […] Clearly, the Stalinist celebration of the
Russian national past must be seen as an important link in the genealogy
of current nationalist rhetoric.
(Platt & Brandenberger 2006: 8)
My study adds a nuance to this argument by demonstrating that the reap-
propriation of elements of Stalinist propaganda was by no means complete –
for example, the relative absence of Peter the Great – nor was it unproble-
matic. The holiday commemorating the end of the Time of Troubles, for
instance, was soon co-opted by nationalists and steadily lost symbolic ground,
while the memory of Ivan continues to be so volatile that only those on the
margins of the political debate dare employ it.
The case studies have also shed light on the extent to which state-dependent
ﬁlm and television productions about history reiterate state-sponsored lines of
interpretation; in other words, whether it is appropriate to speak of systemic
‘patriotic propaganda’ with regard to this period. I agree with Stephen
Hutchings and Vera Tolz that, despite evident pressure from the government,
state-aligned television demonstrates ‘a level of dialogic exchange which,
although tame by western standards, belies [its] image as a mere purveyor of
Kremlin propaganda’ (Hutchings & Tolz 2015: 4). In an opinion piece for
Vedomosti, Russian journalist Andrei Babitsky has suggested that television
should rather be seen as an ‘open market for patriotic trash than a factory for
propaganda’:
National television creates something like a stock exchange, where dif-
ferent persons and businesses can sell timely patriotic content to the state.
[…] The system is perfectly liberal in its contours: it’s not central plan-
ning, but a stock exchange open to anyone to come sell their goods and
earn a paycheck. […] It’s undeniable that this market’s structure, despite
the high price, has many advantages. The buying and selling all happens
in one place, you don’t have to pay for anything before it’s ready, and
most importantly you don’t need to try all that hard. Because Russian
television deals in price tags, not placards.
(Babitsky 2015)
In other words, the state has ‘outsourced’ part of its patriotism campaign.
While I strongly disagree with Babitsky’s characterisation of this ‘patriotic
market’ as ‘open to anyone’, he is correct to point out how self-interest and
self-censorship have long been suﬃcient means to control the medium,
including its role in memory politics.
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The ﬁlm The Descendants (Nasledniki, Vladimir Khotinenko, 2015) can be
seen as a reﬂection on how the societal system of memory politics I have
described in this study works. The apparent paradox is that, although the ﬁlm
appears to uncover the truth behind the ‘patriotic propaganda machine’, the
production was ﬁnancially supported by the Ministry of Culture and directed
by Kremlin loyalist Vladimir Khotinenko (director of, e.g., 1612). The setting
for the ﬁlm is a TV show about the memory of Sergii of Radonezh, one of the
most venerated saints of the Russian Orthodox Church, who pronounced his
blessing on Dmitrii Donskoi before the fourteenth-century Battle of Kulikovo
Field. Unmistakably modelled on The Name Is Russia and similar pro-
grammes, Khotinenko uses the television format as a microcosmos to explore
the intersection of politics, religion and history in contemporary Russia. The
guests on the show represent the leading actors of memory politics: the state
politician (rumoured to be based on Medinskii), the patriotic publicist,
the Orthodox cleric, the historian, the celebrity (a look-alike of singer Alla
Pugachova) and, of course, the popular television host himself. Two young
brothers in the audience personify the general public at the receiving end of it
all. When the host discovers that his show will be cancelled, he sets out on an
act of sabotage aimed at exposing the truth behind the spectacle of prime-
time patriotism. His plan backﬁres, though, which makes it all the more
painfully clear that, at the end of the day, each of the groups represented on
stage has to resign themselves to the role it has been assigned to play.
The alternative approach to memory politics that I have developed in this
study has demonstrated the importance of non-state actors in memory poli-
tics. Nevertheless, there are a number of related issues that my approach has
not been able to fully address. First, I have taken only modest steps towards
assessing the reception of memory politics in Russia. The impact and eﬀec-
tiveness of the political uses of the past, however, remains an understudied
but vital aspect of memory politics. In addition to assessing the ways that
memory politics aﬀects popular perceptions of governance, further research in
this direction could also shed light on whether state-produced memory nar-
ratives work diﬀerently in this respect to those circulated in the media and/or
as entertainment. Also, such reception studies – employing, for instance, focus
groups – can provide a better understanding of the extent to which certain
(entertainment) genres are more or less likely to aﬀect political preferences, as
well as how state-aligned media take advantage of these diﬀerences.
Second, further research is needed into online memory discourses. The
internet is the most signiﬁcant remaining platform where alternative and
opposing views on memory politics can be expressed. At the same time, the
state increasingly interferes in these online debates and in recent years has
rapidly expanded its body of legislative restrictions on online freedom of
expression. The dynamics of these online memory discourses, how they relate
to oﬄine discourses, who the various actors of online memory politics are and
how they interact with one another: these questions have yet to be addressed
in a satisfactory manner.
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More than twenty-ﬁve years has passed since the Soviet Union ceased to
exist. For the 15 former republics that (re)gained their independence, the col-
lapse of the Soviet state necessitated the rewriting of their respective collective
histories. In retrospect, we can see that, at the same time, it had been precisely
such a critical revisiting of the past that contributed to the Soviet Union’s
demise. Indeed, the experience of Perestroika testiﬁes to how, in authoritarian
states, ‘change often starts when the past is challenged’ (Johnson 2016). For
the Putin regime, having founded its legitimacy on historical narratives, con-
trolling the past has become vital to its survival. In fact, a clear pattern
emerges if we look back on the development of governmental memory poli-
tics since 2000: the intensity of the regime’s eﬀorts in the memory domain
peak whenever it feels that its legitimacy is threatened. It relied on the mobi-
lisation of history to strengthen its position and discredit its opponents fol-
lowing both the wave of colour revolutions of the early 2000s and the Russian
protest movement that developed in response to the rampant electoral fraud
in the Duma elections of December 2011. With the presidential elections of
March 2018 approaching, and the resurfacing of mass street protests in the
year preceding, the state has once again turned to the familiar remedy to
mitigate the perceived political threat: it has intensiﬁed its memory politics,
simultaneously restricting public debate. Evidently, it believes that if the past
cannot be challenged, regime change will also be averted. But the severity of
the legal measures it has now put in place demonstrates that the regime fears
the subversive potential of its citizens more than ever.
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List of interviews
All interviews were conducted in Moscow in the fall and winter of 2014/15.
None of the interviewees requested anonymity. However, I have decided
against identifying them by name to prevent them from encountering any
possible negative consequences from their participation in this study.
Interviewee A
Former editor of video archives for a state television channel
Interviewee B
Video-editor for television productions
Interviewee C
Camera operator for national and regional television
Interviewee D
Independent documentary maker, high-ranking position in an industry repre-
sentational body
Interviewee E
Former governmental advisor on ﬁlm policy and state funding
Interviewee F
Camera operator for national television
Interviewee G
Employee at a major ﬁlm festival
Interviewee H
Documentary producer at a state television channel
Interviewee I
Documentary director at a state television channel
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